The study of pension politics is increasingly popular among scholars, reflecting the importance of this issue in aging populations. Economists have also joined this debate and are becoming attuned to current developments in political science. Vincenzo Galasso's contribution represents an interesting blending of economics and political science literatures. While scholars of the welfare state may grow frustrated by some of the simplistic assumptions made in the formal model utilized throughout the book—such as the division of the population into three age groups representing a generational cohort—this is a welcome addition to the field and indispensable for scholars interested in the study of pension politics by economists. Unfortunately, for political scientists, while Galasso acknowledges the importance of corporatist structures and other features of various political systems that may impede pension reform, he opts explicitly for concentrating solely on electoral concerns and how population aging affects this dynamic. Thus, those expecting a quantitative contribution factoring the broader political process will be disappointed.

The main focus of this book is on the ways in which electoral considerations affect the political sustainability of pension systems. By political sustainability, Galasso refers to “the existence of a majority of voters backing the system in all its features, such as the contribution rate, retirement age, the benefit calculation criterion, and indexation” (p. 57). His focus, however, is primarily on contribution rates. As the median voter becomes older, he argues, political support for social security increases, resulting in a higher tolerance for increased contribution rates. He creates a model factoring various economic, demographic, and political aspects with the features of six social security systems around year 2000. He then forecasts the value of each aspect up to year 2050. For example, he concludes that if the effective retirement age in France remains the same, the social security contribution rate could reach 40.8% in 2050. However, if the effective retirement age were to increase to 65, contribution rates would be substantially lower at 29.7% (which is 7.3% higher than 2000 rates). It is interesting to note that only in France and the United States would increased contribution rates be associated with improved replacement rates. By adding another dimension to his voting model, where voters can select simultaneously (but separately) to increase the retirement age and contributions, he concludes that “[f]uture voters will be willing to support a rise in the retirement age because of the negative economic impact of the aging process” (p. 217).

Galasso's analysis rests on multiple assumptions about current and future voters, which is key for this type of analysis. I raise two critiques. First, does the median voter actually have a proper understanding of the expected value of his/her pension and the parameters stated in Galasso's definition of political sustainability? Current evidence suggests not. It has been easier to reform certain measures, such as altering the indexation mechanisms, over others, such as raising contribution rates. Second, the current model oversimplifies voting behavior as being driven solely by age. Multiple factors, such as prior attachment to a party or occupational status, are ignored. Blue-collar workers, for example, have a stronger preference for higher wages than higher future retirement benefits relative to while collar workers.

A highly interesting feature of this book is its comparative nature. Galasso's framework is applied to six cases (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the United States, and the United Kingdom). The individual country chapters describe the main features and recent reforms implemented, followed by an application of the theoretical framework. The formative chapters (1–4) and the conclusion (Chapter 11) illustrate well the difficulties associated with the creation of a model that can be applicable across countries with different pension systems. However, the reader should know that this book is entirely focused on the six cases and does not discuss pensions in other countries. Nonetheless, it would be easy to conceive how Galasso's framework could be applied to other industrialized countries.

His selection of cases is, however, puzzling. The United States and the UK are referred to as redistributive because of the presence of mechanisms within their public pension system that transfer resources within a cohort. Low-income families, therefore, receive a higher return on their contributions (p. 48). It is within this context that Galasso refers to the British pension system as being “highly redistributive” (p. 159). In these cases, the nature of the programs matters greatly. The literature is rather clear on the political sustainability of having a universal versus a means-tested program (which makes it less likely that higher contributions will be accepted in the latter). Thus, I focus on another aspect related to the theoretical assumptions made by the book. Despite redistributive features in British and American public pension schemes, their pension system are not really redistributive once we consider the cost and size of tax benefits granted to promote the accumulation of private pensions or other assets resulting in higher retirement income, such as housing. As a result, it is difficult to buy into the author's argument for the UK and the United States because public and private pensions are so intertwined. Ironically, this was one of the reasons cited for their selection (p. 4). A median voter may be willing to accept a higher contribution rate for a public pension system if he/she receives similar benefits to support his/her private pensions. Going back to my earlier critique, it can also be difficult for the median voter to process the appropriate information when a pension system has multiple dimensions. For example, a citizen of the UK may have up to a hundred parameters to consider in calculating the value of his/her pension, making it, in the words of the recent Pensions Commission, “the most complex pension system in the world” (Pensions Commission, The First Report of the Pensions Commission, 2004, p. 210).

In closing, this book presents a thoughtful simulation on the potential tolerance for higher contribution rates and higher retirement age among voters. Despite an oversimplification of political realities, The Political Future of Social Security in Aging Societies should be commended for its efforts to bridge the gap between two disciplines.