I read Beiner's book as the intellectual biography of someone who is both a witness and actor in the contemporary renewal of political philosophy. This is why, in the reflections that follow, I focus not on his perspicacious analyses of the various authors treated in the book, but rather on the manner in which he understands the nature of this renewal and the future of the discipline itself. My reflections are based in a fundamental agreement with the definition of philosophy defended in this work. Political philosophy is a discipline that reflects on the ends of human life in order to rank and to judge them. This is why, according to Beiner, political philosophy has the ambition to present totalizing views of human nature (14).
In a note citing Aristotle, Beiner insists on the degree to which it is natural for human beings to engage in reflection on the ends of human existence. Political philosophy on this view is nothing more than an extension of what human beings do naturally: all moral or political action presupposes that we have an all-encompassing conception of the good and the just (165n26). The work of political philosophy is, then, first to make explicit these conceptions and then to judge them according to criteria and standards that allow us to order goods hierarchically. Political philosophy cannot judge in advance if such criteria exist, or, indeed, if reason can succeed in grasping them. Thus, in its inquiry it must be as open as possible to all the options presented to it. The vitality of political philosophy depends on this dialectical tension that must nourish its movement.
In his account of the history of contemporary political philosophy, Beiner perceives this dialectical tension in the authors who have proposed ambitious philosophical syntheses—Arendt, Strauss, Voegelin, Löwith, Gadamer, Foucault, and MacIntyre. Beiner characterizes these authors’ practice of political philosophy as “epic,” focusing on the very quality that other readers have found problematic in these thinkers (xi–xiv, 107, 233). By “epic” we are to understand the tendency of the above-mentioned philosophers and others with the same sensibility to present their philosophical visions by means of totalizing grand narratives of political modernity (xix–xx, 47n13, 50, 232–33). Their thought was, for better or worse, fixated on the problem of “crisis,” and they never shied away from grand generalizations about and poignant critique of modernity and its destiny (76–77, 92, 97, 122–23, 124n5, 138, 149, 232–33, 234n9). In spite of certain reservations, Beiner approves of this epic practice. Given the radicalism of its questioning, it corresponds with what he considers to be the essence of political philosophy.
The complex history of the reception of these thinkers is a task that remains to be completed. One surprising fact, however, should strike us: these authors became “popular” and indeed founded schools of thought at the very moment in which the “European civil war” was ending and liberal democracy was rising to the position of the indispensable and unsurpassable political regime of our time. These authors were all, to varying degrees, critics of modernity, and their relationship with the ideal of liberal democracy was complex. How ought we to interpret this fact? I propose a hypothesis that Beiner's book and his intellectual trajectory confirm to a certain extent. These epic theories played a compensatory role in a universe in which the intellectual horizon appeared to have narrowed suddenly. One of Beiner's principal arguments in favor of these epic authors is, indeed, that their works kept alive, at the heart of liberal democracies themselves, critical points of view that permitted them to expand the horizons of political philosophy and of the questioning of human ends.
If my interpretation is correct, this raises a fundamental question about the relationship between political philosophy and liberal democracy. Beiner wants political philosophy to be as free as possible in its inquiry concerning the ends of human life. He thus criticizes the philosophy of the late Rawls as the very incarnation of the refusal to engage in the most fundamental type of questioning. Even more, in applying the liberal “principle of toleration to philosophy itself,” Rawls is preparing the death of political philosophy (xxxiii, 98, 205–6, 212–14). What appeared to the great majority of contemporary philosophers as the work that gave new life to political philosophy was, in Beiner's view, signing its death warrant.
Beiner's book reads like a eulogy to a dying philosophical enterprise. But its relative pessimism is tempered by a judgment that is found at its conclusion: “I remain an unreserved and undeflateable optimist on the question of whether political philosophy in the epic mode has a future. Political philosophizing of the epic sort is an ineliminable aspect of the human condition” (235; cf. also 229). This eternal aspect of philosophical questioning reposes on a double observation: first, that political philosophy has never succeeded in ending the controversy on the nature of the good and the just, and second, that the vitality of political philosophy's questioning rests precisely on the total openness of horizons that is presupposed by philosophy itself. Philosophical examination, by nature of its radicalism, always goes beyond the bounds of existing political regimes, whatever might be the intrinsic value of the conception of the good and the just on which they depend.
I do not doubt for a moment Beiner's attachment to liberal democracy (137n7, 229n3), but the type of political philosophy that he defends presupposes a certain detachment from this regime if it wishes to examine, in all its magnitude, the question of the good and the just (see the question that he poses to Rawls, 205n17). Now, this type of philosophical procedure that requires all rival conceptions and alternatives to be taken seriously has become, today, much more rare and difficult in the field of political philosophy. Those who pursue this task risk being pushed to the margins of the field, tolerated as relics of a bygone age.
That said, certain notable events of our recent political history invite us to entertain a less “provincial” and narrow conception of political philosophy than that which dominates in our universities today. Whether it be the rise of the power of China, the staggering diffusion of political Islam, or the apparition of a neo-pan-Slavic ideology in Russia, these phenomena require of us a considerable effort of decentering ourselves in order that we might penetrate the political and philosophical modes of thought that are so foreign to us. Epic philosophy might have a great future before it, for these phenomena will not be understood unless they are viewed in light of the wider horizon of the quarrel over modernity that gave such luster to political philosophy during its twentieth-century revival.
