John Joy is cofounder and president of the St. Albert the Great Center for Scholastic Studies. This complex and closely argued book is the published version of his doctoral dissertation at the University of Fribourg in Switzerland. The first one hundred seventy-one pages contain the dissertation itself. The remaining eighty pages contain two appendices, in German, which are chapters from the first and second edition of Joseph Kleutgen's influential Die Theologie der Vorzeit.

After a substantial introduction that lays out basic terms and the direction of the work, the dissertation itself is divided into three parts. Part 1 studies the origins of the terms “ordinary” and “extraordinary” magisterium in the work of the important nineteenth century Jesuit theologian Joseph Kleutgen. Part 2 reflects on how both Pius IX in his apostolic letter Tuas Libenter (1863) and the First Vatican Council's dogmatic constitutions, Dei Filius and Pastor Aeternus (1870), made use of Kleutgen's terminology (Kleutgen being a major influence in the writing of at least the latter document). Finally, Part 3 reflects on the development of the terminology in post-Vatican I theology, in various pre-Vatican II documents, and in Vatican II's Dogmatic Constitution on the Church, Lumen Gentium. Joy concludes his work with a concise and dense, but significant chapter in which he summarizes his argument, offers three practical applications for ecclesiology today, and proposes two ways by which ecclesiology can move forward.

Joy's basic thesis is that Kleutgen's proposal, developed in the two editions of Die Theologie der Vorzeit is useful, and should basically be retained today. The context of Kleutgen's development of the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary magisterium was a response to a kind of theological liberalism present in nineteenth-century Catholic theology that taught that Catholics were free to follow any opinion that was not explicitly taught by the Church's official Magisterium. He emphasized, therefore, the universal teaching of the Church on issues not formally defined but nevertheless believed and taught in scripture and tradition, discovered especially from the consensus of theologians. This distinction of the “ordinary magisterium” from the “extraordinary magisterium” of “explicitly documented definitions” was “a distinction within the infallible magisterium of the Church” (163).

Kleutgen's distinction was basically employed in Pius IX's Tuas Libenter and the two constitutions of Vatican I on faith and reason and papal primacy and infallibility, although some bishops at the council warned of an ambiguity in the use of the term “ordinary magisterium.” It was, they claimed, open to different interpretations—an assertion that proved true in the decades after the council. Gradually, the idea emerged regarding an exercise of an ordinary magisterium in papal teaching, although it was not determined whether such exercise was infallible or not. “This new distinction between solemn and non-solemn forms of explicit teaching was then superimposed upon the original distinction between documented and undocumented forms of Church teaching” (163–164). Was the distinction to be understood as between explicitly defined and implicitly taught infallible doctrines of the Church? Or was the distinction that of an infallible extraordinary magisterium over against a “merely authentic” (164) ordinary magisterium?

Joy finds a solution in paragraph twenty-five of Vatican II's Lumen Gentium. Although the terms appear in the notes, the text of the Dogmatic Constitution avoided the terms “ordinary” and “extraordinary” magisterium altogether. In place of “extraordinary magisterium,” the council used the terms “solemn judgment” or “definition.” In place of “ordinary magisterium” it used the term “authentic magisterium” to refer to “’non-definitive’ teaching of the pope or bishops” (165). Although the terms are not used in the text, Joy judges that Vatican II's solution is actually close to Kleutgen's original understanding of the distinction—a distinction within the infallible magisterium of the Church. This would lead him, then, to propose that the weight of Vatican II's teaching on the sacramentality of the episcopacy in Lumen Gentium and John Paul II's teaching on women's ordination is Ordinatio Sacerdotalis might need to be rethought. These teachings might indeed be infallible teachings in virtue of Kleutgen's original understanding of “ordinary magisterium”—a bold proposal indeed.

While Joy's proposal does have the advantage of emphasizing the role of the church's teaching office as more than explicit teachings by the hierarchy and the inclusion of all the faithful in the preaching and teaching of the gospel (see 168–171), one wonders if it extends the range of infallible teaching too far. Ironically, even though the “ordinary”/”extraordinary” distinction can lead to some confusion, its development since Kleutgen does have the advantage of considerable clarity as well. As the teaching has developed and found in writings on the magisterium today (for example, Sullivan and Gaillardetz), all “extraordinary” teachings by popes and the bishops in council are infallible teachings and are to be responded to in faith. The “ordinary,” non-definitive teaching of the entire People of God, and of bishops and popes in particular, is not proposed as infallible, and is open to discussion within the Church, even though it is to be treated with utmost respect. Doctrines not explicitly defined, however, that are held by the entire Church as an essential part of the faith (for example, Christ's resurrection; loving one's enemies) are believed to be infallible, essential truths of faith, and integral to the gospel message. Perhaps “ordinary” and “extraordinary” magisterium are terms that need to be revised. But infallibility needs to be attributed to Church teaching—explicit or implicit—with utmost judiciousness.

This is a serious work and needs to be studied carefully. Discussion among theologians will ultimately judge whether Joy's proposal and interpretation of Vatican II will change how theology understands the teaching authority of the Church—the responsibility given to all the People of God, who are served by their ordained leaders.