Since Alasdair MacIntyre (Reference MacIntyre1984) and David Miller (1983), many authors have argued that patriotism could be regarded as an ethical virtue rather than as a vice. However, defending patriotism is not an easy task, since one possible objection might be that patriotism goes hand in hand with chauvinism which sooner or later degenerates into intolerance against people who don’t belong to the same community. In his seminal article, MacIntyre appealed to the ‘useful distinction’ traced by Hegel between Sittlichkeit and Moralität as a way to present the philosophical dilemma at issue here. For MacIntyre, ‘liberal morality’ alone, resting on rational impartiality, does not account for the richness and concreteness of our everyday ‘ethical life’. How then are these two conflicting principles, the particular ‘principle of nationality’ and the universal principle of humanity, or Sittlichkeit and Moralität, to be reconciled?
In her book, Lydia L. Moland offers a refreshing view on this issue by making use of Hegel’s conceptual tools. Her contribution to the debate around patriotism and nationalism might be summarized in three points. First, she puts into question any form of ‘illiberal nationalism’ (153). Illiberal nationalists always give preference to the welfare of their fellow citizens and claim the absolute superiority of their own culture. She considers Hegel, by contrast, to have developed a ‘liberal’ form of nationalism that sticks to a universal principle of recognition and equal freedom. Second, Moland picks up from Hegel the distinction between patriotism and nationality, a distinction that is often neglected in contemporary debates where those notions mostly appear as synonyms. Patriotism relates to political citizenship in a rational state, whereas nationality refers to the attachments individuals feel towards their culture in terms of landscapes, past history, language, or religion. According to Moland, Hegel understands patriotism and nationality as two complementary dimensions of the modern ‘political identity’ that come together in the very idea of a ‘nation as a state’. Third, Moland maintains that Hegel’s well-known critique of political cosmopolitanism leaves room today for a cosmopolitanism of an ‘ethical’ kind. The latter promotes the state as ‘the best form of political association’ (157) without being blind to the welfare of other people living in other countries.
Patriotism, nationality, and ethical cosmopolitanism are three decisive components of what Moland calls the modern ‘political identity’, i.e., of the way individuals conceive themselves as members of a political community framed by the modern state and its institutions. But how are those components related to each other? Moland’s first approach of that question lies in her discussion of the notion of ‘practical identity’ of which ‘political identity’ is said to be one form. In her introduction, she defends the Hegelian model of an ‘ethical agent’ against the Korsgaardian-Kantian model of a ‘reflexive self‘: ‘[I]nstead of viewing the desires as alien forces that the reflective self needs to control, Hegel suggests that the self becomes truly free through its desires’ (14). Against the ‘monological’ conception inherent in the Korsgaardian-Kantian model, Hegel also insists on the intersubjective aspect of free agency. The Hegelian model of ‘practical identity’ finally defines concrete freedom as ‘the individual’s ability, developed through her interactions with others and within rational institutions, to shape her desires in such a way that she can reflectively endorse them’ (149). Being essential parts of modern political identities, patriotism, nationality, and ethical cosmopolitanism are interrelated in that they together contribute to ‘concrete freedom’ in the Hegelian sense. But what are the specific contributions of each of these components? And is each of them equally important?
Those questions form the very core of Moland’s book. They are treated in chapter 2 (on patriotism), chapter 3 (on nationality), and chapter 6 (on cosmopolitanism). But before turning to these chapters, mention should be made of the challenging way in which Moland approaches the non-political aspects of the concept of political identity. Commentators interested in Hegel’s political philosophy usually focus on the Elements of the Philosophy of Right (PR) and more specifically on the sections devoted to the state. They thus neglect the role played by the non-political in shaping the political. Moland, on the contrary, retraces ‘the sources of political identity’ in the ‘subjective spirit’ part of the Encyclopedia, discussing among other things the ‘anthropology’, which is one of the rare places where Hegel explicitly confronts the problem of a diversity of nations (chapter 1). She also offers an interesting account of ‘political identity and absolute spirit’ in which she nicely shows how art, religion, and philosophy are linked to the question of the ‘nation as a state’ (chapter 5). In chapter 4, the author convincingly argues that we need to take into account Hegel’s theory of history in order to make sense of his political philosophy: the criterion of ‘concrete freedom’ offers an escape to moral relativism, since only those national traditions and states that promote individual freedom are justified from a world-historical perspective.
Chapter 2 begins with a brief history of the notion of patriotism in Hegel’s time. Patriotism primarily referred to a sort of attachment to local groups (patriotische Gesellschaften) that went together with a cosmopolitan perspective. According to Fichte, ‘the German can accordingly be a patriot; only he can, in working for his own nation, also work for all of mankind’ (50). However, during the Napoleonic Wars that ravaged Germany at the start of the nineteenth century, patriotism rapidly lost its ties to cosmopolitanism and became more and more associated with a narrow-minded and emotionally loaded nationalism. As Moland points out, Hegel strongly criticized this shift, especially in his preface to the PR. Against this historical background, Moland then turns to Hegel’s own account of patriotism as an ‘ethical virtue’. It consists for modern citizens in the political disposition (politische Gesinnung) of trusting the state, which thus ceases to be something alien and external to individuals. This disposition is not a mere subjective feeling, but has its objective and true ground in the rational institutions of the modern state. Patriotism provides therefore a mediation between the universality of the state and the particular projects of the citizens, making possible the ‘mutual recognition’ of the state and its citizens. Patriotism accomplishes ‘concrete freedom’ since it promotes the freedom of the individual within the institutional framework of the modern state. However, as Moland puts it, ‘a citizen of a country whose fundamental principles are unjust and unreformable, cannot be a patriot in Hegel’s sense’ (69). This is illustrated by Hegel’s reference to Aristophanes as a ‘real patriot’ who attacked the Athenian democracy of his time precisely because of his attachment to its most fundamental principles. There is obviously a circularity at work here between patriotism in its true form and the rationality of the political institutions that ‘real patriots’ are disposed to support. In Moland’s terms, ‘the state depends on individuals who pursue their interests within the state’s institutions. If these institutions are just, they allow citizens to develop trust that their interests are being promoted in the state’. (61)
Through his account of true patriotism Hegel already takes distance from illiberal or sentimental forms of nationalism that emerged in Europe during his lifetime. Once conceived ‘as a response to rational institutions that promote the individual’s freedom’ (69-70), patriotism cannot be confused with the love of one’s country (Vaterlandsliebe). For Hegel, love is an immediate feeling that should be restricted to the sphere of the family and therefore not interfere with the higher political level of the state. That is why nationalism is not a central issue in the sections of the PR that deal with the state. Even though Moland acknowledges that nationality is almost absent in this work, she nevertheless asserts that ‘defining the place of national identity within political identity was, if we look beyond the Philosophy of Right, one of Hegel’s central concerns’ (76). Taking into account his philosophy of history as well as the sphere of absolute spirit, Moland’s interpretation also relies on a passage from §331 of the PR, where Hegel speaks of ‘the people (Volk) as state’ as ‘the absolute power on earth’. She proposes to translate Volk as ‘nation’ instead of ‘people’, a translation which is in my view contestable. But let me first consider how Moland comes to treat nationality as an essential part of political identity and as an element that contributes to concrete freedom.
Moland gives two arguments why nationality should be seen as a decisive element of modern political identities. On the one hand, nationality responds to the need of individuals to express their cultural identities, mainly through art. On the other hand, nationality offers a mediation between the attachments of individuals to a specific culture and the more universal principles embodied by the rational state such as the recognition of personhood. Considered apart from the state’s institutions, a nation often refers — in Hegel’s view — to an almost natural phenomenon, namely the fact that a number of individuals share the same natural environment and accordingly develop common dispositions, which leads to the formation of local or national spirits (Lokal- oder Nationalgeister). In the addition to §394 of his Encyclopaedia, Hegel shortly discusses the diversity of ‘national spirits’ through the various ‘temperaments’ exhibited by Italians, Frenchmen, and Germans. But since a nation is also part of the realm of spirit, it evolves from something natural into something more reflexive and conscious. The ‘spiritual’ side of a nation is rendered by Hegel with a notion he probably borrowed from his readings of Montesquieu and Herder, namely, the notion of Volksgeist (literally ‘spirit of a people’). Volksgeist, in Moland’s definition, is ‘a relation among people who share a description of who they are, given the history, norms, beliefs, and institutions that define them’ (82). As such, the term refers to the process of reflection carried out by the members of a nation on their ‘natural’ identity, a process that corresponds to the act by which a Volk gives itself a political constitution (Verfassung).
Moland’s definition of Volksgeist helps to understand why the ‘nation as a state’ presents us with ‘the best form of political association’ (157). In her view, the particular principle of nationality and the universal principle of stateness have to be somehow combined in order to achieve the kind of ‘concrete freedom’ Hegel had in mind. A nation must form a state because ‘becoming a state requires members of a nation to reflect on whether their traditions as they exist promote freedom’ (92). This transformation of a nation into a state occurs 1) when the members of a nation are recognized not so much on the basis of their belonging to particular groups, but rather universally as independent persons and 2) when the institutions that frame their ‘ethical life’ are internally differentiated into the family, civil society, and political representation. In return, a state has to be built on a nation if we want to avoid that its rational principles remain something purely formal and abstract. Hegel thus offers us — so Moland — the chance to consider a possible mediation between the particularity of national customs and traditions and the universality of political principles. As she sees it, ‘concrete freedom according to Hegel is best achieved when the individual combines nationality and citizenship into one political identity’ (127).
Moland’s interpretation of Hegel largely rests on her contestable translation of Volk by ‘nation’. The question should at least be raised whether the German term Volk can be translated systematically by ‘nation’ instead of ‘people’, as Moland does. In chapter 5, when she discusses the connection of arts and ‘national spirits’, she quotes a remarkable passage from Hegel’s lectures on aesthetics: the arts in general ‘are more or less national (nationell), connected with the natural side of a nation (eines Volkes)’ (127). In a note referring to this passage, Moland writes: ‘the idea that a Volk can have a “nationell” side […] suggest[s] again that Nation corresponds more to the “natural” aspects of a group, while the Volk is the more developed, self-conscious group’ (199). It is clear then that the German word Volk cannot systematically be translated by ‘nation’ for the same reason that Volk in Hegel’s comprehension of the term cannot be reduced to its mere ‘natural side’. Now, Moland of course appeals to the ‘spiritual’ side of the Volksgeist and to the collective process of self-reflection carried out by members of a national community. But I don’t see how, at least from a Hegelian perspective, this process could take place without the intervention of the modern state and its institutions. For, as soon as nationality becomes the object of a collective self-consciousness called Volksgeist, members of a nation are already engaged in the kind of ‘political disposition’ Hegel defines as ‘patriotism’. Far from being an equally important term that can somehow be combined with political citizenship, nationality is aufgehoben through the spiritualization process of the ‘national-natural’ side of a Volk. This should lead us to the conclusion that, contrary to Moland’s view, Hegel does not consider nationality to play any essential role in the formation of modern political identities. Just as love, its role is a minor and ‘non-political’ one. If modern citizens do have a common ‘political identity’, it is less because of their particular cultural backgrounds (in terms of past history, language, or religion) than because of a shared culture of freedom that finds its true expression in the way they put their everyday trust in the political institutions and in the constitution of the rational state. Hegel sticks to the understanding of ‘patriotism’ such as it was first formulated by the French revolutionaries, before its ‘nationalist’ shift at the beginning of the nineteenth century. In that respect, he is much closer to the position defended today by Jürgen Habermas in terms of ‘constitutional patriotism’ than Moland suggests (cf. 202, note 8).
Moland concedes that ‘there is an obvious tension between the need for rational institutions and the requirement that these institutions grow out of a nation’s tradition’ (87). In the last chapter of the book, this tension increases. Discussing the issue of cosmopolitanism, Moland goes as far as to insist on ‘Hegel’s decoupling of patriotism and national identity’ (160, my emphasis). If we remember Ernest Gellner’s definition of ‘nationalism’ as the idea that ‘political unity’ and ‘national unity’ must be ‘congruent’ (Gellner Reference Gellner1983), we better understand why Moland is suddenly brought to abandon any idea of a ‘combination’ of those two elements. Again, it seems, from a Hegelian perspective, that the modern state does not necessarily have to be grounded on a homogenous national community in order to function properly. Yet Moland’s main aim in chapter 6 consists in advocating an ‘ethical cosmopolitanism’. After recalling Hegel’s critique of ‘political cosmopolitanism’, she adds that ‘for all his talk about the importance of national identity, Hegel believes that the bedrock of ethics is recognition of humans regardless of nationality’ (163). She rightly points out, however, that relying on a universal principle of humanity alone does not suffice from a Hegelian point of view. Using the case of global poverty as an example, she argues that ‘ethical cosmopolitanism’, unlike a merely ‘moral’ one, implies ‘concern for others beyond national borders that recognizes more than their basic humanity: that also addresses, instead, their concrete situation and needs’ (166). Attractive as this kind of cosmopolitanism may sound, I do not see how it escapes the objection of a certain ‘moralism’. A ‘moral-economic sensibility’ (170) to global poverty also needs to rest on an institutional framework if it is to be ‘ethical’ in a Hegelian sense. Moland admittedly gives transnational organizations as an example of institutions that could possibly sustain an ‘ethical cosmopolitanism’. But, taking a closer look at how those organizations effectively work (even the European Union in its actual shape), they still appear to depend on the prevailing form of the nation-state. As for ‘nationality’, doubt could therefore be raised whether an ‘ethical’ form of global citizenship really is part of our modern political identity. It seems rather that ethical cosmopolitanism remains limited to the level of ‘abstract freedom’ (‘all humans ought to be free’) without making the crucial step towards ‘concrete freedom’ (all humans are free within a given institutional framework). Indeed, even if there are several reasons to despair about our international situation, this should not lead us to give up the more realistic and political perspective already endorsed by Hegel. In one of his lectures on the philosophy of right, Hegel claimed that ‘the well-being of everyone is an empty word. Dead people and the future generations must of course be deducted from it. And how could I promote the well-being of the Chinese people?’ (Hegel Reference Hegel1974, my trans.)
A book should be judged by the number of interesting questions it raises rather than by the answers it offers. In that sense, Hegel On Political Identity is very much worth reading, even if the reader might not always be convinced by the way it tackles today’s burning issues of patriotism, nationality, and cosmopolitanism.
