What explains the occurrence and nonoccurrence of institutional change regarding judicial selection mechanisms in the American states? Existing explanations tend to take one of two approaches in answering this question. Quantitative studies have analyzed the extent to which state-level factors such as holding constitutional conventions, size of the legislative majority, and years since statehood admission generate change at particular points in time. In addition to this macro approach, qualitative case studies have examined the micro-level determinants of change in certain states. In Judicial Selection in the States, Herbert Kritzer adopts a blended approach—offering detailed state-level case studies explaining why proposed judicial selection reforms succeed or fail, but doing so in a systematic way across states that yields generalizable conclusions. The result is a rich study of institutional reform efforts that significantly enhances our understanding of judicial selection and state politics.

The book, consisting of 13 chapters plus an introduction and conclusion, is organized into three parts: “change as an exercise in partisan politics” (pp. 33–124), “change as court modernization or good government” (pp. 125–238), and “unsuccessful change efforts” (pp. 239–343). Within these parts, the 13 chapters consider case studies from 22 states. Most chapters are devoted to a single state, but several chapters, including every chapter in the “unsuccessful change efforts” part, address multiple states. The coverage period spans 1980–2018. Kritzer amasses a wealth of information for this project, including interviews with state-specific experts, primary-source materials, and judicial elections data. As a result, he is able to tell the stories of state-level institutional reform in a way that makes the reader feel like a contemporary observer. In less deft hands, such an accumulation of particulars could lead to information overload and risk missing the forest for the trees, but Kritzer masterfully weaves the individual threads together in a way that keeps the stories flowing smoothly.

For a theoretical lens through which to view reform efforts, Kritzer adopts a framework developed by Richard Richardson and Kenneth Vines that distinguishes “legal and democratic subcultures” (p. 7). The former emphasizes “norms that seek to insulate judges from political pressures,” while the latter “reflects the democratic values of representation and accountability,” including the notion “that judges should reflect the politics and policy preferences of the community in which they serve” (pp. 8–9). Using this lens, Kritzer loosely classifies the case studies, finding that both subcultures play a role in adoption decisions but that the legal subculture dominated from 1980 through 1999, with the democratic subculture prevailing from 2000 through the present. The legal and democratic subcultures framework is not fully up to the task of sorting the multifaceted reasons for reform successes and failures that Kritzer uncovers, but he appropriately does not ask more of the theoretical lens than it can provide. Rather, Kritzer unfurls the state-by-state evidence as he finds it and draws on the framework primarily to help guide the search for systematic answers to the question of what motivates judicial selection reform.

My primary takeaway from the book is that the judicial selection reform story is messy. Sure, partisan politics matters, and some reformers are genuinely motivated by a desire to improve the quality of the bench. But the debate is often motivated at least in part by haphazard events and circumstances, such as one judicial decision, a controversial appointment, scandal involving a sitting judge, effective use of rhetoric, the transaction costs associated with making institutional reforms, pressure from a particularly active or influential lobbying group, the prospect of a political party losing candidate-filing fees, and even an entrepreneurial pair of judges making an uninvited proposal. Kritzer’s story has it all. Most of these occurrences are broadly political, of course, and in any event are filtered through a political lens. The complexity of the big picture would be impossible to appreciate, however, had not Kritzer uncovered and synthesized the finer details.

One of the book’s central contributions is its inclusive perspective on judicial selection reform debates. As an initial matter, Krtizer’s discussion spans the judicial hierarchy. Much of the literature on judicial selection, and state courts more broadly, focuses on apex courts. Although this prioritization owes more to a general information deficit with respect to the lower courts than wanton neglect, it is nonetheless problematic, given the importance and typically heavier caseloads carried by state trial and intermediate appellate courts. Kritzer could have easily carved out a similar book exclusively analyzing reform efforts involving apex courts, but to his credit he charted the more difficult path by including lower courts. In addition to the sheer information value inherent in effectuating this approach, the inclusion of lower courts leads to a key finding: reform attitudes often differ for trial as opposed to appellate courts. Many stakeholders prefer contestable elections for trial courts and a “merit plan” system combining commission-aided gubernatorial selection with retention elections for appellate courts.

Attention to secondary judicial selection and retention rules is the second commendable inclusionary aspect of Kritzer’s project. Academics and reformers interested in these debates mostly focus on the primary question of which selection or retention mechanism should be adopted. The standard choice set for selection institutions includes unilateral gubernatorial appointment, legislative appointment, commission-aided gubernatorial appointment, nonpartisan election, and partisan election, whereas the typical retention options are life tenure, elite reappointment, contestable election, and retention election. Kritzer emphasizes these debates, of course, but also digs into secondary rule choices, which are much less well understood. Examples include choosing between plurality and majority voting in elections, determining whether elections are held in the fall or spring, considering whether to require legislatures to confirm gubernatorial appointees, setting the vote threshold for success in retention elections, and designing nominating commissions.

The bottom line is that Judicial Selection in the States is a remarkable achievement. Kritzer assembles and amalgamates an abundance of information on state-specific debates that coalesces into a comprehensive account of reform efforts during the modern era. Whereas scholars are often interested in the consequences of judicial selection and retention institutions for outcomes such as quality, diversity, and decision making, reformers work from a broader set of motivations when choosing primary and secondary selection and retention rules. Kritzer comprehensively demonstrates that the background principles driving reform debates are broadly political, but are more explicitly partisan now than in the late twentieth century. This book is clearly a must-read for anyone interested in judicial selection, but it will also prove fascinating for those interested in law and courts, state politics, and political institutions more broadly. It is an impressive accomplishment.