The idea of human rights stands at a crossroads. On the one hand, the language of rights has never been so popular. Civil society organisations constantly hoist the banner of human rights in their campaigns, while international organisations refer relentlessly to the central importance of rights in their work. Legal instruments that attempt to encapsulate and give binding force to human rights have become integral elements of most legal systems. Academics and activists consistently try to expand the reach and scope of rights approaches: initially conceived as a narrow set of minimal guarantees to protect core human liberties, the language of rights have now become a conceptual framework for articulating a vast range of normative claims. Socioeconomic rights, equality rights, children’s rights, cultural rights and other new varieties of ‘rightspeak’ have all emerged in recent decades, and have flourished across the globe. Human rights appear to be the progressive ideology of choice for our times.
However, on the other hand, human rights face new and growing political challenges, especially since the events of 9/11. Many Western governments, partial cheerleaders for human rights during the Cold War, have begun to kick against the constraints which human rights instruments impose on their freedom of action. Ironically, some Western governments also increasingly use the language of human rights to justify actions, such as the Iraq invasion, which rights activists often bitterly oppose.Footnote 1 This development reflects the ever-increasing salience of human rights ideals, but also demonstrates the existence of real conflict and disagreement about their substance. In addition, some states, such as Russia, increasingly indicate a willingness to reject or repudiate the human rights package. Fundamentalist religious ideologies challenge the universalist and Enlightenment-rooted assumptions underlying most contemporary accounts of rights. The predominance of neoliberal ideologies and increasing commodification of social goods since 1989 has denied political oxygen to some of the narratives of human solidarity out of which elements of the human rights idea originally grew. In other words, just as the ideology of human rights attains significant new levels of impact and support, it is attracting a backlash. New debates have broken out as to who can speak in the name of rights, and how the integrity of human rights ideals can be maintained in the midst of this uncertainty.Footnote 2
The three books all reviewed here engage with these issues in different ways. Gearty’s Can Human Rights Survive? is a collection of essays that were originally presented as the 2005 Hamlyn Lectures. This volume is an ambitious undertaking, and a considerable contribution to the great tradition of Hamlyn papers. In the first chapter, Gearty attempts to identify what, if any, common, shared understanding can underpin the idea of human rights in what he calls the current ‘crisis of authority’, where foundational or metaphysical accounts of human values have largely succumbed to withering critique. He argues that a ‘Darwinian’ sense of shared human compassion is perhaps the only solid basis on which human rights ideals can rest (pp. 40–50).Footnote 3
Gearty then proceeds in the rest of the book to examine how the ‘legalisation’ of rights (i.e. their conversion into judicially enforceable legal norms) and the incorporation of the language of rights within the current discourse of ‘national security’ pose a serious threat to the emancipatory potential of the human rights idea. He sees human rights as beleaguered, resting on shaky normative foundations and facing a life-threatening crisis in the form of the current ‘War on Terror’. This book attempts to explore how this ‘Esperanto of the virtuous’ can survive and thrive despite these threats, via the re-emphasising of the emancipatory, participatory and ultimately compassionate roots of the idea of human rights. In general, this volume represents perhaps Gearty’s finest work: he returns to old and familiar themes that have recurred throughout his work, such as the dangers of the legalisation of rights and the rhetoric of counter-terrorism, but his analysis has deepened and become more nuanced.
Dembour, in Who Believes in Human Rights?, also engages with some of these themes, except that her focus is primarily on the application of the rights norms contained in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) by the European Court of Human Rights (hereafter ‘the Strasbourg court’) in its case-law. Her admirably clear and focused introduction makes it clear that she shares Gearty’s scepticism about the existence of any basis of ‘universal universality’ on which to rest the normative foundations of human rights ideas. However, her approach differs from that of Gearty, in that Dembour does not attempt to find any substitute basis for rights ideology. She maintains a degree of suspicion about the entire package of human rights ideals, while accepting their potential usefulness as a form of rhetoric and persuasion. She explores some of the major ‘classical critiques’ of human rights ideology and applies these critiques to how rights are institutionalised and protected via the case-law of the Strasbourg court. Dembour concludes that many of these critiques, including the realist, radical feminist, utilitarian, Marxist and ‘particularist’/anti-universalist perspectives, have considerable validity when applied to the Strasbourg jurisprudence. The human rights case-law of the Court is riddled with normative gaps, uncertainties and multiple instances where human rights law does not deliver on its emancipatory potential.
Dembour moves on from this conclusion to discuss the normative and ethical limits of rights jurisprudence, and against this background she analyses human rights scholarship and how it defines the idea of rights and responds to these limitations. For her, four ‘schools’ of human rights scholarship can be identified: the ‘natural’ scholars, who see rights as inherent and ‘given’; ‘deliberative’ scholars, who see rights as agreed norms settled by a process of social and political debate; ‘protest’ scholars, who see rights as ideals to be fought for; and ‘discourse’ scholars, who see rights as indeterminate norms that are consistently in the process of being formulated and discussed. In a very interesting analysis, Dembour proceeds to examine the interrelationship between these different approaches to human rights. For her, an approach based on ‘human rights nihilism’ and linked to the ‘discourse’ school is ultimately preferential: human rights may be useful as a ‘system of persuasion’, but they are ultimately contested norms with limited effect that are rooted in particular subjective assumptions, and which do not rest on any firm normative foundation (pp. 274–75).
The final book is less ambitious in its philosophical ambitions than the first two, but no less interesting for that. Greer in The European Convention on Human Rights: Achievements, Problems and Prospects sets out to examine the track record of the ECHR, its limits, successes and achievements, as well as the evolving role of the Strasbourg court. He argues that the purpose of the Convention has changed: established at the beginning of the Cold War to serve as a statement of basic shared Western European values in response to Communist authoritarianism, it has morphed into an ‘abstract constitutional model’ for the European continent as a whole, setting out a range of normative standards which public institutions across Europe must strive to meet.
While more upbeat in his assessment of what the Convention has achieved than is Dembour, Greer shows that the ECHR’s enforcement machinery, and in particular the Strasbourg court, has struggled to adjust to its changed role. He examines how the shift to a constitutional role has impacted upon the jurisprudence and interpretative approach of the Court, but also how the growing case-load has imposed intolerable burdens on the functioning of the Court and has not been matched by adjustments to the Convention’s barely adequate machinery for ensuring state compliance. Greer concludes this outstanding book by suggesting that this new ‘constitutional’ role for the Court is here to stay: therefore, he suggests that considerable adjustments need to be made to the admissibility rules, practice and procedure and functioning of the Court, as well as to the (currently very limited) relationship between the Strasbourg institutions and national human rights bodies.
Greer’s concerns are therefore more specific and narrower than those of Gearty and even Dembour, who also concentrates upon the Strasbourg jurisprudence but uses it for the purposes of her theoretical arguments as a representative example of an institution applying human rights standards. However, all three books make substantial contributions to the existing literature. All three are excellent pieces of human rights scholarship: each in their own way will constitute important points of reference for some time to come. They also have the immense virtue of being well-written, clear and accessible: arguments are made with punch and style, with the Gearty and Dembour books being particularly readable and engaging.
Indeed, from the perspective of a student, all three books strike the happy balance of combining rigorous argument with clear exposition. For academics, these books also have a welcome willingness to take controversial positions. Greer breaks ranks with much NGO opinion in questioning whether the right of individual petition to the Strasbourg court should remain open to all potential litigants. He suggests that this is now untenable given the volume of the Court’s case-load: instead, the Court needs to be able to act as a constitutional court in selecting significant cases while rejecting others that are more appropriately dealt with elsewhere, a position which with I agree. Gearty reiterates his oft-expressed scepticism about the legalisation of rights and is not afraid to highlight the very problematic distinction between terrorism and political violence. Dembour assaults sacred cows left, right and centre: her challenge to foundationalist accounts of rights, while not altogether new,Footnote 4 is bracing, well-argued and refreshingly nuanced. She also brings anthropological and philosophical perspectives to bear in her analysis that are often overlooked in contemporary human rights scholarship, including the always interesting work of Guy Haarscher.Footnote 5 Her book is also notable for her use of personal experience and individual examples to highlight the real people behind the statistics of inadmissibility decisions and other court determinations.
As ever, there are parts of all three books that could have been expanded, or better developed. I would have liked to see Gearty take forward the idea of human rights being founded on a Darwinian sense of compassion, and apply this to other contexts apart from his usual safe terrain of the legalisation of rights and national security. How, for example, could this idea be applied in the context of socioeconomic rights? However, the format of the Hamlyn lectures perhaps precluded this, and we may have to wait for subsequent works. Dembour could perhaps have developed her concept of ‘rights nihilism’ a little: does it differ very much from Rorty’s pragmatic scepticism, despite its roots in Nietzsche’s subjectivism? Much of Greer’s text has already seen the light of day in article form: this means that some of the separate chapters are largely self-contained and adhere to the framework of their progenitor articles. This means that in places overarching ideas are not as fully developed as perhaps ideally they would be: for example, I would have liked to see more on the ‘abstract constitutional role’ the Strasbourg court is now playing. Greer argues that its functions increasingly mirror the constitutional review conducted by the US Supreme Court and German Constitutional Court. I tend to agree with him, but can the often Delphic and case-specific findings of the Court play a similar role as the more tangible norm-setting role of national constitutional courts? Does Strasbourg ultimately have the authority and legitimacy to play such a role?
However, pointing out how arguments could or should have been developed further is the luxury of the reviewer: all three books may not be perfectly complete, but all generate ideas, fresh insights and new perspectives of real value. What then can we take from these useful pieces of human rights scholarship? Given the simultaneous position of strength and weakness that human rights find themselves in at present, as outlined in the opening paragraphs of this review, do the arguments made in these books stand up? Do they offer a coherent account of where human rights ideas find themselves now, and where they might find themselves in ten or twenty years’ time?
At the time of the drafting of the Universal Declaration in 1948 and the subsequent UN human rights treaties of the 1960s and 1970s, human rights texts were the product of a cross-cultural, cross-national dialogue: they were intended to serve as a statement of agreed shared values that could unite a divided world in agreement on certain basic minimal entitlements. For their framers, they perhaps were never meant to be anything else. However, with the revigoration of natural law philosophies in the wake of World War II, and the hugely influential work by Rawls, Dworkin and others which gave new and vibrant life to liberal political philosophy, the human rights idea seemed to encapsulate and give concrete shape to these exciting new normative currents. Even philosophical perspectives rooted in more critical traditions, such as Habermasian ‘discourse theory’,Footnote 6 Derridian deconstructionism and Foucaultian post-structuralism, have a tendency to reach for concepts rooted in the human rights tradition when it comes to outlining a positive agenda of progressive change.Footnote 7 Gearty exaggerates when he says that human rights have become a new ‘secular religion’: however, as I have suggested above, it has replaced socialism and other ideologies as the progressive doctrine de jour. However, in an era apparently dominated by post-modern critique on the one hand, and a return to the easy certainties of total religious belief on the other, does the human rights idea rest on solid normative foundations? Or is it essentially hollow in nature, and therefore vulnerable to its abuse, misappropriation and rejection?
Gearty and Dembour both share the belief that ‘grand narrative’ universalist theories of rights cannot stand up to post-modernist critique. Gearty, however, argues that his concept of ‘Darwarian universalism’, which is predicated upon the existence of a shared sense of compassion, can step into the normative gap: in the alternative, at least the lowest common denominator of this idea of human compassion can provide a common point of agreement for all who wish to come under the human rights umbrella. This is an attractive idea, and is well developed in Can Human Rights Survive?. However, can the vague and uncertain concept of compassion really provide the idea of human rights with enough normative clarity?
Compassion is a vague and imprecise emotion, and it will often be unclear what compassion for the underdog actually requires. Conflicting stances on many issues can readily be justified by citing compassionate impulses. The invasion of Iraq, the detention without trail of alleged terrorists, access to abortion or the rights of defendants within a criminal justice system are all examples: in each case, ‘compassion’ can be used as a justification for almost any stance that one wants to adopt. However, it cannot by itself give human rights the hard and clear definition that is required, if the idea of rights is to give firm normative guidance on difficult and controversial questions. More is needed.
I would suggest that when human rights arguments are deployed to push for governments to adopt or to avoid a particular course of action, much of their normative and emotional appeal lies in their claim to combine both compassion and rationality in a coherent package. If one for example argues for greater respect for the human rights of asylum seekers, one is arguing (a) for more compassionate treatment, but also (b) for treatment that is founded on a more coherent set of moral principles than that currently being inflicted. Human rights claims are more than emotional appeals to the good nature or conscience of government: they contain a morally rationalist component, as well as an emotive dimension.
This claim to contain a rational dimension, embodied in legal requirements such as the proportionality test, gives added force to rights arguments. This rational component is also relied upon to define what course of action best complies with rights standards, and to give precision to human rights claims that mere appeals to compassion lack. However, this appeal to rational principles means that rights claims invariably place some reliance upon the very Enlightenment-rooted philosophical constructs that Gearty suggests lack authority in the post-modern era. As a result, I am sceptical whether the human rights edifice can be built up from Gearty’s compassion principle alone.
Indeed, Dembour is sceptical about the existence of any objective normative foundation for rights ideology, hence her ‘rights nihilism’. Indeed, she is sceptical about the idea of human rights in general, seeing its primary value as a useful rhetorical tool to be deployed where appropriate for progressive ends. She bases her scepticism on her extensive critique of the case-law of the Strasbourg court. Dembour makes a questionable logical jump here, moving from identifying the limits and gaps of the Strasbourg jurisprudence to a wider philosophical critique of the human rights idea in general. The deficiencies of the Strasbourg jurisprudence may give rise to questions about the usefulness of institutionalising rights via a legal framework. However, it does not necessary indict the human rights idea itself, which is of course separable and often much more capable of having an emancipatory impact outside of legal frameworks.Footnote 8 In other words, Dembour relies too much on a critique of a specific legal framework in making a wider case about human rights thinking in general. Nevertheless, her critique of human rights ideology has considerable force, especially since the aim of much of the human rights movement is to embed rights in legal structures such as the ECHR. However, if Dembour is correct in arguing that the human rights idea is devoid of real objective normative force, then can it be sustained in the face of competing ideologies?
Dembour focuses on predominantly ‘progressive’ critiques of rights, but notably absent from her analysis are the challenges that are made against human rights by conservative, fundamentalist or authoritarian critics of rights. These perspectives are notable for their absence from most academic analysis, but in practice are often politically very potent. At the heart of these critiques usually lies an assertion of subjective values at the expense of what is usually presented as a false or hollow cosmopolitan universalism: the needs of a particular national group, or a particular belief, or a particular ‘way of life’ are presented as more deserving of protection than universal rights norms. The post-modern critical embrace of subjectivity finds an uncomfortable echo in these conservative assaults upon rights values.Footnote 9
If Dembour’s ‘human rights nihilism’ is the position to which the ‘crisis of authority’ has lead us, there may be a price to be paid if the human rights project can no longer be credibly seen as articulating objective norms of universal validity. Why should the ‘discourse’ of human rights command any more respect than the particularist discourses of nationality, religion, culture, values and even race? If the idea of human rights becomes just one more ideology, then it may lose its ‘aura’ of normative superiority. This is perhaps why Gearty wishes to find some basis for the human rights ideal in the idea of human compassion. Dembour is less concerned about this prospect, welcoming greater normative scepticism about rights. However, it remains to be seen whether the appeal of human rights ideology can survive the potential loss of its ‘aura’.
This potential loss of ‘aura’ could also afflict the delicate and somewhat precarious structure of international human rights institutions. Even well-established human rights institutions such as the ECHR and its enforcement machinery remain vulnerable to political winds. If the human rights ideal were to become tarnished, or become one more ideology amongst many, the status and prestige of the Strasbourg mechanisms will increasingly be exposed to new challenges. This is already happening: the European Court of Human Rights is coming under new forms of political pressure, especially from Western European governments concerned about the terrorist threatFootnote 10 and from Russia’s increasingly overt hostility to the Strasbourg institutions. In addition, the Strasbourg court is to an extent a victim of its own success: as Greer discusses, with its huge case-load, the Court is buckling under the strain of living up to the expectations that it has successfully generated over the last two decades. Taken together, these factors combine to create an increasingly turbulent climate for the Court, notwithstanding its status as one of the more respected and effective human rights institutions in the world.
This should be a source of concern to those well disposed towards the human rights ideal, even if only in a qualified and provisional way. Dembour’s critique of the Court makes too much of the inevitable compromises, caution and judicial tentativeness that come with the legalisation of rights via a judicial (or any other) framework. She herself notes that the European Court of Human Rights has been a valuable agent for progressive change. Human rights institutions will inevitably disappoint, to some extent. However, they are essential for infusing human rights concepts into the bloodstream of mainstream legal and political discourse. Greer’s book is invaluable in discussing the ways in which the Strasbourg court has achieved some success in achieving this gradual transfusion over the last few decades, and in exploring how this relative success can be maintained and followed though. However, it may be that the future of the Court may depend as much on the ideology of human rights maintaining its current ‘aura’ as on the institutional dynamics that Greer discusses. In other words, the current difficulties that the Court finds itself in are linked to the wider issues affecting human rights, a dimension that perhaps Greer underplays in his otherwise excellent analysis.
The idea of human rights has reached its current salience in an era of accelerating neoliberalism, post-modern erosion of attempts to construct universalist normative projects, and the apparent resurgence of particularist alternative ideologies. Some of the current appeal of human rights ideology may stem from how rights thinking is both linked to these trends and yet also is opposed to them in interesting and complex ways. The human rights idea can accommodate a wide diversity of different philosophical viewpoints, as Dembour shows. It gives expression to common human needs and bonds, as Gearty argues. The institutions established to protect rights may have the capacity to adopt and change over time, as Greer illustrates. However, in the final analysis, human rights may be inextricably intertwined with the Enlightenment project, which may prove to be an inherent strength or considerable weakness in the years ahead.Footnote 11
