1. Outlooks, pictures, frameworks, lenses
How to people come to religious belief? There are no doubt many different ways of coming to believe something. The most common is an almost instantaneous process, as when you believe there is a chair in the corner of the room, or that your cup of coffee has gone cold. Such ordinary basic beliefs are formed pretty much involuntarily when you look round the room, or take a sip of coffee. In this kind of belief-formation process, the mind seems almost passive: the data from the senses are processed by the brain, and the belief spontaneously forms itself in the mind, ‘just like that’. There is the chair; the coffee is cold. End of story.
Very different from this is the case where there is a more active contribution from the agent, as when someone examines the evidence for a proposition before reaching a decision on what to believe. For example, she sees spots of water on the window pane, opens the window and holds her hand out, and after a moment or two's waiting, decides that the rain has now stopped.
Both these ways of believing are familiar enough, and conceivably a person might come to religious belief in one of these two relatively straightforward ways, or something analogous to them. But I suspect that what characteristically and typically turns someone into a religious believer is an altogether different kind of process, more radical in terms of the psychological changes undergone, and more comprehensive and all-pervasive in its scope and extent. People sometimes speak of contrasting ‘visions’ of the world, and one thinks here of what philosophers call a ‘worldview’ or a ‘picture of reality’. In the German language, always more comfortable with compound nouns than English, it is common to speak of an individual or a society having a Weltanschauung, literally a ‘world-outlook’. The German term has had a variety of meanings since it was first coined in the late eighteenth century by Kant (albeit in a rather special sense),Footnote 2 but has been widely adopted into English as an accepted way of referring to a general system of ideas or a comprehensive system of thought.
Although a system of thought is a complicated structure which may have many ramifications, it can often have at its centre a certain simple and vivid picture of the way things are. Sometimes such a picture may take hold of us almost without our being aware of it, as Ludwig Wittgenstein points out when he speaks of a picture ‘holding us captive’.Footnote 3 The context of that particular remark was a discussion of how the structure of language can predispose us to think in a certain way, and indeed mislead us, or ‘bewitch the intelligence,’ as he puts it elsewhere.Footnote 4 But other pictures may be more benign, as when Wittgenstein speaks of a religious outlook as involving the feeling of absolute safety: ‘nothing can injure me, whatever happens’. This sort of attitude, Wittgenstein went on to say, is obviously different from a feeling of safely about some ordinary matter such as feeling secure that you can't get whooping cough because you've had it once already. To ordinary common sense ways of thinking, you might well be safe from whooping cough, but there are obviously other diseases you could get, so to say you are safe ‘whatever happens’ is in a literal sense nonsense. But this should not lead us to dismiss such language out of hand, since it is inevitable that thinking about religion will sooner or later ‘run up against the boundaries of language’. Such religious thinking, according to Wittgenstein, springs from a tendency in the human mind that demands ‘deep respect’, as he put it, even though it might not add to our factual knowledge.Footnote 5
Despite such expressions of sympathy for religious ways of thinking, Wittgenstein was himself unable to embrace any traditional religious world picture, although he continued to wrestle with what was involved in adopting a religious outlook. In one of the places where he discusses religious belief he speaks of it as involving commitment ‘to a set of co-ordinates’. A variant reading has the more general phrase ‘a system of reference’ (einem Bezugssystem).Footnote 6 One of the thoughts underlying this comparison may be that a system of reference, or a system of measurement (for example the metric system), is something that is adopted even though it cannot itself be verified in the way that a given measurement within the system (‘this stick is three meters long’) can be verified. The metric system does not itself belong in the complete set of true propositions expressing metric measurements; rather it is a framework that generates the possibility of such measurements. So Wittgenstein may be suggesting that a religious outlook or belief-system does not refer to objects or items within the world but instead provides a general framework for understanding and interpreting it.
But not all frameworks are equally congenial to everyone. If we pursue the metric analogy, it is clear that there are some anti-Europeans in early twenty-first century Great Britain who deplore the adoption of the metric system, and greatly prefer more ‘human’ measurements like the foot and the yard, originally based on traditional ways of pacing out distances. Whether or not we sympathise with this, there is no contradiction, in this type of debate, in someone saying ‘you stick to your system and I'll stick to mine’. Neither system is ‘the right one’ in any fundamental sense; nor are they really in conflict (though of course people may be anxious for political or cultural reasons to champion one over the other).
What is at stake in the measurement example is thus not truth, but convenience or utility or pleasingness, or something of that sort. But in the religious case, when people give their allegiance to a given framework or picture of reality such as theism, they do so because they believe it to be true. Perhaps, in so far as it may shape our thoughts and actions, it can be compared to a ‘system of co-ordinates’; but for the believer this is not just a matter of convenience or personal preference. It is taken by the believer to be a system that genuinely reflects the structure of reality, uncovers the true purpose and meaning of human existence, and serves as a valid and trustworthy guide to how we should live our lives. And this in turn raises the question of how we can decide whether the theistic picture of reality is true? How we can know whether to accept it and put it at the centre of our outlook on the world?
The religious sceptic will already have answered this epistemic question by saying we can't know, and will go on to say that in the absence of any compelling evidence there can be no reason to consider accepting it. One has to admit that there is a certain robust reasonableness about this, calling to mind the definition of a sceptic (best uttered in a dry and slightly ironic tone) as ‘one who prefers his statements to be true’. If we dramatize the process of assessing a picture of reality and imagine the religious worldview as a picture in the literal sense, like a painting hung in a gallery, the sceptic can be thought of as one who stands back, scrutinizes it carefully, raises a doubtful eyebrow, shakes his head and calmly walks on.
The simile does not quite work, however. For if we accept the idea that a worldview functions as a ‘framework of interpretation’, then it will hardly be comparable to a particular painting hung in a gallery alongside others. On reflection it is clear that a framework of interpretation could not be the kind of thing that can be assessed in the way a single item in a collection can be assessed, since it is not an ‘item’ or ‘object’ at all. If we have to find a simile for the kind of thing it is, we might say it is more like a lens: not an item in the collection but that which enables us to see the collection in the first place, or to bring it into proper focus so as to grasp its significance.
Unfortunately though, the ‘lens’ model is not quite satisfactory either, or at least it raises further difficulties of its own. Taken one way, it might suggest an implanted lens in the eye, like a pair of spectacles which it is impossible to take off. One thinks here of Immanuel Kant's theory that our human experience of the world is necessarily structured in terms of notions like space and time and causality, so that we cannot but process the world around us in these terms, and experience it accordingly.Footnote 7 But using this kind of lens analogy for a religious worldview would imply that we necessarily have to view or interpret the world in a certain way, the way suggested by a religious perspective. Yet it is obvious that this is not so. Many people start off with a religious outlook, perhaps inherited from parents and teachers, and then come to discard it (just as, conversely, there are cases of agnostics or atheists who change from a neutral or anti-religious to a religious worldview). So there is nothing necessary or unavoidable about understanding or experiencing the world in a religious way.
We therefore need a better model for what a religious world picture is like, a model that presents it not as a pair of spectacles that cannot be taken off, nor on the other hand as an object or item in the gallery that is simply there in front of us to be scrutinized and evaluated. We need to find room for the idea that a religious worldview can be adopted or rejected, but we also need to do justice to the thought that such adoption or rejection is not a ‘flat’ process of detached inspection and assessment, but something more dynamic, something that engages us at a deeper level of involvement.
2. Transformation and truth
The examples I began with, seeing an coffee cup on the table, or deciding if it is raining, tend to imply a fairly straightforward conception in which the world which has such and such features – and that in the light of how those features present themselves to us we have to decide how to conduct ourselves towards it. But humans are not just passive observers of the world; we constantly interact with it. That much is true even of non-human animals. Yet in our human case there is an additional aspect, a kind of creative dimension. Instead of merely processing the data from the five senses in ways determined by the innate structure of our sense organs and nervous systems and shaped by our previous perceptions, humans have additional faculties, active creative powers of reflecting on and interpreting their experience. A group of children exploring a garden will not simply map it out and find their way round, but will, even from a very young age, transform it creatively into a rich locus of imaginative play, places to hide, scary dark corners to avoid, bushes that are ‘monsters’ to be confronted, banks that are places of safety and refuge.
The sober rationalist may dismiss this as ‘mere imagination’, or may take a more functional approach, talking of play as a useful mechanism which affords practice in learning to deal with what will later be the practical hazards of adult life. But far more is involved than that. In virtue of our unique conceptual powers and sensibilities, all of us do much more than encounter the world; we transform it, creating out of the raw data of perception a whole rich ‘lifeworld’, a world full of meaning and value. In other words, in our basic relation to the world there is, in the human case, a kind of poetry, in the strict etymological sense of poēsis, a ‘making’. What the Nobel Laureate Seamus Heaney discusses in the following passage in reference to his own literary activity as a poet applies in a wider sense to the entire transformative relation in which human beings stand to the world:
In order that human beings bring about the most radiant conditions for themselves to inhabit, it is essential that the vision of reality which poetry offers should be transformative, more than just a printout of the given circumstances of its time and place. The poet who would be most the poet has to attempt an act of writing that outstrips the conditions even as it observes them.Footnote 8
Because we often think of imaginative writing as ‘fiction’, it is easy to misunderstand the point being made here as the banal claim that human beings have the capacity to ‘make things up’. Much literary output is indeed fictional, in the sense that it does not record historical occurrences or consist of literal factual propositions. But Heaney's point about human beings bringing about the ‘most radiant conditions for themselves to inhabit’ is a much more subtle and important one than that. Part of what he is saying is that the writer never produces a mere ‘printout of given circumstances’. Indeed, on reflection it is clear that we cannot really grasp what such a raw ‘printout’ would be: there can never be, for humans, an uninterpreted world, a world that is not always already a world of significance, a world where some features are salient because of what they mean for us, and the way they point beyond themselves to other elements of our lifeworld.
The key concept at work here is not ‘fiction’ in the sense of making up things that are literally false, but transformation. When Heaney says that poetry should have a ‘transformative’ function, he does not mean that it distorts or alters things, changing a given item into something else. What the poet deals with, as the passage makes clear, is the real world: he has a ‘vision of reality’. It is a vision that sharply embraces and delineates what is there in view, disclosing its significance. Poetry is thus not fiction, but truth, truth in the sense Martin Heidegger famously referred to when he harked back to the etymology of the Greek word for truth, alētheia, literally an ‘unconcealment’ (in German Unverborgenheit), a disclosing of what is (partly) hidden.Footnote 9
Thinking more about Heaney's idea of a ‘transformative vision’, we can see that it has application far beyond the literary domain. When humans interpret the world, as they necessarily must, what happens is a kind of co-operation between the reality that is there before them and their own attempt at understanding it. And that is never a final and completed process; by its nature it engages the restlessness of the human search for meaning. So again when Heaney talks of the poet's writing ‘outstripping the conditions even as it observes them’, we can see something of the elusive mystery of Being. The nature of reality is never finally packaged up and definitively presented to us, and we always reach beyond the given in our human struggle to understand it.
The restlessness and the struggle that are inevitably involved here again mark a contrast between us and the other animals. For them, the world is ‘given’ in a relatively determined and fixed way; they are not confronted with a mystery of being, because they are simply wholly absorbed in dealing with it in ways directly related to their immediate needs. In this sense, they are ‘at home’ in the world, in a manner we can never be – a point powerfully underlined by Rilke in his Duino Elegies:
Once we have got this far, it is possible to see that a purely science-based understanding of the world can never be a neutral way of describing what is ‘given’. Rather it is one particular way of dealing with reality – a way that involves a deliberate decision to filter out the interpreted world of meaning and value in favour of certain structural and quantitative descriptions that are suitable for the purposes of explanation and prediction. This is not at all to disparage science, whose achievements have been enormous. But at the very least it opens the way for the possibility of alternative visions of reality, which cannot be dismissed as mere ‘flights of imagination’ or ‘fiction’, but which have a right to be considered as potential disclosures of the meaning of the world we inhabit. Theistic belief, belief in a personal Being who is the ultimate ground underlying the mystery of being in the universe and the source of its meaning and value, is just such a vision, a transformative vision that brings into salience features of the world which simply drop out of view in the quantitative printouts of particle interactions, or (to take another example) in the Buddhist style conception of reality as an impersonal flow of conditions that arise and pass away, leaving our own deepest individuality and selfhood as nothing more than an illusion.
3. The double helix
The process of coming to accept a certain vision of reality is not only transformative in the sense of changing what is seen, or disclosing what was not seen before. It is also transformative in the sense that it changes the experiencing subject, altering the way in which he or she is able to see things. In other words, the transformation involved when a religious worldview is adopted is a dual transformation: not only does a whole new reality come into view, not only is the world, as it were, transfigured, but the subject who experiences that world is also made new. One might say, following the famous image of William Blake, that the ‘doors of perception’ are cleansed.Footnote 11 And this is not just an epistemic change, a change in our ability of discern or know certain things, but it is also a moral change, a change in the character and dispositions of the perceiver – indeed the two types of change are inextricably linked.
It follows that such a process, unlike the more routine types of belief formation discussed earlier, is a highly dynamic one. Unlike the involuntary mechanisms which automatically generate my belief that there is table in front of me when I open my eyes, or the ‘flat’ process of deciding what to believe, when I dispassionately evaluate the evidence and come to a conclusion, I am instead caught up in an complex upward spiral of change, an interactive double helix, if you will, where the world starts to look different, and simultaneously my character, as I confront the world, starts to undergo a radical shift.
Now it might seem that this leads to a vicious circle, or, to put it another way, that I could never gain any entry point into the upward spiral in the first place. If I have to undergo interior change in order accept a certain worldview, or in order to begin to discern something of what it discloses, how will such necessary interior change be possible at an earlier stage, before the transformed vision or the world has already begun to work on me? Perhaps I already have to be a certain kind of person in order for the vision to be available, or in order such a vision to take a grip on my imagination; while conversely, if I am not such a person, then the vision could never take hold of me in the first place. If this is right, it begins to look as if the world is going to be divided into two groups of people, those whose lives are imbued and informed with a certain picture of reality, or who are perhaps, in Wittgenstein's phrase, ‘held captive’ by it, and those who are outside the charmed (or deluded) circle, and have no way of breaking into it.
On this kind of account of the difference between believers and non-believers, there is nothing much that either group can do to change. To put the matter in the way some theologians have understood it, there will be the ‘saved’, already predisposed and pre-destined to believe and accept the true worldview, and the ‘damned’ whose ‘hearts are hardened’, and who could never come to believe.Footnote 12 How then can anyone break into the ‘upward spiral’ of belief? The answer given by those who take a strict ‘predestinarian’ line is that no one can, unless they are already divinely so predisposed. On this view, salvation cannot be earned, and religious belief cannot be attained by any voluntary process of evaluating the evidence or scrutinizing the facts, or indeed any other human voluntary activity, but can only come as a free unmerited gift, by divine grace.
For present purposes however, we can pursue our reflections on the psychology of belief-formation without being drawn into such theological niceties. The metaphor of the ‘upward spiral’ or ‘double helix’, introduced a moment ago, suggests that the adoption of a belief system or a worldview is not a matter of simply coming up against a religious belief system and then straightforwardly assenting to it or rejecting it. Rather, it may involve successive stages of transformation, both in the subject and in the way the relevant picture of reality takes shape. To make this clearer, let me go back to the ‘picture gallery’ metaphor I was using earlier, but this time consider not one of the paintings hung on the wall, but a prism, fashioned of stained glass and suspended from a cord high up in middle of the room. Many visitors ignore it or give it a wide berth, hurrying past to inspect the individual paintings. But others, without perhaps quite knowing why, linger and find themselves moving near it or standing under it. Once the resistance to moving in that direction has been set aside, the room begins, from this position, to look different. Patterns of light and colour in the air and on the walls become visible and begin to glow and shine, in turn bringing about changes in the attitude of the subject. She ceases to be a detached spectator, bent on inspecting and assessing the various objects in the gallery, and starts to be moved: responsive feelings of delight and awe begin to surface. And now she begins to be enthralled, as from this vantage point all manner of objects in the room are illuminated by the prism, bring into focus complex new relationships, which begin to form a wondrous pattern. The meaning of the whole exhibition, before occluded, now comes vividly into view.
Without labouring the simile, which like all similes cannot be pushed too far, it may at least indicate a possible way out of the impasse described earlier – the problem of there being no way to break into the ‘upward spiral’ of belief. What begins as a mere minimal willingness to pause and look around, becomes, as the transformations take affect, an attentive looking, and then a delighted looking; and at each stage, richer dimensions of reality come into focus. As we progress up the spiral of committed attention, we ourselves undergo interior change, and this leads to changes in perception, awareness of new relationships, which in their turn generate further transformations, both in the reality that is presented to me, and in how I perceive its meaning.
4. A new model of religious understanding
One of the implications of what I've been saying is that we need a new model of religious understanding.Footnote 13 Now the phrase ‘religious understanding’ is open to various interpretations, but I propose we construe it in what I take to be the most intuitively obvious way, namely adverbially, as it were, as referring to a certain mode or manner of understanding the world. In similar fashion we speak, for example, of ‘scientific understanding’, of ‘musical understanding’, or of ‘psychoanalytic understanding’; and in all these domains we mean a characteristic way of relating to or interpreting reality, or some part of it. The question about religious understanding then becomes what is it to relate to the world religiously? or what is it to understand things in a religious way?
Let me pursue the analogy with musical understanding. By this phrase someone might perhaps have in mind the kind of theoretical intellectual understanding that musicologists aim at – for example being able to expound the difference between ‘just intonation’ (where the ratios of notes are related by small whole numbers) and ‘equal temperament’ (where all notes are defined as multiples of the same basic interval). But in contrast to this kind of abstract or theoretical approach, one might be thinking instead of the kind of rich cognitive and emotional awareness that we attribute to someone when we say, in ordinary parlance, that he or she is a ‘very musical’ person. These two different kinds of musical understanding seem logically, psychologically and causally quite distinct. It seems possible, for instance, that someone could score very well in a musicological examination where the candidates are required to write an essay on equal temperament, or some similar topic, while not having much, if any, musical understanding in the latter sense of having a rich musical sensibility; and conversely, it seems clear that someone could be gifted with outstanding intuitive musical awareness without any grasp of theory (an actual example is the opera singer Njabulo Madlala, who at the age of nineteen auditioned at the Guildhall and was offered a full scholarship even though, as he subsequently informed the adjudicators, he had had no musical education and could not even read music).Footnote 14
The basic thought here is that one can have a kind of direct, intuitive, way of understanding something that needs to be distinguished from a detached, analytic way of approaching it. Iain McGilchrist, in his groundbreaking book The Master and His Emissary, draws on recent brain science concerning the different functions of the two hemispheres of the brain. And he speaks of
two ways of being in the world, both of which are essential. One is to allow things to be present to us in all their embodied particularity, with all their changeability and impermanence and their interconnectedness, as part of a whole which is forever in flux. In this world we, too, feel connected to what we experience, part of that whole, not confined in subjective isolation from a world that is viewed as objective. The other is to step outside the flow of experience and ‘experience’ our experience in a special way: to re-present the world in a form that is less truthful, but apparently clearer, and therefore cast in a form which is more useful for manipulation of the world and one another. This world is explicitly abstracted, compartmentalised, fragmented … essentially lifeless. From this world we feel detached, but in relation to it we are powerful.Footnote 15
The kind of ‘power’ McGilchrist refers to here is very seductive for philosophers. We like to feel we are detached scrutineers, above the fray, mapping out the logical structure of various theories and pronouncing our lordly judgements about their viability. But if McGilchrist is right, there is a danger in always allowing the logical, analytic, detached mode of awareness [the ‘left-brain’ skills, if you will] to predominate in our philosophical thinking. Similarly, Eleonore Stump has recently deplored analytic philosophy's tendency to ‘suppose that left-brain skills alone will reveal to us all that is philosophically interesting about the world’.Footnote 16
The key point here is that much moral and religious discourse is multilayered – it carries a rich charge of symbolic significance that resonates with us on many different levels of understanding, not all of them fully grasped by the reflective, analytic mind. Any plausible account of the human condition must make space for the crucial role of imaginative, symbolic, and poetic forms of understanding in deepening our awareness of ourselves and the reality we inhabit. This in turn suggests it's a serious error to try to reduce the religious outlook to a bald set of factual assertions whose literal propositional content is then to be clinically isolated and assessed.Footnote 17 Perhaps the kind of connection the religious outlook searches for cannot be achieved by the critical scrutiny of the intellect alone, but requires a process of attunement, or Stimmung, to use a Heideggerian term,Footnote 18 a moral and spiritual opening of the self to the presence of the divine.
One implication of this (with which I will close) is that we need a new epistemology for thinking about religious belief and its basis. Both the Dawkins-type critics of religion, and (interestingly) many mainstream natural theologians as well, operate with an epistemology of control. We stand back, scrutinize the evidence, retaining our power and autonomy in a ‘left-brain’ kind of way, and pronounce on the existence or otherwise of God. But why assume that the divine presence will detectable via intellectual analysis of formal arguments or observational data? The ancient Judaeo-Christian idea of the Deus absconditus (the ‘hidden God’) suggests a deity who is less interested in proving his existence or demonstrating his power than in the moral conversion and freely given love of his creatures, and in guiding aright the steps of those who ‘seek him with all their heart’, in Pascal's phrase.Footnote 19 And when we think about the means of such conversion, it becomes clear that it could never operate through detached intellectual argument alone, or through the dispassionate evaluation of ‘spectator evidence’, to use Paul Moser's label.Footnote 20 Hence those who insist on casting the ‘God question’ in a form that is apt for evaluation by ‘left brain skills’ alone may be missing the core issue that is at stake in the adoption of a religious worldview. The question is not ‘Can I, while scrutinizing the data and remaining detached and fully in control, satisfy myself of the rational acceptability of belief in God?’; but rather something like the following: ‘How can I embark on a path of moral and spiritual change which might open me to a deeper awareness of something that I now glimpse only faintly.’
In short, this is an area where we need to relinquish the epistemology of control, and substitute an epistemology of receptivity. This is not special pleading on behalf of religion, since there are all sorts of other areas of life – appreciation of poetry, of music, entering into any kind of personal relationship, where we need to be ‘porous’, to use Martha Nussbaum's term: not hard, detached, critical evaluators, but open, yielding, receptive listeners.Footnote 21 Otherwise, while we pride ourselves of being in control and evaluating the evidence, we will actually be closing ourselves off from allowing the evidence to become manifest to us.
So this is what I mean by moving towards a ‘more humane’ religious epistemology. Instead of being fixated on scientific models, and on impersonal, spectator evidence, we should be prepared to allow that there are many areas of human life, including the domain of religion, but by no means confined to this, where we have to give up the fantasy of being lofty, detached evaluators, surveying the data and pronouncing our verdict. Whether we like it or not, we have to be involved, to be receptive. This does not mean being gullible, or blindly accepting the first idea that comes into our minds. But it does mean that we have to be prepared to listen, to be porous, to be permeable, to allow the possibility that there are parts of reality that have a transformative effect on us, and that, if we allow ourselves to be transformed, we may be taken to new levels of awareness and understanding. The analogies I've mentioned, with literary awareness, with poetic awareness, with musical awareness, and with personal awareness, with our intimate relations with others, may sound alarm bells for those who want to keep knowledge clinical, detached, and scientific. But being human involves being open to all aspects of reality, and adopting an epistemology that allows for this may be a way for us all, philosophers of religion included, to become more fully human.
