The ancient emotions have been a topic of extensive discussion in recent years, generating a number of monographs and edited volumes (e.g. D. Konstan, The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks [2006]; D. Cairns and D.P. Nelis [edd.], Emotions in the Classical World [2017]; R.R. Caston and R.A. Kaster [edd.], Hope, Joy, and Affection in the Classical World [2016]). This volume, the result of a series of workshops held jointly by the Department of Classics at the University of Michigan and the Institut für Altertumskunde at the University of Cologne, showcases an admirably wide array of scholarly approaches to this topic, including papyrology, philosophy, history and literary studies.
According to the introductory chapter, this book distinguishes itself from other similar volumes by focusing on the relationship between order and the emotions. Against the common assumption that the emotions are fundamentally irrational and disorderly, this work highlights the ‘positive and stabilizing’ effect of the emotions (p. xvii). In particular, most of the contributions treat the ways in which the emotions serve to maintain the social order – or ‘the structures of power’ in the words of the volume's subtitle. Bettenworth and Hammerstaedt align themselves with the cognitivist view of the emotions held by many ancient and modern theorists, whereby emotions involve some level of propositional content (p. xvi); this cognitivist approach, which attributes a rational element to the emotions, is in line with the book's overall claim that the emotions can be a stabilising force.
The volume is divided into two halves. The first explores philosophical and documentary texts, which, according to Bettenworth and Hammerstaedt, aim to manipulate emotions in order to effect change in the ‘“real” world’ (p. xx). The second half of the volume deals with emotions portrayed in literary or historiographical texts, which do not explicitly theorise the emotions but can nevertheless provide insight into the relationship between order and emotion. The sequence in which these genres are discussed is effective: the opening chapters, which analyse explicit philosophical theories about the emotions, lay the groundwork for discussions later in the volume of the (often more elusive) role of emotions in literary texts.
The volume opens with D.R. Morphew's chapter, ‘Structuring Emotions: Plato on the Origin of Cognitive Content in the Soul’. Morphew argues that feelings of anger and shame, which derive their force from the thumoeides or spirited part of the soul, nevertheless contain propositional content that originates in the logistikon or rational part of the soul. These feelings can sometimes be in conflict with the logistikon, but this conflict does not indicate that anger and shame are irrational feelings; they merely pick up on and magnify certain rational propositions while failing to take others into account. For this reason, anger and shame can play a positive role in ‘quelling disorderly passions’ (p. 24). In the next chapter Hammerstaedt discusses the second-century ce Lycian inscription commissioned by Diogenes of Oenoanda. Hammerstaedt draws attention to Diogenes’ argument that society will be more ordered if its citizens do not fear death, illness or the gods, contra the belief of some of Diogenes’ contemporaries that society requires such fears in order to maintain order. Hammerstaedt concludes that Diogenes elaborated upon extant Epicurean beliefs, adding ‘thoughts which either had come up in his time or were the product of his own independent reasoning’ (p. 41).
The documentary subsection of the volume begins with E. Skarsouli's chapter. Skarsouli argues that, even before the Hellenistic period (when this meaning is commonly thought to have arisen), the term eulabeomai can sometimes denote fear (rather than caution) and that this fear can nevertheless be a positive force. Next, in ‘The Pre-Classical fidei committere and the Order to be Established Upon Death’, M. Avenarius treats the Roman practice whereby individuals who wished to bequeath assets to non-heirs could charge a heir or legate (called the fideicommissarius) with the task of distributing these assets to the desired recipient. Avenarius makes the compelling argument that this practice relied upon emotion, namely the affective ‘sense of obligation’ (p. 77) experienced by the fideicommissarius.
The second half of the volume begins with three chapters devoted to literary depictions of order and emotion. The first is R. Scodel's chapter ‘The Erinyes and Political Anger’. This chapter draws from Aeschylus’ Eumenides a ‘model of how to deal productively with the frustration of the losing party in democratic elections’, in the words of the volume's introduction (p. xxii). According to Scodel, Athena's judgement in favour of Orestes angers the Erinyes for legitimate reasons: Athena admits that she always sides with men. However, the Erinyes receive timê in exchange for the suppression of this anger, which leads to Athenian ‘internal stability and legitimacy’ (p. 101). As a modern parallel to the Eumenides, Scodel adduces the 2000 Bush vs Gore election, claiming that, while she and many others were angered by the ‘partisan’ decision of the Supreme Court in favour of Bush, they ‘also placed a high value on the constitutional system, and … therefore acquiesced’ (p. 105).
Next, in ‘Thinking of Others: Pity and Empathy in Terence's Comedies’ R.R. Caston argues that, while neither feeling exclusively fulfils this role, both pity and empathy hold the potential to ‘transcend the expectations set by the social order’ (p. 108). Furthermore, according to Caston, Terence links empathy to role-playing and theatricality; we are thus left with the tantalising implication that Terence's plays invite us to overcome the stringencies of social hierarchy through affect. Finally, T. Leiendecker examines Juno's dolor in Ovid's Fasti 5, in which the goddess’ grief after Jupiter's parturition of Minerva spurs her to her own parthenogenesis of Mars. Leiendecker argues that Juno's dolor is in fact a form of invidia: Juno is jealous that, by giving birth, Jupiter has taken her place in the social order.
The final three chapters deal with historiographical and epistolary texts. First, in a chapter on fear as a narrative device in the Historiae Alexandri Magni Bettenworth shows that the valence of Alexander's fearlessness does not map neatly onto his character trajectory: sometimes his courage makes him a good ruler, and at other times it is a sign of his tyrannical tendencies. However, Bettenworth argues that the general public's fear straightforwardly reflects Alexander's character arch: those around him begin to fear him as his rule takes a despotic turn. Next, W. Ameling examines the role of acclamations (or ritualised public displays of emotion) in the Historia Augusta, especially Commodus 18–19, which contains the only acclamation in the HA commonly believed to be genuine. Ameling spends most of the chapter making the convincing case that there is no reason to trust the authenticity of this acclamation. He then argues that acclamations constitute a way of evaluating old regimes and ushering in new ones, without threatening the social order. Finally, in ‘Order and Emotion in Carolingian Letters: the Case of Alcuin and Einhart’ P. Orth examines Latin epistolography of the late eighth and early ninth centuries, demonstrating that Alcuin deploys emotions as a way of cementing bonds of friendship in his letters and that the emotions in Einhart's letters, which are often dismissive of inferiors and deferential to superiors, reflect social hierarchies.
By scrutinising the relationship between order and emotion, this volume provides a welcome opportunity to explore a controversial topic within the study of affect. Such a provocative guiding theme will necessarily raise a number of productive questions. As mentioned above, the book is structured around the idea that the emotions can fulfil a positive role by maintaining ‘the structures of power’. But according to whom is the preservation of power structures ‘positive’? In the case of most of the arguments contained in this book, we can infer that the stabilising force of the emotions is ‘positive’ according to either the author of the ancient text at hand or the dominant ideology of the time in which the text was written. Such arguments are legitimate and important: emotions often function as ideological tools. However, the chapters in this volume rarely name or put critical pressure on the ideologies that maintain themselves through this ‘positive and stabilizing’ function of affect. For instance, Skarsouli cites as an example of the ‘positive connotations’ (p. 64) of fear an anecdote from Aeneas Tacticus in which the military governor Euphrates ‘impos[ed] … order through fear’ (p. 50) by wounding and killing a number of soldiers who did not follow his commands. Presumably Skarsouli means to suggest that this enforcement of order was ‘positive’ in the eyes of Aeneas Tacticus, Euphrates or the norms of either of their contemporary societies. Because she and other authors do not make this sort of attribution explicit, we are sometimes left wondering whether the authors of the chapters believe that the maintenance of ‘the structures of power’ is inherently positive. In one case, such a value judgement in favour of social order is made explicit; as discussed above, Scodel extracts from the behaviour of the Erinyes a lesson for the modern political system. (Caston's chapter, which points to empathy's ability to overcome social hierarchies, is an exception to this volume's implicit commitment to order.) Whether we are discussing ancient perspectives or passing our own value judgements, we should not take for granted the positive valence of stability. Bettenworth and Hammerstaedt are right to break from narratives that dismiss emotions on the grounds that they are irrational; however, yoking affect to order is not the only way out of such reductive narratives. In fact, many modern affect theorists have celebrated precisely the irrationality and ineffability of affect, pointing to the political and creative potential generated therefrom (see M. Gregg and G. Siegworth, Affect Theory Reader [2010], p. 4; M. Figlerowicz, Affect Theory Dossier [2012], pp. 3–5). This volume would have benefited from a more explicit defence of the choice to redeem affect by linking it to order as well as a discussion of the implications of this choice.
This volume raises crucial questions and contributes thoughtfully to an important ongoing conversation. It contains numerous convincing essays and effectively draws upon a wide range of methodologies. Its discussions are often technical and too advanced for beginning students, but translations of Latin and Greek throughout render this volume accessible to scholars outside Classics. As such, it will be relevant to any scholar with an interest in the ancient emotions.
