We “confess” that we often write with China in mind (is there anything wrong with that?). But we do not write exclusively for the Chinese context. We label our approach “rooted global philosophy” (p. 28), meaning that we take one philosophical tradition as a point of departure and freely make use of other traditions if it allows us to make progress. In chapters 1, 4, and 5, we draw on a wide range of intellectual resources to develop arguments for morally justifiable forms of social hierarchies with intimates, animals, and machines, respectively. Professor Kim ignores these chapters, but we mean to engage with readers who share our “progressive conservative” sensibilities both in China and the rest of the world.

Chapters 2 and 3 are more China focused because we try to make moral sense of the hierarchical ideals that drive China’s political system at home and abroad. Our motive is critical: we argue for ideals and suggest ways of reducing the large gap with the reality. Kim seems to think our aim is to defend the status quo.

In chapter 2, we argue that a Chinese-style political meritocracy is justified if the rulers serve the people and the people trust the rulers. As an alternative, Kim invokes the standard that a policy can be legitimate only if it is “objectively good for all who are affected by it.” But any large-scale society cannot come close to meeting such an absurdly demanding standard (with the possible exception of policies meant to protect the right to life, and here China has done exceptionally well at implementing policies meant to contain the coronavirus after the early debacle in Wuhan). Almost all policies are bound to be controversial and to be against the interests of some people.

That said, we agree with Kim that increased pluralism and moral disagreement in China mean that there is a need for more political participation. We do not seek to explain, much less justify, “why the Chinese political system remains undemocratic.” On the contrary, we explicitly argue that “the government needs more input from the people, not just to help decide on priorities, but also to take the heat off when large constituencies are unhappy with policies.… In short, democracy is necessary to save political meritocracy in China” (p. 95) That is why we argue for democratic practices such as freedom of speech, local elections, deliberative polling, and open public hearings. But we worry that competitive elections at the top would undermine the advantages of political meritocracy; namely, that leaders with political experience can focus on policy making and take the long-term view. We would love to hear some counterarguments, if there are any.

In chapter 3, we argue that hierarchies between states are inevitable and that they are justified when they serve the interests of both strong and weak states. In the case of East Asia, we argue that the United States has to make room for China, but that China can justifiably (re)establish itself as head of a regional hierarchy only if it acts in the interests of smaller states. Kim asks, “Why would Japan, Vietnam, and South Korea subscribe to this hierarchical order?” But we do ask the question, “How could China regain the trust of its neighbors?” (p. 137). We argue that China can do so only if it sets a good model at home and provides weaker states with economic and security benefits, as well as strives to (re)establish a common culture. Kim can disagree, but we hope that he can engage with our arguments.