Algeria's tragic political history finds its roots in the century-long occupation by France followed by two decades of socialist authoritarianism. From late 1988 until early 1992, however, the country seemed on the verge of moving toward a democratic future. An Islamic political movement (the Islamic Salvation Front) spearheaded the effort, but many in-country and foreign observers felt confident that Islam and democracy could find common cause. Algeria could thus provide the Arab world with its first ever authentic democracy, including public contestation and participation within a constitutionally legal framework. All this proved illusionary, however, as the high army command, long the system's dominant political actor, staged a crude military coup d'état that plunged the country into a bloody decade-long fitna, or chaos, costing nearly 200,000 Algerians' lives. Like scholars before him, Volpi examines state–society relations in Algeria and seeks to explain why such relations were reduced to a life and death struggle between a militaristic political order and an Islamicized civil society.
The book includes seven separate chapters and a conclusion. Chapter 1 evaluates Algeria's democratic experiment within the context of political democratization in the 21st century. Volpi dismisses reductionist arguments regarding Islam and democracy as presented by Samuel Huntington, Francis Fukuyama, Gilles Kepel, and others. The rise of Hizbullah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine may raise more questions than answers regarding Islam's compatibility with democracy, but the Algerian experience, along with those of other Muslim-majority countries such as Turkey, Indonesia, and Bangladesh, challenges simplistic “clash of civilizations” assumptions. As Volpi correctly observes, “Islamic themes appear to be sufficiently compatible with the demos' expectations to be able to produce a recurrent demand for an Islamicised form of democratic governance” (p. 11).
Chapter 2 provides a broad historical and ideological overview of competing political discourses within the Middle East and North Africa, including nationalist and religiously inspired constructs. Volpi focuses on the wide intellectual divide separating alternative frameworks of analysis as represented by such intellectual luminaries as Alexis de Tocqueville, Frantz Fanon, Ibn Khaldun, Muhammad Abduh, and Sayyid Qutb. The materials and interpretation are not new or innovative, but their reconceptualization within the state–society and secular–sacred context within the Algerian situation is informative. However, this chapter also includes slipshod writing, historical inaccuracies, and questionable assertions that, unfortunately, recur in several subsequent chapters. For example, Volpi writes that Algeria in the 1990s witnessed “successive military strongmen [coming] to the political leadership only to be overthrown a few years or months later …” (p. 25). The 1990s did not witness a single “succession of strongmen.” Mohammed Boudiaf, a nonmilitary civilian, was assassinated within six months of assuming power, to be replaced for two years by a civilian politician, Ali Kafi. Kafi, in turn, was succeeded by an “elected” president, Liamine Zeroual, a retired high army officer. Zeroual relinquished his position voluntarily, albeit with strong military support, to Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who remains in power until the next presidential election, in 2009. The author makes another similar factual error when he writes that Ben Bella was “overthrown a few months [after independence in 1962]” (p. 23). In fact, it was nearly three years before Boumedienne pushed Ben Bella aside in a military coup. Indeed, one of the most consistent if not remarkable attributes of postindependence Algeria has been relatively stable leadership.
Chapters 3 and 4 provide uneven rehashes of well-trod materials covering Algeria's democratic experiment (1988–91) and the immediate postcoup period (1992–94). In this period, “the Algerian military showed that intransigent repressive policies allied to an adroit manipulation of the institutional framework could crush a powerful popular protest and bring about a successful transition to authoritarianism” (p. 62). For the uninitiated, these chapters provide basic overviews of how the state–society dialectic was transformed from a democratic dialogue into a jihadist bloodbath. Here too, however, errors of fact and interpretation abound. The Berbers of the Kabyle struggle for cultural, political, and economic autonomy, but they are not engaged in a struggle for “independence” (p. 37). Reference is also made to “nightclubs” and “luxury hotels” (pp. 40–41) as if these are standard features of urban life in Algeria; they are not. The names of key political figures are misspelled: it is “Sahnoun” not “Shanoun” (p. 43) and “Nahnah” not “Nannah” (p. 43). The first round of parliamentary elections in 1991 took place on 26 December, not November (p. 54). The socialist French president's name is spelled “Mitterrand,” not “Mitterand” (p. 74).
Chapter 5 updates political events from Zeroual's presidential election, in 1995, to Bouteflika's first presidential term, in 2000. This chapter develops the important theme of “electoral marketing,” involving the establishment of formal representation while maintaining “informal authoritarianism.” Bouteflika further ensconced the process as he shifted around political players and amended the constitution in ways that lowered the military's profile in politics and consolidated national power within the executive at the expense of all other formal institutions of government.
Chapter 6 turns attention to civil society and its discontents. By mid-2006, such discontent had increased in intensity and scope. Critical cleavages along secular–sectarian, rural–urban, Arab–Berber, fundamentalist–liberal, male–female, and young–old grew under conditions of increased economic hardship and social deprivation despite the massive flow of hydrocarbon-generated revenues accruing to the state.
The penultimate chapter incorporates the “international arena” as part of understanding Algeria's state–society dynamic and the failure of democracy to take hold. Volpi pays particular attention to the exaggerated fears of Western nations that democracy in Algeria could result in an Islamic fundamentalist regime coming to power, along the lines of Iran. Whether intentional or not, both Washington, D.C., and Paris, the key external actors, equivocated at the crucial moment when democracy's fate in Algeria was at stake. The author observes correctly that “Algeria became the first casualty of a geostrategic order in which political changes were not constrained by Cold War strategic calculations to halt the spread of communism but by the constraints of a New World Order, which had as one of its main components the fear of Islamic fundamentalism” (p. 118). Although not fully developed, this chapter pays brief attention to an important and growing phenomenon—how the internationalization of the Algerian conflict has encouraged a re-Islamization and radicalization of French youth of Maghribi origin living in the banlieues.
The book's concluding chapter attempts, only partially successfully, to address “learning and unlearning to be democratic” (p. 128). Volpi correctly observes that Algeria's democratic experience constituted “the very first genuine democratic transition of the contemporary Middle East and North Africa” (p. 128). Yet, he blames its failure to sustain that transition on the “lack of [an] organic connection between the citizenry and the institutions of state” (p. 130). For a connection to have been successful, the author argues, a more explicit learning environment, a kind of political pedagogy, would have been necessary, in which state actors and their counterparts in the opposition would have understood, accepted, and applied the democratic rules of the game. Such a strategy implies a civil society devoid of political consciousness and therefore congenitally incapable of absorbing democracy's foundational ethics and principles. Yet, Algeria's history proves otherwise. Over a century of interaction with European society and its values, including democratic political processes, long ago exposed both Algerian elites and masses to participatory politics. Indeed, Algerian civil society developed a sophisticated grasp of political pluralism through experience within French civil society as union organizers, party activists, and members of independent association groups. Authoritarian elites undermined that participatory legacy at independence, justifying their actions in the name of ideological purity and political uniformity as part of the collective struggle against underdevelopment, neocolonialism, and imperialism. The combination of ideological pride, economic development, and coercive force kept Algerian civil society at bay for the first two decades after independence. It ultimately collapsed, however, under the weight of the numerous contradictions such a combination engendered, symbolized most dramatically in the nationwide riots of October 1988. If this analysis is correct, then Volpi's pessimistic forecast that “democratic regression” and the “entrenchment of authoritarianism” (p. 137) are Algeria's lot for the future may need reformulation. Algeria's civil society, with all its complexity if not contradictions, is alive and well. It is fully prepared to serve as the foundation for any democratic process that will emerge once the authoritarian state begins to dissipate, as it inevitably will.
