The 2008 Agreement for Co-operation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of India Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy [“123 Agreement”] has a clear purpose: to “enable full civil nuclear energy co-operation between the Parties”.Footnote 1 This may seem simple enough, but language that is ostensibly clear can easily be made to appear murky and uncertain, contestable and confusing. Apart from questions of interpretation, the 123 Agreement also challenges the international lawyer by raising issues of, inter alia, international trade law, the law related to nuclear non-proliferation, and the law of development. Chimni locates it within a much larger shift that he sees in post-colonial India from an earlier “anti-imperialist dualism [… to a] non-dualist logic”.Footnote 2 While the 123 Agreement is certainly not unique among treaties in involving a number of areas of international law, that it does so makes a critical assessment of it more complicated, yet also more interesting.
This article examines the 123 Agreement within the context of the International Law Commission's (ILC) work on international liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international law. It begins by sketching the black letter law of the 123 Agreement and situates it within a particular context of geopolitical change. It then explores the two international instruments that resulted from the ILC's work on international liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international law and examines how the underlying international environmental law principles that they reflect might interact with the 123 Agreement in practice. Attention is paid to three issues in particular, namely how international environmental law has developed to interact with vaguely worded environmental protection provisions, such as those in the 123 Agreement, and the role of experts in this regard, the issue of civil nuclear liability, and the question of what international law might require for environmental impact assessments under the 123 Agreement to pass muster. Reference is made to the International Court of Justice's (ICJ) 2010 decision in the Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay.Footnote 3
I. The 2008 United States-India Nuclear Co-Operation Agreement
For decades following the 1974 nuclear test at Pokhran, the international community kept India at arm's length on all things nuclear. While no one had argued that India had a legal obligation as such not to develop nuclear weapons, if only because it remained outside the fold of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),Footnote 4 and because a corresponding customary international law obligation on the matter remained doubtful, the Indian test clearly flouted the broad international consensus that existed at the time according to which all states should be enticed into joining the NPT and should not do anything that would undermine its objectives. India, however, has always criticized the NPT as a matter of principle, and it continues to do so. According to it, the NPT is nothing more than institutionalized “nuclear apartheid”,Footnote 5 a treaty that mocks the notion of the sovereign equality of states by distinguishing between nuclear weapon states (NWS) and non-nuclear weapon states, and affording the former certain rights of retention of nuclear weapons while forbidding the latter from even acquiring such weapons.
A shifting geopolitical landscape in the first decade of the new millennium, however, saw a radical change in the international community's posture towards India on the nuclear issue. Led by the then United States President, George W. Bush, a new consensus began to emerge, albeit fittingly, that challenged, and would eventually overcome, the theretofore accepted wisdom according to which nuclear “hold-outs”, such as India, should never be “rewarded” for their refusal to become parties to the NPT. The fact remained that decades had passed since India's Pokhran test, and India showed no signs of any eagerness to join the NPT regime. The reasons for this are complex, but some explanation lies in the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons in South Asia, particularly from India's perspective as regards Pakistan, and the failure of state parties to the NPT, but particularly the NWS, to conclude the “pursu[it of] negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control”.Footnote 6 The international community seemed to face a stark choice. As then Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Mohamed El Baradei put it in June 2006, “[e]ither we begin finding creative, outside-the-box solutions or the international nuclear safeguards regime will become obsolete”.Footnote 7
The first major step in the road to the 123 Agreement was a joint statement between the United States and India on 18 July 2005 (Joint Statement). This highlighted the developments that would unfold between the states in the years to come toward a comprehensive nuclear deal. The second half of the Joint Statement is the most interesting in this regard. In that part, the United States commended India for its record on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and stated that, “as a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology, India should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other such states”.Footnote 8 The United States went on to commit itself to helping India achieve “full civil nuclear energy cooperation”Footnote 9 and expressed a determination to work to change both the domestic legal framework in the United States and the international legal regime to facilitate this objective. In exchange, India expressed its commitment to “assume the same responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits and advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology, such as the United States”.Footnote 10 For India, this would entail the separation of its civil nuclear energy facilities from its military nuclear facilities, placing the former under the IAEA safeguards system, and continuing its policy of no unilateral nuclear testing, among other commitments.
While the 123 Agreement would ultimately succeed in realizing the ambitious undertakings of both President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in the Joint Statement, significant changes were necessary in both the domestic legal framework in the United States and the international legal regime to give effect to it. Domestically, President Bush had to convince the United States Congress to make an exception to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA). Section 123(a)(2) of the AEA prohibits the United States from engaging in nuclear co-operation with any state unless “IAEA safeguards [… are] maintained with respect to all nuclear materials in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such state, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere”.Footnote 11 A legislative adjustment was necessary to enable the United States to conclude a nuclear co-operation agreement with India.
The Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 (Hyde Act), although far from uncontentious in its passage through Congress, essentially addressed this domestic legal hurdle.Footnote 12 It opened the way for President Bush to conclude a nuclear co-operation agreement with India provided that: a Nuclear Suppliers Group waiver was secured; India separated its civil nuclear energy facilities from its military nuclear facilities and filed a declaration with the IAEA as regards the former; India agreed to place these same facilities under perpetual IAEA safeguards; India made significant headway, in conformity with IAEA standards, toward an Additional Protocol as regards its civil nuclear energy facilities; India assisted the United States on non-proliferation matters and in moving towards a possible fissile material cutoff treaty; and India improved its nuclear export controls.Footnote 13 President Bush made the required determination that these steps had been achieved in a Presidential Determination on 10 September 2008,Footnote 14 and the 2008 United States-India Nuclear Co-operation Approval and Non-Proliferation Enhancement Act,Footnote 15 which was signed into law soon thereafter, recognized this progress. It also paved the way for both states to sign the 123 Agreement on 10 October of the same year, effectively operationalizing in treaty form the undertakings that the United States and India had made in the Joint Statement over three years earlier.Footnote 16
Although the 123 Agreement involves a number of subfields of international law, it is particularly interesting to view it against the backdrop of international environmental law given the increasing concern for the environment of recent decades. According to the 123 Agreement's preambular language, peaceful nuclear activities “must be undertaken with a view to protecting the environment”.Footnote 17 The United States and India must also co-operate in following best practices to minimize any environmental impact caused by radioactive, chemical, or thermal contamination that may arise from their civil nuclear energy co-operation and in related health and safety matters.Footnote 18 Even though these are the only provisions of the 123 Agreement that expressly mention the environment, the entire corpus of international environmental law hovers in the background, binding both states. The concern with the environment, of course, is the concern with what the ICJ referred to in Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons as the “living space, the quality of life and the very health of human beings, including generations unborn”.Footnote 19
II. The International Law Commission And International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law
Given the international environmental law implications of nuclear energy in general and the 123 Agreement in particular, it is useful to assess the 123 Agreement within the context of what is one of the ILC's most significant contributions to international environmental law to date, its work on international liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international law.Footnote 20 The ILC's conclusions on this topic usefully complement and consolidate the already existing international treaty regime related to nuclear activities that deals with such matters as the regulation or prohibition of nuclear activities, obligations of assistance and notification in cases of nuclear accidents, nuclear waste, damage, and reparation.Footnote 21
Like the 2001 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,Footnote 22 the ILC's work on international liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international law has not (yet) resulted in the adoption of a treaty. Rather, it has resulted in articles dealing with the prevention of transboundary harm from hazardous activities, the 2001 Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities (Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm)Footnote 23 and allocation of loss principles, the 2006 Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm Arising out of Hazardous Activities (Allocation of Loss Principles).Footnote 24 The General Assembly has since commended both of these instruments to the attention of states, without prejudice as to possible future action.Footnote 25
Before proceeding to an in-depth examination of the Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm and the Allocation of Loss Principles, however, it is necessary to consider their status as such under international law. Are they “good law”, in whole or in part? This is not an easy question to answer, and one should be careful not to simply assert as law norms that may make for good policy without having first scrupulously interrogated the law-making process. Clearly, since neither instrument is a treaty, neither instrument has binding legal force as a matter of international treaty law.Footnote 26 As for customary international law, that “evidence of”, to quote Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the ICJ, “a general practice accepted as law”,Footnote 27 scholars have arrived at different conclusions. Boyle and Chinkin's research, for example, suggests that the ILC's work on international liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international law largely codifies but insufficiently progressively develops international environmental law in this area.Footnote 28 By slight contrast, Birnie, Boyle, and Redgwell argue that the Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm “essentially codify existing obligations of environmental impact assessment, notification, consultation, monitoring, prevention, and diligent control of activities likely to cause transboundary harm”,Footnote 29 and that the Allocation of Loss Principles codify the existing law on the allocation of loss, but only in part.Footnote 30
The views of states as to the status under international law of the Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm and the Allocation of Loss Principles have been inconsistent. During the Sixth Committee's discussion of the topic in late October 2010, New Zealand, speaking on its own behalf and also for Australia and Canada, praised both instruments for offering “authoritative guidance for the conduct of all States [… and for being] a major contribution to the achievement of a consistent, coherent and fair international regime on the topic”.Footnote 31 Mexico and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya largely concurred.Footnote 32 Vietnam characterized the two instruments as representing “significant step[s] forward in the development of international law on the topic[s]”.Footnote 33 Other states, however, though not outright condemnatory, suggested something of a disjuncture between the instruments and the current state of international law. Malaysia, for example, argued that some of the provisions in the instruments were vaguely worded.Footnote 34 India asserted that the understanding of “damage” was overly expansive.Footnote 35 The view of the United States in the Sixth Committee that the instruments were “[c]learly innovative and aspirational in character”Footnote 36 echoed its blunt view of just a couple of months earlier that “[b]oth the draft articles and draft principles go beyond the present state of international law and practice, and are clearly innovative and aspirational in character, rather than descriptive of current law or State practice”.Footnote 37
The ICJ could have clarified this state of affairs in Pulp Mills by expressly stating that the ILC's work on international liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international law reflects customary international law, in whole or in part,Footnote 38 but it chose not to do so. This was unfortunate, not simply because Uruguay had referred to the Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm as being a reflection of general international law,Footnote 39 thus giving the ICJ an excellent opportunity to “take the bait”, but also because, it can be argued, the ICJ has a special role, indeed, one might say a special responsibility, to clarify international law. The various declarations and separate and dissenting opinions appended to the judgment also avoided commenting on the status of the Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm and the Allocation of Loss Principles under customary international law.
An exacting analysis of the extent to which the ILC's work on international liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international law reflects customary international law lies outside the scope of this article. In any event, this whole debate as to “status” may be misguided. It may be misguided because of the artificial divide between “soft law” and “hard law”, between those norms that are asserted not to be binding as a matter of law and those that are. The line between lex ferenda, the law as it might be, and lex lata, the law as it is,Footnote 40 here as elsewhere in the law, often appears in shades of grey, with a “kitchen sink” approach seeming to prevail on these complex and fundamental questions of law.Footnote 41 Having said that, it seems that many of the underlying international environmental law principles reflected in the two international instruments that resulted from the ILC's work on international liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international law surpass the threshold of that which Dupuy refers to as a “certain intellectual perception”,Footnote 42 which is to say, the threshold for those norms that can command the attention of international decision-makers, states among them, when they engage with the law in this area.Footnote 43
A. Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities
Over the course of nineteen individual articles, the Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm put forward a comprehensive framework of best practices for preventing transboundary harm from hazardous activities. When read alongside their Commentaries, they flesh out the duties of states that the ICJ has but broadly alluded to in its case-law,Footnote 44 for example, in Corfu Channel, Footnote 45Nuclear Weapons,Footnote 46 and Case Concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project.Footnote 47 As the ICJ put it in Pulp Mills, each state must “use all the means at its disposal in order to avoid activities which take place in its territory, or in any area under its jurisdiction, causing significant damage to the environment of another State”.Footnote 48
The Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm apply to, and only to, “activities not prohibited by international law which involve a risk of causing significant transboundary harm through their physical consequences”.Footnote 49 This involves four principal considerations. The first of these is a qualitative assessment, namely that the activities at issue not rise to the level of an internationally wrongful act of state as the law of state responsibility understands this concept.Footnote 50 In other words, the activities at issue are wholly lawful, as would be the case in principle with civil nuclear energy activities under the 123 Agreement. The second consideration focuses on the locus of the activities: they must be “‘planned or […] carried out’ in the territory or otherwise under the jurisdiction or control of a State”.Footnote 51 Third, the activities have to trigger a “risk of causing significant transboundary harm”.Footnote 52 Finally, the consequences at issue must involve physical consequences, as opposed to, for example, consequences of a socioeconomic or monetary nature alone.Footnote 53
Assuming that the activities at issue meet these four principal considerations, they will trigger the application of certain rights and duties of states. The Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm's core prevention article requires that the state of origin “take all appropriate measures to prevent significant transboundary harm or at any event to minimize the risk thereof”.Footnote 54 This article, Article 3, imposes an obligation, not an option. This requires a proactive posture of due diligence, prevention policies both “on the books” and implemented and enforced in practice, policies that are “generally considered to be appropriate and proportional to the degree of risk of transboundary harm in the particular instance”.Footnote 55 What is at issue is what the reasonably prudent state would do or abstain from doing under the circumstances, as the “degree of care in question is that expected of a good Government”.Footnote 56 What is at issue is what Pisillo Mazzeschi refers to as not a “negative duty to abstain, but rather a positive duty to protect”.Footnote 57
This duty of prevention is meant to operate in a transparent and co-operative manner between the states concerned,Footnote 58 and the state of origin must only permit the operation of covered activities when such activities have satisfied an environmental impact assessment.Footnote 59 If the state of origin's environmental impact assessment suggests that activities risk causing significant transboundary harm, then the affected state or states can prevent the state of origin from authorizing such activities for up to six months.Footnote 60 Any state concerned, at any time, can trigger consultations among states concerned as regards the prevention of significant transboundary harm,Footnote 61 and while the state of origin can ultimately continue with the covered activities despite objections raised, it must “take into account the interests of the State likely to be affected in case it decides to authorize the activity to be pursued, without prejudice to the rights of any State likely to be affected”.Footnote 62 The Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm also give any state with “reasonable grounds to believe that an activity planned or carried out in the State of origin may involve a risk of causing significant transboundary harm to it”Footnote 63 a proprio motu power to ask that the state of origin notify it, though the state of origin is under no duty to halt the activity in question.Footnote 64
It is noteworthy that the Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm continually emphasize the importance of information exchange. This applies generally between the states concernedFootnote 65 and also involves a duty by the states concerned to seek the views of the public and to disclose to them information related to covered activities and the harm and risks involved.Footnote 66 The state of origin must also promptly inform any state likely to be affected when an emergency occurs.Footnote 67 In this regard, it is not surprising that the Declaration by the IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety in Vienna on 20 June 2011 stressed the importance of transparent, prompt, adequate, and ongoing information exchange in the light of the nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station that was caused by the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami of 11 March 2011.Footnote 68
As such, the Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm apply to any internationally lawful activity that can reasonably be said to risk causing significant transboundary harm through its physical consequences. They apply to both nuclear and non-nuclear activities without distinction, assuming that they meet the required test.Footnote 69 Certainly, there will be circumstances in which the Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm will not apply to a state's non-nuclear activities, but it seems unlikely that they would ever not apply to a state's civil nuclear energy activities.
B. Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm Arising Out of Hazardous Activities
As stated above, the ILC divided its work on international liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international law into two subfields: articles dealing with the prevention of transboundary harm from hazardous activities, the Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm, and allocation of loss principles, the Allocation of Loss Principles. Both sets of model rules are meant to be read and understood cohesively and consistently, but they have different aims: the former seeks to prevent harm while the latter allocates loss in the event of damage. Neither presumes state responsibility for an internationally wrongful act as such.
The Allocation of Loss Principles have as their purposes “(a) […] ensur[ing] prompt and adequate compensation to victims of transboundary damage; and (b) […] preserv[ing] and protect[ing] the environment in the event of transboundary damage, especially with respect to mitigation of damage to the environment and its restoration or reinstatement”,Footnote 70 and recognize that damage can be caused to any, all, or a combination of persons, property, and the environment.Footnote 71 They focus, as Principle 4 makes clear, on operator liability.Footnote 72 Principle 4's “prompt and adequate compensation” provisions envisage that each state will allow for operator liability and that certain funding arrangements will be set up, by operators themselves, across industries, and by the state itself, to facilitate compensation for victims.Footnote 73 Thus, operators of activities that risk causing transboundary damage from hazardous activities carry particular burdens in the event of actualized harm, backstopped by the state.
It is important to note, however, that the subtle distinction between the definitions of state of origin contained in the Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm and in the Allocation of Loss Principles—“State in the territory or otherwise under the jurisdiction or control of which the activities referred to in Article 1 are planned or are carried out”Footnote 74 in the former versus, merely, “State in the territory or otherwise under the jurisdiction or control of which the hazardous activity is carried out”Footnote 75 in the latter—may have the effect in law of shielding a state that would be considered a state of origin for prevention of transboundary harm purposes from any residual obligation of compensation under the ILC's allocation of loss scheme, with arguably inequitable implications.Footnote 76
In Corfu Channel, the ICJ recognized that the fact of and vagaries related to a state's “exclusive territorial control […] within its frontiers”Footnote 77 can warrant imposing a lesser burden of proof on a claimant state,Footnote 78 and something of this seems to be behind the fact that the Allocation of Loss Principles do not require that the claimant prove fault on the part of the operator.Footnote 79 The reasoning behind this seems to be that it would be unreasonable to expect a claimant to prove fault in the light of technological complexities, the complicated reality of trade secrets, and other concerns.Footnote 80 A survey of state practice of nuclear accidents that includes the Fukuryu Maru (“Lucky Dragon”) and Chernobyl incidents seems to support a strict liability standard,Footnote 81 and this is to be contrasted, of course, with the due diligence standard that generally obtains for state responsibility in this context.Footnote 82
In addition to the inquiry as to liability being squarely focused on the operator and fault not being required for the claimant in making his, her, or its case against the operator, the Allocation of Loss Principles require certain things of states in the event of covered damage. The state of origin must notify both the states affected and the states likely to be affected,Footnote 83 “with the appropriate involvement of the operator, shall ensure that appropriate response measures are taken and should, for this purpose, rely upon the best available scientific data and technology”,Footnote 84 and should co-operate with other states in mitigating or eliminating damage.Footnote 85
III. Assessing the 123 Agreement in The Light of Its Environmental Protection Provisions
Given that the preamble and Article 11 of the 123 Agreement state, respectively, that peaceful nuclear activities can only be engaged in with a view to environmental protection, and that the United States and India must co-operate in following best practices to minimize any environmental impact caused by radioactive, chemical, or thermal contamination that may arise from their civil nuclear energy co-operation and in related health and safety matters, the ILC's work on international liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international law would seem to provide an obvious rubric for clarifying the 123 Agreement's vaguely worded environmental protection provisions. A number of issues could be addressed in this regard, but this section limits its examination to briefly discussing three of these, namely: how international environmental law has developed to interact with vaguely worded environmental protection provisions, such as those in the 123 Agreement, and the role of experts in this regard; the issue of civil nuclear liability; and the question of what international law might require for environmental impact assessments under the 123 Agreement to pass muster.
Accepting that the principles that permeate the Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm and the Allocation of Loss Principles embody Dupuy's “certain intellectual perception”, then they clearly become relevant for understanding the 123 Agreement's environmental protection provisions. They become relevant, in other words, to interpreting the preambular language and Article 11 in “good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose”,Footnote 86 to infusing these vaguely worded environmental protection provisions with legal content. “Context” and “object and purpose”, while surely not without their own limitations, imply a larger interpretative milieu that looks beyond the “four corners” of the 123 Agreement itself. This is because an understanding of the ILC's persuasive provisions necessarily impacts upon the interpretative conclusions that are drawn in law for analogous treaty provisions on the same or similar subject when this would not otherwise be excluded by the treaty language itself.
How has international environmental law developed to interact with vaguely worded environmental protection provisions, such as those in the 123 Agreement, and what role do experts play in this regard? Any disputes that may arise in interpreting and implementing the 123 Agreement must be resolved through that softest of peaceful means of dispute settlement, negotiations, promptly.Footnote 87 Although there will necessarily be horse-trading and compromise between the United States and India, as well as considerations of power and short-, medium-, and long-term interests, recourse to the underlying legal framework, the 123 Agreement, will play a key role in resolving such disputes. As Abbott, Keohane, Moravcsik, Slaughter, and Snidel note, “[l]egalization of rules implies a discourse primarily in terms of the text, purpose, and history of the rules, their interpretation, admissible exceptions, applicability to classes of situations, and particular facts”.Footnote 88
This begs the question, then, of what exactly the various provisions in the 123 Agreement “say”; what they “mean”. How clear and certain are they, and if it can be said, as this article asserts, that the 123 Agreement's vaguely worded environmental protection provisions more or less approximate the underlying principles reflected in the Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm and the Allocation of Loss Principles, what particular challenges might the ILC's work on international liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international law raise in this regard?
Let us examine but one particular challenge. Recall that the Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm's prevention obligations for the state of origin focus on, and only on, “activities not prohibited by international law which involve a risk of causing significant transboundary harm through their physical consequences”. In legally grappling with this statement, each phrase, each word, can be, and should be, rigorously parsed.
As to “risk of causing significant transboundary harm”, for example, the ILC states that this involves a balancing of probability and magnitudeFootnote 89 and “includes risks taking the form of a high probability of causing significant transboundary harm and a low probability of causing disastrous transboundary harm”.Footnote 90 The concern here is with a purportedly objective assessment, an “appreciation of possible harm resulting from an activity which a properly informed observer had or ought to have had”,Footnote 91 and considerations of a precautionary nature are relevant in this regard.Footnote 92 According to the Commentaries to the Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm, furthermore, “significant” can be legally understood only on a case-by-case basis and evidently lies somewhere above “detectable” but below “serious” or “substantial”.Footnote 93 Is this language problematic, and if it is, is it nonetheless inevitable in this area of law? The Commentaries suggest that the “degree of care in question is that expected of a good Government”, but might “good Government[s]” act differently when faced with the same facts? How are these concerns likely to unfold in the context of the 123 Agreement?
The ICJ seemed to provide a methodological framework that would resolve the issue of vaguely worded environmental protection provisions in Pulp Mills. In that case, the ICJ faced Argentine claims that Uruguay had violated certain of its procedural and substantive obligations under a bilateral treaty between the two states, the 1975 Statute of the River Uruguay (1975 Statute). Of particular relevance for present purposes is Article 41 of the 1975 Statute, which articulates vaguely worded environmental protection provisions that can be fairly analogized to the environmental protection provisions in both the 123 Agreement and the ILC's conclusions on international liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international law.Footnote 94 The ICJ stated that such cases present the law with having to grapple with filling “broad obligations” with “more specific content” in the light of particular facts and circumstances.Footnote 95 It becomes, then, a matter of “plugging in” with “more specific content”.
If one applies this thinking to the “best practices for minimizing the impact on the environment from any radioactive, chemical or thermal contamination” language referred to in Article 11 of the 123 Agreement, a cynic might conclude, not necessarily unreasonably, that the “best practices” that the law requires are simply an eclectic hodgepodge of legal obligations under international treaty law and customary international law that can be cobbled together, with some reference to soft law instruments being thrown in for good measure and tactical advantage.Footnote 96 Of course, these calculations cannot be divorced from the now considerable international framework of technical standards that governs such matters with an increasing degree of predictability,Footnote 97 nor from the fact that India remains similarly bound by the “best practices” standards articulated in the 1994 Convention on Nuclear Safety, which entered into force for it in June 2005. How will the fact that disputes under the 123 Agreement must be resolved through prompt negotiations, as opposed to, for example, a more formal means of dispute settlement, such as judicial settlement, affect these discussions, if at all?
Decision-makers will undoubtedly make use of experts when grappling with these vaguely worded environmental protection provisions. While this does have the effect of contributing to what Said criticized as being the “cult of the certified expert”,Footnote 98 this may be inevitable when interpreters of legal language without specialized scientific knowledge engage with complex environmental situations. While perhaps inevitable, however, resorting to experts may also be problematic. As ICJ Judge Cançado Trindade put it in his separate opinion in Pulp Mills, history has shown that recourse to experts and worship of the “general belief […] that the cultivation of specialized knowledge [… is] the most adequate path to human safety and even happiness” has not been without its deleterious side effects.Footnote 99
As an example of a recent international environmental law case in which resort to experts was highly contentious, let us once again consider Pulp Mills. In that case, the majority could be not unfairly criticized for having drawn its conclusions without addressing, much less seeing the need to address, questions related to the authority, reliability, and merits of expert evidence.Footnote 100 A number of the opinions appended to the judgment both supported and disagreed with the ICJ's approach in this regard,Footnote 101 and some did so vehemently. As Judges Al-Khasawneh and Simma noted in their dissenting opinion in Pulp Mills, multiple factors may be involved when considering activities that risk causing significant transboundary harm, time lags and delayed harm may be at issue, and questions of interdependence and causality may arise, all in a context of scientific uncertainty and controversy that may require grappling with a “complex matrix of factual issues”.Footnote 102 When negotiated, disputes as to the interpretation and implementation of the 123 Agreement's environmental protection provisions will also have to contend with such challenges. How are state and non-state actors likely to react to this?
As regards the issue of civil nuclear liability, it should be said that the terms of the 123 Agreement themselves do not provide much clarity. Rather, the position here has been that in balancing the needs of potential victims of nuclear incidents with the business community's desire to attract foreign direct investment in the civil nuclear energy sector, India would make appropriate changes to its domestic law in this regard, consistent, of course, with its obligations under international law. The resulting law, however, the 2010 Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (Civil Liability Act), has caused nearly as much debate and dissent as the idea of the 123 Agreement itself.Footnote 103
Adopted in September 2010, the Civil Liability Act appears at first glance to mirror many of the provisions contained in the Allocation of Loss Principles. According to Section 4, for example, the operator assumes liability for nuclear damage caused, and this operates according to a strict liability standard. Where the Civil Liability Act sharply diverges from the ILC's approach, however, is that it provides for a right of recourse by the operator when a nuclear incident results “as a consequence of an act of [a] supplier or his employee, which includes supply of equipment or material with patent or latent defects or sub-standard services”.Footnote 104 It will be recalled that the Allocation of Loss Principles, by contrast, squarely roots itself in operator liability. Apart from the legal question as to the compatibility or otherwise of this expansive right of recourse or even of the Civil Liability Act more generally with India's obligations under the 123 Agreement to facilitate “full civil nuclear energy cooperation” with the United States, suppliers will clearly be reluctant to inject themselves into the process of civil nuclear energy projects in India given the possibility of operator lawsuits as a result of the Civil Liability Act.
A final issue that arises under the 123 Agreement that can be briefly discussed here is the question of what international law might require for environmental impact assessments under the 123 Agreement to pass muster. Although the 123 Agreement does not expressly mention environmental impact assessments as such, it is surely impossible to imagine any civil nuclear energy activity that would not require their use. Certainly, if one applies the ILC's work on international liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international law to civil nuclear energy co-operation between the United States and India, environmental impact assessments are required as a matter of law. Indeed, Pulp Mills, in which the ICJ stated that general international law requires environmental impact assessments for activities that risk causing significant transboundary harm and that whether this has been done can factor into due diligence assessments, supports this conclusion.Footnote 105
As to exactly what international law might require for environmental impact assessments under the 123 Agreement to pass muster, general international law does not require a particular content or scope for these assessments as such, each state bearing the burden in this regard, “having regard to the nature and magnitude of the proposed development and its likely adverse impact on the environment as well as to the need to exercise due diligence in conducting such an assessment”.Footnote 106 The vagueness of the ICJ's guidance in this regard, particularly given its rigidly formalistic dismissal of the possibility of referring by analogy to the 1991 Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary ContextFootnote 107 simply because, as the ICJ bluntly put it, “Argentina and Uruguay are not parties to the Espoo Convention”,Footnote 108 hardly seems reassuring for relevant actors as they seek to plan how they will act or refrain from acting in meeting their obligations under international law in nuclear co-operation activities under the 123 Agreement, and it is perhaps inevitable that these challenges will resolve themselves through state practice, in “fits and starts”.
IV. Conclusion
The underlying international environmental law principles that the Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm and the Allocation of Loss Principles reflect can help to clarify, at least to a certain extent, the 123 Agreement's environmental protection provisions. Like international environmental law generally, however, what is at issue in this context are vaguely worded provisions that can only be resolved in the light of particular facts and circumstances. For better or for worse, international law's simple reassurance to states is that their acts will be legally unproblematic as long as they are undertaken according to that most question-begging of standards, good faith.
India, like many developing states, sees in civil nuclear energy the possibilities of rapid economic growth, the lifting of its masses of millions out of the dire poverty that afflicts both its rural outposts and urban slums. For the Indian state, the 123 Agreement promises to go quite some way in allowing it to realize its ongoing constitutional obligation to “rais[e] […] the level of nutrition and the standard of living of its people and the improvement of public health[, which is …] among its primary duties”.Footnote 109 However, just as the Indian constitutional lawyer would draw the state's attention to its countervailing duty to “protect and improve the environment and to safeguard the forests and wild life of the country”,Footnote 110 so would the international lawyer caution that great care must be taken to strike a legally convincing balance between needed development and environmental imperatives.Footnote 111
