The UNSC Resolution 1907 (2009): Contents, Background, and Facts

Resolution 1907 was adopted by the UNSC on December 23, 2009, by a vote of thirteen in favor, with one opposed (Libya) and one abstention (China). According to Libya’s permanent representative to the U.N., “the path adopted in the resolution is not realistic but hasty. Sanctions are not the appropriate means of sorting out the existing problem. Rather it will aggravate the situation prevailing in the Horn of Africa” (Africa News 2009). China’s permanent representative said, “the UN Security Council should act prudently in imposing sanctions, and…the adoption of the resolution on sanctions against Eritrea by the Security Council should not replace diplomatic efforts to resolve disputes through dialogue and negotiations” (China Daily 2009). In the case of both countries, their own negative experiences of sanctions may have influenced their positions (see Wenping Reference Wenping, Cheru and Obi2010:161; U-Jin Ang & Peksen 2007:136).

The UNSC resolution begins with the following statement:

The central elements of the sanctions are an arms embargo, a travel ban, and the freezing of assets. The statement continues,

The UNSC’s claim that Eritrea supports armed groups in Somalia and refuses to withdraw its troops from its borders with Djibouti suggests a number of question, including the following: Why are these accusations not directed to Ethiopia? Let’s examine the first part of the allegations, notably the claim that Eritrea has supported Somali Islamist rebel groups trying to overthrow the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia that is supported by the West. It is noteworthy that these accusations had in fact been watered down. According to the U.N. representative to Somalia, Ahmed Ould-Abdallah, the evidence from a 2006 report of the U.N. Monitoring Group on Somalia (MGS) that constituted the basis of future accusations was judged “not conclusive” by the UNSC. The MSG report, which was compiled pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1676 (2006), stated that in 2006 at least twenty-eight separate consignments of arms, ammunition, and military equipment had been delivered by Eritrea to Islamist groups in Somalia. Eritrea was also believed to have provided troops and training to the Islamic Court Union (ICU). According to the report,

Such details about the orderly consignment of weapons and ammunition, including the exact dates and precise amounts, give the impression that hard evidence was collected. The MGS, however, did not provide any documents supporting these claims, raising the question of the credibility of their sources and informants. The MGS had been criticized in the past for compiling reports on the basis of flimsy evidence. Mark Bowden, an official at the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), was quoted as saying that its report on the diverting of WFP’s Somalia food aid “was based on ‘hearsay’ and not backed up by any documentary evidence” (BBC News 2010). The same criticism could be made about the report on Eritrea’s supplying of armaments to the ICU. It should be mentioned that a later (2011) report from the successor to the MSG, the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea (MGSE), similarly was based on information collected from anonymous informants that could not be verified in an open and transparent manner.^{Footnote 1} Nevertheless, the UNSC, rather than questioning the evidence outright, merely diluted the content of its report, accusing Eritrea not of arming, training, and participating in the rebellion, but rather of providing political, economic, and logistical support to the Islamists.

Some historical background is in order here. The power struggle between the ICU and the Western-supported warlords of the TFG had reached its zenith in June 2006 when the ICU vanquished the TFG and took control of Mogadishu. In an attempt to halt the expansion of the ICU, the TGF was then reconfigured, with financial and military support from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), as the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (Marchal Reference Marchal2007:4; Lyons 2007:176). Nevertheless, within a few months the ICU controlled not only Mogadishu, but also most of southern and central Somalia. The success of the ICU led to the invasion of Somalia by Ethiopia in December 2006. It was widely believed that what motivated Ethiopia was not only the threat posed by the ICU, but also the fact of Eritrea’s siding with the ICU (Wrong Reference Wrong2007a). Analysts contended that the unresolved conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia was actually being played out in a proxy war in Somalia (Wrong Reference Wrong2007b; ICG 2008; Healy & Plaut Reference Healy and Plaut2007).

The defeated ICU fled to Asmara, Eritrea, and in September 2007 formed the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) (Lyons Reference Lyons2009:174). Soon, however, a split took place within the ARS, as a result of which two groups, known as the “Asmara” group and the “Djibouti” group, emerged. The Djibouti faction, led by Sheikh Sharif Sheikh, signed an agreement with the TFG in June 2008 (Lyons Reference Lyons2009:174) and assumed the presidency. At that point, many of those who had fled Somalia and found sanctuary in Eritrea began to accuse their former friend of supplying arms to their enemy, Al Shebab. Pursuant to its eventual (2011) invasion of Somalia, Kenya alleged that three planes carrying weapons from Eritrea had landed in the Al Shebab-controlled Somali town of Baidoa. Kenya reported Eritrea to the UNSC, while Eritrea filed a counterclaim of defamation against Kenya. The Ethiopian-led IGAD also accused Eritrea of arming terrorists and asked the UNSC to take action. Later, however, the MGSE found out that Eritrea had not supplied Al Shebab with weapons: “SEMG’s preliminary assessment is that these reports were incorrect and the alleged deliveries to Baidoa probably did not take place” (Daily Nation 2012).

There are certain circumstances that effectively impede Eritrea’s ability to provide meaningful material support to the rebels in Somalia. Eritrea does not share a border with Somalia. This means that from a practical perspective it would be very difficult for Eritrea to smuggle weapons into Somalia. In addition, the region is subjected to tight international surveillance and control that makes it extremely difficult for small players to operate with impunity (see Bereketeab Reference Bereketeab and Reid2009:123). Because of the threat of piracy and the so-called war on terror, the Horn of Africa (Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti) is currently the most militarized region in the world, with French, American, German, Dutch, Spanish, Chinese, Russian, and Japanese military forces all operating in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean.

The Eritrean government is on record as stating that on the basis of principle, it is willing to provide political, moral and diplomatic support to the resistance movement in Somalia. It has also repeatedly stated its opposition to the intervention of Ethiopia and the U.S. in the internal affairs of Somalia and has maintained that the Somalis are capable of resolving their internal problems on their own. It has also refused to recognize the reconstituted TFG pursuant to the Djibouti agreement of June 2008. Undoubtedly the Eritrean government’s statement of moral, political, and diplomatic support for the opposition in Somalia was imprudent; it has been construed as defiance toward the international community, which has labeled the dissidents as outlaws and terrorists (Wrong 2011). Nevertheless, the Eritrean government strongly denies supplying weapons to the resistance.

The Conflict with Djibouti

The second justification for the imposing of sanctions on Eritrea is its border dispute with Djibouti. Due to unclear border lines between the two nations, Djibouti‒Eritrea relations have been characterized by intermittent flare-ups; according to the 2008 report of the fact-finding mission of the European Parliament Committee on Development (EPCD), as long as the border remains unclearly demarcated it will be difficult to make sense of the claims and counterclaims. However, the commission also acknowledged the role played by regional politics in the Djibouti‒Eritrea conflict. The first episode was in 1996 (Sudan Tribune 2008), when Djibouti claimed that Eritrea had produced a map that incorporated Djiboutian territory and Eritrea responded angrily, saying that it was all a misunderstanding. A similar a dispute occurred in 1999 (see Woodward Reference Woodward2003:131).

In April 2008, Djibouti accused Eritrea of amassing armies on the common border and of occupying Djiboutian territory. Eritrea strongly refuted the accusations and also charged that foreign forces were behind the campaign. In an interview with the French newspaper Le Monde on May 19, 2008, the Eritrean president asserted that the accusations were pure fiction and that the campaigns were being directed by forces outside Djibouti with the goal of destabilizing the region.

It appears, in fact, that Eritrean forces had indeed been moved to the border area, although a number of circumstances would explain this action. These include the movement of the Ethiopian army to the border of the three countries at Mount Ali Mousa (EPCD 2008:3) as well as (unconfirmed) reports of U.S. intelligence activities around Ras Doumeira. All this might have contributed to what Eritrea perceived as an imminent Ethiopian invasion.

The Djibouti‒Eritrea confrontation had both regional and international dimensions. Djibouti is an important ally of France, the U.S., and Ethiopia and can count on the support of these powers. The EPCD (2008:3) noted that “France, which has a military base and a defense agreement with Djibouti, has come in with logistical and military support. It has to be assumed that Ethiopia would also get involved on the side of Djibouti should the conflict escalate further, as Ethiopia depends on Djibouti to access the sea.” Indeed, Ethiopia was on the record as saying that it was “prepared to secure its vital trade corridor with the Red Sea port of Djibouti in the event of any conflict between Djibouti and Eritrea” (Sudan Tribune 2008). As a result of the conflict, Djibouti was able to boost its warfare capacity with modern weaponry, tanks, aircrafts, and armored vehicles supplied by France.

The military confrontation between the two countries in June 2008 led to several casualties (Lyons Reference Lyons2009:177), including the deaths of a dozen Djiboutian soldiers (Reuters 2010). According to the EPCD (2008:3), “violence escalated at the border between Eritrea and Djibouti in Ras Doumeira, which resulted in 35 fatalities and dozens wounded.” The Djiboutian version of the story was that the fighting had started after Eritrean deserters crossed the border into Djibouti and Eritrea had demanded their return. When Djibouti failed to respond to an Eritrean ultimatum, Djibouti soldiers were attacked “during prayer times” (EPCD 2008:3).

Worldwide Demonstrations by Eritreans

Eritreans reacted to the sanctions immediately, and with strong indignation. A press release issued on December 23, 2009, by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs called the resolution “shameful” and asserted that “this brazen act is neither based on fact nor on the provision of international law. It constitutes a travesty of justice and amplifies the dangers inherent in a unipolar world.” It also implicated the United States in the action.

The sanctions seem to have resuscitated in the Eritrean psyche a deeply seated image-ghost—one that has been haunting them for the last sixty years or so and is connected to a chain of misdeeds, actions, and inactions on the part of the international community (the U.S., U.K., and U.N.). First was the forced federation with Ethiopia in 1952, which Eritreans believe was mostly designed to serve the strategic interests of the U.S. (see Wrong Reference Wrong2007a; E-SMART 2010). Then came the international community’s silence when the U.N.-sponsored federation was arbitrarily abrogated by Ethiopia in spite of the fact that the U.N. was responsible for safeguarding it (see Habte Selassie 1989; Yohannes Reference Yohannes1991; Gebre-Medhin 1989; Iyob Reference Iyob1995; Bereketeab Reference Bereketeab2007). The thirty-year independence struggle was also met with absolute silence by the U.N. and the big powers, as was Ethiopia’s rejection, in defiance of UNSC resolutions, of the April 2002 verdict of the EEBC and the PCA on the border issue (see Lauterpacht Reference Lauterpacht2006; UNSC 2008). Many scholars and observers have stressed that the Eritrea‒Ethiopia conflict is at the center of the discord in the Horn of Africa. Resolving this conflict will certainly facilitate considerably the resolution of the other conflicts (see ICG 2007, 2008; Reid Reference Reid2009; Bereketeab Reference Bereketeab and Reid2009; Lyons Reference Lyons2009), and yet the UNSC has shied away from pressuring Ethiopia to implement the verdict.

Thus for the Eritreans, Resolution 1907 was the latest insult in a long history of Western persecution and represented an affront to the hard work and sacrifices involved in the struggle for independence. Many Eritreans see the sanctions as targeting the Eritrean nation and Eritrean sovereignty (see AGE 2010; ITFE 2010b; E-SMART 2010). In 2010 an Eritrean diaspora group called the Action Group for Eritrea (AGE) began to organize under the banner “Say No to Sanctions Against Eritrea” (AGE 2010). Another diaspora group that calls itself the International Task Force on Eritrea (ITFE) defines its aims as “bringing their case to the attention of the International Court of Justice in the Hague to demand the immediate invalidation of the illegal sanctions against Eritrea” (2010a). In announcing its intention of initiating legal action, the ITFE is implicitly defining the action of the UNSC as illegal. The campaign against the sanctions has also been waged by diaspora radio stations such as one in Halifax, Canada.

On February 22, 2010, Eritreans from fourteen European countries converged in Geneva. Members of diaspora communities in Australia and New Zealand converged in Cambra, and Eritreans residing in the U.S. converged in Washington, D.C., and San Francesco. The slogans and banners the demonstrators carried included:

It is important to note, however, that not all diaspora Eritreans supported the demonstrations. In fact, some Eritreans who oppose the government actively supported the sanctions, which have therefore been very divisive and damaging to Eritrean unity in the diaspora.

Intensification of the War of Words between the U.S. and Eritrea

Since the failure of implementation of the April 2002 verdict of the Eritrea‒Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) and the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) (which established the EEBC and tasked it with demarcating and delineating the border), Eritrea‒U.S. relations have deteriorated. Eritrea was convinced that it was the U.S. administration’s complacency that encouraged Ethiopia to reject the final and binding verdict. Washington had been a close friend of both Eritrea and Ethiopia until the outbreak of the second Eritrea‒Ethiopia war (1998‒2000), when it increasingly favored Ethiopia for geostrategic reasons (see Connell Reference Connell and Reid2009; Mengisteab Reference Mengisteab and Reid2009:63‒64). In order to appease Ethiopia the Bush administration, instead of taking a firm stand on the EEBC border verdict, attempted to persuade the leaders to initiate bilateral dialogue to resolve the stalemate (see Wrong Reference Wrong2007b; Bereketeab Reference Bereketeab and Reid2009). This further muddied the U.S.‒Eritrea relations. Following the events of September 11, 2001, and the initiation of the so-called war on terror, Ethiopia became an even more important ally of the U.S.

The more the U.S. tended to appease Ethiopia, the more Eritrea’s frustration grew. Eritrea began to intentionally and persistently campaign against the U.S., provocatively allying itself with countries traditionally considered to be hostile to the Americans such as Libya, Iran, China, and Cuba. This rather increased resentment of the U.S. administration, which actively labored to isolate the Eritrean government (see Connell Reference Connell and Reid2009).

With the aim of initiating dialogue, Washington sent Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jedayi Frazer to the region in 2009. Indeed, Frazer was engaged in what was seen by many as a U.S. attempt to renegotiate the PCA final and binding verdict. However, the Eritrean leaders refused to meet with Frazer, who was notoriously hostile to Eritrea. In August 2007 she had “suggested that Washington was ‘looking into’ whether Eritrea should be added to the state sponsor of terror list” (Lyons Reference Lyons2009:177). On a number of occasions she had also raised the issue of regime change in Asmara, which some understood as giving a green light to Ethiopia to intervene (Woldemariam & Yohannes 2007). According to John Bolton, she intended to “reopen the 2002 EEBC decision, which she had concluded was wrong, and award a major piece of disputed territory to Ethiopia” (2007:347). In 2009, in what many considered a vindictive response to Asmara’s rebuff, Frazer visited Badme, the flashpoint of the conflict on the Ethiopian side and in breach of the EEBC verdict proposed a referendum to determine the town’s future (see Woldemariam & Yohannes 2007).

On the day that Eritreans were staging worldwide demonstrations, the U.S. Embassy in Asmara issued a statement accusing Eritrea “of working to destabilize the Horn of Africa region” (Reuters 2009), of posing a threat to international security, and of contributing to a dire humanitarian crisis.^{Footnote 2} To many the timing of the statement was suspect, suggesting that it was intended to divert public attention from the demonstrations. The war of words continued to escalate, and on March 2, 2010, the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Consular Affairs issued a travel warning in regard to Eritrea. Particularly interesting was the travel warning’s mention of heightened border tensions:

In fact, there had been no reports of skirmishes between the two troops in the period mentioned, and “large numbers of Eritrean and Ethiopian troops” had been present along the border for the previous ten years. An Eritrean opposition group operating from Ethiopia had issued a statement on January 1, 2010, saying that it had attacked the Eritrean Defence Force in areas close to the Ethiopian border and that they had killed and wounded several Eritrean soldiers, but Ethiopia and Eritrea told contradictory stories about the alleged incident. Eritrea maintained that the attackers were Ethiopians who had been repulsed, and Ethiopia denied that any such incident had taken place between its troops and Eritrean troops. The trading of such accusations has become part of the propaganda war being carried on by the two countries. But what is interesting in this case is that the U.S. seems to have joined in the battle.

It is also interesting that the travel warning advised U.S. citizens to steer clear of demonstrations.

This part of the travel warning was very puzzling. The multicity demonstrations had taken place a month earlier and, moreover, had passed without any incident. Was the U.S. expecting additional demonstrations in the future and therefore attempting to take preemptive action against them? What was even more puzzling was that these demonstrations had taken place in Geneva, Canberra, and the U.S., but this notice was inserted into a travel warning concerning travel to Eritrea. Overall, it could be said that U.S. geostrategic policy played a very destructive role in the implementation of the EEBC verdict.

The Consequences of the Sanctions to Eritrea

The consequences of the sanctions to Eritrea may be very serious and far-reaching. The Security Council maintains that the sanctions target political and military leaders and institutions that actively or tacitly support the Somali rebels. As experiences from other countries demonstrate, however, it is quite often the common people who suffer the most.

The potentially dire consequence of the sanctions to the Eritrean nation and to Eritrean sovereignty should be assessed within the context of the Ethiopian‒Eritrean conflict. Although the Ethiopia‒Eritrea war (1998‒2000) ended with the Algiers Agreement of 2000, there still exists a situation of “no war, no peace” between the two countries (ICG 2008; Healy Reference Healy2008). Ethiopia has repeatedly accused Eritrea of taking measures to remove its government.^{Footnote 3} In light of the unsettled border conflict and consequent tense situation, and of deep-seated resentment of Eritrean independence among the majority of Ethiopians, imposing an arms embargo on Eritrea certainly places Eritrea in an insecure and vulnerable position. Recently Ethiopia has increased its military budget considerably and has also announced that it is purchasing two hundred tanks, worth US$100 million (Sudan Tribune 2011). This has heightened the sense of fear among many Eritreans, who also fear that the sanctions have strengthened Ethiopia’s position.

What is also worth pondering is the efficacy of the sanctions. In general, the effectiveness of sanctions in achieving their targeted objectives is highly questionable (see Galtung Reference Galtung1967; Wallersteen 1968; Elliott Reference Elliott1998). Historical experiences demonstrate that UNSC-imposed sanctions rarely affect the intended leaders of the countries that are targeted, and indeed, it is the common people that tend to suffer economically and in other ways (see Sugrue Reference Sugrue2010).

The sanctions imposed on Eritrea are likely to have a devastating effect on the Eritrean people for a number of reasons. As mentioned, Eritrea is formally in a state of war with Ethiopia. If war breaks out again she may not be able to defend herself. Second, the sanctions will have a devastating effect economically because export and import activities are conducted by business firms that mostly are owned by the ruling party. The sanctions not only affect exports, but also deprive the citizens of such imported items as medical supplies, construction materials, food, and fuel. On June 28, 2011, IGAD, which many see as dominated by Ethiopia, asked the AU and the UNSC to impose additional sanctions on Eritrea, focusing on two vital economic lifelines: the emerging mining industry and the diaspora remittances. An observer notes that “the current efforts, led by Ethiopia, to impose tighter economic sanctions on Eritrea to prevent the exploitation of these resources is a further illustration of economic warfare” (Healy Reference Healy2011:43). This will certainly have dire consequence for Eritrea’s socioeconomic development.

Third, the “no war, no peace” situation is already causing immense suffering. The stringent national service requirements are forcing youth to flee the country. The economy is shattered because of lack of manpower. The personal life of those engaged in the endless national service is disrupted. Political and human rights are severely curtailed. The government will surely use the sanctions to argue that the world is against Eritrea and the youth must remain in the national service to safeguard the survival of the nation. The sanctions will therefore worsen the precarious situation.

Fourth, the sanctions will have a devastating effect on the morale and psychology of the Eritrean people. These are a people who have fought long and hard, who have suffered and sacrificed immensely to get respect and to be recognized as an equal member of the free world. The imposition of sanctions on the very symbol of their struggle, the Eritrean state, can be perceived as an act intended to humiliate them. This could explain the rage that led to the worldwide demonstrations. A morally depressed, psychologically wounded society can easily regress to a state resembling that of Somalia, Sierra Leone, and DRC in their darkest hours.

Fifth, the sanctions will adversely affect the internal unity of Eritrean society. On December 29, 2009, Cornelios Osman, a leader of an ethnically based group called the Democratic Movement for the Liberation of the Eritrean Kunama (DMLEK), was quoted as saying, “This is a good opportunity for us.... We are preparing our military forces to launch more attacks” (AFP 2009). Two other groups, the Red Sea Afar Democratic Organisation and the Eritrea Salvation Front, both based in Ethiopia, also issued a joint statement in which they claimed to have wounded or killed several Eritrean soldiers (Sudan Tribune 2010).^{Footnote 4} The sanctions and their effects could thus lead to the disintegration of the nation, dissecting it into small groups fueled by ethnic and religious entrepreneurs. This will only further weaken state, and a weak state cannot provide security and stability to its people and the outside world.

Sixth, the sanctions could lead to the actual collapse of the Eritrean state. Centrifugal forces, encouraged by the sanctions, are intensifying their attacks. In light of the interstate conflict that is rampant in the region, the sanctions imposed on the Eritrean state expose it to external aggression, with a likely outcome of disintegration. Up until now the Eritrean state has been considered relatively strong, albeit tyrannical. For several years the Failed States Index in its annual report described Eritrea as stronger than many of its neighbors.^{Footnote 5} A crucial question is, then, who benefits from a collapsed Eritrean state or its possible disintegration? The possibility of replicating a Somali scenario in Eritrea should be a concern to the UNSC.

Those who push for the sanctions blame the behavior of the Eritrean government. There is no excuse for the imprudent diplomatic behavior of the Eritrean government or the dismal domestic political situation prevailing in the country. However, there is a connection between internal behaviors and external provocations. One of the external factors that many contend has contributed to the crisis in the country, and which the international community is to be blamed for, is the Eritrea‒Ethiopia conflict. Where is the morality of imposing sanctions on the basis of flimsy evidence or politically motivated accusations while at the same time ignoring a binding PCA verdict?

A resolution of the Eritrea‒Ethiopia conflict would considerably ease the endeavor of resolving the conflicts in the Horn of Africa. But the double standard of the world community and uneven treatment meted out to Eritrea has driven the Eritrean government to the edge. We should now be contemplating, as Wrong (2011) put it, “how double-dealing built a pariah state.”