With this book Thomas Allison Kirk tries to answer an interesting question: what kind of relations were possible between small and wealthy states and big powerful ones in an early modern Mediterranean context? In order to deal with this complex subject, he paid his attention to the republic of Genoa. This is not a random selection. In his opinion, this small Italian state is an interesting observation point to outline the evolution of the relationships between the Mediterranean world and the other countries of the old continent in a period of important changes (p. ix). Moreover, although Genoa's maritime history in the early modern age has long attracted the interest of Italian researchers, until now no systematic study has been attempted in English. So this book will be appreciated also by English speaking scholars.
The author analyses the evolution of Genoa's maritime and naval policy during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries together with its foreign policy. These aspects, according to his opinion, are closely related.
The starting point of Kirk's research is 1559 (the same year of the peace of Cateau-Cambresis), when a permanent state body was created, the Magistrato delle Galere, which was responsible for overseeing the state-owned naval force. The ending point is 1684, when the French navy bombarded Genoa for three days and the republic was forced to reduce its warship fleet (which was completely dismantled five years later) in order to preserve its independence. From that moment on, according to Kirk's point of view, there were no relevant changes in Genoese maritime policy until the republic's fall in 1797 (p. x).
Since 1528 the republic had been an ally to Spain, which had protected Genoa and its trade against other European states and African corsairs. In exchange, Genoese bankers provided the Spanish crown with important financial services. During the seventeenth century Spanish supremacy in the western Mediterranean gradually eroded, and Genoa faced this situation by adopting a free port policy. In Kirk's opinion, for the republic, the institution of the free port was an alternative to a strong military presence at sea.
In consequence of those changes, Genoa, which was an important financial hub during the sixteenth century, progressively evolved into a commercial and economic center of little more than regional importance. This was, according to the author's thesis, the price to be paid to preserve its independence (p. 197).
This study is organized into two sections. The first one (chapters 1 and 2) provides a concise (but clear) overview of the history of Genoa through the middle ages and the early modern period, dealing with political, economic, and institutional aspects. In the second part of the book (chapters 3 to 7) the author examines the evolution of the republic's maritime policy, with particular attention not only to the construction of the military fleet, but also to the adoption of incentives to support shipping and maritime trades, such as Genoese's attempt to create a trading company (like those of the Dutch and the English), or the adoption of a free port policy.
This period may be divided into three different phases. The first one is characterized by internal conflict, which ends with the consolidation of the ruling class, and also by the great importance of Genoese bankers in sustaining the Spanish court. During the second phase, Genoa experienced a long period of economic and political withdrawal from Spain. This was followed by different attempts to reinvent Genoa's maritime vocation and to promote a free port policy.
As Kirk points out, during the seventeenth century the notion of the Genoese free port changed in order to adapt to the evolution of the Mediterranean context. Originally it was exclusively a means of attracting goods for local consumption or commerce, but progressively changed into a way of attracting merchants. Nevertheless there was an important difference between Genoa's free port policy and that of its main rival city: Livorno (in Tuscany). The republic's aim was to create an entrepôt, “a focal point for gathering goods to be redistributed by Genoese merchants”; in Livorno, on the other hand, the fiscal facilities were accompanied by an adequate incentive to attract foreign merchant colonies (p. 155).
Finally, in the second half of the seventeenth century, the goal pursued by the republic of Genoa was to tie up “the economic interests of more powerful countries in a free port as a means of inducing them to protect the city” (p. 195). This strategy did not avoid the previously mentioned brutal aggression carried out by the French navy in 1684. From that moment onward it was clear that Genoa's strength lay in the interests bound up in its port and no longer in its military fleet.
Although this is a well-built book, with an interesting and original approach, it is not without flaws. Kirk's monograph is based on a relevant number of primary sources from diverse Italian archives. However, Genoese archives contain more documents on this subject than those cited in this book. Moreover, not all bibliography is updated. In particular, from 2000 on, Genoese historians have produced several essays on port organization, the republic's fleet, and maritime policy in the early modern period. Nevertheless the author does not mention them at all.
Despite this, Kirk's explanatory model seems to be convincing. So this book may be considered as a welcome addition to the international literature concerning with the economic and social history of early modern Italy.
