This edited volume makes significant contributions to current debates over constitutions and constitutionalism in Latin America across several scholarly disciplines. Indeed, the book's formidable strengths lie in its theoretical and methodological pluralism. The downside, though, is a lack of cohesion and a somewhat scattershot approach to a multifaceted topic.

Detlef Nolte and Almut Schilling-Vacaflor begin by presenting data on the pace of constitutional change and the procedures for implementing constitutional reform across Latin America. Their discussion of flexibility versus rigidity is thoughtful, though it misses an opportunity to engage Arend Lijphart's (Patterns of Democracy, 1999) arguments about the majoritarianism of flexible constitutions. They then introduce their key concept. “New constitutionalism” is associated with recent reforms in Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia, and characterized by more direct and participatory modes of democracy, expanded social and group-based rights, and more pluralistic and plurinational state structures. The choice of nomenclature is inopportune: Earlier works have already dubbed not one but several rather different “new constitutionalisms.” Some of this previous scholarship is discussed here (e.g., Ran Hirschl, “The Political Origins of the New Constitutionalism,” Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 11 [no. 1, 2004]: 71–108); some is not (Stephen L. Elkin and Karol Edward Soltan, eds., A New Constitutionalism: Designing Political Institutions for a Good Society, 1993; Stephen Gill, “Globalization, Market Civilization, and Disciplinary Neoliberalism.” Millennium 24 [no. 3, 1995]: 399–423).

The introduction closes with the editors (p)rebutting anticipated accusations of naive constitutionalism: After all, in Latin America, “meticulously conceived and comprehensive constitutions go hand in hand with a widespread lack of respect for the law” (p. 25). The editors admit that elements of “new” constitutions—especially the proliferation of social and economic rights—are indeed more aspirational than real. But even “dormant clauses” matter, since “without the inclusion of new rights today, there can be no judicial recognition of new rights tomorrow” (p. 26). (What is more, aspirational rights clauses can become focal points for social mobilizations demanding that states actually fulfill these promises.)

New Constitutionalism in Latin America then proceeds in five parts: two sections on conceptual and historical questions, followed by three clusters of case studies. Nineteen different chapters are amalgamated into this structure, some more easily than others. There is two (or even three) books' worth of material here; the collection is bountiful but a bit unwieldy.

Beyond the introductory chapter, Part I develops additional concepts and analytical frameworks, most of which are not redeployed in any subsequent chapters. Astrid Lorenz explores the strengths and weaknesses of “static” versus “dynamic” (i.e., complex, multicausal) approaches to analyzing constitutional change. Gabriel Negretto tests hypotheses on the causes of constitutional amendment versus replacement, and finds that—given the fragmentation of many Latin American party systems—more flexible amendment procedures, coupled with stronger judicial review, reduce the impetus for wholesale replacement. José Antonio Cheibub, Zachary Elkins, and Tom Ginsburg argue that executive-branch institutions have evolved in ways that challenge the presidential/parliamentary dichotomy; Latin American constitutions are converging around a presidentialism in which the executive has immense lawmaking powers. The final chapter of this part, by Albert Noguera Fernández, pivots from institutionalism to a neo-Marxist analysis of “critical constitutionalism”: the deconstruction of neoliberal capitalism and the reconstruction of collective subjectivities for participating in, and rebelling against, state power.

Two chapters in Part II trace the comparative historical development of Latin America's constitutions. Laurence Whitehead reminds us that constitutions are living organisms, shaped by local conditions and experiences yet adopting and adapting traits from other systems. Latin America's “incomplete experimentation” (p. 140) with impersonal institutions, on the one hand, and democratic governance, on the other, is an “unresolved dialectic” (p. 139), though not one unique to the region. Roberto Gargarella similarly views the shift from nineteenth-century “negative” constitutionalism to twentieth-century “rights-filled” constitutionalism—and the interplay among conservative, liberal, and radical constitutional projects—through changes in “public philosophy” (p. 145) and the “material conditions of constitutionalism” (p. 157).

Part III assembles case studies on the impact of constitutional reforms on democratic governance. Rickard Lalander argues, but does not quite prove, that Venezuela's Community Councils are arenas for autonomous grassroots political participation, not (just) mechanisms for state paternalism. Jonas Wolff compares Bolivia's and Ecuador's transitions from exclusive, liberal representative democracy to a more inclusive, participatory social democracy. In both cases, the executive branch has emerged vastly strengthened (though Bolivia's experiment also empowered communities and civil society, while Ecuador's did not). Rogério Arantes and Cláudio Couto note that Brazil's constitution addresses a vast array of detailed public policy issues, and for this reason (among others) it invites frequent amendment. Writing about the Dominican Republic, Leiv Marsteintredet compares the 2010 constitutional reforms with earlier changes promulgated in the 1960s, highlighting the more open, participatory, and inclusive deliberations behind the 2010 reforms. Finally, Claudio Fuentes outlines the piecemeal, gradualist process of reforming Chile's 1980, Pinochet-era constitution. Pro-democracy political forces first “played by the rules,” demanding few substantive reforms during the 1989 regime transition; more than a decade later, left and right parties negotiated the elimination of some authoritarian enclaves and antidemocratic rules; and more comprehensive democratization was debated only after 2005.

Organized around the “empowerment of courts,” Part IV consists of two loosely related chapters. One, by Julio Ríos-Figueroa, examines judicial review of due process rights in criminal cases in Mexico and Colombia; his results suggest that greater institutional autonomy fosters a more activist judiciary, and expansive review powers encourage broader interpretations of rights. In a second, Elena Martínez-Barahon analyzes data from Costa Rica and Nicaragua on the role of high courts in preserving or altering rules for presidential reelection. Among her findings: Presidents “judicialize” their demand for rule changes when they lack a sufficient majority in congress but do have political allies on the high court (as well as an approving public).

Part V hones in on the “rights revolution” of new constitutionalism: broader social bases for claiming rights, combined with new approaches to old questions about the status of indigenous law and of indigenous and African-descent peoples. In a chapter on Colombia, Juan Fernando Jaramillo synthesizes advances in human rights law made possible by the 1991 Constitution: chiefly, a new Constitutional Court and effective new judicial mechanisms such as the acción de tutela (writ of protection of rights). Claudia Müller-Hoff takes a somewhat more pessimistic view of Colombia's “rights revolution” in the age of globalization, emphasizing that state's inability to hold transnational corporations accountable for violations (as compared, e.g., to Ecuador's more aggressive pursuit of claims in international tribunals.) The other two chapters in this part shift the discussion to plurinationalism and legal pluralism. Comparing Bolivia and Ecuador, Schilling-Vacaflor and René Kuppe argue that not much has changed: Both countries have constitutionalized “indigenous autonomies,” yet both retain highly extractive economies (which breed conflict between the state and indigenous groups), and both feature powerful, centralized executive branches. Political elites in Ecuador, more so than in Bolivia, have resisted deeper plurinational reforms. Anna Barrera sees somewhat more movement toward pluralism in the legal sphere. Ecuador's 2008 constitution and Bolivia's 2009 constitution—supported by subsequent legislation—officially recognize indigenous law, demarcate the jurisdiction of indigenous legal authorities, and incorporate indigenous worldviews into the state justice system (though again, Bolivia has gone farther than Ecuador).

In a concluding chapter, the editors reflect on the implications of the “new Latin American constitutionalism” for liberal, representative democracy. New forms of democracy and citizenship are emerging alongside old ones, constituting multiple, mutually interactive dimensions of democracy. Yet Nolte and Schilling-Vacaflor note, with some consternation, that the most transformational “new” constitutions (in Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador) were also those created amid the most extreme political polarization. Ironically, the most participatory constitutions also foster the most personalistic concentrations of executive power. Less drastically reformed constitutions (in the Dominican Republic, Colombia, and Chile) may have broader legitimacy and more effective constraints on executive power. In the end, the editors quite rightly fear that enhancing vertical accountability through new rights and new forms of participation cannot compensate for weak horizontal accountability.

If this volume as a whole is not greater than the sum of its parts, most chapters stand up quite well and will be of enduring value to scholars of politics, law, and legal anthropology.