Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 March 2005
The philosophy of Josiah Royce (1855–1916) has recently begun to regain attention; Griffin Trotter, in particular, has utilized Royce in questions concerning medical ethics. This resurgence in attention is for good reason—Royce's philosophies of loyalty and community provide both a descriptively accurate picture of the self and a prescriptively solid ethical system. Royce recognized, as do all pragmatic philosophers, that persons only exist socially, and this sociality will necessarily influence the individual ethically, but also epistemologically. What we know, how we act, how we think we ought to act are not individual questions, but rather questions that arise for individuals only in the context of a larger community.
The philosophy of Josiah Royce (1855–1916) has recently begun to regain attention; Griffin Trotter, in particular, has utilized Royce in questions concerning medical ethics. This resurgence in attention is for good reason—Royce's philosophies of loyalty and community provide both a descriptively accurate picture of the self and a prescriptively solid ethical system. Royce recognized, as do all pragmatic philosophers, that persons only exist socially, and this sociality will necessarily influence the individual ethically, but also epistemologically. What we know, how we act, how we think we ought to act are not individual questions, but rather questions that arise for individuals only in the context of a larger community.
Royce's ethical system allows for a pluralism of values between communities without resulting in radical relativism. We are provided a means by which we can evaluate intentions and actions, but at the same time are given reasons why we must respect intentions and actions that differ from our own, so long as these differing actions and intentions satisfy one very basic criterion—they must not infringe on the ability of others to choose and remain devoted to their own intentions and actions. I will briefly explicate what I take to be the key element of this ethical theory, and then illustrate the benefits of such a system using the somewhat controversial topic of assisted suicide as an example.1
In this essay I address only the assisted suicide of adult, mentally competent, terminally ill patients.
In Royce's philosophy, loyalty is more than mere virtue, and actually stands as an “ethical principle”2
Royce J. The Philosophy of Loyalty. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press; 1995 at p. 8.
See note 2, Royce 1995:9.
See note 2, Royce 1995:10.
Clearly, it is possible for one to be forced into action not associated with loyalty, for example, when one is threatened at gunpoint. The victim, however, is not acting from a sense of loyalty to the cause of the criminal.
See note 2, Royce 1995:12.
See note 2, Royce 1995:51.
We may look at suffering, and particularly the mental and physical suffering associated with sickness, to illustrate the descriptive accuracy of Royce's philosophy. In The Loyal Physician, Griffin Trotter distinguishes between illness and disease insofar as illness is sickness subjectively experienced by a patient where disease is sickness as perceived objectively by the physician. Trotter explains:
Illnesses are problematic because they prevent patients from pursuing their ideals. Even the patient who seems wholly uncommitted to any cause will generally be concerned to safeguard his or her own comfort and in this sense has an ideal, selfish and narrow though it may be. The patient who lacks even this basic sort of life plan will be impervious to illness (though of course, not to disease).8
Trotter G. The Loyal Physician. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1997 at p. 140.
This interruption in the pursuit of one's life plan is experienced as suffering. If one were to lack a system of causes to which one is loyal, or life plan, there would be no ideal with which to compare a given experience, such as the experience of being sick. With no ideal, no life plan, illness would therefore not be experienced as disruption or interruption of the pursuit of this ideal—as suffering—by the patient.
For example, consider the illness of Françoise de Beauvoir, Simone de Beauvoir's mother, as described by Simone in A Very Easy Death. Françoise was elderly and suffered from a broken femur, abdominal cancer (a fact that was kept from her—due to her extreme fear of cancer she was told she had peritonitis), and infection from the removal of the tumor as well as complications to the digestive system (which was again attributed to peritonitis). Françoise often vacillated between periods of immense suffering and periods of relative calm, in which she felt she had recovered fully. I suggest that in these periods of calm, Françoise had begun to lose her unity of self—her life plan began to fracture—her loyalty to certain causes began to waver. The disease did not lessen during these periods, only her suffering did. Her suffering abated insofar as the framework of self against which illness is experienced and understood disintegrated. In writing “The transition from my mother to a living corpse had been definitively accomplished,”9
Beauvoir S de. A Very Easy Death. O'Brian, P. trans. New York: Warner Books; 1973 at p. 85.
Any given cause or system of causes constituting a life plan arises from a social setting and demarcates a resultant community. One's will, one's choice of causes, must indeed be an autonomous decision for the devotion to result in genuine loyalty, but the choices and causes available are themselves socially shaped. Ideals are presented by society, and we adopt them as our own possible causes through a combination of imitation, learning, social training, and, of course, an assertion of individual will. Royce explained, “I have no inborn ideal naturally present within myself. By nature I simply go on crying out in a sort of chaotic self-will, according as the momentary play of desire determines.”10
See note 2, Royce 1995:16.
While one's life plan may be socially formed, it exists in community, and the two should not be confused. Society is merely some group of persons, but community is demarcated and unified by a cause, and consists of all persons loyal to that cause. A town may be a society, although it becomes a community only if the inhabitants of the town are all loyal to a cause, such as democratic rule. Consequently, there are as many communities as there are causes, some overlapping, others mutually exclusive, and individuals are, generally speaking, members of multiple communities. When we speak of loyalty to a cause, then, we are at the same time speaking of loyalty to the community of those persons loyal to the same cause. In this sense, a given cause necessarily exceeds the loyal individual, or, to use Royce's terminology, is superpersonal, insofar as there is always a community of at least potential, if not actual, “fellow-servants” to the cause. Additionally, the value of a cause is not dependent on any individual's loyalty, for the cause possesses an inherent value. Whether there are two or two thousand persons loyal to a cause does not affect its value. Royce explained, “You love [the cause] just because of its own value, which it has by itself, even if you die.”11
See note 2, Royce 1995:11.
If we agree with Royce that any cause is superpersonal, meaning that it exceeds the individual, we can follow Royce in his assertion that so long as one is loyal to a cause, one not only gains a personal good (meaning in life), but also contributes to and sustains the personal goods of other fellow servants. Loyalty to any cause is then at the same time loyalty to the loyalty of those sharing the cause. For this reason, loyalty to any cause—good or bad—is, to a certain degree, loyalty to the “meta-cause” of loyalty itself, and it is this meta-cause of loyalty that allows for the individual to find her “supreme personal good.” But the effects of one's loyalty on those not sharing a given cause remain to be addressed. With what has been said thus far, a patriot fighting a war gains a supreme personal good through his loyalty to the cause of his country. Additionally, the patriot contributes to the loyalty (and thereby the good) of his fellow patriots, who are also loyal to their country. But what of the persons against whom the war is waged? Certainly we do not want to say that civilians, and perhaps even soldiers, in an occupied country gain a “supreme personal good” as war destroys their land and lives. The civilians and soldiers themselves are loyal to various causes, perhaps causes that prevent them from leaving their land or surrendering to the opposing patriots, and loyalty to their own causes is, again, itself a good. As the invading patriots wage war in the name of loyalty to their causes, they actually destroy the loyalty and the “spirit of loyalty” of those against whom they wage war. A cause, then, may be evaluated as “good” based on the loyalty that it engenders or allows to flourish in others, including those beyond the scope of one's own cause. Action on behalf of one's cause should always and at the same time engender loyalty to loyalty. Royce stated:
My cause is, indeed, always such as to involve some loyalty to loyalty, because, if I am loyal to any cause at all, I have fellow-servants whose loyalty mine supports. But in so far as my cause is a predatory cause, which lives by overthrowing the loyalties of others, it is an evil cause, because it involves disloyalty to the very cause of loyalty itself.12
See note 2, Royce 1995:56.
Loyalty, while allowing for the possibility of valuation, is also normative—it demarcates “good” causes, or those worthy of loyalty, from “bad” causes, or those unworthy of loyalty.
This does not imply that there exists a simple and strict hierarchy of causes, where each cause possesses a “loyalty” quotient, nor does it imply that the loyal person prioritizes one's loyalties by simply calculating which cause is higher on the ladder. Indeed, Royce was all too aware that causes conflict. A single mother, for example, may be faced with the conflicting causes of nurturing her children and financially providing for them at the same time. Decisions are difficult and we are fallible, but decide and act one must, insofar as loyalty itself is understood through action. One must therefore prioritize one's loyalties at the given moment in time in which the decision is being weighed and made. If a single mother is faced with the above dilemma, she must decide whether to spend time with her children or work outside of the home and provide for them financially. To remain indecisive will not benefit her or her children. One ought to look to the future when considering the implications of action, but one ought not lose sight of the fact that the decision is needed in the present. To choose not to decide without adequate reason—that is, without the belief that additional information will be provided in the future that will directly affect the pending decision and action—is itself a decision, and one that Royce felt neglects one's loyalties. To delay decision in order to avoid action is far worse an ethical transgression than to act in good faith and err, “[f]or ignorant service, which still knows itself as a willing attempt to serve the cause of universal loyalty, is better than a knowing refusal to undertake any service whatsoever.”13
See note 2, Royce 1995:89.
Look first at the whole situation. Consider it carefully. See, if possible, whether you can predict the consequences to the general loyalty which your act will involve. If, after such consideration, you still remain ignorant of decisive facts, then look to your highest loyalty; look steadfastly at the cause of universal loyalty itself. Remember how the loyal have always borne themselves. Then, with your eyes and your voice put as completely as may be at the service of that cause, arouse all the loyal interests of your own self, just as they now are, to their fullest vigor; and hereupon firmly and freely decide. Henceforth, with all your mind and soul and strength belong, fearlessly and faithfully, to the chosen personal cause until the issue is decided, or until you positively know that this cause can no longer be served without disloyalty. So act and you are morally right.14
See note 2, Royce 1995:90.
The pragmatic themes of reevaluation and revision in light of new information are evident in this method. Royce's insistence that one belong “fearlessly and faithfully” to one's cause does not mean that one must cling tenaciously to one's cause. For Royce and other pragmatists, human beings can never be certain of any epistemic claim. The community provides the background against which epistemic claims are judged to be true or valid, and, insofar as both human beings and communities continually grow and change, the background as well as the epistemic claims made will grow and change, too.15
For a more detailed explanation of Royce's epistemology, see Royce J. The Problem of Christianity. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press; 2001, especially 273–342.
See note 2, Royce 1995:92.
The result of this fallibilism as well as the multiplicity of causes within Royce's ethical system is the possibility for the existence of disagreeing and perhaps incompatible moral communities. The cause of another community must be respected so long as it does not infringe on the ability of others to be loyal to their own causes. This does not mean, however, that moral communities exist solipsistically. Rather, while these communities may be loyal to causes incompatible at the particular level, they generally are loyal to a broader cause that unites them, such as, in Royce's case, the cause of human flourishing. Dialogue, debate, or “friendly competition”17
Trotter G. Pragmatism, bioethics and the grand American social experiment. American Journal of Bioethics [serial online] 2003 [cited 2003 Oct 30];1(4). Available from: http://bioethics.net.
As has been discussed, there are numerous causes to which any one person may be loyal. I will now focus, however, on several concerns expressed by terminally ill patients, and argue that these concerns may be understood as causes contributing significantly to the life plans of individuals. Although many physicians have expressed concern that terminally ill patients would be tempted to request assisted suicide due to financial concerns, this has not been borne out empirically in the past five years in Oregon, where physician-assisted suicide has been legal since 1997 under the Oregon Death with Dignity Act.18
For the complete text of this act, see http://www.deathwithdignity.org/resources/oregonact.htm (2003).
Oregon Department of Human Services, http://www.dhs.state.or.us/publichealth/chs/pas/year5/ar-tbl-3.cfm (2004). Additional concerns expressed to physicians have been, in decreasing frequency, losing control of bodily functions; burdening friends, family, or other caregivers; and inadequate pain control. Only 2% of patients who died under ODWDA expressed concerns about the “financial implications of treatment.”
Autonomy, broadly construed as the ability to self-govern within a larger social setting, seems to be a common communal ideal, with a large number of “fellow-servants” loyal to it, at least in the United States, if not in the Western world. Legally, humans are understood to be responsible for and in control of their own actions. An individual, it may be argued, is socially influenced, but in the end, generally speaking, acts under his or her own volition. This is why individuals, rather than societies, are often tried for crimes such as murder. As President George W. Bush has recently explained, following orders is no excuse for immoral behavior. We hold persons morally and legally responsible for their own actions and the implications of those actions. This responsibility is ingrained socially from the earliest of ages, when we are taught as children that it is unacceptable to blame others for our own inappropriate behavior. Further, we assume that persons are not only responsible for their own actions, but also, generally speaking, the goals associated with those actions. Individuals are able to set goals according to their own likes and dislikes. College students are able to choose their major fields of study; adults are able to choose their careers and hobbies. Those things determined to be and pursued as pleasurable are, again, socially influenced, but, we believe, individually chosen. Clearly, many persons will immediately mention that autonomy in the sense just described is directly tied to issues of class, race, gender, and others, and I would agree. My point, however, is that even if we admit that social constraints currently limit choice, the ability and desire to choose is still a communal ideal that we pursue, or else we would not be concerned or troubled by the fact that some persons are, in fact, constrained in their autonomy.
The ability to “participate in activities that make life enjoyable,” too, seems to be a widely held communal ideal. An obvious example is the fact that criminals are punished with the removal of this ability through imprisonment. We assume that the majority of adult persons possess the ability not only to determine what is enjoyable (autonomy within a social context), but also the ability to seek out and gain or accomplish those things deemed enjoyable. If, for example, we grant that within our capitalist society the gaining and spending of money are commonly held to be enjoyable, we can see this communal ideal played out in the social myth of oppressed persons “pulling themselves up by their bootstraps.” In other words, it is believed (in certain political circles) that persons, regardless of the oppression they may have faced in the past, always have the ability to individually gain and participate in the things that will make life enjoyable to them, in this case, money.
These two communal ideals, or causes in the Roycean sense, then, I suggest, contribute extensively to the life plans of many individuals. In Royce's philosophy, however, we never simply possess a cause; rather, we work toward the cause. A cause is an ideal with which we contrast and compare our current actions and desires, but also a goal toward which one strives, and a tool with which one may project present actions into the future. The causes of autonomy and the ability to “participate in activities that make life enjoyable,” which, for the remainder of the paper I will refer to as agency, and others, are goals. Some persons may believe they have attained these goals and that they do, in fact, possess these things, although they must still act to protect these ideals. For example, even those persons who believe themselves to be completely autonomous act to protect this ideal politically. Generally speaking these persons will not vote for leaders whom they believe will reduce the autonomy or agency of the individual, and in this sense the ideal of autonomy is a goal that is pursued.
The goals (causes or communal ideals) of autonomy and agency, and others, provide meaning and significance in the lives of many persons. These causes are so prominent in some life plans, I suggest, that when persons find themselves in situations where their ability to serve these causes or work toward these goals is diminished (in this particular case due to terminal illness), they may face a crisis of meaning or significance in life. This will not always be the case. The various causes that contribute to any given life plan are prioritized and evaluated through time. Some persons may prioritize other causes, such as religious belief, above the causes of autonomy and agency. If this is the case, the crisis of meaning may be averted or diminished. Terminally ill persons who do not possess or prioritize goals above autonomy or agency may suffer, however, because they are unable to pursue their ideals due to the progression of their illness, and, insofar as the illness is terminal, do not foresee themselves ever returning to the position of being able to pursue these goals.20
This is a somewhat simplified example. The interruption of any highly prioritized cause may result in crisis and suffering—the cause need not be one of the two I have mentioned, nor must the interrupting factor be illness.
A lack of meaning in one's life is itself problematic only because it, too, is the result of loyalty to the communal ideal that life ought to be meaningful. In other words, a meaningful life has been evaluated to be a “good” by some community.21
I take it to be self-evident that there is a community loyal to the cause of having meaning in life—instances can be found in the work of Royce, Trotter, and Hester, and one might look to existentialism or religion for broader examples.
Hester DM. Significance at the end of life. In: McGee G, ed. Pragmatic Bioethics. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press; 1999 at p. 121.
The question remains, however, as to how or why assisted suicide would be morally acceptable, and who it is that ought to assist. Both questions are answered similarly. Those persons sharing these loyalties and prioritization of these loyalties (and certainly not all persons will) ought also to support the attempt to address the crises encountered in terminal illness. Assisted suicide is morally justified insofar as there is a community loyal to the same causes to which the terminally ill patient is loyal (in this example autonomy and agency) as well as loyal to the communal ideal that life ought to be meaningful and sharing the same prioritizations as the patient. Currently, it is the physicians of this community that are in the position to actually assist the terminally ill person, although there is no reason that this must necessarily be the case. It is conceivable that healthcare may be reformed such that persons other than physicians take on this role, as long as they, too, are members of the above communities.
Generally speaking, though, the issues and concerns surrounding assisted suicide arise when the loyalties held by the patient (and the prioritization of these loyalties) differ from the loyalties of persons interacting with the patient. So, for example, a child may feel that her parent can still live a meaningful life despite the loss of autonomy, an ethicist might argue that assisted suicide in this instance will lessen the autonomy of patients on the future, and the priest worries that assisted suicide will jeopardize the patent's eternal life after death. But that the conflicts arise at all is because of a loyalty shared by the above persons to an ideal “good” life. The child believes that a good life is one spent in contact with loved ones as long as possible, the ethicist believes a good life requires autonomy, and the priest believes a good life requires a relationship with God that will result in eternal salvation. These persons are free to pursue their own causes, ideals, and loyalties so long as they do not hinder the loyalties of others, but they must also begin a conversation with the patient as to the specifics of what a good life entails, insofar as they are all loyal to this ideal. Further, these conversations must take place within the confines of a loyalty to loyalty; that is to say, the ability of each participant to make his or her own evaluations (in this case, evaluations as to what constitutes a good life) must be protected throughout the conversation.
It might be suggested that these conversations are already ongoing, but that not much progress has been made toward resolving the various conflicts. It is here that we see the value of Royce's pluralism. Morally acceptable actions in one community need not be morally acceptable in others. Members of various communities may argue about intermediate causes and concrete actions, but they may not sanction them, so long as the causes and actions facilitate further loyalty. This is not to imply that complex social issues such as the debate concerning assisted suicide will simply fade away once we have entered a dialogue about it, but rather to claim that loyalty can provide a structure to ongoing debates and perhaps facilitate further conversations by making apparent shared communal ideals, even if the specifics of the ideals differ.
There is one last benefit in adopting a Roycean attitude toward the end of life, and that is the fact that Royce recognized that we are mortal as well as fallible. Rather than ignoring our mortality or assuming death brings only loss, Royce asserted that grief, and particularly grief due to death, motivates creativity and increases loyalty. He urged us to “[r]egard defeat and bereavement, therefore, as loyalty's opportunity.”23
See note 2, Royce 1995:137.
The most familiar of all those blows of fortune which seem to us, for the moment, to make our personal cause a lost cause, is death, when it comes to those with whom our personal cause has so far been bound up. And yet what motive in human life has done more to idealize the causes of individuals than death has done? Death, viewed as a mere fact of human experience, and as a merely psychological influence, has been one of the greatest idealizers of human life. The memory of the dead idealizes whatever interest the living have in former days shared with the departed. Reverence for the dead dignifies the effort to carry on the work that they began, or that, if they died in childhood, our fond desire would have had them live to do.24
See note 2, Royce 1995:137–8.
The person suffering from terminal illness will die, as will we all. We will die in a community, however, and it is the community that provides various and pluralistic means by which to understand, control, and mourn our deaths and the deaths of those close to us. This Roycean perspective has not removed the controversy surrounding assisted suicide, but has provided a reason to honor the wishes of those requesting it—their loyalties must be respected so long as they do not quell the ability of others to be loyal. Assisted suicide, in some situations, may be an instance of affirming loyalty and creating meaning at the end of life.