Can Africa be democratic? With 44 attempted coups since 2000, multiple ongoing famines, and presidents-for-life on the airwaves, outside observers likely overlook day-to-day successes and failures of African governments in administration and democracy. Some countries have made tremendous progress, even if others remain stagnant – but even the latter are not irredeemable, and democracy can work for Africa.

This work by two scholars and two statesmen reviews the history and present state of democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa. The authors note that, on average, African states score 60% lower than industrialised countries on indicators of governance – but that difference is not evenly distributed: Those states that outperform are almost invariably those with democratic regimes. How they have sustained democracy is central to the authors’ analysis.

Sophisticated autocrats long ago learned not to interfere with an election on voting day; instead, manipulation of elections begins months or years in advance, through voter registration, media suppression, discreditation of opponents, and stacking election commissions and courts. This contrasts with committed democrats willing to check even their own power, told through interviews with heads of state and national leaders. The authors show that the perceived successes of authoritarian states, such as Rwanda, are largely projected out of context, unlikely to be replicated.

The authors debate at length the role played by the African Union and donor states in shaping African politics. Foreign donors have de-emphasised democracy promotion, instead favouring stability and strategic geopolitics. Election monitors are singled out for particular criticism, for their disproportionate willingness to accept questionable elections and overlook civil rights violations before and after election day.

That republican procedures do not make republican substance has been described as far back as Kant, Madison and de Toqueville. That democratic polity corresponds with national wealth was demonstrated by Lipset, affirmed by a variety of recent authors. That democratisers can succeed, often in the face of fierce resistance and with minimal support, demonstrates the extent to which citizens strongly support pluralist polities, even in the face of those who would try to suppress political expression.

The role of the military as an autonomous actor is largely glossed over. Other authors have gone so far as to say that the military is the principal gatekeeper to political change – dictating whether, and to what extent, effective democratisation is permissible. Additionally, the prerequisite conditions for democratisation are not well operationalised. The authors describe several, referencing specific cases, but only conceptually. For example, donors are simultaneously portrayed as antithetical and essential. Successful transitions seem to hinge on the happenstance office-holding of autocrats with the support, risk-tolerance and patience to see through a bona fide transition. By establishing a baseline, a rubric against which to measure the growth of state institutions could be created to assess future cases.

No authoritarian regime can democratise overnight; sustainable democracy takes decades, if not generations, to build, and is fragile in its early stages. At the same time, people almost invariably want better democracy than they have. Democracy can work in the African context, wanting only for reliable institutions, political norms, external support and leadership willing to take the risks to make it happen. A spark, supported at home and abroad, and allowed to flourish, can start the ball rolling. ‘It is time’, as the authors say, ‘for all actors to align their actions with their rhetoric that repeatedly cites the importance of democracy’.