The distinguished Iranian scholar Said Amir Arjomand introduces this very interesting volume by distinguishing between classic modernization theory and “modernization lite”. The former is seen as an American inspired view popular from the postwar period to the 1970s, but in fact with a late efflorescence in Frank Fukuyama’s claim that the world of liberal capitalism was all that remained once the Soviet Bloc collapsed. The theory at its crudest suggested that an evolutionary process would lead all societies to develop and eventually to share a single set of cultural standards. Arjomand accepts that “modernity” is amongst us, but wishes to escape from the notion of a uniform process and singular end. In particular, he draws on the notion of “multiple modernities” to suggest different outcomes throughout the world. The creation of world civilizations, most of them based on one of the world religions of the axial age posited by Karl Jaspers and made much of by Shmuel Eisenstadt, to whose memory the book is dedicated, has mandated varied responses to such modern forces as industrialism and nationalism. One conclusion is that our social theory must change so as to take non-Western cultural categories seriously. Arjomand amusingly notes the attempt of Indian Marxists to see popular resistance in terms of class, stressing the recent and wholly sensible move to speak again in terms of caste. A second conclusion is equally obvious: we do not live in a uniform world, and so must place regional variety at the center of our attention.

The proper response to this claim must be critical endorsement by which I mean “lite” acceptance. I can so to speak prove my own enthusiasm for the study of different civilizations, less perhaps in my own early jejune intellectual efforts than in the allocation of very large amounts of (McGill’s) money into positions in both global history and the Institute of Islamic Studies when serving as Dean of the Faculty of Arts. One can be passionate about “lite” acceptance for reasons that seem to me absolutely obvious. Human beings have values, and these differ both within and between social worlds. Further, these values are constitutive: it is not the case that once they are removed individuals will emerge, all operating on the set of principles beloved by rational choice theory. Of course, cultures have been massively influenced by the world religions, whose emergence has dictated the shape of history. Equally, it is indeed vital to see and to explain the view from below, from non-Western actors. Highlighting all of this is a genuine advance as occidental theory has often been insensitive, patronizing and blind:

These are the admonitions of Babak Rahimi. At times such prefatory comments can be so detailed that they take away time from actual analysis, but this is certainly not the case in his superb ethnography of Arab Iranian Shi’ite celebrations in Bushehr. If further justification is needed as to the intellectual advance made possible by expanding our horizons one need only point to the superlative achievement of Chris Bayly’s account of the modern world.^{Footnote 1}

But much of this book wants to make a much stronger statement. Arjomand insists that a new paradigm is on offer, and one often feels an air of effervescence at work—cemented it seems by institutional links in Uppsala, Germany and SUNY Stony Brook. Certainly many of the authors of this volume have appeared in several of similar kind, in special issues of Daedalus and this journal, and to their number one must now add an important volume on the axial age itself, co-edited by Robert Bellah and Hans Joas—who are best seen as outliers to the main group.^{Footnote 2} Further, these authors tend to cite each other a little too often, though perhaps this is comprehensible given the genuine importance of the general claim. But here a reviewer must pause to issue a warning. It would seem that there is a good deal of fighting inside this putative kolektiv. The lack of a single center renders the reviewer’s task difficult even though the differences are often deeply interesting. My preference for “lite” endorsement of the volume—that is, for refusing to accept that a new paradigm is really present—draws on some of the reservations made by authors attached to the approach. This makes it all-too-possible that I will be accused of distortion by missing the recognized subtleties. Nonetheless, it seems appropriate to confront the central claim head on as it is so often made with considerable vigor, ignoring at least for the moment the small print that is sometimes present.

Before doing so, the shape of the volume should at least be noted. The first five essays deal with civilizations, comparative sociology and regional studies. Arjomand explains the new paradigm compared to its failed predecessors. Bjorn Wittrock makes similar points with larger reference to social philosophy. Edward Tiryakian provides an interesting institutional and academic history of the study of civilizations. Willfried Spohn compares the view of power of the new approach to that adopted by Michael Mann. Wolf Shafer offers slightly heretical points about the importance of modern science.

The second section is rather different, concentrating on patterns of development and on social evolution. Johann Arnason offers a superb account of current scholarship on the classical axial period, whilst Arjomand presents us with an interesting account of the links between Islam and empires, culminating in a rather optimistic view about the future of Muslim societies. The final two papers stand rather apart from the central thrust of the volume. Donald Levine’s long engagement with Ethiopia allows him to present an original statement about evolutionary stages. Almost as a complement, Goran Therborn provides a very striking account of four regions of the world, so as to specify differences in their relations to capitalism and to nationalism as the result of the different moments and means through which they encountered modernity.

The final part concentrates on colonialism, with particular reference to movements from below. Peter Wagner brings back to our attention the important work of Louis Hartz on “new societies”, and this is complemented by Wolfgang Knöbl’s fine essay comparing the developmental patterns of North and South America. Jeremy Smith describes variety within capitalist society; this is complemented by a traditional world systems account of labor regimes in the global periphery—though Manuela Boatca’s essay holds great interest for those prone to using concepts such as “second serfdom” or “second slavery”. Rahimi’s essay has already been noted. Thomas Kern, Lotta Meyer and Sand-hui Nam write interestingly on regional identities in East Asia, paying particular attention to the trauma created by Japanese imperialism. Sujata Patel then describes the creation of a powerful sociology of India freed of colonial assumptions—and freed too of excessive culturalism.

Several arguments lead me to reject the claim that we must accept a new paradigm.

1. 1. Most importantly, the new paradigm is far too culturalist or idealist. Arnason’s prior interest in civilizations rightly leads him to reject the generalized axial model: “the common denominator of axial civilizations can be seen as a cultural program perilously close to the models that Parsons presented as long-term determinants of social evolution (though it makes greater allowance for conflicts and contingent outcomes” (p. 180). Bellah and Eisenstadt of course come from the Parsonian stable. But meaning alone does not make the world go around, not least as ideologies tend to be loose and baggy monsters allowing varied groups to express their interests with ease.^{Footnote 3} Differently put, the commanding heights of ideology are rarely so spare and clear as to constrain and mandate social conduct. Human beings are not just—or, if you prefer, not always—mere concept fodder. Wittrock’s view that the two key elements in the renaissance of historical thought in the social sciences are Cambridge intellectual history based on the work of Wittgenstein and Austin and the history of concepts pioneered by Koselleck, both of which tend to see social life driven conceptually, is accordingly mistaken. Certainly the stress on meaning can blind one to other realities. That point is made decisively by Knöbl in his withering criticism of Eisensadt’s early and wholly culturalist account of the differences between North and South America.

2. 2. A closely related criticism is that the new approach is far too intellectualist. The details of doctrine are held to be vital, very much in the spirit of Max Weber. But doctrine is the sphere in which intellectuals move and have their being; most often social life, including religious life, works in a much more unquestioned way, by habit and custom—which is not, let me stress again, to say that this does not matter or is not somehow real. The guiding light to much belief in social life really ought to be Durkheim rather than Weber: social cohesion often has more importance than variety in doctrines of transcendence.

3. 3. Michael Mann once made this last point, and his work deserves mention here. In my view, Spohn is correct in saying that Mann at times does not pay quite enough attention to legitimacy as an element of power. But he wholly misses the extremely useful distinctions that Mann makes about ideology. Ideology can have autonomous power, either by breaking social arrangements, as with the Jacobins or Bolsheviks, or by giving self-belief and force to a group of recognizable actors. That was the case, as Weber tells us, of the city dwellers of medieval Europe once they were able to latch on to the hard disciplinary beliefs of Protestantism. However, while ideological power can have such power at times, it is also necessary to note that that strength can be diminished in at least two ways. First, ideologies often follow circumstance; there is, in other words, often truth to the “reflectivist” position advocated both by Marx and Durkheim. Second, social actors, though always possessed of cultural values, often act simply in the face of power. There is an important corollary here: social movements tend to gain their character and ideological identity through interactions with particular regimes. And of course economic motivations do exist! The emphasis placed by many in this volume on Weber focuses primarily on his work on the world religions. While that work is fundamental, there is more to Weber than this appropriation recognizes.

4. 4. A potential danger of culturalist approaches is relativism: the insistence that universal mechanisms should be put to one side. But there is a great deal to be said in favor of the currently fashionable view that stresses the need for social science to concentrate on mechanisms of one sort or another. Such mechanisms clearly exist. Matthew Lange has shown that a sudden increase in education amongst a majority of the population can lead—within very different cultural conditions—to vicious struggles with the previously dominant minority; the former seeking access to top level jobs, the latter determined to hold on to its privileges.^{Footnote 4} Furthermore, we now know a good deal about revolutions and civil wars in different cultural conditions because of sociological understandings of state weakness and of the impact of exclusion from political life.

5. 5. Skepticism towards the claims made in this volume also arises once one considers alternative views of our current sense of history. The emphasis on divergence can lead to understating forces pointing in the other direction. One such force is nationalism, and another capitalism. There is everything to be said in favor of stressing the diverse routes involved, but one can at least note that their very general requirements can undermine the tenets of the cultures into which they are inserted.^{Footnote 5} This is the point made by Shafer when discussing science. There is surely something to Max Weber’s view that science brings endless goodies whilst undermining moral certainties. There is an opportunity/cost to modernity that leaves us largely bereft, thank goodness, to what Sartre used to refer to as “totalizing” ideologies. The collapse of the Soviet bloc was a global historical event, but one wholly without ideological import. “Consumers of the world unite” seems to have replaced the nobler injunctions of Marx and Engels. Of course, there will be new ideologies, but it is as well to remember that some have failed. Both fascism and Bolshevism were alternative moral worlds. They are now gone, one defeated in the war, the other undermined by military and economic competition. Finally one might challenge an implicit assumption at work in several authors in this volume, namely that the Occident has lost its power, making the turn to multiple centers of the modern, so to speak, necessary as well as desirable. This is a huge issue of course, but at least some considerations point in the other direction. For one thing, Northern power within capitalism, headed by American seigniorage resulting from the hegemony of the dollar, is not yet in complete decline. For another, rising powers seem more intent on amending the capitalist world they wish to join than in replacing it with an alternative of their own.

Let me leave this line of criticism so as to stress two points in conclusion. First, the book contains all sorts of information and argument that make it worth reading. Here we have the latest state-of-play amongst those involved in Eisenstadt’s legacy. One question discussed is whether the axial age should be extended to early Christianity and to Islam, or perhaps even to the twelfth century Renaissance—an approach firmly rejected by Arnason. Then a very great deal can be learnt from, and more thought provoked by, the insistence on taking regions seriously. In that way we move beyond a sociology based on nation-states that provides the statistics that we take for granted. Some of the individual essays are fine stand-alone pieces in their own right, especially those of Therborn, Levine and Knöbl.

This leads to my second point. The book as a whole represents an advance in sociology, from the concentration on industrial societies to a full and proper concern with the historical record. Who now could take seriously the jejune binary divisions between traditional and modern, or between mechanical and organic? There is massive evidence here of complexity in the division of labor in the agrarian world. Understanding this, and much else, will indeed improve social theory. If we should reject the notion of a new paradigm, we can rejoice in the certain fact that the promise of sociology is being fulfilled by the turn to history.