This well-written and engaging book situates James Madison as a spirited defender of popular government. Colleen Sheehan gives us a Madison whose republicanism is preoccupied by shaping, mobilizing, and guiding public opinion as the animating spirit of self-government. In unfolding this Madison, Sheehan turns to his often neglected writings from the 1790s, particularly his “Notes on Government” and National Gazette essays. Sheehan makes a good case and, to be sure, gives us a deeper and more rounded understanding of Madison. Yet, as Jane Austen's Elizabeth Bennett says, “[M]y spirits might often lead me wrong.” Sheehan, let me say, is not so much wrong, but in her spirited defense of Madison's insistence on a spirited people, she downplays the self-interested passions from which Madison deliberately built.
While much has been written on the consistency of Madison, contrasting his putatively Federalist period of 1780 with his republican conversion of 1790, Sheehan persuasively casts Madison as largely consistent. If in the 1780s Madison was primarily concerned with the problem of majority faction, in the 1790s he was “concerned with minority schemes that would thwart the public voice” (7). Sheehan gives us a vivid and compelling portrait of a principled and independent Madison: he is not the junior partner to either Alexander Hamilton's Federalist or Thomas Jefferson's republicanism. Indeed, Madison comes off as a deeper and more compelling constitutional thinker and statesman than either Hamilton or Jefferson. In contrasting Madison's thinking with his contemporaries, Sheehan places him closest to Jefferson's republicanism: “What Madison and Jefferson disagreed about was not whether public opinion is sovereign, but how the sovereign authority of public opinion is best gathered and actively expressed in republican government” (140).
More intriguingly, Sheehan connects Madison more fully than has been done before to French Enlightenment thinkers and, particularly, to their developing notion of public opinion. This sort of public opinion is quite different from how we regard it today: “Public opinion is not the sum of ephemeral passions and narrow interests; it is not an aggregate of uninformed minds and wills” (79). Rather, “public opinion reflects a moral consensus and is a source of political authority and stability in government” (63). Sheehan gives a comprehensive account of Madison by reading The Federalist and his earlier work in light of his Party Essays of the 1790s. She persuasively illustrates how the themes evident in these later essays are evident in his famous essays as Publius in The Federalist as well—even in the much vaunted Federalist, no. 10.
In making this argument, Sheehan insists that Madison was not primarily driven by John Locke. This contention is brought most vividly to light in Sheehan's discussion of the “commerce of ideas.” As Sheehan puts it, Madison “envisioned a commerce of ideas in the extended republic that would not only refine the will of the majority in the legislature but, to the extent possible, would also modify and enlarge the will and views of the majority (or society) itself” (94). Madison, thus, roots his republicanism in popular sovereignty, but seeks to refine the sovereign in accord with right and reason.
Yet Sheehan does not reject the role that prejudice might play in attaching the people to the Constitution and is an attentive reader of Federalist, no. 49. What Sheehan does seek to draw out is that Madison saw the cultivation of “better opinions” as the means to “anchor a republican citizenry in the moral principles of free government” (105). For Madison, this cultivation was the primary mechanism by which republican government is sustained—recognizing institutional devices, and particularly self-interest, as subordinate features in this scheme. Sheehan takes aim, in particular, at Martin Diamond's argument that Madison developed the commercial republic, with its clash of rival economic interests, as the key to modern republicanism. Even while Sheehan makes a nod to the commercial republic, she sees it as far better captured by “commerce in ideas” than by conflicting commercial interests. Indeed, her most powerful chapter, “The Commerce of Ideas,” is a play on Diamond's commercial republic and Lockean self-interest. According to Sheehan, Hamilton, not Madison, is the theorist of the commercial republic of rival interests (122). Madison, on the contrary, saw institutions and the resultant construction of majorities as secondary and no substitute for “civic education and the need to form an American character” (4).
In laying out this argument, Sheehan brings to light Madison's reading of Jean Jacques Barthelemy's Voyage of Anacharsis (157) and its possible influence on Madison's “Notes on Government,” which defines public opinion as the “pivotal element in Madison's schema.” Moreover, Sheehan traces Madison's thinking back to book 5 of Aristotle's Politics on “regime preservation” (161). Following Barthelemy, as well as Montesquieu, Madison speaks to the “Spirit of Government” within the science of politics that turns on the mores and opinions of the people. This understanding has much more in common with Aristotle's view of the regime than, say, the legalisms of Thomas Hobbes. Yet, like Montesquieu, Madison stops short of the classics by placing (modern) liberty, and not civic education, as the end of government. As Sheehan argues, “[Madison] employed Montesquieu's method of preserving the liberty of the constitution and at the same time reclaimed the Aristotelian political task that took seriously the liberty of the citizen and the need for civic education in the spirit of the regime” (167).
Sheehan makes this point in her discussion of the Bill of Rights. While we tend to think of it as protecting individual rights in a modern and legalistic manner, Sheehan argues that Madison thought it would be most powerful in shaping the public mind. This is perhaps most illustrative of Madison at his best—he is securing liberal rights, but sees that one powerful way of doing so is by teaching the public. This example makes a powerful case for the “synthesis theory” of Madison: while there are elements of classical thought in Madison, modern liberal ideas of natural rights, limited government, and economic freedom are the predominant strands of his theory (5). Sheehan does not neglect this side of Madison, but she downplays Madison's understanding of politics as rooted in self-interest and channeled through institutional devices. The whole Madison—the author, for example, of the very Lockean “Memorial and Remonstrance”—had a capacious and combining mind that drew on diverse strands of thought to construct a stable and enduring constitutional regime. Sheehan has elegantly and artfully recaptured neglected and forgotten elements of Madison's thinking that all serious scholars of Madison will need to confront. Yet, if Diamond once overplayed the significance of the extended commercial republic with clashing interests and constructed majorities, these remain important elements of Madison's political science.
Let me repair to the words of another of Sheehan's favorites, the redoubtable Albus Dumbledore, as he tries to guide (and channel) Harry Potter: “I was afraid that your hot head might dominate your good heart.” This sentiment expresses, albeit somewhat imperfectly, much of what grounds Madison's political science. If, as Sheehan argues, Madison wants to cultivate a spirited people, he is also eager to limit and channel that very people.
