Tribalism

To reveal the broader implications of the discourse examined, we contextualise the findings within the social psychology concept of tribalism developed out of evolutionary biology (Darwin Reference Darwin1981/1871; Boyd & Richerson Reference Boyd and Richerson2005; Greene Reference Greene2013). This is defined as the loyalty and attachment to one’s own social group (Ferrera Reference Ferrera2015) and is considered by some as a fundamental human social trait (Wilson Reference Wilson2012; Clark et al. Reference Clark, Liu, Winegard and Ditto2019). Tribalism exists at many levels of human organisation, ranging from genetic kinship and geographic culture to political party alliances (Clark et al. 2019). Highly fragmented social groups such as sports fans, professional organisations, and even consumers of product brands are considered to generate a form of neo-tribalism (Maffesoli & Maffesoli Reference Maffesoli and Maffesoli1996; Cova & Cova Reference Cova and Cova2001, Reference Cova and Cova2002; Armstrong Reference Armstrong2003) based primarily on a community with shared interests and sentiment. A study of the professional composition of the equine industry in France proposed that equestrianism is a form of tribalism in that members of equestrian culture become deeply entrenched in the practices and attitudes of their sport (Grefe & Pickel-Chevalier Reference Grefe and Pickel-Chevalier2015).

We propose that the discourses analysed in this study reflect the outcome of enculturated equestrian practices and attitudes that come into conflict with the moral views of at least some social groups outside of equestrianism. The discourses interpreted might be, at least in part, the result of “tribalism” amongst equestrians and interested groups in broader society.

Notably, the ad hominem attacks directed towards the equestrians in Case A and B were observed only in the horse welfare advocacy and public social media groups, and not within the performance horse welfare group comprised of individuals identifying as equestrians. Ad hominem is considered a feature of tribalism as it is a manifestation of an “us vs them” attitude (Borovali Reference Borovali2018; Anthony Reference Anthony2020; Bradley & Roland Reference Bradley and Roland2022). Argumentative tactics that employ ad hominem are often the initial response to highly controversial or emotional issues triggering moral outrage (Walton Reference Walton1998; Macagno Reference Macagno2013), but these hold little strength in persuasion (Rozin et al. Reference Rozin, Lowery, Imada and Haidt1999; van Eemeren et al. Reference Van Eemeren, Garssen and Meuffels2012). However, it does not appear that most individuals contributing to the discourse and utilising this argumentative tool intended to persuade others of their position. Therefore, it is proposed that the disparaging discourse analysed in this case study is rather a signal that moral transgression has been perceived (Rozin et al. Reference Rozin, Lowery, Imada and Haidt1999; Tetlock et al. Reference Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green and Lerner2000) and individuals choose to signal this to others to reinforce their tribal identity and associated moral positioning (Aquino & Reed Reference Aquino and Reed2002). According to the model of moral contagion developed by Brady et al. (Reference Brady, Crockett and Van Bavel2020), individuals share virtual messages of moral outrage on social media, and this effectively spreads to others who then come to similar moral evaluations and potentially form moral “tribes.”

Not only do ad hominem statements contribute to the socio-moral identity of a tribe, but they also contribute to its defence. In a discussion of argumentation in political debate, Borovali (Reference Borovali2018) proposed that ad hominem arguments contribute to tribalism by focusing arguments on denigrating others of differing perspectives rather than promoting constructive discussion of diverse views. Thus, ad hominem attacks are potentially detrimental to the promotion of horse welfare within equestrian culture by creating resistance to change. The barrier to rational discourse caused by the ad hominem can be seen in the defensive responses in protection of equestrian culture and practice. The extent of loyalty and belonging to a group influences the willingness of individuals to overlook moral violations, especially when perpetrated by highly respected group members (Abrams et al. Reference Abrams, De Randsley and Travaglino2013; Travaglino et al. Reference Travaglino, Abrams, Randsley and Yetkili2016). This could explain the discourse defending the equestrians in Case A and B, and the lack of decisive outrage by some towards the actions of those equestrians.

Further, we note that discourse (particularly Discourse 2) was highly anthropocentric. These findings suggest underlying speciesist attitudes possibly rooted in traditional equestrian views towards horses and their objectified value. Speciesism is defined as the bias in favour of one’s own species and the reduced moral value of some species over others (Singer Reference Singer2002). Associated with speciesism is the trivialisation of animal emotion; those that consider humans as superior to non-human animals may be likely to trivialise the experiences of less cognitively sophisticated animals. This attitude has also been linked to negative perceptions towards less privileged social groups (Costello & Hodson Reference Costello and Hodson2010). It has been argued that tribalism is the root of speciesism (Machery Reference Machery and Kiverstein2016) as the tribalistic tendency to discriminate against those outside one’s social groups may extend to beings outside their species membership (Jaquet Reference Jaquet2022).

Moral disengagement

Moral disengagement is the cognitive process of rationalising one’s actions and attitudes when they conflict with one’s internal moral views to reduce moral distress (Bandura Reference Bandura1990). The process of moral disengagement can be motivated by tribalism, as individuals cognitively modify their moral concerns to maintain alignment with group norms and moral reputation as well as their self-identity within the group (Kelly Reference Kelly2013; Ashokkumar et al. Reference Ashokkumar, Galaif and Swann2019). This phenomenon has been studied in politics where strong partisan loyalty motivates people to ignore and justify behaviours that they would normally find reprehensible (Ashokkumar et al. Reference Ashokkumar, Galaif and Swann2019; Hull et al. Reference Hull, Warren and Smith2024).

In the context of animal welfare, moral disengagement has been described predominantly regarding the meat paradox (i.e. the psychological dilemma raised by people’s love for animals and concern for animal welfare and their consumption of meat) (Joy Reference Joy2009; Piazza et al. Reference Piazza, Ruby, Loughnan, Luong, Kulik, Watkins and Seigerman2015; Bastian & Loughnan Reference Bastian and Loughnan2017; Loughnan & Davies Reference Loughnan and Davies2020; Rothgerber Reference Rothgerber2020). More recently, Schüßler et al. (Reference Schüßler, Nicolai, Stoll-Kleemann and Bartkowski2024) demonstrated how media discourse surrounding the meat and dairy industry in Germany contributed to moral disengagement amongst consumers. Ultimately, the outcome of moral disengagement is reduced concern given to animal welfare and prioritisation of human interests.

Here, we posit that moral disengagement (Bandura Reference Bandura1990, Reference Bandura2002) might underpin the trivialisation, justification and reframing of whip use and attitudes in support of aversive training methods in Cases A and B. According to social cognitive theory, moral disengagement occurs when social group norms conflict with individual moral positions (Bandura Reference Bandura1990, Reference Bandura2002; Moore Reference Moore2015). For example, an individual may support whip use as part of enculturated traditional equestrian practice yet find the broader concept relating to the unnecessary hitting of an animal as immoral.

Bandura’s moral disengagement theory (1990, 2002) is comprised of eight cognitive mechanisms. Below, we describe how these mechanisms may be at work in the discourse analysed in the present study:

1. 1) Moral justification: justifying actions as socially valuable or moral: “A strict parent with loving intentions” is better than a parent allowing any behaviour “out of apathy” [CB]). Moral justification in the case study speaks to the power dynamic between humans and horses. The analogy of a strict parent used in the discourse we analysed is reminiscent of the "strict father” construct in political theory (Lakhoff Reference Lakoff2016) wherein the parent is the moral guide and any deviation by the child must be punished. Justifications for whipping the horses in Case A and B certainly appear to fit this description.

2. 2) Euphemistic labelling: using language to detract from harmful actions (“Horses by nature thrive on direction given by a respected leader” [CB]). Bandura called euphemising “an injurious weapon” (2002) as it has been used to make cruel and inhumane acts more socially acceptable. Regarding non-human animals, euphemistic language is used in animal agriculture to disguise practices within raising and slaughtering animals that might not be comfortable for society (Stibbe Reference Stibbe2001; Croney & Reynnells Reference Croney and Reynnells2008; Abrams et al. Reference Abrams, Zimbres and Carr2015). Similarly, the way in which harmful practices are sometimes termed “training” may allow individuals to disguise welfare-compromising actions.

3. 3) Advantageous comparison: trivialising actions to make them seem less harmful (“…she is only asking the horse to pick up its feet…not beating it” [CA]). In this example, advantageous comparison allows one to redefine the act as a form of communication “to ask” a horse to do something rather than “beating” a horse in punishment or abuse. This does not consider the horse’s experience of the whip being used to produce the seemingly benign outcome.

4. 4) Displacement of responsibility: shifting responsibility for actions to others (“[sport governing bodies need] clearer guidelines, policies, and procedures concerning the best welfare for horses” [CB]). Responsibility shifting has been observed in other animal welfare contexts such as laboratory animal use (Engel et al. Reference Engel, Silver, Veeder and Banks2020), but also previously in the horse world. For example, tight nosebands on horse bridles are used to increase control over the horse and reduce behavioural signs of discomfort that might be judged unfavourably in competition (Merkies et al. Reference Merkies, Copelin, Small and Young2022). Despite evidence of the harm caused by tight nosebands, lack of rule enforcement is blamed for the issue (Visser et al. Reference Visser, Kuypers, Stam and Riedstra2019). The need for governing bodies in equestrian sport to define, and enforce, acceptable practices support the idea that equestrians act as a collective culture.

5. 5) Diffusion of responsibility: suggesting that there is no choice but to follow social norms (‘The acceptable fix for this is to get the horse going forward in any way possible…” [CB]). Mechanism 5 shows how practices are entangled with equestrian culture. The fact that welfare-compromising practices such as whipping exist as normalised practices, despite the availability of alternative training methods (Goodwin et al. Reference Goodwin, McGreevy, Waran and McLean2009), is evidence of this.

6. 6) Disregard or distortion of consequences: avoiding confrontation (“It doesn’t amount to abuse to me, horse’s movements aren’t affected and I don’t see any injury being caused” [CA]). In some cases, individuals chose to avoid judging the whipping or consider the subjective experience of the horses being whipped, which may reflect a disregard or distortion of consequences.

7. 7) Dehumanisation: reducing perception of human qualities of the victims (“Horses kick and bite each other all the time to signal to one another to move over, etc. […] you can observe that they communicate with each other by aggressive touching all the time” [CA]). Although the focus of the current study was the welfare of horses, and thus the subjects logically incapable of being dehumanised, we consider a form of self-dehumanisation as a potential mechanism for moral disengagement here. In the case study, there were claims that the way the horses behave is a justification for a form of human behaviour towards another that would be considered unacceptable towards another human. This results in “self-dehumanisation”, which has been observed in many other contexts of immoral behaviour including social ostracising of others, online game violence, cheating and dishonesty (Bastian et al. Reference Bastian, Jetten and Radke2012, Reference Bastian, Jetten, Chen, Radke, Harding and Fasoli2013; Kouchaki et al. Reference Kouchaki, Dobson, Waytz and Kteily2018). Self-dehumanisation functions to reduce the moral distress caused by one’s own immoral or unethical behaviour. In the present case, individuals may dehumanise their own actions to justify their behaviour towards horses. Therefore, if horses behave aggressively towards each other then it is justifiable for a human to do so as well, even if humans would not act this way towards each other.

8. 8) Attribution of blame: blaming the victim for the harm inflicted (“Some horses learn the easy way, and some just don’t. Horses are smart creatures, and they can learn to just refuse to do as they’re told…[CB]). Victim blaming not only diminishes the subjective value of the one being harmed but also minimises the claim of the harm done. This is commonly seen in domestic and sexual abuse cases (Capezza & Arriaga Reference Capezza and Arriaga2008; Flynn et al. Reference Flynn, Cama, Powell and Scott2023). Blaming the victim also leads to reduced accountability for the harmful actions, which means the one committing the offence is less likely to change their behaviour in the future (Henning & Holdford Reference Henning and Holdford2006).

Moral disengagement theory provides one explanation for how and why individuals choose to diminish the welfare-comprising actions of some, even when wider society judges the acts as morally wrong. The mechanisms of moral disengagement may also provide targets for behaviour change strategies.

Overall theme of polarisation

Contrasting views were expressed across all discourse topics analysed in this case study, in which discourse either supported the performance horse industry and practices depicted within, or was decidedly opposed. Some individuals justified, trivialised and reframed the use of tools like whips, bits and spurs, while others were firmly opposed to these. Horse-focused discourse either expressed some level of concern for the horse or placed blame on horse behaviour that required harsh treatment to correct. Perspectives on welfare were likewise strikingly varied, with some framing the events of Case A and B as “abuse” while others framed them as examples of poor or even acceptable horsemanship. The polarisation of perspectives overall interpreted in this study reveals perhaps the most important implication of this study: recognising tribalism can serve as both a barrier and opportunity for change.

Although tribalism is widely accepted as part of the social organisation of humans, it can create a barrier to cultural change (Greene Reference Greene2013; Haidt Reference Haidt2020). The polarisation of views related to horses, equestrian activities and horse welfare as described above is evidence of the “us vs them” of tribalism. With discourse positioning individuals within their respective socio-moral tribes, there is no indication that other perspectives are given any real consideration. Furthermore, the apparent dismissal of the concerns of those who were so outraged by the actions in Case A and B may be a sort of “in-group policing”. This is a phenomenon described in polarised social group conflicts where the “in-group” attempts to silence or intimidate others who share conflicting views (Stanton Reference Stanton2013; Haidt Reference Haidt2020; Shissler 2025).

As discussed in a study on the motivation and maintenance of veganism, tribal bias reduces the likelihood of individuals engaging with out-groups (Cherry Reference Cherry2015). Vegans may be unlikely to engage with those attempting to dispute the benefits of veganism and meat-eaters may likewise not be open to information about veganism (Cherry Reference Cherry2015); however, engagement may result in a “backfire effect”, whereby individuals end up more strongly endorsing a misperception or controversial opinion (Abelson Reference Abelson1986; Nyhan & Reifler Reference Nyhan and Reifler2010). Resistance to change may be more likely or amplified when attempts to create change include insulting language (Hornsey & Esposo Reference Hornsey and Esposo2009), such as seen in this case study’s ad hominem discourse.

Not surprisingly then, when discourse in the social media groups was aimed at educating others, or where commentators attempted to argue their opposing positions by commenting on the perceived knowledge deficit of others, it was met with resistance. The knowledge deficit model assumes the attitudes and behaviours of others are underpinned by a simple lack of knowledge (Simis et al. Reference Simis, Madden, Cacciatore and Yeo2016). Bail et al. (Reference Bail, Argyle, Brown, Bumpus, Chen, Hunzaker, Lee, Mann, Merhout and Volfovsky2018) and Merhout & Volfovsky (Reference Merhout and Volfovsky2018) likewise observed this effect in social media commentary where people shared political views and found that this only increased polarisation instead of opening minds to alternative views. If individuals are not already open to information, they are unlikely to engage constructively with it. This is similarly seen in science communication, where attempts at education are often perceived as judgement of the moral and practical norms of a group and have the opposite of the desired effect (Hart & Nisbett Reference Hart and Nisbet2012; Simis et al. Reference Simis, Madden, Cacciatore and Yeo2016).

Stemming from tribalism is the potential influence of collectivism (Bond Reference Bond2004) vs individualism, which may be fundamental to the polarisation of the discourse described here. Collectivism is the tendency toward group interdependence and cohesion, whereas individualism is the focus on individual goals (Hofstede Reference Hofstede1980). Social groups where individualism is valued as a group norm are more likely to behave individualistically (Jetten et al. Reference Jetten, Postmes and McAuliffe2002). In the context of the present case study, statements of belief from those attempting to promote animal welfare may be coming from an individualistic approach.

Although collectivism and individualism are culturally driven, there is evidence that social groups may also be subject to the effects of these attributes. Jetten et al. (Reference Jetten, Postmes and McAuliffe2002) applied social identity theory and social categorisation theory to demonstrate this. Social identity theory indicates that individuals incorporate the norms of their social in-group into their personal identity (Tajfel Reference Tajfel1982; Tajfel & Turner Reference Tajfel and Turner1986), while social categorisation theory describes how humans tend to categorise each other based on social group membership (Turner et al. Reference Turner, Wetherell and Hogg1989). Our previously proposed idea that equestrians become enculturated and thereby uptake the attitudinal and practical norms of equestrian culture fits well within this social identity theory (Cheung et al. Reference Cheung, Mills and Ventura2025). Social groups that have a strong social identity and deep-rooted collective social norms, such as equestrianism, are suggested to be more likely to have members that exhibit collectivist tendencies that guide their behaviour (Jetten et al. Reference Jetten, Postmes and McAuliffe2002). Those confirming the norms of equestrianism may be exhibiting a form of collectivism, which is strongly motivated to maintain social group norms (Tajfel Reference Tajfel1982; Tajfel & Turner Reference Tajfel and Turner1986). We observed this in Discourse 2, where the enculturated practices and attitudes of the equestrian industry may promote moral disengagement and protection of traditional views towards horses. We suggest that this finding underscores the need for the equestrian industry to re-ground its culture and practices in science-based evidence of horses and their welfare (McLean & McGreevy Reference McLean and McGreevy2010; Uldahl & Mellor Reference Uldahl and Mellor2025).

Regardless of the legitimacy of the arguments that whipping constitutes abuse or poor horsemanship, people find moral judgement aversive and resist it (Minson & Monin Reference Minson and Monin2012). Resistance to judgement of one’s moral self-identity may ultimately produce opposition to perspectives on horse welfare when arguments are presented in a way that leaves no room for discussion. Weiper and Vonk (Reference Weiper and Vonk2021) found that a less rigid approach to communicating with meat-eaters on moral standpoints on veganism and animal welfare was received with greater open-mindedness than when inflexible values were expressed. Ultimately, here we propose that strict arguments made by some in the social media comments we analysed may have the opposite of intended effects to help the horse world achieve progress in animal welfare. Neither argument for nor against whip use and other aversive training methods in the performance horse industry will gain traction if presented to equestrians simply as something that is deemed wrong, or to non-equestrians as a matter they just do not understand.

Possible ways forward

Since there is a paucity of research on overcoming tribalised polarisation in animal welfare, we turn to work in the social psychology of political tribalism. Relevant proposed solutions to reduce the discord caused by tribalism are considered and applied to this case study.

One way of cooperating on polarised moral issues created by tribalism is proposed by Greene (Reference Greene2013), who advocates a utilitarian approach. Greene proposes a “meta-morality” that transcends tribalism (Greene Reference Greene2013). This means finding a rational moral common ground where a solution is developed based on scientific evidence that provides the most benefit to the most individuals Greene Reference Greene2013). If this solution can include the horse, i.e. improving horse welfare, then this approach might be advisable, though as evidenced throughout the case, what it means to care for horses and how human actions affect their welfare is variably interpreted and the weight given to human versus other animal interests may vary between interest-groups.

Another potential solution is offered by Haidt (Reference Haidt2012), who encourages understanding the emotional position of others and interacting with outgroup members in what he terms “friendly” ways (2012). Furthermore, Haidt’s framework requires open-mindedness to the value of other moral viewpoints outside of one’s tribal group. This acceptance of moral pluralism is critiqued as there are moral tribes that include objectively harmful values, such as white supremacy groups (Clark & Bain-Selbo Reference Clark and Bain-Selbo2022), so this only works insofar as preservation of animal welfare is a shared value across groups. In the current context, there may be the opportunity to establish this as a guiding principle to which all can buy in, without initially defining it, or exploring related evidence.

Martha Nussbaum (Reference Nussbaum2008, Reference Nussbaum2015) argues that the harmful aspects of tribalism are reduced, in part, through love and compassion. According to Nussbaum (Reference Nussbaum2008, Reference Nussbaum2015), these emotions are a necessary guide for moral reasoning in place of the post hoc rationalisation often seen. She goes on to say that compassion and love expand our concerns to the well-being of all. This concept overlaps with some aspects of Greene’s utilitarian plan (2013) and Haidt’s consideration for other perspectives (2012). Perhaps, with compassion for the emotional experiences of others, constructive discussion could occur and polarisation of views on animal welfare might be reduced. Including horses (and other animals) in the circle of concern that Nussbaum indicates, by considering their needs as subjective beings in their own right, may further erode tribalistic speciesism.

Study considerations

This instrumental case study sought to explore the phenomena of perceived performance horse welfare violations and how they are dealt with by people on social media. Social media as a data source has potential limitations associated with the selection of sites for data collection and the inability to identify participants. The social media environment creates potential biases in the scope of individuals commenting and may promote emotional responses (Morstatter & Liu Reference Morstatter and Liu2017). We acknowledge that our specific findings are limited to the context of the social media discourse we analysed and not generalisable beyond this context, but our approach nonetheless gives insight into much wider issues relating to the social construction of animal welfare, which may inform other contexts.

Ethical considerations limited the identification of the case subjects and commentators on social media, which has prevented the potential to investigate underlying factors contributing to our findings at this time. However, we did not conduct this study with the intent of quantifying equestrian or non-equestrian perspectives, nor interpreting the meaning behind individuals’ comments. Rather we sought to identify discourse in relation to the case scenarios and understand their broader meaning based on the importation of relevant theories that are not widely considered within the field of animal welfare. This is an important distinction between other forms of qualitative research and qualitative discourse analysis.