I. Introduction
Critically drawing on Michel Foucault's work, the principal aim of this paper is to analyse sovereignty as part of multiple power operations and the self-referential semantics of positive law and politics regarding the concept of popular sovereignty. The interplay between power structures and the self-description of society as democratic polity reflects on the typically modern tension between democracy as a contingent form of government and democracy as an imagined definite form of social totality. It is already present in Tocqueville's early analysis of democracy as government depending on a shared civic culture which, nevertheless, is historically and socially contingent and dependent on positive laws and politics itself.
The notion of the sovereign people as polity representing the collective foundations and moral expressions of society and thus legitimising power of government is paradoxically countered by the fact that these foundations and expressions need to be communicated by this government and its power structures. Democratic polity legitimises the power of government, yet the same power constitutes such polity, and its laws facilitate the semantics of popular sovereignty both materialised and limited by the rule of law. In the final sections of the paper, I therefore argue that the semantics of society as democratic polity, rather than being the existential precondition legitimising positive law and politics, is an internal construct of autopoietic social systems of law and politics both within and beyond the state organisation.
II. Between potentia and potestas: sketching the historical emergence of state and popular sovereignty
‘Our constitution is called a democracy because power is in the hands not of a minority but of the whole people … We are free and tolerant in our private lives; but in public affairs we keep to the law. This is because it commands our deep respect.’ (Thucydides, cited in Burrow, Reference Burrow2007, p. 29)
These famous sentences, noted in Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War, are from Pericles’ funeral oration over Athenian soldiers who died during the first year of the Peloponnesian War. They describe the overall settlement of the Athenian polis including the rule of law and the distinction between private morals and public interests which directly contradicts the modern misconception of ‘the liberty of the Ancients’ (Constant, Reference Constant, Leroux and Hart2012, pp. 68–82), falling short of private autonomy. Constitution is a matter of political power, the law's ultimate command of public affairs and the general social condition of life in polis. It stretches from power politics to the authority of law and mores conducting both private and public affairs of the Athenian society. In other words, it describes issues and problems commonly associated in modern political and legal theory and philosophy with the concept of sovereignty as power of a command, its juridical form and the overall life form of political society.
The question of sovereignty is relatively recent and modern, yet its structural and semantic preconditions are ancient (Bartelson, Reference Bartelson1995). It seems inexhaustible because of the mutual interdependence and relationships between politics and law and their reflections on the overall life form and social settlement of different polities. The law rules, yet its foundations are not legal, as Hobbes summarised in one of the most quoted statements of modern political philosophy – auctoritas, non veritas facit legem. However, without the laws, political authority and its power would descend into the tyranny of arbitrary force. These general and intrinsic tensions and conflicts were well summarised by Pascal: ‘Justice without force is impotent; force without justice is tyrannical. Justice without force is contradicted, because there are always bad people; force without justice stands accused … Justice is subject to dispute; force is easy to recognise and indisputable’ (Pascal, Reference Pascal1958, p. 85; for this translation see Derrida, Reference Derrida2009, p. 8).
Long before Pascal, in the fourteenth century, Bartolus of Saxoferrato already argued that sovereignty is a matter of legal form and thus further emphasised the inseparability of political authority from legal normativity. Power exercised without the legal title is illegitimate. In the same historical period when Marsilius of Padua defended the claim of Ludwig of Bavaria, the elected candidate for Holy Roman Emperor, that the Holy Roman Empire is independent from the Papacy and identified ‘the supreme legislator of the human race’ with ‘the totality of mankind, to whom the sanctions of Law fall to be applied’ (Jouvenel, Reference Jouvenel1962, p. 30), he effectively supplanted the principle of divine sovereignty with popular sovereignty. According to Marsilius, the sovereign power of kings and princes derived from the affected secular polity and was not to be subordinated to the church and papal interference (Maiolo, Reference Maiolo2007).
Defining the question of sovereignty in terms of human laws and polity, and removing it from the realm of divine authority, Marsilius, nevertheless, only shifted the legitimacy foundations of political power while keeping the sovereignty as ‘a transcendent principle behind the power’ (Jouvenel, Reference Jouvenel1962, p. 42). The very notion of sovereignty is part of the historical growth of political power, its monopolisation and centralisation in the Middle Ages and final transformation from the monarchical to the democratic notion of sovereignty as the popular self-rule legally defined and limited by the constitution.
Spinoza summarised this difference between power and sovereignty as the difference between potentia and potestas, which is still commonly accepted as a definition of the difference between the capacity and authorisation of the use of force. In other words, the fear of the power of those subject to sovereign power is its most effective check. The most efficient use of power, therefore, is the prevention and neutralisation of social conflicts which is not a matter of simple coercive measures.
The medieval and early modern concept of sovereignty signified superior power in the complex system of political hierarchy. Sovereignty used to be absolute in the sense of legibus solutus – being exempt from the laws. At the same time, political power in medieval times was commonly limited by other autonomous authorities, such as the church, and shared in the feudal assemblies. However, sovereignty as a principle of political organisation and legal fiction emerges only after the collapse of this medieval world of imperial and clerical hierarchies.
State sovereignty became a central category of national and international jurisprudence in the second half of the seventeenth century and continued to dominate European legal and political thought for the next three centuries, especially in the form of the sovereignty of the modern nation-state. Modern systems of international politics and law historically emerged as systems where sovereign states mutually co-ordinated their actions, settling their disputes and establishing institutions of international co-operation. In this context, sovereignty was commonly defined as ‘the highest power of command’ (Bodin, Reference Bodin1992, p. 1) over a particular territory and over those who live there – the subjects of a sovereign. It was associated with the sovereign's externality and transcendence (Foucault, Reference Foucault and Foucault2000b, pp. 204–205).
However, the absoluteness of sovereignty is a modern idea associated with the popular will, which is the general and ultimate source of all laws and thus serves as the only legitimate law of democratic society. In modern society, sovereignty ceased to be an attribute of the Prince exempt from the laws, and became an abstract and independent political entity (Jouvenel, Reference Jouvenel1997, p. 218). The sovereign will is absolute because the exemption from the laws paradoxically became the first law – the general will can never be wrong! In Rousseau's political and moral philosophy, the general will is always right and desires the public good and, more importantly, knows best what it is.
III. Modern sovereignty, its theories and recent criticisms
In modernity, sovereignty particularly signifies tension and conflicts arising from attempts to legally define and regulate political will and the decisions of specific political bodies. However, sovereignty also means the possibility of increasing political will and enhancing decision-making power by legal means (Philpott, Reference Philpott2001, p. 143). It means power to both make and suspend the law and declare the general political will as the ultimate law to exceed all positive laws. This legally unbound sovereignty nevertheless has the exclusive form and legal force of a constitution in modern society. Sovereignty's conceptualisations thus continually oscillate between the normativity of a legal constitution and the unrestrained political will of the commanding sovereign (Preuss, Reference Preuss1992–1993, p. 643).
Sovereignty is a relational and paradoxical concept with both a legal and political dimension (Loughlin, Reference Loughlin2003; Loughlin and Walker, Reference Loughlin and Walker2007). It refers to both the power that enacts laws (the political sovereignty of constituent power) and the law that restrains and regulates the constituent power of the people (the legal sovereignty of constituted power). Sovereignty thus has had its explanatory value as a concept formulating the complexities of modern attempts to legitimise political commands, obedience, and civic bonds between the governed and those who govern them (Jackson, Reference Jackson2003, p. 801). The modern state became the nation-state legitimised by the sovereignty of its people (Yack, Reference Yack2001, pp. 517–536). Popular sovereignty, manifesting itself within the institutional constraints of the democratic constitutional state, gave rise to modern constitutionalism and all its productive paradoxes and differences between the constituent power of the people and the constituted power of the democratic state (Loughlin and Walker, Reference Loughlin and Walker2007).
Modern theories and philosophies of politics and law and social science approaches therefore tackle various issues and themes traditionally associated with the concept of sovereignty. They examine operations of political power including its legal form, yet also specify what the relations between public authorities and their subjects should be like and by what means and goals they should be brought about. They can address both legitimate origins and uses of power, the criteria and conduct of public authorities, and the conditions of obedience of their subjects. They can be realistic encounters of politics as the realm of power and decision-making, yet equally explore the notion of the common good and political virtues as preconditions of the maintenance of political and social order. Coercive state power is impossible to exercise without legitimacy of the power's origin and use.
Despite the quasi-theological imagination associated with the general will and political sovereignty, these concepts are profoundly linked to the historical emergence of legal and sociological positivism. Jeremy Bentham's reductive and inadequate, yet simple, seductive and notoriously quoted and equally criticised definition of law as the sovereign's command has made the concept of sovereignty a pillar of modern analytical jurisprudence, drawing on the positivistic methodology of social sciences, as if sovereignty in its primitive social structure of commands and the general habit of obedience were an indisputable social fact constituting the normativity of positive law and integrating society in general.
However, sovereignty persists as an intrinsic part of the complex social systems of modern positive law and politics. It, therefore, can be reformulated and comprehended within the context of autopoietic social systems theory. The functional differentiation of modern complex society into autopoietic social systems operating without any hierarchical ordering replaces the Parsonsian image of specific systems supporting the functioning of overall society. Systemic differences are more significant than societal unity (Luhmann, Reference Luhmann1990, p. 93). Instead of being considered the unifying force ultimately determining the political and moral foundations of society, sovereignty subsequently can be described as the specific semantics internally constructed by the functionally differentiated systems of politics and law beyond the image of Leviathan and its socially integrating force.
Autopoietic social systems theory often inspires theories of supranational and transnational legal and constitutional pluralism. Nevertheless, these theories often fail to address the persistent problem of political and constitutional sovereignty because they draw on a normative critique of state law and power politics. For instance, Gunther Teubner's societal constitutionalism involves a paradox of criticising the political and legal form of la politique while using its concepts to describe non-political processes of self-limitation and self-constitution of different subsystems and sectors of global society (Teubner, Reference Teubner2012, pp. 114–116). The concept of constitution is effectively depoliticised, yet reallocated the most prominent political role in le politique by identifying it with societal alternatives to institutionalised politics. Teubner even refers to political constitutions as ‘Beelzebub’ (Teubner, Reference Teubner2012, p. 86; for a critique, see Přibáň, Reference Přibáň2012, pp. 441–471), casting out the devil of the power expansion of the political system by its self-limitation. Nevertheless, these criticisms of modern state law and political rationality, inspired by Savigny's and Ehrlich's examinations of the forces silently operating behind legislated laws, are unable to sociologically explain the operations and organisations of constitutional politics and thus continue to be confronted by the persistent question of power, legality and legal legitimacy.
The concept of legitimacy as the transformation of social power into political domination represents a modern sociological response to the political and jurisprudential problem of sovereignty as the transformation of potentia to potestas. The sovereignty question, therefore, can be redefined as a sociological question of power operations and their self-legitimation within and beyond the state which cannot be ignored by legal pluralism studies of horizontal networks and spontaneously evolving orders (Hoffman, Reference Hoffman1995). The simple fact that global society falls short of any form of global political sovereignty concentrated in a single transnational organisation does not justify theoretical conclusions of the end of sovereignty.
Furthermore, these power structures distinguishing between political and legal alternatives include specific operations of self-legitimation. The sovereignty question has always involved the problem of legitimation, and neither Europeanisation nor globalisation changed it. Unstructured, contingent and socially pervasive power creates its legitimation strategies and establishes legitimate frameworks, such as nation-states or supranational and transnational organisations (Bartelson, Reference Bartelson1995, pp. 217–219). Instead of the distinction between societal and political constitutions, another one needs to be introduced and critically assessed to comprehend the persistence and persuasiveness of sovereignty in Europeanised and globalised society as well as its historical transformation, namely the distinction between state and capillary constitutions and power.
IV. Societal power beyond the law and its critique
According to Jacques Derrida, capillary power permeating all social areas has its ‘capillary constitution’ which permeates the state constitution, yet its specific mode of self-imposition is beyond the state constitution's control. It is curious that Teubner recalls Derrida's and Foucault's view of capillary power achieved beyond juridical power and political sovereignty through scientific disciplines and technology (Teubner, Reference Teubner2012, pp. 85–86), yet never explores its political context and impact. Foucault, however, contrasted power as capillary transgression of social institutions to the constitution of right organisation and judicial techniques of social control. Rather than societal spontaneity and self-regulation, it is the extremity of power at its outer limits and violent interventions which defines its capillarity and societal pervasiveness (Foucault, Reference Foucault2003, pp. 27–28).
This position may be summarised as ‘enter power (in various guises); exit law’ (Golder and Fitzpatrick, Reference Golder and Fitzpatrick2009, p. 13). Capillary power, by its definition, rules out the possibility of some constitutional containment and rule-based settlement. It signifies expansive societal power unbound by any rules, customs and regulatory regimes. It is a model of power of extreme exercises directly contrasted to the power based in the sovereignty of either monarchical, or democratic right and judicial exercise (Foucault, Reference Foucault2003, p. 28).
The history of power is far too complex and extreme to be contained by interests, customs, laws or the juridical fiction of sovereignty and its institutional settlement. Power is not a state of affairs and something that agencies can possess and exercise as force. It has a relational character and thus can only be comprehended as the interplay between opposing terms and techniques and the war raging at the periphery – multiple capillaries of the social body.
According to Foucault, modern society is constituted by internal wars as the precondition of its survival and protection. Civil war, so much abhorred by legal and political theorists in early modernity, cannot be eliminated by any sovereign power. The constitution of the sovereign state from the warlike state of nature only masks the fact that the civil state is the continuation of civil wars by other means (Foucault, Reference Foucault2003, p. 28). Wars and struggles continue in the laws and political institutions which are officially legitimised by their capacity to regulate and limit power.
This state of permanent social wars signifies a retreat from the political constituent notion of the sovereign nation to the medical notion of population and/or the biological notion of a racially defined and internally divided nation (Fitzpatrick, Reference Fitzpatrick1992, pp. 150–154). Indeed, Foucault notes that the nation is characterised by the state, its potential and capacities. ‘The nation is the State’ – it is constituted by its ability of self-administration through state control (Foucault, Reference Foucault2003, p. 223). However, the nation is not just a juridical category of self-rule which is the necessary precondition of the formation of constitutional government and the delegation of power. It is equally defined by its historical existence and social functions and apparatuses, such as the army, justice, the church and the administration (Foucault, Reference Foucault2003, p. 219).
These social functions and apparatuses are much more important for understanding the production and circulation of power in the body of modern society than abstract images of the political nation and the legal fiction of state sovereignty (Yack, Reference Yack2001, p. 517). They determine who is the enemy of society and which strategies and wars need to be launched to defend society against these enemies within its body.
The rise of modernity is subsequently described by Foucault as the diminishing role of the rule of law and political sovereignty, which get replaced by new and more effective modes of disciplinary power over individual bodies and populations. The problem of sovereign authority governing the state territory and its individual inhabitants was replaced by the problem of various authorities administering populations and shaping their selves through ‘governmentality’ (Foucault, Reference Foucault and Foucault2000b, pp. 201–222).
Foucault's concept of the juridico-discursive power in the first volume of The History of Sexuality is therefore profoundly different from the power of limiting legality. It is an expansive and formative bio-power (Foucault, Reference Foucault1979, p. 83). This contrast draws on Foucault's earlier view that ‘power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth’ (Foucault, Reference Foucault1991, p. 194). A genealogy of power thus needs to critically highlight this jurisprudential production of sovereignty and the sovereign right as the ‘truth’ (Foucault, Reference Foucault and Gordon1980, p. 121) of modern politics emerging in the medieval Western legal system.
According to Foucault, the sovereign right disguises the actual multiplicity of techniques of social domination by the institutionalised and centralised system of the sovereign rule (Rose and Miller, Reference Rose and Miller1992, pp. 176–177). This critical view considers the complex conceptualisation and semantics of sovereignty as a mere discourse production of truth, the function of which is both the obfuscation of the multiplicity of subjugations taking place in society and the legitimation of the particular form of politically institutionalised and socially centralised subjugation (Hunt, Reference Hunt1992, p. 1). The sovereign right is an instrument of social domination, yet domination is not just:
‘the brute fact of the domination of the one over the many, or of one group over another, but the multiple forms of domination that can be exercised in society; so, not the king in his central position, but subjects in their reciprocal relations; not sovereignty in its one edifice, but the multiple subjugations that take place and function within the social body.’ (Foucault, Reference Foucault2003, p. 27)
While Weber considers domination a legitimate exercise of power based on social obedience and acceptance, Foucault defines domination in terms of techniques of subjugation involved in social discipline (Tadros, Reference Tadros1998, p. 80). Underneath the code of legality, disciplinary power supervises and produces normality by non-legal and more effective means of disciplinisation (Hunt and Wickham, Reference Hunt and Wickham1994). This is the reason why, according to Foucault, the problem of sovereignty as the obedience of individuals submitting to the legitimate right of ultimate, centralised and institutionalised power needs to be replaced by the study of polymorphous techniques and procedures of subjugation in society (Foucault, Reference Foucault1981, pp. 221–254).
V. Sovereignty of the social norm
In modern society, ‘the juridical is increasingly incapable of coding power, of serving as its system of representation’ (Foucault, Reference Foucault1979, p. 89). Instead of the system of positive law, it is now the power and expansion of the social norm that are important for the order and discipline of modern society. The rise of socially productive biopower corresponds to ‘juridical regression’ (Foucault, Reference Foucault1979, p. 144).
Capillary power extends beyond the limits of the sovereign state and its official laws, and functions as a disciplinary power of social norms (Foucault, Reference Foucault and Gordon1980, p. 122). The views and conceptualisations of Hobbes and Machiavelli, these generally recognised founding fathers of modern political theory, need to be abandoned because they are grounded in the realm of institutionalised politics and its legal form of the legitimate right. As Foucault comments:
‘rather than asking ourselves what the sovereign looks like from on high, we should be trying to discover how multiple bodies, forces, energies, matters, desires, thoughts, and so on are gradually, progressively, actually and materially constituted as subjects, or as the subject.’ (Foucault, Reference Foucault2003, p. 28)
Machiavelli's image of the Prince's politics of absolute power exempt from the laws, and Hobbes's concept of Leviathan with the legal right to sovereignty, are dismissed as ‘false paternities’ (Foucault, Reference Foucault2003, p. 59) because they exactly raise the question of how a multiplicity of individual wills gets transformed into a unity and single political will and body. Absolute power of sovereignty constitutes one political subject.
Foucault, however, contrasts this image of the political subject constituted by sovereignty to the multiple subjects constituted by polymorphous power techniques emerging at the periphery of and beyond the limits of institutional politics and its constitutional form (Smith, Reference Smith2000, p. 283). He presents a sweeping critique of juridical theories of power and sovereignty (Beck, Reference Beck1996, p. 489). The inadequacy of the juridical focus on absolute power is summarised in the following words:
‘From the Middle Ages onward, the essential role of the theory of right has been to establish the legitimacy of power; the major or central problem around which the theory of right is organised is the problem of sovereignty. To say that the problem of sovereignty is the central problem of right in Western societies means that the essential function of the technique and discourse of right is to dissolve the element of domination in power and to replace that domination, which has to be reduced or masked, with two things: the legitimate rights of the sovereign on the one hand, and the legal obligation to obey on the other.’ (Foucault, Reference Foucault2003, p. 26)
Indeed, the sovereignty model of society drawing on the simple differentiation between the sovereign and its subjects is useless for depicting the complexities of modern political power and its legitimation. The reciprocity of political will established by the fictional social contract is too weak, and the habit of obedience can hardly be separated from other techniques of social domination and subjugation.
Foucault's dissolving of the state by power politics (Bartelson, Reference Bartelson2004, pp. 175–176) and denunciations of sovereignty nevertheless do not mean a complete denial of the state and law's functionality within the power constellations of modernity (Wickham, Reference Wickham2006, p. 596). Law rather becomes a battlefield and tactics (Foucault, Reference Foucault2007, p. 99), and the normative force of biopower can be channelled through constitutions, legal codes and the legislature's constant activities (Ewald, Reference Ewald and Post1991, p. 144).
This adoption of the power of the norm by the system of legality due to which ‘the law operates more and more as a norm’ (Foucault, Reference Foucault1979, p. 144) is described by Francois Ewald as a shift from the concept of law as the expression of sovereign power to the concept of social law (Ewald, Reference Ewald and Teubner1988a), regulating the welfare of society and facilitating its production of normality and governmentality (Ewald, Reference Ewald and Post1991, p. 138).
Despite Foucault's frequent denunciations of sovereignty and law, the question of sovereignty persists in his work (Golder and Fitzpatrick, Reference Golder and Fitzpatrick2009, pp. 58–59). In the discussion of the relationship between sovereignty and governmentality, he famously commented that the transition from the rule of law to societal discipline and policing actually makes the problem of sovereignty ‘more acute than ever’ (Foucault, Reference Foucault2007, p. 107). In his analysis of governmentality, Foucault even remarks:
‘[w]e should not see things as the replacement of a society of sovereignty by a society of discipline, and then of a society of discipline by a society, say, of government. In fact we have a triangle: sovereignty, discipline, and governmental management, which has population as its main target and apparatuses of security as its essential mechanism.’ (Foucault, Reference Foucault2007, pp. 107–108)
Instead of the simple contrast between law and norm, the continuing mutual interdependence (Rose and Valverde, Reference Rose and Valverde1998, p. 542) of the legal form and the social norm's power is typical of modernity.
Sovereignty is no more the central concept of legal and political theory (Walby, Reference Walby2007, p. 551). It has become part of a police science in modernity. Foucault's critique of sovereignty is part of his more general critique of political modernity, which is surprisingly close to post-humanist systems theory (Honneth, Reference Honneth and Kelly1994, p. 165). However, it is compromised by the following shortcomings: it draws on the centre/periphery distinction by focusing on the capillary extremities of power techniques and contrasting them to the centre of institutionalised politics; furthermore, it considers power the ultimate productive and omnipresent mode of social relationships and communication which is everywhere and has ‘no outside’ (Foucault, Reference Foucault2000a, p. 167); and, finally, it ignores the semantics of sovereignty as a socially and politically mobilising, productive and legitimising force of modern society, opening radically new forms of this society's self-description and self-reflection.
Foucault's interpretation of Hobbes's Leviathan actually draws on common knowledge that the legally legitimised sovereign right to exercise power is not the exclusive form of domination in modern society, which is typical of the multiplicity of power relationships operating irrespective of the code of legality and institutionalised power politics. Foucault's view of power thus ‘amounts to restating some elementary sociological commonplaces’ (Lukes, Reference Lukes2005, p. 97) and classic sociological theories of social regulation, control and discipline.
The distinction between capillary and institutionalised power is useful for understanding the forms of social subjugation and domination operating independently of the legality/illegality distinction (Wickham and Pavlich, Reference Wickham and Pavlich2001). However, this contrast often leads to reductive criticisms of political institutions and their legal form as distorting the real and much more sinister functions and apparatuses of social domination and control (Taylor, Reference Taylor1984, pp. 158–160).
Foucault's contribution to the genealogy of modern social power and the evolution of alternative forms of social discipline, control and knowledge is invaluable, and the distinction between the rule of political law and the power of social norms reveals both legitimation and enforcement limitations of state sovereignty. Nevertheless, the techniques and apparatuses of administration cannot simply be contrasted to the history of political sovereignty. They, rather, are its intrinsic part (Ewald, Reference Ewald and Teubner1988a, p. 40).
Furthermore, Foucault's critique of sovereignty makes it impossible to understand its general political appeal and power of social mobilisation and legitimation. In the following part of this paper, it is therefore necessary to focus on exactly the interplay between power structures and the prescriptive aspect of sovereignty as a legitimation strategy opening the possibility of the self-description and mobilisation of modern political society and its coeval structuration into nation-states and supranational or transnational organisations.
VI. The democratisation of politics: on the self-legitimisation of power as popular sovereignty
Friedrich Nietzsche wanted sociology replaced by a ‘theory of command structures’ (Lepenies, Reference Lepenies1988, p. 239). Foucault's view is part of this intellectual tradition. Like Nietzsche, Foucault finds power and commands everywhere, including in philosophies of modern politics and law as manifestations of the will to power/knowledge. He was always fascinated by Nietzsche's concept of power which excluded freedom and truth (Lipset, Reference Lipset1969).
A social theoretical perspective of sovereignty must accommodate both Nietzsche's call for a theory of command structures and the need to study the social variety of their legitimation. While Foucault's critique of the notion of the nation as a juridical category of self-rule helps to identify non-juridical and politically non-institutionalised forms of power in modern society, it neglects exactly the productive power of the notion of demos and popular sovereignty as a legitimation strategy drawing on the image of the ultimate social body with the unlimited capacity of inclusion and exclusion of individuals, groups, political techniques, programmes and ideas. In the following sections of this paper, the concept of popular sovereignty is therefore analysed as a distinct form of self-legitimation of power generated by the modern political system which, furthermore, involves the self-description of modern society through symbolic representations of political authority and its legal constitution as an imagined polity of the sovereign people.
The modernisation of politics means its democratisation. This process involves fundamental semantic changes in the concept of sovereignty but also pragmatic changes in its metaphorical use. Former subjects of sovereign power – inhabitants of a territory of the state – now become members of a new imagined polity – the sovereign democratic nation (Greenfeld, Reference Greenfeld1992). They expect to exercise the same sovereignty to which they are subjected.
Modernisation as democratisation and the rise of nationhood and the sovereign political people led to the fundamental changes in the political semantics introduced by Hobbes and other scholars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Skinner, Reference Skinner2005). The social contract ceased to be perceived as just a device creating a sovereign rule and guaranteeing social stability, peace and the liberties of the sovereign's subjects. Now, the need for authority and rule became identical with the demand of individual liberty and rights. Liberty and authority became just two sides of the same coin – the self-governing people.
In this context, Montesquieu's famous remark about the confusion between the power of the people and the liberty of the people (Montesquieu, Reference Montesquieu1989, pp. 155–156) may be reinterpreted as an example of different self-descriptions of popular sovereignty, the function of which is to limit the expansive semantics of either the political power or legal normativity associated with modern constitutional sovereignty. Liberty is impossible to guarantee if the sovereignty of the people is unbound and unlimited by the constitution of civil rights and freedoms (Tamanaha, Reference Tamanaha2004, pp. 47–59). Nevertheless, power legitimised by the sovereignty of the people may always redefine and reconsider the extent of the legal protection of individual liberties.
Constitutional rights and liberties mean nothing if they are not self-constructed and self-constituted by the people. What has been described by normative political theory as the struggle between the aristocratic principle of liberty and the democratic principle of sovereignty or ‘the thousand-year-old duel fought between sovereignty and liberty, between Power and the freeman’ (Jouvenel, Reference Jouvenel1962, p. 318), may subsequently be reformulated as the very structure of constitutional sovereignty permanently translating political will to legal norms and vice versa.
The sovereign will of the people guarantees a right aim and a right judgment in modern democracies (Jouvenel, Reference Jouvenel1997, pp. 107–115). Through this evolution of modern political semantics, a political will of the sovereign gets linked to the general popular will and the modern state becomes the democratic state. The creation of the people as the new sovereign legitimised by its absolute and unlimited will is a self-referential and self-descriptive act drawing together the modern political tendency of both despotism and liberty. Whereas the divine will takes the form of eternal laws, the popular will, despite Rousseau's concept of the transcendental general will, has no such stability and, apart from constantly referring to the principle of the common good and natural justice, is contingent and may be changed by the successive laws and decision-making of democratically elected bodies (Riley, Reference Riley1986).
Contingency of popular sovereignty and democratic government cannot be mitigated by elevating the masses, political majority, and its representative bodies to the status of the divine will. In this respect, Herbert Spencer commented:
‘The great political superstition of the past was the divine right of kings. The great political superstition of the present is the divine rights of parliaments. The oil anointing seems unawares to have dripped from the head of the one on to the heads of the many, and given sacredness to them also and to their decrees.’ (Spencer, Reference Spencer1982, p. 123).
The most significant change in the concept of sovereignty now identified as popular sovereignty is thus the enhancement of power generated from within society. It is no longer individuals and political bodies who exercise sovereignty by limiting all other power agencies within the framework of institutionalised politics. In modern times, sovereignty signifies the self-administering and steering capacity of society that is self-governed by the popular will and legitimised by the common good of the whole polity. The constant making and unmaking of the modern sovereign state, as well as supranational and international organisations, actually contributes to this enhancement and expansion of power (Keohane, Reference Keohane2002, pp. 71–72).
VII. Contingency of popular sovereignty: notes on Tocqueville's proto-sociology of politics and civility
When Montesquieu wrote his treatise on the spirit of the laws, the fascination by the social and cultural multitude was matched by the common perception of sovereign authority as fundamentally important for the process of law-making and the overall organisation of political life. The spirit of the laws referred to the particularity of human cultures, but the very concept of political power and the exercise of a sovereign rule were considered independent variables of politics. A sovereign ruler, indeed, had to respect the spirit of the laws, but this job was not fundamentally different from the Hobbesian sovereign's obligation to protect those whose acts of will led to the civil association and the constitution of sovereign power (Arato and Cohen, Reference Arato and Cohen1992, pp. 87–88).
Nevertheless, it was Tocqueville who first noticed the paradoxical truth about modern political democracy governed by the constitutional rule of law, namely that its stability depends on citizens being aware that they can change the laws at any time because they have made them (Dannhauser, Reference Dannhauser1984, pp. 141–160). Popular sovereignty is thus typical of securing social stability through contingency – stability resigning to any transcendental legitimacy by natural or divine laws but also giving up the notion of sovereign power external to the political body. Popular sovereignty, therefore, finds itself under the jurisdiction of contingent non-transcendental social law (Ewald, Reference Ewald and Teubner1988a, p. 45, Reference Ewald and Teubner1988b).
Though Rousseau's and Robespierre's notions of politically enforced civil religion profoundly differed from Tocqueville's emphasis on personal commitment to both individual liberty and the public order of democracy, the intrinsic contingency of the democratic political system is strikingly present even in Rousseau's famous statement that each man ‘in giving himself to all gives himself to none’ (Rousseau, Reference Rousseau1994, p. 55), which summarised the identification of liberty with authority of the general will, and considered this will a process of constant willing of all members of the polity.
Now, sovereignty is reformulated as the democratic self-reference and self-description of self-governing citizens (Offe, Reference Offe2005, p. 17). The democratic self-rule embodying political equality of all citizens turns out to be the structural precondition of the modern political system. The republican notion of liberty as personal autonomy and a lack of political domination can materialise only if it establishes the political sphere of participating and deliberating citizens. The concept of politics as socially active involvement and participation – politics of active republican citizenship – is considered the most effective protection against arbitrary rule and domination (Bellamy, Reference Bellamy2007, pp. 154–175).
However, Tocqueville asked the most intriguing question of how democratic societies can persist despite their profoundly pluralistic nature (Tocqueville, Reference Tocqueville2000, p. 7). He believed that citizens had to share the same civic virtues, mores and faith in the democratic process and institutions because no democratic society could survive without these common bonds of civic culture, irreducible to individual goals and interests (Yack, Reference Yack and Beiner1998). Studying democracy and its civic culture subsequently required a completely new approach, emphasising the social conditions of modern political life and the novelty of social and moral experiences caused by the gradual development of democracy.
Because a sovereign ruler is the people living in its self-governed polity, politics becomes study matter for a sociologist, and Tocqueville highlights three theoretical variables that are essential for the study of the coming social and political age of equality, namely the factual conditions, the institutions and laws, and the subjective dispositions. While the factual conditions drew on Montesquieu's studies of historical, geographical and other external aspects of political life, and the institutions and laws recalled the Hobbesian language of politics, the subjective dispositions of particular customs, sentiments and expectations of members of a particular political society indicated a radical shift in political science (Dijn, Reference Dijn2008, pp. 150–151). According to Tocqueville, the power of intersubjective and commonly shared customs eventually determined social and political developments and the functioning of normatively imposed institutions. Social structural preconditions, such as the lack of historically rooted inequalities acquired by birth, frequent elections and exercising political rights, had been extremely important for American democracy (Wolin, Reference Wolin2001, p. 305), yet this democracy could only flourish because its citizens loved it as much as they loved their private religion. The public devotion to liberty had been as strong as the private devotion to religious beliefs and, paradoxically, an intrinsic part of this public devotion to liberty had been a belief that secular and religious powers must be kept away from each other and religious authority must not end up in the hands of politicians (Beiner, Reference Beiner2011, pp. 249–258).
VIII. Concluding remarks: popular sovereignty as the simultaneous self-legitimation and de-legitimation of power
Tocqueville's view that a common civic culture and faith in shared civic virtues and mores is a precondition of democratic society informs a classic sociological view that modern politics is impossible to be exclusively founded on the instrumental purposive rationality of individual actors negotiating the most acceptable ways of securing individual goals and interests. The modern tension between democracy as a form of government and democracy as a form of social life (Ranciere, Reference Ranciere2010, p. 47) is reflected in the generalisation of moral values and legal norms which leads to the semantic creation of a new point of politics – the nation as the sovereign people using its political will to enforce generally binding legal rules in its polity (Barnard, Reference Barnard1983).
However, the sovereign people and its polity is not the substance of power but one of its conceptualisations in modern politics and law. The self-legitimation of power through its democratic constitutionalisation is part of the general tendency of power to self-justification, and a drive to accept the social state of things as understandable and therefore acceptable for those living in it. The modern constitutional question formulated by the paradoxical differentiation of constituent and constituted power – this unique semantic invention of the political sovereign of the people that does not decide anything itself and transfers all decision-making processes to the normative realm of political constitution – thus needs to be reconceptualised as coeval processes of the constitutional self-limitation of power and power dynamics beyond the realm of constitution which, nevertheless, recursively influence the conceptualisations and symbolisation of basic constitutional categories such as the people, the citizen, constitutional sovereignty, constitutional rights, their transnational legal regimes, and so on (Walker, Reference Walker, Walker and Mendlovitz1990).
Tocqueville's early analysis of democracy already draws on the paradox of government founded by a historically and socially contingent civic culture which recursively requires governmental enforcement and support. Democratic polity of the sovereign people representing the moral foundations of society and legitimising power of government is paradoxically countered by the fact that the fundamental values and moral expressions require the support of government and its power structures. Governmental power legitimised by the image of democratic polity actually constitutes this polity. Its laws facilitate the semantics of popular sovereignty both materialised and limited by the rule of law.
Sovereignty of the people as demos, therefore, is not the existential pre-political condition and foundation of constitutional democratic politics. Polity, rather, is constituted by the structurally coupling legal and political systems to enhance and legitimise power in society. There is no polity without the systems of positive law and politics (Wendt, Reference Wendt1994).
The concept of popular sovereignty, especially its specific paradoxes informing the interrelationship of constituent and constitutive power, is just an expression of the general sociological paradox of the lack of either normative, or volitional, foundations of modern political society. This paradox means that ‘[T]he “power of the people” simultaneously legitimises and de-legitimises itself’ (Ranciere, Reference Ranciere2010, p. 53). This paradox found its strong manifestation within the sovereign constitutional state as a historically specific organisation facilitating communication between modern politics and the system of positive law. Nevertheless, it applies to national polities as well as to the great variety of supranational and transnational cosmopolitan communities – cosmopolities.
Though cosmopolitan community may be important rhetorically and semantically, it can hardly govern any government in an operative sense (Rubin, Reference Rubin2005, p. 225). Supranational and transnational organisations, therefore, facilitate their specific forms of communication between law and politics and incorporate self-legitimation alternatives beyond the nation-state and symbolic images of demos as the ultimate existential foundation of polity as society. Nevertheless, these alternatives cannot completely avoid legal and political communication reflecting on the notion of self-governing polity of free and equal citizens actively participating in these supranational and transnational legal and political organisations.
Modern law and politics – local, national, European or global – are thus permanently exposed to the irresolvable questions of who is the people, what is the difference between a man and a citizen, what establishes the difference of private and public life, how to overcome intrinsic tensions between social and legal justice, legitimacy and legality, etc. Neither legal normativity nor political decision fully grasp the social contingency underlying the modern concept of popular sovereignty. The autopoietic social systems of positive law and politics, therefore, can only steer communication about these issues of ‘substance’ which is necessarily contingent and, rather than identifying the foundational norms and principles of politics, raise only more questions stimulating further political and legal communication without moral and existential foundations.
