This is a book about norms, but one that fundamentally revises how we should conceptualize the phenomenon that has been understood under that label. Simon Frankel Pratt’s Normative Transformation and the War on Terrorism is a major advance in how to approach “norms” as objects of study. Bringing together insights from relational sociology, practice theory, and pragmatist philosophy, the book argues for a shift from understanding a “norm” as a static entity that “causes” action, to thinking about “normative configurations” as a process that inheres in action. Empirically, the book intervenes into debates over the US conduct in the post-9/11 war on terror and the question of whether the use of practices such as torture and assassination mean that we are witnessing the decay or death of established norms.

The book opens with a critique of how international relations (IR) has approached the phenomenon of “norms,” and particularly the question of normative change. The first concern raised is that IR theory tends to dichotomize “interest based/strategic” and “normative” or ethical motivations, which has led to a reified and rigid debate in IR between those who advocate for “realist” versus “constructivist” views of the world (p. ix). Yet as Pratt points out, in practice ethical and strategic motivations are often intertwined. The key conceptual innovation of the book is the introduction of the concept of “normative configuration,” which conceptualizes ethical/normative forces as residing in practices and relations, rather than static “values.” A key advance here is that this approach aims to develop a more satisfactory way of understanding both how “norms” affect action, and how “norms” may change. Like the traditions of practice theory and relational sociology on which it builds, this approach aims to avoid the pitfalls of understanding “values” as themselves having force upon action, without a clear understanding of the mechanism through which this occurs. Drawing on three substantive case studies, Pratt develops an analysis in which practices are the site where norms inhere, and the institutionalization of practices as the mechanism through which the phenomenon we understand as “norms” takes root. In some ways, the theory of “norms” developed here is closer to sociological theories of institutionalization (and make no mistake, this is a good thing).

While most existing work focuses on the development and imposition of norms, especially norms that restrict state behavior (and which might be understood as positive, or morally “good” by most observers), Pratt’s work joins a still relatively small body of recent work that focuses upon the flip side of this process: how such norms “decline” or “decay.” However, Pratt argues that we should not necessarily understand change as a process of decay, arguing that, as demonstrated in the three cases he studies, the impact of prohibitive norms continues to shape the use of “prohibited” practices such as torture and assassination even when they proliferate. The key piece of evidence here appears to be the fact that agents continue to engage with these norms even as they seek to transgress them. As Pratt writes, “To propose that ‘norm death’ has occurred in these cases is therefore to take a side in an interpretive dispute that the relevant actors themselves have not yet settled, because their dispute is over what the relevant norm means, with one ‘side’ claiming that it continues to exist more or less unchanged” (p. 8). The shifts witnessed in the course of the US war on terror should therefore, he argues, be understood as changes, or evolution, in “norms” rather than their “decay” or “death.”

The empirical center of the book focuses on three case studies of normative transformation in the post-9/11 US war on terror: targeted killing, torture, and use of mercenaries/private military contractors. In each of these cases, Pratt applies his analytic method of “de-reification, attribution of agency, and tracing transactions” (p. 50) to trace how the changes occurred. Pratt introduces a three-part mechanism for how norm transformations occur, comprising what he calls convention reorientation, technological revision, and network synthesis. In each of the cases, he argues that actors faced a crisis, and actively reframed previously forbidden practices, making use of new technologies and new networks, change the dominant “normative configuration.”

Normative Transformation and the War on Terrorism is a crucial contribution to the study of norms in IR; it should be read by all working in the field. In addition to developing a new theoretical approach that overcomes many of the weaknesses in prevailing approaches, it is distinguished by its incorporation of the role of technology and the material world, as well as human agency and innovation, into its model of change. Another significant contribution is the clear way in which Pratt describes his methods, with the book’s three moments providing a clear model for those who might wish to pursue future work in this vein.

I do have a few questions about the specifics of the empirical analysis, as well as the broader normative and political implications suggested in the conclusion. One has to do with the methodological choice to restrict the focus primarily to the agents directly involved in the enactment of practices that appear to violate norms. This decision makes sense in light of the practice-oriented theoretical framework, but it does raise questions about whether “normative configurations” do, or can, take into account the role of broader political and societal consensus. Although the role of public approbation is discussed to some extent, particularly with regard to the case of torture, it is relatively undertheorized. The focus on whether actions are “permissible” focuses on the actors directly engaged to an extent that seems to minimize the role of understandings of permissibility among broader groups, such as the political elite class or the general public. Perhaps due to this focus on the direct actors, the analysis seems generally to take these actors at their word as to both their beliefs and their actions, and I wonder whether a more skeptical approach to some of these accounts might alter the results.

Second, with regard to the broader normative implications of the analysis, I wish to take up two points. The first has to do with the case of the use of torture, and the eventual failure to institutionalize the practice. Does the reversal on the official use of torture in this case really mean that we can understand this as a return to the “status quo ante”? This would only seem to make sense if we understand norms/normative configurations to be wholly resident in practices, such that, once the practice is abandoned, the change is “undone.” But although the attempt at normative transformation in this case was, indeed, ultimately unsuccessful, the United States (and the world) does still have to reckon with the fact that these practices were undertaken, and formally justified, even if they were only temporarily institutionalized. In other words, even though the new “normative configuration” came undone, the fact that it was assembled, even if not robustly and permanently, means that the “recipe” for its use remains, and could potentially be reassembled if the “technological” failure were to be overcome.

Finally, the book concludes with a convincing response to the common take that frames the use of forbidden practices in the war on terror as a problem for “liberal warfare.” But rather than framing this as a victory for the liberal way of war, as Pratt seems to do, we might instead view this as an indication that the problem is not whether liberal war may be defeated, but how far it can be stretched to encompass all sorts of violations.