Denise Natali's comparative study on Kurdish nationalism seeks to explain the differences between the Kurdish movements in Iraq, Turkey, and Iran. Why, for example, is the Kurdish movement in Iraq more influenced by tribal leadership and organization than the Kurdish movement in Turkey? Why is the Kurdish movement in Iran more inclined toward accommodation with the Iranian state than its counterparts across the border? Simply by foregrounding these sorts of questions, Natali makes a significant contribution to Kurdish studies, which has heretofore seen little explicit comparative methodology. Her clear-sighted analysis also goes a long way toward challenging several persistent conceptions that circulate in scholarly and popular analyses: Kurds are “one large tribal community”; Kurds who ally with state governments are “not really Kurds” or, worse, are traitors; and the Kurds should somehow be pointed to as a case of “failed nationalism.” Instead, Natali wants her readers to see nationalism as “part of a contextually contingent process whereby a nation can follow multiple paths over long periods” (p. xxiv), and, more precisely, to see even “die-hard” Kurdish nationalists as profoundly influenced by multiple contexts that may sometimes reduce, as well as exacerbate, their propensity to mobilize against the state.
Her explanation for the differential and variable nature of Kurdish nationalism is straightforward, emphasizing above all the relationship between Kurdish communities and the states in which they live. Natali refers to this as “political space”: “political and cultural opportunities for groups to express their ethnic identity and the possibilities to assume alternative identities over time” (p. xviii). As she later illustrates, it includes components such as the nature of official nationalism and state strategies toward Kurds. Although, she argues, the content of Kurdayetî (Kurdish national identity) is based on relatively objective group features, its character—urban or rural, religious or secular, and so forth—is determined by the nature of this political space, which varies across time and geographies.
Although the concept of political space at times threatens to become a catch-all phrase, Natali for the most part employs it usefully in her eight comparative chapters on Kurdayetî in Iraq, Turkey, and Iran (she does not deal with Syria, which also has a sizable number of ethnic Kurds). Thus, in chapter 1 on the late Ottoman and Qajar periods, she sees a “large political space” in which the privileging of “traditional social structures” largely inhibited ethnonationalist mobilization (pp. 11, 22). Two chapters on Kurdayetî in Iraq between the 1920s and the early-21st century track the variety of relationships Iraqi Kurdish leaders established with successive Iraqi regimes and the growth of an increasingly ethnicized understanding of Kurdish nationalism under the pressure of the Arab Baʿth. From the 1970s onward, as she demonstrates, Kurdish nationalism in Iraq has been bifurcated, not only between two parties (the KDP and the PUK) but also between two oppositional identities: one marked by violent resistance (as symbolized by the peshmerga) and one by compromise.
Natali then moves on to explore Kurdayetî in Turkey and Iran. Her chapters on Kurdish nationalism in Turkey are solid, although they cover mostly familiar ground. She sees Kurdayetî as having a “nearly nonexistent” political space in the early republic before finding a more liberal atmosphere in the 1960s, when the movement fragmented and diversified to a much greater degree than in Iraq. One of the best parts of her discussion here is her emphasis on the role economic transformation played in redefining Kurdish nationalism in Turkey, both after 1960 and in the 1980s under Turgut Özal's privatization program (pp. 112–13). Less compelling are some of her comparative assessments; she asserts, problematically, that the political space of 1960s Turkey was “as dangerous and restrictive for Kurdish nationalists as it was during the Kemalist period” (p. 97) and, debatably, that the diversification of Kurdish communities in Turkey created a “less representative” form of Kurdayetî than in Iraq (pp. 102–3).
Addressing the more rarely studied case of Kurdish nationalism in Iran, Natali offers a thoughtful discussion that examines, among other key questions, why Kurdayatî there has often been less confrontational than in Iraq and Turkey. She attributes this primarily to three main factors: the existence of an alternative (Arab) “other” in Iranian national discourse, more cultural freedom in Iran for Kurdish cultural expression, and a less ethnified Iranian national identity. She also notes that underdevelopment in Iran was not concentrated in the Kurdish regions of the country but affected many non-Kurdish provinces (p. 137). Natali's last substantive chapter on the impact of transnationalism is in some ways the most interesting and original part of the book, highlighting the differential impact of “asymmetrical” transnational space on the three Kurdish movements under examination.
Natali handles this far-ranging discussion deftly. Particularly important is her emphasis throughout on Kurdish agency: whether in Iraq, Turkey, or Iran, Kurdish groups are depicted as, in her words, “an active and diverse periphery responding in different ways” (p. 181), not as a uniform or helpless group. Although the book is theoretically underpinned by work on ethnicity and nationalism, it is written in plain language, with most of the references gathered at the end of relevant paragraphs. Given their subtlety, it is worth noting the richness of the sources, which include a large number of primary documents (especially Kurdish-language periodicals and other texts) and an array of other materials in languages including English, Kurdish, Turkish, and French.
As is to be expected in a work of this range, there are critiques. Some key organizations and events, especially wars, that one would expect to have had a deep impact on the nature of Kurdish nationalism seem dropped into the text with little explanation or analysis of their impact (the Kurdish wars against the Iraqi state in the 1960s, for instance, and, in Turkey, the Kurdistan Workers Party [PKK] and its struggle with the Turkish state after 1984). Specialists may also find the book's macroperspective overly general (an ironic complaint, given the author's extensive fieldwork and intimate knowledge of Kurdish politics, especially in Iraqi Kurdistan and Europe). Overall, though, this is an important book for advancing the terms of discussion in the still narrow field of Kurdish studies and for offering an accessible, systematic study to more general readers interested in such timely matters as Kurdish politics and nationalism in the Middle East.
