Odd Arne Westad's Empire and Righteous Nation elucidates the history of the relationship between China and Korea over the past six hundred years. It divides this history into three broad periods: Chosŏn Korea's relations with the Chinese empire under the Ming and Qing dynasties, the upheavals and transformations of this relationship from the mid-nineteenth century to the late twentieth century, and post–Cold War Sino-Korean relations. It canvasses changes and continuities in this relationship through a fluid and insightful historical narrative, with important policy implications for present-day regional politics in Northeast Asia. Among these changes, the most obvious is the transformation of the nature of the Sino-Korean relationship, from the imperial tributary model exemplified by the Chosŏn's intimate ties with Ming China, to the collapse of this relationship under the onslaught of Western and Japanese imperialism, and finally to a wholly new set of relationships between the People's Republic of China and a Korea now divided between the North and South. The continuities are no less impressive. China has had an enduring perception of its rightful influence over Korea, except for a short period in the early twentieth century; Korea, while recognizing the inescapable pull of Chinese power, has always tried to defend its autonomy against it, except when its survival depended entirely on Chinese support.
The book begins by introducing the concepts of “empire,” “nation,” and “righteous,” with the first serving as a guiding notion for discussing China and the latter two—combined as “righteous nation”—for discussing Korea. While the nomenclature “Chinese empire” is a commonplace in the historical literature, the characterization of Korea as a “righteous nation” is novel. “Righteous” (yi) is a Confucian notion, and Westad rightly emphasizes that it would be impossible to understand Sino-Korean relations without understanding Confucian principles (p. 27).
A history of Chosŏn Korea's relations with Ming and Qing China quickly follows the conceptual discussion. Westad pinpoints major events including the Chosŏn's establishment of extremely close ties with the Ming, its conflicts with the Manchus during the time of the Ming-Qing dynastic transition, and the gradual return to an exemplary tributary relationship with the Qing that mirrored its relationship with the Ming. Overall, Westad gives more coverage to the Korean side of the story, which is welcome given the usual Sino-centric bias in much of the existing scholarship.
Westad discusses the whirlwind of Sino-Korean relations during the modern era under the broad rubric of the internationalization of East Asia. Starting with both countries’ struggle with modern reforms, this part of the book examines Japanese imperialism and the challenges it posed to both China and Korea, the rise of Chinese and Korean nationalisms, the activities of Korean exiles in China, the war against Japan, the beginning of the Cold War in Northeast Asia with the creation of a Communist China and two Korean states, the Korean War, and China's difficult relationship with North Korea after that war and the gradual warming of its ties with South Korea.
The final part of the book explores contemporary relations between China and the two Koreas. Most of the discussion takes place in the third chapter, “China and Korea Today,” but an interesting analysis of the debates and options concerning Chinese policy toward the North Korean nuclear problem and the future of Korean reunification is presented in the concluding chapter. There, Westad offers a historian's advice to policy makers—especially those in Beijing—that “[i]f history is a guide, the best that we can hope for at this moment in Korea is, first, arms control, then détente between North and South, and finally a Chinese policy of letting North Korea go when the regime starts to unravel” (p. 173). One wishes that he had expanded the historically grounded policy analysis in the concluding chapter into a separate, full-blown chapter. At a time when the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue is nowhere in sight, and when the growing rivalry between China and the United States is diminishing the prospect of their collaboration over North Korea, a historically informed analysis is sorely needed to enrich the current policy debates.
The book raises issues and further questions. It is entirely appropriate—and spot-on—to pinpoint the Confucian principle of “righteousness” (yi) as underpinning Korean policy, but yi was also important to Chinese policy. Besides yi, the concept of li (ritual propriety) was another concept critical to both countries’ foreign relations, and there is an intrinsic connection between the two. “Righteousness” may not be the best translation of yi given its religious connotations in the Western context; “rightness” or “appropriateness” may serve as a substitute.
The book's narrative reveals the importance of both culture and realpolitik in Sino-Korean relations. Toward the end of the book, Westad suggests that realpolitik is the reason why China is intent on protecting the North Korean regime, and he assails it for producing negative foreign perceptions of Chinese policy. In the beginning of the book, he demonstrates the power of culture in the Chosŏn's foreign relations when he shows how the Koreans stubbornly refused to submit to the conquering Manchus even when their country's very survival was at stake, mainly because they identified with the Ming as the embodiment of a higher culture. This subject will prove to be a fruitful area for further study by international relations scholars.
Westad, a preeminent historian of the Cold War, has written one of the best concise introductions to the history of Sino-Korean relations. Combining historical erudition with policy observations, it will appeal to historians, area specialists, international relations scholars, and policy makers concerned with the future of Northeast Asia.
