POLITICS, SUB-POLITICS AND RELIGION

In the interaction between religion and politics, the rules of the game are set and the spheres of authority are determined. While early secularization theories have predicted the demise of religion and its relegation from the public to the private sphere, religion has proved resilient and remained a significant force in many political systems. Contemporary theories of secularization suggest a more multi-faceted view of the role of religion in “formal” politics as well as in everyday life. Religious and secular ideas and practices are part of the social realities of everyday life and are often present in intermingled forms (Ammerman Reference Ammerman and Nancy2007, 6). Desegregation of secularization has separated the decline of religion from that of religious authority and the institutional aspect of secularism from individual religious beliefs and practices (Chaves Reference Chaves1994; Dobbelaere, 1999). Secularization, however, is matched by opposing trends as religion, through various agents and institutions, often attempts to preserve or augment its power. Thus, the greater choice available to individuals and the “bricolage” of religion does not necessarily weaken religion's position.

Religious values and norms often clash with the hedonistic consumer culture when the global market economy frees itself from prior constraints, religious limitations included, in favor of the rules of supply and demand. The removal of economic activity from the restrictions of religion exploded under global capitalism of the late 20th century. “Consumer culture,” explains Barber (Reference Barber1992), has no tolerance for restrictions imposed by religious rules. Thus, the global consumer society offers a variety of commodities whose consumption is associated with lifestyle and are in the pursuit of “pleasure” (Bauman Reference Bauman1992, 50), often contradicting religion and religious dictates (Turner Reference Turner, Jones, Higgs and Ekerdt2008). But, in a “disjunctured” (Appadurai Reference Appadurai1990) globalization process, religion remains a significant political and social force that struggles to protect its turf and expand in both developed and developing states (Thomas Reference Thomas2005, 27). Fundamentalists who feel that their tradition is at risk in a secularizing world take measures to protect their way of life from these threats (Fox Reference Fox2002). On more moderate levels, globalization and hyper-modernity underpin not only consumerism but also a search for identity and meaning, often found in religion. Thus, globalization, on the one hand, creates new demands on religion and, on the other hand, provides motivation and opportunities for religious agents and groups to organize and act against what they view as a threat to the existing order. Religious and secular struggles, however, while still significant, may shift into new realms if existing political structures seem to lose their significance.

A central aspect of globalization is the functional weakening of the state (though not necessarily its psychological and cultural significance) that has significant implications for the nature of the religious-secular struggle. The study of religion and politics tends to naturally focus on the formal political sphere where religious and secular actors struggle over legislation and allocations to shape the public sphere. However, formal politics in many countries has lost much of its appeal as “anti-politics,” namely a growing distrust of politics and politicians (Arian et al. Reference Arian, Hermann, Atmor, Hadar, Lebel and Zaban2008; Boggs 2000), takes hold in more and more places. In practice, these attitudes are reflected in declining turnouts at political events, the apathy and withdrawal of citizens from party affiliation and political involvement and, consequently, the diminishing capacity of traditional governance (Pierre Reference Pierre2000). A decline in trust in and satisfaction with the government and politicians (Dalton Reference Dalton2004; Norris Reference Norris and Norris1999; Nye Reference Nye, Nye, Zelikow and King1997), alienation from political institutions and leaders (Diamond and Gunther Reference Diamond, Gunther, Diamond and Gunther2001) and fall-offs in turnouts for elections (Hay Reference Hay2007; Pharr and Putnam 2000; Warren Reference Warren2002) were found.

Politics, however, before and after globalization, should not be identified solely with the state and its institutions. The assumption that only the state creates rules and enforces them “minimizes and trivializes the rich negotiation, interaction, and resistance that occur in every human society among multiple systems of rules” (Migdal Reference Migdal2001, 15). Understanding of the dynamics of political change must widen the scope of and locus of politics so that political activity is not only what is openly declared and visible and not only direct engagement with rulers and elites (Singerman Reference Singerman1995, 14; Mohanty Reference Mohanty, Mohanty, Russu and Torres1991, 38). A wide definition of politics, on the one hand, and accounting of actual structural changes in the past two decades, on the other hand, suggests that the decline of interest and participation in traditional forms and arenas of politics may lead not to apathy and withdrawal but rather to a search for new political channels of influence.

Researchers, argues Beck (Reference Beck1997), may be looking for politics in the “wrong places.” “Sub-politics,” a non-institutionalized form of politics “outside and beyond the representative institutions of the political system of nation-states” may be replacing traditional forms of participation (Beck Reference Beck1996, 18; see also Holzer and Sorensen 2001). Sub-politics means “direct politics … ad hoc individual participation in political decisions, bypassing the institutions of representative opinion-formation (political parties, parliaments) and often even lacking the protection of the law. In other words, subpolitics means the shaping of society from below … subpolitics sets politics free by changing the rules and boundaries of the political so that it becomes more open and susceptible to new linkages — as well as capable of being negotiated and reshaped” (Beck Reference Beck1999, 39–40). Practices of sub-politics can be traced outside the formal political system of the state, in the supermarket, at school, in the media, and on the streets (Beck Reference Beck1997). Thus, what Holzer and Sorensen (2001) define as “active subpolitics” implies the taking of responsibility by citizens for matters in their everyday, individual-orientated life arena that cuts across the public and private sphere. This form of citizen engagement has also been defined as “individualized collective action” which is “… the practice of responsibility-taking for common well-being through the creation of concrete, everyday arenas on the part of citizens alone or together with others to deal with problems that they identify as good life” (Micheletti 2003, 25).

SUB-POLITICS AND/AS POLITICAL CONSUMERISM

The complex relations between states, economies, and secularization in the past two decades developed within the context of globalization and the related changes in political and social life. Globalization relates to a complex overlapping network in which state and non-state actors are part of “an evolving structure which both imposes constraints on, and empowers, communities, states and social forces” (Held et al. Reference Held1999, 12). The changing relations between citizens and the state and the decline of the traditional forms of politics are matched by the emergence of new modes of “sub-politics.” Specifically, when states lose control over the authoritative allocation of values in society, new arenas for political participation are sought (Stolle, Hooghe, and Micheletti Reference Stolle, Hooghe and Micheletti2005).

Consumption and the self-reflexive consumer are part of what Giddens (Reference Giddens1991) describes as the “life-style politics” characteristic of late modernity. The political and ethical choices consumers make as they use their “purchase votes” seek to shape society. Political consumerism is an emerging form of participation (Stolle, Hooghe, and Micheletti Reference Stolle, Hooghe and Micheletti2005) in which choices consumers make between products extends beyond tastes, prices, and values to moral-political considerations. In practice, political consumerism can translate into a boycott, defined as “an attempt by one or more parties to achieve certain objectives by urging individual consumers to refrain from making selected purchases in the marketplace” (Friedman Reference Friedman1999, 4). Boycotts are an instrument for consumers to demonstrate discontent and increase corporate sensitivity to their economic, political, and social concerns. Boycotts constitute an organized, collective, but non-mandatory refusal to consume a good. This effort can aim either at changing marketing practices such as lowering a price or at coercing their targets toward specific ethical or socially responsible actions (Sen, Gurhan-Canli, and Morwitz 2001). To achieve political ends through market means, consumers can also use the positive approach of organized action and engage in “boycotts” to support the production and purchase of goods and services they find ethical and to promote groups and issues with which they identify. Consumer boycotts attempt to influence shoppers to buy the products or services of selected companies in order to reward them for behavior that is consistent with the goals of the activists (Friedman Reference Friedman1996).

Research suggests that people's consumption decisions are strongly influenced by their reference groups. Consequently, their decision to boycott is influenced not only by their identification with the boycott's objectives, but also by their identification with the group itself (Sen, Gurhan-Canli, Morwitz. 2001). One assumption is that social capital, the embeddedness in voluntary associations, is likely to help overcome collective action problems involved in boycotts (Stolle, Hooghe, and Micheletti Reference Stolle, Hooghe and Micheletti2005). Stated differently, the trade-offs consumers make between individual incentives and group commitments are likely to hinge significantly on the social pressure they feel to comply with the behavior of relevant reference groups. Thus, the size, identity, and interdependence of the group, the amount and nature of the communication and commitment within the groups and the identifiably of group members are all factors that influence the decision to participate in boycotts and ultimately determine their success (Sen, Gurhan-Canli, Morwitz. 2001).

The increase in secular-religious tensions, on the one hand, and the declining authority and significance of formal politics, on the other hand, can explain why the market sometimes becomes an arena of struggle and sub-politics. The global economy and the consumer culture it promotes have no tolerance for restrictions imposed by religious rules (Barber Reference Barber1992). This intolerance translates into business initiatives that disregard existing norms and cater to a secularizing public. These initiatives, however, can be matched by a religious public demanding to maintain or strengthen religious norms in the public sphere. Religions often promote a framework of ethics that influences consumption (Lindridge Reference Lindridge2005) and provides its followers with a coherent and stable set of norms and values that underscore their identity, and individuals with religious beliefs can use consumption to express their commitment to religion (Cosgel and Minkler Reference Cosgel and Minkler2004). Given that boycotts mean individuals have to make some sacrifices in favor of a common good or goal, it is logical to assume that religious groups in general would have an advantage in promoting such campaigns. The religious commitment to shared values, and often their institutional leadership, can reduce uncertainties and limit defections, making cooperation and compliance with boycotts more likely.

Our case study, presented below, the observance of the day of rest in Israel provides an interesting example of sub-politics and religion. The struggle over the Sabbath between the religious community, demanding that rules preventing commerce be maintained, and the secular community, demanding that commerce be allowed, has shifted from the formal political sphere to the economic sphere and sub-politics. The vacuum left by the stagnant political system is filled by businesspeople and secular and religious consumers struggling to shape the public sphere in general and the day of rest in particular.

ISRAEL — THE (SUB) POLITICS OF THE SABBATH

Since the early days of Zionism and Israeli statehood, the question of Sabbath observance has underscored many religious-secular struggles. For religious Jews, the observance of the Sabbath, which includes a prohibition on business, commercial activities, travel, and many leisure activities, is of major significance. Accordingly, in the early days of Israel's statehood, religious Jews struggled to ensure that state laws would limit business and leisure activities on the Sabbath. Arrangements established in the early years of statehood, known as the status quo, created compromises between the religious and secular communities, including issues related to the character of the Sabbath. However, economic and demographic changes that occurred in the 1990s eroded the status quo arrangements as more and more businesses began operating on the Sabbath, catering to the growing demand of the secular public. While initially activities on the Sabbath drew political attention and energy, in recent years it seemed to decline even though the rift between the religious and secular communities has widened.

Even before the State of Israel was established, the dispute over the character of the Sabbath was a main issue between the religious and secular communities. The status quo, which regulated the relationship between the two groups, consisted of agreements that were described as an unwritten constitution. They were designed to maintain unity among the Jewish groups in the pre-state period, a condition that was believed necessary for nation and state building (Ravitzky Reference Ravitzky1997; Soen Reference Soen2003). The status quo arrangements included keeping public institutions kosher (observing the Jewish dietary rules), Orthodox control over matters of marriage and divorce, and the observance of the Sabbath as the official day of rest (Cohen and Susser Reference Cohen and Susser2000). According to the status quo, “secular” practices on the Sabbath and holidays, including commercial activity, were restricted although the law remained rather vague on what was not permitted.

In 1951, the Knesset (the Israeli parliament) enacted the “Working Hours and Rest” law, which proclaimed the Sabbath as the official rest day for the Jews in Israel. The law authorized the Minister of Labor (through a special committee) to permit work on rest days “if he is convinced that ceasing work … is liable to inflict major damage on the economy, on an ongoing work project, or on the provision of a vital service to the public or to a part of it” (Cohen and Susser Reference Cohen and Susser2000, 28). Naturally, the law was interpreted differently by religious and secular groups, and its implementation was often decided by the political affiliation of the Minister of Labor. These differences were resolved by informal agreements and local arrangements between Orthodox and secular communities or, at times, were brought to the Israeli Supreme Court for adjudication. Given the limited economic conditions of the time and a dominant culture of collectivism that extolled the simple way of life, commercial activity was a relatively minor issue in religious-secular relations. By the end of the 1980s, however, the context began to change as an emerging consumer society challenged the existing arrangements.

Since the 1980s, as a result of economic and demographic changes, Israel has developed into a multicultural, market society. Economically, Israel has gradually become a Western style affluent society with more hedonistic values, open to foreign cultural influences, and deeply engaged in consumption. Until the 1970s, production exceeded consumption, but from that point on the opposite was true (Carmeli and Applbum 2004). In the 1990s, the economy experienced a wave of growth resembling that of the East Asian “Tigers” and living standards were within reach of those of the rich organisation for economic co-operation and development (OECD) democracies. Between the years 1975–1995, the gross domestic product (GDP) in Israel grew seven times so that Per capita income in 1996 reached $16,690 (Shafir and Peled Reference Shafir and Peled2002, 1). Economic growth in Israel was matched by an “Americanization” of Israeli society that included the introduction of consumerist behavior and values, leisure activities and entertainment patterns and lifestyles into Israeli society, which up to this point had been relatively closed (Azaryahu Reference Azaryahu2000; Shalev Reference Shalev, Shafir and Peled2000).

By the 1990s, the cultural change in Israeli society was striking. American fast food and retail chains such as McDonalds and Burger King had been established across Israel, and large international retail chains such as Ace Hardware, IKEA, Toys R Us, Office Depot, and others where opened in many outdoor shopping malls that had sprung up throughout Israel. Entrepreneurs and urban planners tended to give names such as BIG and Mega to these sites and generally referred to them as “power centers” because they represented large national and international businesses and big money. Blind to the constraints of religiosity, ethnicity or family connections, these shopping centers spoke to modernity and linked Israelis of all sorts to the larger Western, and mainly American, world of plenty (Markowitz and Uriely Reference Markowitz and Uriely2002). Israelis were spending more and more on housing, transportation and communication, and less on food and clothing. Similarly, their affluence and consumerism were attested to by the increase in the number of motor vehicles, electrical appliances and, later on, mobile phones and Internet access (Ram 2005; Yishai Reference Yishai2003). One important result of these changes was a growing demand or desire for commercial activity on the Sabbath and less willingness to comply with religious restrictions.

The changes in Israel included not only the growing commercialization and globalization described above, but also a demographic change — the immigration of over a million Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union, the majority of whom were secular. For religious Jews, the Sabbath is a day of rest, and work of any kind and commerce are strictly prohibited. However, for a growing number of secular Israelis and non-religious Jews (see Ben-Porat and Feniger Reference Ben-Porat and Feniger2009) who regard shopping as a leisure activity, the restrictions on commerce are perceived as outdated. As will be described below, this clash of values and a struggle over the shape of the public sphere has quickly shifted away from the formal political sphere.

Paradoxically, while religious parties have gained significant formal political power since the 1980s, their control over some significant aspects of the public sphere has waned. In the 1980s, the difficulties of the two large parties, Labor and Likud, in forming a coalition increased the bargaining power of the religious parties. Religious ultra-Orthodox parties joined the ruling coalition in return for allocations for religious institutions, exemptions from military service, and promises about religious legislation. But legislation, and even more so enforcement, proved more difficult as secular resentment and resistance prevented major changes and new opportunities to circumvent laws were created. In the case of the Sabbath, religious political power was strong enough to prevent any formal change in the status quo and existing laws, but this victory had at most a limited impact upon actual developments. Secular Israelis wanted more options for the Sabbath, but were not necessarily interested in political struggles. Backed by the changes described above, they did not need political struggles to change the status quo. In 1984, the decision to allow cinemas to operate on Friday night in the city of Petach Tikva led to religious demonstrations. The demonstrations lasted three years but eventually the operation of cinemas became an accepted practice in Petach Tikva and elsewhere. The mayor of the city who made the decision to allow the cinemas to operate explained, in retrospect, what had happened. “Leisure became a central part of secular families’ lives in the 1980s … I could not ignore that” (Gutkind-Golan Reference Gutkind-Golan and Liebman1990, 71). The rules of the game were now determined, among other things, by the purchasing power of the secular public.

THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STATE

The status quo restrictions on commercial activities on the Sabbath could be maintained in a society in which consumerism was a minor issue and the desire for consensus overrode other interests. But, Israel in the 1990s was a different country from what it had been 40 years earlier when the status quo arrangements were crafted. Economic and demographic changes had resulted in a secular public less willing to comply with restrictions. Under these circumstances, it was expected that the government would devise new arrangements or strictly enforce the old ones. However, in the last three decades, Israel has become a society that is politically paralyzed, plagued by a multitude of parties that must join in unstable coalitions to govern. Rising inequality, increasing political violence, a decline in social solidarity and diminishing faith in democracy (Horowitz and Lissak Reference Horowitz and Moshe1989) are reflected in the fall off in election turnouts and participation in politics. Many elected governments cannot finish out their terms. Surveys show that Israelis do not trust politicians and are dissatisfied with their inability to implement their campaign promises (Arian, Atmor, and Hadar Reference Arian, Atmor and Hadar2007) and their commitment to their voters (Vigoda-Gadot and Mizrahi Reference Vigoda-Gadot and Mizrahi2006).

The Supreme Court turned into a significant player since the 1980 as citizens and politicians appealed to the court that developed an activist approach. The Supreme Court, especially under Chief Justice Aharon Barak, fostered a secular Jewish discourse that included both a plural view of Judaism and liberal sensitivity to civil rights (Barzilai Reference Barzilai2003, 68). The court generated an inclination to diminish slightly the dominance of Jewish Orthodoxy through different rulings that upheld principles of equality, liberal rights, and freedom of occupation (Barzilai Reference Barzilai2003, 74). As a result, the Supreme Court became an address for the secular elite who lost its grip on the formal political sphere and for individuals harmed by the status quo arrangements. The court's activism was enhanced by the enactment of two fundamental rights laws in 1992, the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. In 1993, several months after the passing of the Basic Laws, the Supreme Court stroked down Ministry regulations limiting the importation of non-Kosher meat products into Israel, as they infringed freedom of occupation. Several months later, however, the Basic Law was amended, forbidding again the import of non-Kosher meat. The secular agenda of the Supreme Court included provision of secular cemeteries, liberalization of prayer rights in holy sites, questioning draft deferment of yeshiva students, review of rabbinical court decisions, recognition of non-Orthodox conversions and refusal to accept the exclusion of women and non-Orthodox Jews from membership in religious councils (Hirschl Reference Hirschl1994). But, is spite of the court's liberal rulings its overall influence on existing religion and state practices were limited as the formal Orthodox monopoly remained firm.

On the issue of the Sabbath as the day of rest, the Supreme Court attempted to balance between religious and secular demands. Already in 1968, the court ruled in favor of an owner of a gas station that the municipality ordered not to operate on the Sabbath. The court explained that while the day of rest must be observed, a gas station provides a necessary service for a growing number of people. In the 1990's, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of cinema owners that municipalities prevented from operating on Sabbath. The court, however, in several rulings, distinguished between the operation of cultural institutions it allowed to operate on Sabbath and between commercial ones it prevented from operation. This distinction, the court explained, “preserves the Sabbath as a national treasure, and at the same time as an individual day of rest, each one according to his preference” (5026/04). Consequently, the court upheld state fines placed on businesses operating on the Sabbath, arguing they do not violate Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. While the court suggested a new arrangement for the day of rest, separating leisure and culture from commerce, it was the state's role to craft such arrangement.

The growing secular-religious rift, on the one hand, and the governance crisis, on the other hand, severely limited the possibilities for formal change. The old arrangements were the result of consociational negotiations in which strong and pragmatic leaders on both sides were able to enforce compromises on a willing public. Conversely, since the 1980s weak coalition governments have survived by avoiding major decisions and have been continuously challenged by more radical parties, both secular and religious, that rejected compromise. While the secular-religious debate in the political arena was intensified, in practice no significant decisions were made. Rather, short-term or local policies shaped the character of the Sabbath. Fines placed on businesses had limited influence at most and business operation on Sabbath rapidly expanded. More importantly, however, the stagnated political system has opened the way for other initiatives that fit the description of alternative politics and sub-politics. At first, it was secular entrepreneurs who used the purchasing power of secular consumers to shape the character of the Sabbath. The religious camp followed suit and began to use its own purchasing power to protect the Sabbath. In essence, the character of the Sabbath was no longer determined in the formal political arena but in other political arenas, especially the economic sphere.

SECULAR ENTREPRENEURS: COMMERCIALIZING THE SABBATH

In the 1980s, businesspeople in Israel began to cater to the growing demand for shopping and other forbidden leisure activities on the Sabbath. While early attempts met with the objections of religious politicians committed to protect the Sabbath, the demographic and economic changes in the 1990s undermined any attempts to enforce the old rules of the game. Economic growth and the rapid development of a consumer society in Israel were reflected in the number of shopping malls that opened across the country. Open air shopping malls were built on the outskirts of cities or in rural areas, taking advantage of cheaper land and available parking space. These shopping malls had another advantage. Located away from religious neighborhoods and mixed (religious-secular) cities and often near secular kibbutzim (communal settlements), they could open on the Sabbath.

The decision to open shops on the Sabbath was first and foremost an economic decision based on the entrepreneurs’ business interests and growing competition between shopping malls. As one entrepreneur explained:

The opening of the shops themselves on the Sabbath was left to the discretion of the owners. For many of the foreign franchise stores that entered the Israeli marketplace in the 1990s, opening seven days a week was all but natural. Local shops and chain stores chose various strategies. Some stores followed the foreign franchise stores and began to operate seven days a week. Others, for religious reasons or fear of losing their religious clientele, chose not to open, and some developed a mixed strategy of opening shops only in secular areas. Businesspeople described their decision as a process of “trial and error,” observing other businesspeople's decisions and actions, opening when revenue was expected to be high and shutting down if it did not meet expectations. As one store manager explained:

Decisions to operate on the Sabbath are individual and not a coordinated, collective action but are influenced by the decisions of other businesspeople and consumers:

It is a question of revenues … if the revenues do not justify the costs of opening on the Sabbath, it will shut down. There is a snow ball effect. Gradually, more and more shops will close, fewer customers will come and eventually the shopping center will cease to operate on the Sabbath (Interview 2).

Consumers, much like the entrepreneurs, tend to view shopping on the Sabbath not as a secular act of defiance but rather as a leisure activity or a necessity, having no time for shopping during the week. Consequently, many of those who shop on the Sabbath do not define themselves as “secular” and do observe other religious commandments and practices (Ben-Porat and Feniger Reference Ben-Porat and Feniger2009). Surveys conducted in recent years demonstrate strong support for commerce on the Sabbath. In a study conducted in 1999, the majority of Jewish Israelis described the Sabbath as a special, family day but a majority also supported the liberalization of the Sabbath regulations, including the opening of restaurants and coffee shops (72%), the opening of shopping malls outside city centers (70%) and in the cities (65%), although only 17% reported that they often shop on the Sabbath (Levi, Hana, and Katz Reference Levi, Hana and Katz2002). Another, study, conducted by a commercial group, found that about one-third of the respondents had shopped at least once on a Sabbath in the past year and estimated that 600,000 Israelis visit shopping malls every Sabbath (Brendman 2001). Finally, a study conducted by the Ministry of Labor found that in 2003, Israelis spent about 5.2 billion IS (the equivalent of about $1.3 billion at the time) while shopping on the Sabbath and that 40% of Israelis shop on the Sabbath (Yedioth Aharonot, June 15, 2003).

For businesspeople, the incentive to operate on the Sabbath is economic. The revenue of shops open on the Sabbath was reported to be three times greater than on weekdays, offering these stores a competitive advantage (Haaretz, Real Estate Section, December 15, 2002). The large supermarket chains, closed on the Sabbath largely out of concern about a religious boycott, were estimated to lose about $100 million every year to shops open on the Sabbath and reportedly have contemplated changing their policy. Other businesses, pressured by demands to shut down on the Sabbath, explain that they are providing a service for their customers or must operate as long as their competitors do.

Thus, while public support may not lead to formal political change, in practice, it allows businesses to operate on the Sabbath. The government has at its disposal the Hours of Work and Rest Law it can use against businesses operating on the Sabbath. The law that forbids the employment of Jews on the Sabbath was used by the Ministry of Labor, especially when it was in the hands of the religious parties, to fine businesses open on the Sabbath. However, the limited budget allocated to enforcement agencies and the relatively small fines for breaking the law are unmatched by the revenues accrued by businesses operating on the Sabbath. For some businesspeople, the choice to open on the Sabbath was a matter of principle and they chose to make their voices heard after being fined by, among other things, appealing (unsuccessfully) to the Supreme Court.

Attempts in the past decade to draft a new Sabbath law have all failed to materialize. The compromise suggested by many politicians, academics and various public figures advocated that “cultural” and “leisure” activity (cinemas and restaurants) will be allowed and “commercial” activity (shops) be forbidden. This compromise was based not only on religious reasoning but also on the protection of workers’ rights. However, the objections of more radical religious and secular groups to compromise, the power of business and consumer interests and the general impotence of the political system prevented the drafting of a new law. The majority of businesspeople chose not to publicly challenge the fines for employing Jewish workers. Initially, as indicated above, the fines were merely a nuisance and the number of inspectors was small. Businesspeople, wishing to avoid confrontation, repeatedly stated that their shops were not interfering with religious life.

These statements and policies resonated with the majority of the Israeli public but were insufficient to change the law and stop the fines. When fines grew larger and inspections more frequent, businesspeople chose again not to organize politically. As noted by one interviewee (Interview 6), the few attempts made were futile as politicians proved unreliable. Rather, the strategies chosen were to instruct workers to avoid the inspectors, employ non-Jewish workers allowed to work on the Sabbath and, when all else failed, pay the fines and continue to operate.

RELIGIOUS ENTREPRENEURS: TAKING BACK THE SABBATH?

In recent years, religious parties have not only increased their power, measured in numbers of seats in the parliament, but also have held a pivotal position in many elections in post-election coalition building. Their political power enabled them to preserve the formal Orthodox monopoly over marriage and Jewish conversion, to maintain the privilege not to be drafted into the military, and to channel more resources toward religious education and institutions. Yet, as detailed above, this political power was all but helpless against the economic changes that underscored the booming business on the Sabbath. Religious parties’ demands that the government enforce the law and shut down businesses that operate on the Sabbath did lead to some political controversies. However, as noted earlier, enforcing the law in practice was hampered by the limited budget allocated to enforcement agencies, the hiring of non-Jewish workers, and the fact that the revenues from operating on Saturdays was greater than the potential fines.

The inability of the government and religious politicians to reverse the secularization of Sabbath has led to a new course of action. The religious community, especially the Orthodox public, has a history of organized political struggles to protect the Sabbath, such as the major demonstrations against the cinema in the 1980s and other attempts to close religious neighborhoods to traffic on the Sabbath. In the 1990s, however, a new strategy was adopted. The economic power of the religious public was mobilized to counteract secular consumerism.

This new strategy was based on (1) the growing disappointment with religious politicians who failed to protect the Sabbath, (2) reliance on the social capital and leadership available among the religious community that had been used in the past for boycotts, and (3) a calculation that the purchasing power of the religious public, combined with a strong commitment, would force business entrepreneurs to close their businesses on the Sabbath. The economic consequences of the commercialization of the Sabbath encouraged new religious leaders, outside the formal political sphere, to take the lead in a new campaign that eclipsed the religious politicians and was based mainly on an initiative that took the focus away from the parliament to the marketplace. As one entrepreneur explained, “We didn't ask for any help from the politicians and we don't want them to get involved in our struggle” (Interview with the authors, July 2006) and his colleague added: “In the Knesset it was just talking and talking. I got the impression that their main concern is money and not the holiness of the Sabbath” (Interview with the authors, August 2006).

The ultra-Orthodox market is estimated to be worth about $1.5 billion a year (Haaretz, February 22, 2005). Even though they are one of the poorest sectors in Israel, their consumer power is strengthened by their strong religious leadership and the high level of social capital of this relatively closed community. Their consumer strategy is translated into two types of initiatives. The first is aimed at creating services and products designed specially for the religious public as an alternative to the secular ones. The second type, more ambitious, and more relevant to this work, is aimed at shaping the public sphere and the character of the Sabbath. Using their purchasing power the religious community has been successful in pressuring the bus companies to provide buses that separate men and women, and the providers of mobile phones to provide “kosher” phones without Internet capabilities. These specialized products and services, however, did not force the companies to choose between the religious and secular publics. Conversely, the struggle for the Sabbath was to present entrepreneurs with a simple choice: shut down or lose religious customers.

The religious campaign was triggered not only by the growing commercialization of the Sabbath, but also by what religious businesspeople perceived as unfair competition. Consequently, religious businesspeople took a major part in the new campaign. The tender for the shops in the new airport that opened in 2004 included the requirement that they operate on the Sabbath, a demand that angered religious businesspeople who were effectively prevented from competing. Religious businesspeople protested against the decision, including in the courts, but also blamed the religious public for not taking action to support religious businesspeople. “A religious person,” explained one entrepreneur, “will not enter a non-kosher McDonald's even to buy a drink, but he will buy clothes in a shop that operates on the Sabbath … the religious community just threatens but does not do anything” (http://www.shabbaton.co.il/default.asp?V_DOC_ID=1817). A new campaign was advocated by those businesspeople, which favored the use of positive economic incentives for businesses to close on the Sabbath over the enforcing of the regulations banning businesses from opening on the Sabbath (http://www.a7.org).

The shift to political consumerism strategies to protect the Sabbath was based on the belief that a committed religious public can employ boycotts to persuade businesses not to operate on the Sabbath and do what government regulation has thus far failed to achieve. Rabbi Raphael Halperin, the owner of a large optical retail chain, described the current status of the Sabbath as a “cancer in the nation's body” and called for strict enforcement of the laws. He urged the religious community to take the initiative and not to rely on the enforcement of the law: “We are a strong economic force of half a million people.” So far, he informed his audience, thousands had already signed a petition declaring they would not set foot in stores that operate on the Sabbath.

Religious websites were set up to promote a boycott and advertise businesses that observe the Sabbath so that religious people would choose them and encourage more to follow. The “Shamor” (Observe) website allows businesspeople to register their business on the site after they declare that they observe the Sabbath. Another website, Shabbaton, sends updated information to its subscribers and informs them of discounts and new businesses that have joined the list. Another website, “Tarnegol” (Rooster) defines itself as the biggest shopping arena for the religious sector and offers various home products only from stores that are not open on the Sabbath.

The group of entrepreneurs that are behind this website clearly state that their purpose is to strengthen the consumer power of the religious community and promise to donate one shekel for every shekel that the customer donates to support businesses that close on the Sabbath (http://www.tarnegol.co.il/about.asp). As one of them explained:

In one city, the religious community produced stickers to be displayed by businesses closed on the Sabbath so that religious customers could select their shopping venues accordingly. In other cities, brochures were distributed in synagogues with a list of stores that were open on the Sabbath and a list of stores that were Sabbath observant. Two major credit card companies in Israel agreed to produce special cards for Sabbath-observant consumers. The cards cannot be used on the Sabbath and provide cardholders with special discounts in several stores that agreed to join the campaign (Ynet, December 8, 2004). Overall, therefore, the campaign for the Sabbath combines boycotts initiated by the committed Orthodox public and boycotts of a wider public that together would encourage businesses to cease operating on Sabbath, something that religious lobbying, political pressures and demonstrations failed to achieve. As one of the entrepreneurs argued:

Boycotts are also a tool used by religious groups. Generally, they are undertaken locally against businesses that do not comply with religious rules, but sometimes, as in the Weisman case discussed above, broader struggles and bigger targets are chosen. The AM:PM clash began with a demand by an Orthodox community in Tel Aviv to close a store nearby that operated on the Sabbath. The struggle was expanded to a demand to that the AM:PM stores operating on the Sabbath close. Failure to do so would bring about the boycott of Shefa Shuk, a chain of strictly kosher supermarkets designed for the religious public. Fourteen out of 40 branches of Shefa Shuk are located in ultra-Orthodox neighborhoods, and 45% of its customers are ultra-Orthodox who spend about 670 million IS a year (approximately $190 million) in these supermarkets (Ynet, April 6, 2008). In March 2008, a month before Passover, when shopping for food was at its peak, the ultra-Orthodox leadership declared a boycott of all the branches of Shefa Shuk.

Since all the negotiations with the owner of the Dor-Alon group, the Blue Square and Shefa Shuk [the businesses owned by Weisman] about the operation of the AM:PM stores on the holy Sabbath have failed … and since their opening can push others to open their businesses and destroy the Sabbath everywhere … We are announcing that it is forbidden to do business with those firms … (NRG, March 12, 2008).

The clash between Weisman and the ultra-Orthodox attracted media attention and even an attempt by secular groups to organize and buy in the Shefa Shuk stores, compensating the company for the religious boycott and supporting its decision to keep shops open on the Sabbath. Ultra-Orthodox leaders and other observers seriously doubted the secular community's ability to sustain a long term boycott. “Unlike us,” explained the religious leaders, “they have no commitment.” The religious boycott declared on Shefa Shuk had severe consequences for the chain. It was estimated that in the first weeks the stores lost about 60% of their revenues. Today, a year and half after the boycott's announcement, all of Weisman's business are still boycotted. This boycott, as the newspapers continuously report, caused Weisman serious damage. Some of Shefa Shuk stores, mainly those located in or next to ultra-Orthodox neighborhoods, were closed or turned into “regular” supermarkets, while some AM:PM stores located in the center of Tel Aviv began to close on the Sabbath. At the same time, the newspapers reported that a year and a half after the boycott was announced, Weisman agreed to meet the leading rabbis in order to find an agreeable compromise (The Marker, September 2, 2009).