Finding the right moment to evaluate a policy or an organization is a difficult task. Do you pick a five-year period (a lustrum) to celebrate and to look back at achievements? Or do you wait until a storm has passed? The editors of this volume considered the 20th anniversary of the World Trade Organization (WTO) a good occasion to come together and to assess whether ‘it is fit for purpose’ (p. xix). No less than 21 contributors with economic, political science, and legal backgrounds have taken up this challenge, which, in itself, provides great potential for fruitful multidisciplinary collaboration and advances in knowledge. The book definitely lives up to such expectations, but only after the reader has put together the individual parts: that is to say, ‘going beyond existing disciplinary narratives’ (p. i) barely happens within individual chapters. Although greater multidisciplinarity could have added to the coherence of the story, the scholars nonetheless delivered well-grounded research and innovative views on WTO performance. They do so for a broad array of issues that stem from the goals of the multilateral trade regime.

Part I distinguishes between the ‘macro’ and ‘micro’ goals of the WTO, where the former are defined as ‘a group of general objectives that are not core trade objectives, but that are important for the stability of the system’ (p. 15), and the latter as ‘less ambitious, institutional and procedural goals and functions that support the realization of the macro objectives’ (p. 16). By giving a brief overview of ongoing disciplinary debates, they demonstrate that, with respect to these goals, each discipline takes a different angle when analysing performance. To overcome an eye of the beholder problem regarding multilateral cooperation, the editors contend that it is important to connect the various insights from law, economics, and politics, thereby setting the stage for the rest of this volume.

In Part II, it becomes clear that the success of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the WTO's predecessor, should not be attributed too much to its trade rules and its tariff reductions. It is shown that in 1947, just before the Geneva conference, the unweighted tariff average was already about 22% among key participants, which is much lower than the frequently reported 40%. Consequently, the tariff cuts of the first GATT Round were less significant than commonly believed. Rather, the establishment of a negotiating framework that provided transparency and predictability turned out to be a major source of progress, because it enabled politicians to build coalitions among producer groups in favour of trade liberalization. This support is deemed crucial in order to bypass domestic political constraints, and to get consent from Congress or Parliament. The importance of centring the analysis on national policy-making (in relation to the WTO), is also echoed in last chapter of this volume (Chapter 15).

Part III focuses on how dispute settlement – a macro goal – has fared under the WTO. This has led to a mixed picture of risks and (research) opportunities. First, WTO members have improved the functioning of the dispute settlement system (DSS), often through voluntary arrangements. However, these ‘solutions’ are legally unstable since they are not covered by the Dispute Settlement Understanding. Moreover, they tend to be imprecise and, therefore, details need to be worked out, and legislative action is required when changing institutional arrangements. Another risk involves the increasing time lags in the dispute settlement process. It is stated that ‘this dysfunctional dimension of the operation of the DSS, in disregard of one of its basic tenets and praised features, namely its speed, may undermine the whole operation of the system and recourse to it as the key instrument for ensuring respect of trade-opening commitments’ (p. 154). Symptomatic is the recent US claim that Appellate Body rulings issued after the 90-day deadline cannot be considered ‘reports’.Footnote ¹ Second, on a more positive note, the rate of legal compliance with rulings is high, although this has not (yet) translated into larger trade flows after implementation. An explanation put forward is that members try to compensate for the withdrawal of one measure with the introduction of new protectionist policy substitutes (i.e. trade remedies). Furthermore, one of the key remaining questions that needs to be addressed in order to appraise the stability of the trading system is the extent to which members live up to their WTO commitments in advance. A way forward, as identified in this volume, might be to focus more on the pre-litigation process and to unravel how governments decide whether or not to challenge foreign trade barriers – as reported by their exporters – through the DSS.

In Part IV, attention is paid to some specific features of the WTO that have broader implications than one presumably would expect. Third-party participation, for instance, unintentionally results in a trade-off between two fundamental objectives of the WTO: transparency and effectiveness. The presence of a third party makes settlement less likely, which decreases the expected pay-off for that same third-party. For this reason, WTO members ‘stay out of the room when it is overly crowded’ (p. 220). In addition, country-specific rules have been introduced to the WTO via accession agreements. This runs counter to the hailed uniform rule structure and, more crucially, is not always consistent with the WTO's core principles (most-favoured-nation and national treatment). To date, as shown for the case of China–Rare Earths,Footnote ² adjudicators face complex interpretative challenges, while the underlying problem can only be resolved by a (unlikely) reform of the WTO treaty. Similarly, adjudicators experience difficulties with incorporating the ‘negotiated balance’ in their decisions. This has induced the Appellate Body to become increasingly ‘innovative’, which, at least in subsidy jurisprudence, led to some doubtful decisions going against the general objective of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM).

The final part, Part V, deals with WTO performance in relation to other international agreements and organizations. The exception from the most-favoured-nation clause granted to free trade areas is considered a serious threat to multilateralism. Mega-regional trade agreements (such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership) are strongly appealing to political leaders that want to discriminate between favourites and non-favourites in foreign policy. The power of discrimination, once acquired, may be (too) hard to give up. Perhaps less discomforting is that WTO law made its way into these preferential trade agreements, either through references and/or by direct copying of the legal texts. The WTO seems to be present especially in areas where multilateral rules are well established (e.g. anti-dumping) or in issue areas that are relatively new (e.g. services). Lastly, an outward expansion of the WTO domain is observed in some sectors (i.e. food standards, intellectual property), leading sometimes to ‘border conflicts’ with other international organizations, which can stand in the way of mutually beneficial cooperation.

So what does the reader take away from this book? Is the WTO fit for purpose? Of course, there are no easy answers, but the editors started promisingly by setting out five steps on how to approach this question: ‘(i) goal identification, (ii) measurement, (iii) establishing causation, (iv) assessing cost-effectiveness, and (v) considering explanations or indicators of good or bad performance’ (p. 31). It is disappointing that the book, or the individual chapters, did not stick to this (kind of) structure, because it seems somewhat random what is examined when, how, and why. For example, why are six chapters dedicated to dispute settlement and not a single one to the integration of least-developed countries (LCDs) into the trading system? Because the latter is of minor importance? Probably not. In other words, the volume would have benefited from a clear explanation of the choices made regarding the content, or perhaps from some restructuring. Also, the timing of the book requires further clarification. The editors note that ‘good international institutions are those that also work well in times of stress’ (p. 16). Many observers, including the contributors, see that ‘very dark clouds are gathering over the Appellate Body – and the WTO at large’ (p. 313). Knowing this, one could doubt whether this moment – just before the expected storm – is rightfully chosen for an assessment. Except from reaching the 20-year mark, the book offers no motivation for why the WTO should be evaluated at this point in history. Finally, the multidisciplinary nature of the book does not really find its reflection in the separate chapters. The contributions still take a parochial view of the matter, rooted in the traditions of the respective disciplines. It comes down to the reader to combine the different perspectives, and to see the bigger picture, which is a demanding exercise. The life of the reader could have been made easier if the multidisciplinary narrative had already found its way into the chapters.

Despite these limitations, this volume is absolutely a worthwhile read, especially for trade scholars who want to expand their horizons. The book demonstrates, once again, that understanding the WTO – and trade (policy) in general – requires a multidisciplinary effort. Every attempt in this direction should be warmly welcomed, and hopefully this volume incentivizes others to seek this type of collaboration. Moreover, the contributions provide useful insights for policy makers regarding the weak spots of the Geneva-based institution. And, more importantly, they indicate where and how the WTO-building can be fixed before – or after – the rush comes.