Muslims, Media and Mobility in the Indian Ocean Region
Attempts in thinking about the relationships between globalisation, media, transnationalism and Islam have sought to explore their effects on Islamic imaginaries and traditional institutions of authority.Footnote 2 These studies assume a framework that sees globalisation and transnationalism as part of the processes of western modernity, not adequately attending to the idea of religion as an alternate globaliser or a realm of sociality, in which economic, political and cultural networks are underpinned by shared identities. In contrast, links between Islamic practices and Muslim communities can be seen as forging transnational networks across localities, where the use of technology by Muslims in service of Islamic reform constitutes a moral universalism.Footnote 3 The popular use of print and media technologies for Islamic proselytisation and reform could be seen to give rise to a different epistemic process that is associated with the willingness of a subject to adhere to traditions, producing what has been termed as pious subjectivities.Footnote 4 In the case of Indian Muslims the popular use of media also indicates exclusion from the dominant nationalist imaginary, for religious groups tend to use media rather than state processes such as law in seeking intervention. Further, the use of technology by Muslims to articulate an Islamic moral universalism, this article seeks to argue, is unlike a singular telos demonstrated by other universal claims, since it is underpinned by different goals, internal contestations and disparate trajectories within the often undifferentiated category of Muslims.
With this debate in mind, the following article describes two distinct trajectories of Twelver Shi‘i reform practices that deploy print and electronic media in the Indian Ocean region towards varying ends, as manifested by two contemporary Shi‘i organisations. World Islamic Network (WIN), the first of these, is an initiative that operates from the western India coastal city of Mumbai (Bombay). As described in greater detail later, WIN seeks to create a transnational religious market for Twelver Shi‘ism by printing and distributing books, as well as running its own television channel where cultural programmes on Muslim culture and Islamic pasts are broadcast. The second reform initiative, Tanzeem, also circulates books, sermons and Islamic films on Twelver Shi‘ism, articulating a transnational imagination that is linked to Iran and its politics. Unlike WIN, Tanzeem seeks through these activities to effectuate moral and material change within the local Shi‘i community in the inland Indian city of Hyderabad (Deccan).
The article seeks to show, first, that these different conceptions of reform articulate moral universalisms that are embedded in their respective local material cultures. Second, it argues that reformist ideas as propagated using media technology are affected by the different locales that make up this network, impacting upon the nature of Islamic discourse and its implications for power and authority within this moral universalism. In doing so, the article gestures towards contrasting developments in the modern Shi‘i world, despite the propensity of different traditions of reform to use technology to mediate their message.
The material used here emerges from ethnographic studies amongst Twelver Shi‘i Muslims in Daru Shifa in Hyderabad's old city, as well as on Palla Galli in Mumbai's Dongri. Both areas consist of a high spatial concentration of Muslims of different occupational and sectarian groups, being commonly referred to as the ‘Muslim quarter’ of these respective cities.Footnote 5 In both cases, the ethnographic material is based on participant-observations and interviews of what has been catalogued in anthropological parlance as research based on the experience of being a ‘native anthropologist’Footnote 6 in which the ‘observer’ and ‘observed’ belong to a similar cultural context and in this case also a shared religious context. The historical material against which the ethnography is interpreted is based on interviews, in which community narratives that describe a collective past in distinct ways are sought to be explored. Through this I have highlighted distinct aesthetics of the past, using also community records, such as autobiographies and souvenir publications passed on to me during these interviews.
In the case of Tanzeem, as this article will seek to show, ideas of reform use Islamic media to critique local practices of Shi‘ism perceived as remnants of a local Muslim feudal culture in which public Shi‘i practices were patronised since the founding of Hyderabad city. This critique is directed against a dominant public culture of Shi‘ism with deep historical routes in state patronage by the Indo-Persian Qutb Shahi dynasty (1512–1687) that imagined Hyderabad city as an extension of Iran and declared Shi‘ism as state religion. Further, a dominant Shi‘i public culture established during this time gained popularity as part of the local courtly culture within the predominantly Sunni Asif Jahi dynasty (1724–1948); notwithstanding a brief interval during the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb's rule.Footnote 7 Besides critiquing the impact of this local history, as what Tanzeem understands to comprise an existing Shi‘i culture of patronage and nepotism, its reformist ideas are directed also against the perceived dilapidation of Islamic practices. This is a context in which the dominant Shi‘i public culture in Hyderabad was displaced after Indian independence, already hollowed by years of association as a princely state during the British Raj. After independence, patronage of these Shi‘i public practices was devolved to a host of Wakf bodies, which are managed and controlled by the erstwhile nobility with participation from the diasporic Iranian-Hyderabadi Twelver community. Tanzeem believes, then, that such practices have merely shifted from the patronage of the former princely state to the control of traditional community elites, including the existing local ‘ulama or preachers. Using the internet and Islamic print media, the initiative looks to the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran in a revivalist reading that aims to bring politics back into Islam, questioning the historical shaping of Islamic tradition vis-à-vis the colonial disciplining that confines Islamic tradition to the private sphere. It therefore circulates discourses and images that re-read the battle of Karbala as a moment of insurrection, attempting to reform those local attitudes and aesthetics which it believes to be lodged in past cultural repertoires.
Displaying a very different relation to the past and a separate community trajectory are the Gujarati Twelver Khojas whose practice of Shi‘ism could be seen as a subculture within Twelver Shi‘ism. This Gujarati Khoja subculture continues to maintain its distinct cultural identity, being originally a Gujarati Hindu business community believed to have first converted to Islam to form the Shi‘i Isma‘ili Khojas, of which a section later broke away turning to Twelver Shi‘ism, retaining its mercantile and other vernacular cultural forms. Whilst the Twelver Khojas have undergone dramatic shifts in faith, paralleled by movement of people between the areas of Bombay, Gujarat, Africa, the Middle East and the West in a diaspora,Footnote 8 paradoxically the maintenance of cultural traits has continued. A transnational public sphere has been forged through the circulation of print and visual technology between these regions in which Twelver Shi‘i authoritative texts are translated from Persian, Arabic, Urdu and English to Gujarati, Swahili and other local languages and contexts where the Khoja Twelver Shi‘as live. This print culture connects the Twelver Khoja diaspora, where religious monthly journals published in Gujarati circulate amongst the community. These journals are administered by welfare trusts that are funded through khums and zakat (charity capital) with the aim of creating a religious market,Footnote 9 through which awareness about matters of faith and reform is sought to be spread.
From this can be discerned two distinct models of circulation across the Indian Ocean that impact on the nature of reform practices. First, a centre and periphery model connecting Iran and Hyderabad amongst the mainstream Twelver Shi‘as, with distinct roots in an Iranian Shi‘ism.Footnote 10 In this Iranian network of circulation, religio-political leaders from Iran play an important role in transnational Shi‘i politics and are looked to as figures of inspiration and emulation by the majority mainstream Twelver. The second model of circulation is formed around patronage ties where leaders from Iraq, held as charismatic figures, have locally embedded themselves in the activities and organisation of the Twelver Khoja. In exploring reform initiatives embedded in these different trajectories within the common milieu of Twelver Shi‘ism, the article seeks nuanced conceptions of Islamic reformism that vary not only in their media pathways but also their conceptions of Islam and use of media to claim transcendence.Footnote 11
My aim in telling these stories of movement of people, technology and charismatic leaders is threefold. First, I wish to stress inter-regional exchange between spatially segregated populations and locales through Islam. Indian Ocean studies have focused largely on historical exchanges in the pre-modern and early modern periods, and more recently on histories of the modern era, highlighting connected histories.Footnote 12 The second objective is to revisit this idea of connected histories by ethnographically exploring the ways in which circulation through media technology takes place in the present, along continuing pre-colonial and early modern connections. I aim to demonstrate that media flows follow traditional patterns and community trajectories, in which movement of Muslims between places has led the way for technological use. Further, I argue that the historically determined routes of community migration impact the use of technology and the projects of reform it facilitates; as such, attempts to articulate a moral universalism through technology merely reinforce and re-connect plural Islamic transnational networks.
Finally, this article aims to complicate and critique a tendency to explain the effects of technology on the religious understanding of Muslims as one that will eventually undo the traditional structures of religious authority, in the context of modernism of the nineteenth and twentieth century. The use of technology, it has been argued, enabled independence for readers from the tutelage of ‘ulama through individual engagement with religious texts, thereby replacing custom and traditional structure by more democratic and ideology based engagement. Further, it has been posited that the increasing use of print technology will eventually lead to the rise of an urban Muslim reformist imagination circulated within a reading public that will enable direct contact with classical Islamic texts and a departure from intercessionary folk practices.Footnote 13 Such a trajectory of understanding of Islam in the modern world, as one that diminishes diverse ‘local’ Islams can be seen as deriving from ‘Protestant’, ‘disenchanted’ or ‘globalised’ frames, as opposed to an immanent theory of traditions.Footnote 14 In contrast to these disenchanted frames, particular strands of Shi‘ism (such as Usuli) believe in following a marja‘ (learned jurisconsult), within the structures of taqlid: the emulation of living spiritual guides and leaders who provide new religious rulings based on the sayings and interpreted actions of the Imams. As such, while structurally Shi‘ism maintains and follows the authority of its marja‘s, mujtahids and ‘ulama, there are distinct strands of modernity and reformism within Shi‘ism that uphold what has been termed as an ‘enchanted modernity’.Footnote 15 In this understanding of Shi‘ism, rationality combines with affect, the textual with the charismatic, and the theological with the political.
Following Nile Green's observations on Bombay Islam, that newer religious productions in response to industrial and commercial growth need to be grouped together with customary Islam,Footnote 16 I emphasize the need to move beyond an understanding of modern developments within Islam as uni-dimensional, uniform or linear by attending to the development of custom, charisma and technology within Islam. In describing these overlapping technological and ritual networks, I seek to explore the complex and conflicting textures of Shi‘i reformism that employ print technology and media for very different ends, despite their commonalities in aspiring for universalism within what could be joined together to draw up a transnational oceanic Shi‘i geography.
The article is accordingly divided into three parts. The first describes the formation of a Twelver Khoja diaspora through a print-based public sphere, in which community journals in the local Gujarati language circulate conceptions of a distinct Khoja modernity, rooted in activities of funding, philanthropy and reform. The next section describes the formation of a print-based public in Bombay, through the reform initiatives of WIN run by Twelver Khoja businessmen. As a comparison with WIN and its use of technology, the third section describes Tanzeem's reform effort in Hyderabad.
The Twelver Khoja Diaspora
The history of the Twelver Khoja Shi‘as in Bombay, as recounted by members of the community, is constructed around the movement of reformist leaders from Iraq to Mumbai, due to whose efforts it is believed that local mosques and community welfare trusts were first set up, firmly establishing Twelver Khoja presence in Palla Galli in Dongri. The construction of this Twelver Khoja identity displays a distinct Khoja modernity, seen to derive from both its antecedents, in the sense that the Khojas are believed to have belonged to the Hindu Lohana caste before they converted to Islam in the fifteenth century, as it does from movement of people in search of new business prospects to distant lands, and the changes within community structures this entailed.Footnote 17
Bombay's Mohammed Ali Road in Dongri became a major centre of Isma‘ili Khoja settlement, with Khoja families migrating from Kutch and Kathiawar in Gujarat to establish business ventures that derived from an existing Gujarati mercantile culture. With the influx of Gujarati Muslims into the city after 1830, a Khoja cemetery, a chief community hall (jama‘at-khana) off Samuel Street, and the mansion of Aga Khan I in the nearby Mazagaon quarter that became a centre for annual Muharram celebrations in the city, came to be established in the decades after the arrival of the Aga Khan I in 1848 to Bombay.Footnote 18 Later, Bombay also became the setting in which the drama of secession within the Isma‘ili community played out; one of the many factors for this being the Aga Khan's move with the aim of connecting with the Isma‘ili community in their new religious centre that is believed to have resulted in attempts to consolidate his authority over the community.Footnote 19 In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, various secessionist movements within the larger Isma‘ili Khoja community (known locally as the moti jama‘at) resulted in the formation of smaller Sunni and Twelver Shi‘i Khoja groups (called nani jama‘at).Footnote 20
It was mainly the process of the breaking away of the Twelver Khojas from the Isma‘ili Khojas that gave momentum to the active movement of Twelver Shi‘i families and leaders across the Indian Ocean. Further, the impetus to gravitate towards Twelver Shi‘ism came from these journeys. An anecdote from the chronicles of Mullah Asghar ‘Ali, the late president of the World Federation of the Twelver Khoja jama‘at, is an instance. During pilgrimage to the sacred cemetery of Imam Hussain in Karbala (Iraq), a group of Khojas was asked if they had performed the Muslim pilgrimage of hajj (not a mandatory practice according to the Isma‘ili belief) in the presence of the Shi‘i mujtahid Shaikh Zain-ul ‘Abiddin Mazendarani. When the group was reprimanded for this ‘omission’, they requested for a leader from Iraq to be sent to Bombay.Footnote 21 This helped put in place a model that constituted patronage ties with Iraqi Shi‘ism through the migration of religio-political Shi‘i leaders, who were looked to as charismatic figures. Mullah Qadir Husein arrived in Bombay in 1872 at the behest of Shaikh Zain-ul ‘Abiddin Mazendarani, and remained in service for 27 years, becoming the founder of the Twelver Khoja community in Bombay. Seven years later, as community records state, Ayatullah Shaikh Abu’l Qasim Najafi, another ‘alim (knowledgeable leader) from Najaf, reached Bombay after his hajj in Mecca, in order to lead the Friday prayers.Footnote 22 At the request of the Twelver Khoja jama‘at at Bhavnagar (Gujarat), the ‘alim subsequently journeyed from Bombay to Bhavnagar and Mahuva in Gujarat to pursue missionary work there. He returned to Bombay in 1891 and led the first public Twelver Khoja congregation at the Iranian Shushtari imambara in Dongri.Footnote 23 With his support, a piece of land was purchased in the Palla Galli area, adjacent to the Isma‘ili jama‘at-khana on Samuel Street, where the foundation of the Twelver Khoja mosque was laid. Three generations of leaders from this Najafi family led the community after the ‘alim, following their training in the hawza at Najaf.
Apart from the Iraqi Shi‘i leaders, the newly-formed Twelver Khoja community coalesced around the memory of members from the community, who they believe were attacked and martyred by the neighbouring Isma‘ili Khojas, including Haji Allarakia and Laljee Sajjan. In another instance, Abdullah Laljee, a survivor of one such attack highly-regarded for his sacrifice, is believed to have played an instrumental role in building the Khoja Twelver mosque in Palla Galli in Dongri. Among the stories of sacrifice that permeate the Twelver Khoja memory is the story Killu Khatau. Killu Katau's family migrated from Nagalpur in Kutch to Bombay in 1865. Killu is believed to have been sent to poison Mullah Qadir in the month of Ramazan. Instead, on hearing the Mullah preach and on reading his popular book Chiragh-i-Hidayat (The Light of Guidance), he is said to have become a devotee.Footnote 24 Harassed by the rival assassin group, Killu tried to escape to Zanzibar but got caught in a brawl and ended killing Hasan Mukhi, the chief of the Aga Khan. Sentenced to death for this killing, crowds outside Dongri jail are said to have heard him utter his last words ‘Allaho Akbar’, before he was hanged in 1878. Tales of his piety and devotion to Mullah Qadir during the legal proceeding and hanging are popular amongst the community. His brother Dharamsi Khatau left Bombay in 1880 with their parents, and the wife and daughters of Killu Khutau, journeying for a month in a dhow to Mombasa.Footnote 25 The long journey and the sadness of Killu's death is said to have led to the death of their father. Due to this, Dharamsi Khatau decided not to disembark in Mombasa and stayed on board longer till the family reached Zanzibar. He established Dharamsi Khatau and Co., which imported textiles from Germany, and proceeded to set up multiple branches throughout East Africa, including in Mombasa, Lamu, Malindi, Mazeras, Takangu, Kisumu, Bukoba, Nairobi and Meru, where the newly arrived Twelver Shi‘as worked before establishing their own businesses.Footnote 26
Similar tales of sacrifice permeate the collective memory of the community, according to which other persecuted and excommunicated Khoja families are reported to have left Bombay and Gujarat. Conditions of drought and economic hardships are also believed to have contributed to their decision to seek new trade possibilities in the colonial context of Africa. Encouraged by the blowing winds, during the North Eastern monsoons, many such families sailed from the ports of Mandvi and Porbandar towards East African shores in their dhows.Footnote 27 The story of Dewji Jamal, a rich merchant from Bombay who migrated to Africa, establishing trade links with Europe and India, and promoting Twelver Shi‘ism amongst the newly arriving Khoja migrants, provides further insights on the connections between various locales that make up the diasporic community. Dewji Jamal was part of the Khoja group that travelled to Iraq from Bombay for pilgrimage, and on whose request Shaikh Zain-ul ‘Abeddin Mazendarani sent Mullah Qadir to Bombay. An early immigrant from Bombay to Zanzibar, Dewji Jamal helped found the first Twelver Khoja madrasa in Zanzibar in 1881. In 1897, a mosque, a cemetery, and an imambara were established in Lamu, then the chief port of Kenya, with funds from his import company Dewji Jamals & Co.Footnote 28 Also another leader, Sayyid ‘Abdul Husain Marashi Shustari from Iraq, was sent to the island, on Dewji Jamal's request to lead the growing number of Twelver Shi‘as in prayer and in performing rites.Footnote 29
Around the same time as the institution of the madrasa and mosque at Zanzibar, madrasas were also instituted in Mahuwa and Bhavnagar (Gujarat) by the pupils of Mullah Qadir.Footnote 30 Haji Ghulam Ali Isma‘il was prominent amongst these pupils, translating, compiling and writing around 300 books on the theme of Islamic liturgy and ethics in Gujarat. Popularly known as Haji Naji, his contributions in Gujarati were extremely popular in Mumbai, Gujarat and Africa. In particular his translations (tafsir) of the Quran into Gujarati led to the proliferation of books on Twelver Shi‘ism amongst the Khojas, transposing Shi‘i Islam into the local imagination of the diasporic Twelver Khoja community. He translated, for instance, Meraju Sa‘dah (Prayers to Elevate) and Dua no Majmuo (The Book of Prayers), popular especially in Bhavnagar. In 1892 he also started the Gujarati journal Rah-i-Nejad (Path of Salvation) from Bombay, which consisted of theological opinions, information on ritual performance, obituaries and news of members of the community. While the journal moved to Karachi after the Indo-Pak partition in 1947, it paved the way for similar community initiatives of journals published in the Gujarati language. For instance, one family has since 1988 published a Gujarati journal by the same name on Palla Galli, Bombay, covering apart from theological content, affairs of the community, including news of the jama‘at, commemorations of death anniversaries of Imams, and obituaries. More recently, an sms-service of the same name was started across Bombay and Gujarat, which informs the Twelver Khoja subscribers about prayer and fast timings as well as about gatherings, congregations and cremations. Another instance of a Gujarati journal published by the Bombay jama‘at is a monthly bilingual journal entitled Isna ‘Ashari that carries content for propagation, interspersed by news and business advertisements of the community. It began in 1935 under the leadership of Ayatullah Shaikh Mohammed Hasan Najafi, who like his father arrived in Bombay from Najaf at the request of the Khoja jama‘at. An office of the journal, run by a Twelver Khoja trust, continues to be located opposite the mosque on Palla Galli.
Publication of these religious community journals take place in commercial printing presses owned by members of the community, where the business infrastructure of the community members also provides the logistics to establish and maintain a print-based religious public sphere. Within the context of Bombay's proliferating publication market, these printing presses, set up as part of family businesses, have been operational since the early twentieth century. The Isna ‘Ashari journal, for instance, has been published since 1947 at the Novelty Printers – a printing press owned by a Twelver Shi‘i Khoja family - on Bombay's Grant Road. Apart from family business infrastructures that enable the printing of these journals and Islamic books at subsidised rates, most of the publishing is undertaken by welfare trusts run by mostly Twelver Khojas.
In Africa, the Bilal Mission Muslim Trust is supported by jama‘ats of different parts of East Africa, with two centres in Tanzania and Kenya. The Trust also runs 25 madrasas in East Africa, which publish, translate and circulate books for propagation in local languages. The Bilal Mission Muslim Trust was set up in 1964 under the direction of Sayyid Sa‘id Akhtar Rizvi, who was appointed Chief Missionary for his knowledge of Swahili and English, his training at Najaf, and also the marriage alliance with the daughter of the late Iraqi marja‘ Ayatullah Sayyid Abu’l Qasim al-Khoei. The Mission started its first Swahili publication Sauti Ya Bilal (The Voice of Bilal) for its Swahili readership. It also publishes an English periodical The Light, as well as several books in both Swahili and English.Footnote 31 The publishing of Islamic books commissioned by Bilal Muslim Mission is also done in Bombay in presses privately owned by members of the community. The printing press ‘Crown and Ink’, for instance, has been owned by a member of WIN since 1960 and takes orders to print Islamic books, including those commissioned by Bilal Mission Muslim Trust, in Swahili.Footnote 32
Between 1946 to 1961, the jama‘at of Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika and Zanzibar as well as Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, Madagascar, Reunion, Mauritius and Somalia came together to form a federation of Twelver Khoja African jama‘ats to support initiatives in Africa like the Bilal Muslim mission.Footnote 33 This development is in keeping with the role of the community organisation of the jama‘at,Footnote 34 divided into committees and boards with specialised tasks, with the avowed aim of upholding the project of Shi‘i modernity and reform. The activities of the jama‘at, and welfare trusts operated by the Twelver Khojas include sponsorship programmes in the fields of health, education and housing as well as publication of accessible Islamic books in English and other local languages as a shared project of social and religious reform. As Lachaier describes, this federation of the African jama‘at was replicated on a larger scale after the dispersal of the community to other parts of the world, particularly after the expulsion of the Ugandan Indians in 1972 and the nationalist and decolonisation movements in Africa that triggered a second large-scale migration of the community to western countries and, to a lesser extent, Islamic ones.Footnote 35 As a result of this dispersal and a more widely spread diaspora, an umbrella confederation under the World Federation was established in London in 1976, in order to unify these dispersed jama‘at as well as to provide services to the community. In particular, these include the publication and circulation of accessible Islamic literature in English and other local languages, ensuring the availability of informed religious authority as well as accessibility of marital advice and matchmaking agencies. The World Federation also sponsors, provides and distributes charity capital in the form of subsidiaries for education, health and housing projects, which are operational all over India and Africa, with the purpose of seeking to uplift the community. In particular, the jama‘at in its activities formalises the relationship of the community to its new locality as well as keeping links with Gujarat, Bombay and Africa via the Middle East alive, through programmes of philanthropy and reform.
Despite a widening Twelver Khoja diaspora, traditional links with Iraq that contribute to the project of reform and modernity continue. For instance, an exiled Twelver Shi‘i political leader, escaping persecution of the Ba‘ath party leader Saddam Hussain, arrived in Bombay from Iraq in the early 1990s.Footnote 36 His charisma is said to have made him instantly popular with the Bombay Shi‘as. He travelled from Bombay to Hyderabad and then to Gujarat, Delhi and Ladakh, addressing the Shi‘i communities there. As a representative of Ayatullah Sayyid Abu’l Qasim al-Khoei, funds were channelled through him; in Bombay, he launched housing projects for the Shi‘i migrant zari workers from the northern province of Uttar Pradesh, who were living in informal slums. Along with this, there were mass speeches and political rallies that are said to have had the persuasive effect of uniting different Shi‘i communities: Khojas, non-Khojas, Irani, Hyderabadi, U.P., Kashmiri, Delhi and other South Indian Shi‘as from Tamil Nadu and Karnataka. Some claim that this popularity led to his deportation on the grounds of being an illegal resident. On his departure, a trust called ‘Najafi House’ was founded in 1981 that continued the philanthropy projects and also published books on Shi‘ism. The trust currently also brings out an English monthly journal known as Jafferi Affairs on current affairs in the Islamic world.
As described in this section, the breakaway Twelver Khoja community was built around migrating Iraqi Shi‘i leaders and welfare trusts, as part of projects of religious and social reform. These institutions of Khoja modernity brought out community journals and accessible Islamic books, forging a print-based public sphere that linked local sites between Gujarat, Bombay and Africa via funds from the Middle East. This print-based public sphere circulates books written by authoritative Shi‘i figures, replicating traditional structures with newer technological formats.
World Islamic Network
One such institution of Twlelver Khoja modernity is World Islamic Network (WIN) that deployed and forged a public sphere within these transnational linkages, through which community reform could be sought. The initiative, started by a group of fifteen Twelver Khoja businessmen in Bombay, was set up under the guidance of a Shi‘i missionary from Bihar posted in East Africa, Maulana Sayyid Akhtar Rizvi, as mentioned above, who was trained in Islamic studies in Najaf (Iraq).
WIN was registered as a charitable trust in 1991 as part of the print-based Twelver Khoja initiatives of reform. Its primary purpose was to respond to a dearth in accessible literature on Twelver Shi‘ism in the English language, towards marketing the Twelver Shi‘i faith. The initiative first began by printing pamphlets on Shi‘ism and proceeded to publish books in the English language. The first book they published was entitled Imamat by Sayyid Akhtar Rizvi, their mentor and Chief Missionary of Bilal Mission Muslim Trust in Africa. Subsequently, WIN has printed (and re-printed) more than 75 titles on Twelver Shi‘ism, through which the group has sought to create a public in which such books can circulate. This was done by sending translated books in English to subscribers to the group free of cost. In return the subscribers were required to post a summary of the book. Much like a Habermasian public sphere based on membership, reading and discursive communication, a reading public was forged, in which books are read by people who do not physically meet or interact, but who are bound together for the moment of reading by its shared experience. However, this was not the Andersonian kind of public that imagines a community bound by territory and language that legitimates a shared belonging,Footnote 37 but one in which Islamic knowledge freely circulates outside the boundaries of the nation-state as well as a ‘natural’ ‘religious’ community.
The imagination of this reading public in which texts on Shi‘ism circulate was a transnational one, in that it reached out to an international readership outside traditional Shi‘i pockets, including in Southeast Asia, South America, Japan and the United States of America (in one interview it was mentioned that their books were most in demand in USA jails). In seeking a circulation beyond the community's traditional geographical boundaries, this public creates a transnational religious market, where diverse opinions are available and multiple authoritative discourses are circulated in an intermediate sphere located between the personal and the public. In this context, personal preferences for particular Shi‘i specialists or schools of thought and the sectarian undertones and religious controversies they represent are avoided, with the understanding that a religious market is about circulation and not an endeavour to convince others about faith. Also, affiliation to the Iraqi or Irani forms of authoritative traditions are not made public, maintaining that Sistani (Iraqi marja‘) and Khamenei (Iranian marja‘) are “like our two eyes, through which reading and understanding is mediated”. In doing so, WIN's conception of reform is to create a religious market for information about faith as opposed to an ideology-based public. This can be seen in the manner in which the circulation of printed texts and the media channel steers clear of criticism of traditional practices and actively deploys ideas of religious pluralism, a positioning that can be located in the community's own mercantile past and diasporic vision. Further authority invested in the institution of the marja‘ as the centralising institution, is the channel through which funds from both Iran and Iraq are received by WIN, allowing for the maintenance of a religious market for Twelver Shi‘ism in which a range of opinions are available for religious consumption. Further ‘good packaging’, readability and accessibility was emphasized, aimed at propagation, proliferation, and diversification as part of their ideas of reform. The group also dissociates from Wahhabi or puritanical forms of proselytising (tabligh) and instead emphasizes modern and liberal forms of Islam with the aim of diluting public images of terrorism commonly associated with Islam.
In addition to printing Islamic books in English, WIN subsequently also began a commercial 24-hour Islamic television channel in Bombay, on seeing the reach and effectiveness of television. Through this, it aimed to circulate modernist discourses on Islam that stresses rationality, accessibility of knowledge and practices of referencing theological argument with specific authority. While the channel carried an explicit theological content, its intention was not to critically evaluate other religions or faiths, but to use technology for disseminating ideas of a modernist Islam by expanding its viewership amongst non-Shi‘i viewers. The WIN channel was initiated by circulating videotapes among local cable operators in Bombay who broadcast their programmes daily for an hour or two. On seeing an emerging market for religious and cultural programmes based on Islam, an agreement to broadcast was drawn with local cable operators, such as Hathway, Seven Stars and WW One, for an annual carriage fee of 3 million Rupees. Through these agreements the earlier system of circulation of recorded videotapes was converted to a 24-hour channel, in which the main programme consisting of six to eight hours is broadcast on a repeat telecast in Bombay, Thane, New Bombay and Lucknow. These programmes can also be viewed live on its website.
The programmes on the channel include Quranic stories presented in a story-telling form, a programme on Muslim scientists, the history of Islamic ritual practices, a news bulletin on everyday truths, cooking shows, dubbed Iranian films on the life of Islamic prophets, such as Prophet Moses, as well as an Islamic quiz mimicking the Indian version of “Who wants to be a millionaire” (where a contestant is presented with a quiz question and wins the chance to earn higher amounts on successfully answering it). In the design, production and broadcasting of these programmes, secular formats are creatively deployed for religious purposes. Their recording, editing and post-production takes place in the WIN office on the Twelver Khoja Palla Galli in Dongri.
Importantly, despite the theological, social and ethical thrust of these programmes, the markets and audiences are not strictly defined through religious affiliations. In this regard, the importance of receiving letters from viewers belonging to different communities was underlined, and broadcasting anecdotes that focus on the non-Muslim viewership was stressed. Even programmes on theology or coverage of Muharram commemoration and sermons by leaders, which carry an explicit theological content, employ a format that highlights rational discourse. The lectures, for instance, are supported by references and employ an engaging conversational style as opposed to being emotionally charged, critical or challenging. WIN also runs a coaching centre that trains young Muslim boys and girls in fields of secular education, where it is felt that economic disadvantages diminishes chances of gaining access to better schools and colleges.
The infrastructure and initiative for reform employed by WIN, such as printing and circulating pamphlets, publishing and reprinting Islamic books, telecasting Islamic films made in Iran as well as running coaching centres for disadvantaged Muslims can be seen as ways of affecting social and religious reform and strengthening transnational connections. The modernity WIN deploys is distinct to its Khoja antecedents and the use of technology to connect the diasporic Twelver Khoja community. For WIN seeks to create a subscriptional, print-based and electronic public sphere by not only deploying the format, discourse and architecture of a liberal public sphere but also seeks religious and secular knowledge as a means towards belonging in this religious liberal public sphere.Footnote 38 This Khoja modernity, while deriving from ideas of charismatic authority of the Shi‘i Imams who are remembered and looked to as exemplars, draws also from multiple sources of the Gujarati and Khoja past. In seeking to create a market for Twelver Shi‘ism, it uses a conception of infrastructure and progress that is distinctly Khoja as it is Twelver Shi‘i and is modern in its use of a liberal mercantile vocabulary. In this regard, WIN as a Twelver Khoja initiative combines a community organisation based on philanthropy and community regulation, with mercantile attitudes that direct surplus capital towards community development and proliferation of the Shi‘i faith in liberal formats, by making information on Shi‘ism available to a larger audience. Emerging from this distinct modernity, WIN seeks to create a public for Shi‘ism outside the community boundaries, by enacting an indistinct separation between religion and politics, in order to create a transnational market for Twelver Shi‘ism.
Tanzeem
In contrast with WIN and its use of technology, the Tanzeem group was started by Twelver Shi‘i clerics trained in the hawza (university for learning in Islamic sciences) in Qom (Iran), with a vision to reform the local Shi‘i community. This vision is modelled on images (in print and electronic form) of religious and political developments in the Islamic Republic of Iran, post the 1979 revolution that acts as a cultural milieu that Tanzeem uses to model themselves and to rethink the local religious and material context.
Tanzeem, a registered youth welfare organisation comprising 25–30 young professionals in Hyderabad, adopts a similar style of functioning as WIN. It circulates pamphlets on Twelver Shi‘ism, focusing particularly on Shi‘i politics in the Middle East, seeking to not only contribute to accessible literature on Twelver Shi‘ism but also circulates opinions on contemporary Muslim politics, such as opposition in Palestine and Lebanon to Israeli state practices and in particular, the role of the revolution in contemporary Iran. Like WIN, Tanzeem also runs a coaching centre, where members ‘career-counsel’ and coach Shi‘i students from economically disadvantaged contexts, particularly from Hyderabad's old city where a substantial population of the Shi‘i urban poor live. In addition, Tanzeem organises forums for public discussion and debate, including an Islamic quiz through mobile phones, which entails a prize for the first right SMS. Tanzeem's engagement with the media was not merely a self-conscious practice of mediation and marketisation, as in the case of WIN; the engagement with media technology here is premised on the idea of mobilising and seeking political and social change (the Urdu word tanzeem also translates as ‘to bring about change’), where political agency is sought by re-engaging with Islamic traditions within an ‘activist imaginary’.Footnote 39
I discovered the impetus to intervene locally using Islamic media during the commemoration of Muharram in 2008 in Hyderabad, when Tanzeem had for the first time put up a stall in Daru Shifa, Hyderabad's old city. Unlike other stalls that customarily served water, embellished urban space with Islamic iconography and played cassette sermons and Muharram songs on their loudspeakers that reintroduce rhythmic laments every year into the old cityscape, Tanzeem's stall mediated tradition through newer objects, such as CDs, DVDs, books films and T-shirts with a message ‘Muharram against terrorism’. They also sold DVDs and CDs of Islamic films, similar to the dubbed Iranian films on the lives of Muslim Prophets telecast by WIN. In addition, they circulated filmic autobiographies that narrate the moral and political lives of Shi‘i leaders, such as Ayatollah Khomeini and Mustafa Chamran (the Iranian-born Islamist activist who worked in the Lebanese context to organise a military movement in 1974). Apart from this, sermons by Shi‘i preachers from Pakistan, who are trained in Iran, were distributed on CDs and DVDs, with a thematic anti-imperial emphasis.
Through sustained interaction with the activists in subsequent Muharram seasons, I learnt that Tanzeem began as an Islamic self-study circle, which they refer to as QSC (Quranic Study Circle), who met after university and working hours, with an endeavour to engage with Islamic texts. Every meeting at QSC entailed assigning a verse from the Quran to a student, who researched and presented it. The group recited the verse in Arabic and its translation in English, followed by a ten-minute break in which tea and snacks were shared. After the break, an assigned person made his presentation on the specific verse (the group was composed of mostly men) which was discussed by the entire group.
This model of self-engagement with the holy texts, in terms of recitation of the verse, its interpretation and its appreciation in the context of its revelation, is the basis for this reformist imagination. The imagination is derived from a larger Islamic reformist ethos of self-study, which involves an engagement with Islam to establish the true and correct understanding of traditional beliefs and practices, that Eickelman and Piscatori have termed ‘objectification’, and which Deeb has also termed a process of seeking ‘authentification’ in Islamic ritual practices. Tanzeem, therefore, publicly circulate images of a global Shi‘i imaginary that broadly espouses a shift from praxis (practice) or orthopraxy towards logos (reason) or orthodoxy, by calling into being a reflexive consciousness in engaging with questions like ‘What is my religion’, ‘Why is it important to my life’, and ‘How do my beliefs guide my conduct’.Footnote 40 QSC forums were hence a platform to engage with religion through personal reflexivity under supervision of those formally trained. Tanzeem thus works within such an imaginary that seeks an underlying reason and purpose (maqsad) for the performance of Islamic rituals. The performance of rituals are a means towards an end that is politically aware, emancipatory and ethically-rooted in authentic meanings of Karbala as a paradigm for self-reflexivity and political awareness; as also displayed according to them, in the events leading up to the Iranian revolution in 1979.
As a reformist initiative, Tanzeem uses technology to critique the continued association of Twelver Shi‘ism with a culture of patronage. This is a local culture of patronage of public state sponsored Shi‘ism that began with the Indo-Iranian Qutub Shahi dynasty, continued by the Sunni Asif Jahis (notwithstanding a brief interval during Aurangazeb's rule) and is presently overseen by the community elites. The materially ‘backward’ condition of the Shi‘i urban poor is seen as a result of moral retrogression and an embedding in this cultural model of patronage. Traditional commemorative acts of seeking intercession from the martyrs of Karbala are notionally equated with a local Muslim feudal culture embodied particularly in Hyderabad's old city.
Their critique of patronage and feudalism also extends to Twelver Khoja welfare trusts, mostly funded by the World Federation, such as Imam-i-Zamana Mission that has been operating in Hyderabad city since 1984. Unlike, the Twelver Khoja modes of intervention, Tanzeem seek to adopt a model of intervention that they believe will strengthen the community from within, both in matters of faith (deen) and secular education (duniya). Tanzeem circulates images and texts that emphasize a politically-engaged association with Islam as opposed to a model of philanthropy, which, they argue, perpetuates a feudal culture of patronage through the dominance of traditional ritualism, the local elites and welfare trusts. Furthermore, the authority of local ‘ulama, perceived as playing to popular religious sentiments for personal profit, is also sought to be undermined. In seeking to effect change from patronage to a service-oriented and self-reliance as a collective strategy of modernisation and survival, media technology is deployed to effect the movement towards self-reliance.
In the numerous pamphlets published by Tanzeem and the posters displayed in their stall, the most repeated textual references and quotes were from the Iranian spiritual head Ayatollah Khamenei, referred to as the ‘Rahbar-i-Muslimeen’ (Farsi, ‘leader of Muslims’), Iraqi marja‘ Ayatollah Sistani, referred to as the ‘Marja‘-i-Taqleed’ (Farsi, ‘source of authority to follow’), and the Lebanese Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, referred to as the ‘Sayyid-ul Maqawamat’ (Farsi, ‘guide to the spiritual station’). This suggests an attempt to harmonise moral authority from sources that are otherwise multifarious. The videos of live recordings of sermons copied and sold also include reputed politically-active Pakistani ‘ulama trained in Iran, on topics such as ‘anti-Bush’ or ‘anti-imperialism’ within further attempts to forge global Shi‘i imaginaries and a collective Shi‘i identity.
Above all, the exemplars on which Tanzeem models itself came from filmic autobiographies on Shi‘i revolutionaries who played a significant role in transnational Shi‘i politics. For instance, the documentary film Fateh Mubeen was screened in the stall for the passing-by Muharram commemorator in Hyderabad's old city, on the political context of the emergence of the Hezbollah and its role in the 2006 attack of Israel on Lebanon. The film describes the popularity of the Hezbollah party in Lebanon. It narrates the emergence of the Hezbollah as the first organised Shi‘i Arab resistance that successfully gained victory over Israel, and depicts Nasrulla's popularity not just in Lebanon but also in Pakistan in ‘voicing the concerns of the Muslim heart’.Footnote 41 The narrative thus fashions a trans-national Shi‘i identity, weaving diverse struggles like Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq into a continuous fight against injustice as in the idea of the battle of Karbala, obliterating borders of nation-states and reconfiguring varied national events around a singular memory.Footnote 42 What is interesting about the films screened and sold by Tanzeem are the multiple sources from which they are constructed. These films are copied and assembled from various films produced from Iran, Lebanon and Pakistan. Fateh Mubeen, for instance, is a random assembly of images and video footage from Al-Manar (the satellite television station launched by the Hezbollah in 1991 with the help of Iranian funds), clips from programmes produced by Iranian state television as well as from Pakistani news channels such as Payam, AirOne, PP, Sahar TV and GEO Television. The montage of video clips from Iran, Pakistan, Palestine and Lebanon in a single filmic narrative was most striking in a specific short video clip, which was screened in the Tanzeem stall in Hyderabad's old city during the first ten days of Muharram. The video, shot like an MTV song, showed quick images of Ayathollah Khamenei and Hasan Nasrullah addressing large gatherings, shots of Imam Hussain's shrine in Karbala, as well as popular Muharram posters of Imam Hussain's wounded horse (Zuljana) returning from the battlefield to images of mourning by women of the Prophet's family. These images were interspersed with war clippings of wounded soldiers, and mourning women in Palestine and Lebanon. The three-minute video constantly featured the Palestinian flag with a background song “We will take revenge for every crime committed on Muslims since Karbala”. It seamlessly moved between the struggle for Palestine, the shrine in Karbala and the streets of Beirut to link various political struggles through a theme of injustice, rebellion and Karbala, through songs and verse.
As activists, Tanzeem emphasizes that what is needed in Hyderabad is not a Hezbollah but rather a collective change in the local Twelver Shi‘i community, a change from historically-embedded traditional structures of patronage, feudalism and moral decadence, which they perceive to have resulted in the contemporary disadvantages of Muslims as a minority within the Indian nation-state. Through self-study of Islam, Tanzeem activists posit themselves as religious and politically conscious subjects, and critique a postcolonial history that they believe has shaped contemporary ritual practices of Islam by relegating Islam to the private sphere. They seek change in the local Shi‘i community in Hyderabad by re-introducing discourses that fuse traditional ritual with political meanings, as ways of articulating a vision of insurrection that returns a political imagination to Shi‘ism. Tanzeem believes that self-study and a re-engagement with Islam can effect this change. Through the use of technology, Tanzeem activists appear to borrow a modern Shi‘i imaginary, by re-thinking the local in terms of Shi‘i transnational networks; one which relates their ritual practice to political struggles in Lebanon, Iraq and Palestine, as part of the Karbala paradigm to seek justice and ‘progress’.
It is, hence, worthwhile to reflect on the conceptions of reform, and universal aspirations that they entail, in the cases of both WIN and Tanzeem. For the latter, universalism is derived from a re-reading of Karbala in a post-1979 Islamic Iranian milieu, through a tradition of circulation linked closely with Iran and its religious politics. And for WIN, the potential to earn, educate, inform and broadcast the message of Karbala, effectuated through a separation of personal beliefs and sectarian inclinations associated with it, is a movement towards universalisation. Thus, the idea of movement and market informs notions of progress that are tied to wider transnational circulation. These contrasting conceptions of reform by two Twelver Shi‘i initiatives are embedded in their separate circulatory traditions and structures of authority.
Conclusion
Much of the writing on the use of media and print technology for Islamic reform lays stress on the creation of new audiences and new democratic forms of religious expression as a shift from ecclesiastic, ritual and dynastic authority. In describing two conceptions of reform and their deployment of technology towards different ends, this article has sought to complicate such reading. It has highlighted the development of transnational links of reformist Islam as replicating the traditional, social and material contexts from which they emerge, by making technological connections and articulating universal claims.
WIN, as a Twelver Khoja reform initiative, derives from the diasporic experience of members of this community. What connects them in Bombay, Gujarat, port cities in East Africa and later the West, is a print-based public sphere, in the form of community Gujarati journals and Islamic books, whose publication and distribution is overseen and funded by local welfare trusts through charity capital that is routed via structures of authority in Iraq and Iran. As a diasporic community, the Twelver Khojas employ a distinct modernity through community organisations like jama‘at and welfare trusts that uphold social and religious reform. The members of these community organisations bringing out community journals and publishing Islamic books in local languages could be likened to Benedict Anderson's ‘creole journeymen’Footnote 43 or Jon Anderson's ‘technological adepts’ who are not necessarily religious experts but migrants who connect with their homeland through Islam and the Internet, interrogating Westphalian notions of national interest, opinion and language, central to classical notions of the public sphere.Footnote 44 As part of the Twelver Khoja diaspora, they could also be seen as belonging to what Jon Anderson calls an “internal diaspora”, consisting of transnational professionals who combine technological skills with access to Islamic books and texts, and are responsible for bringing Islam into the medium of technology.Footnote 45
WIN, as a reform initiative based in Bombay, is part of a traditional transnationalism enabled, in this case, by diasporic and patronage ties across the Indian Ocean through Islam. As described here, it emerges from this diasporic interconnectedness, including the publication and circulation of Islamic books and community journals amongst a subscribing and readership based public. However, its reformist and universal conception lies in seeking to exceed the traditional contours of the religious print market, in order to circulate Islamic discourses amongst non-Muslims. Employing a transnational imagination, it extends the contours of membership of this public outside the margins of the diasporic Twelver Khoja community and the Twelver community, reaching out to non-Muslims in far-away lands. This imagination desists from being involved in political controversies, and works like a religious market or an intermediate sphere between personal and public that is essentially decentralised, networked and permissive. And yet, as Charles Hirsckind reminds us, the decentralised nature of the religious market created by the technological adepts or ‘creole journeymen’ does not exclude institutional and disciplinary conditions that enable it.Footnote 46 Instead, its dissemination is in accordance with structures of traditional religious authority replicated in the transnational public sphere that culturally draws from Islamic and Twelver Shi‘i authority. This can be seen in the ways in which texts by Shi‘i authoritative figures and local charismatic leaders such as Mullah Qadir, Haji Naji and Maulana Rizvi are published and distributed, discursively shaping the religious market.
WIN, with its location in the context of the post-liberalising city of Bombay, now re-named as Mumbai, is embedded within a distinct Twelver Khoja modernity and belongs to a tradition of circulation that combines movement related to trade with religion. Its production of a religious market, then, is an effort to propagate Islam publicly while seeking to separate religion from politics in creating a transnational appeal for Twelver Shi‘ism. In contrast is Tanzeem's effort in using technology to bring politics back to Shi‘ism in the context of Hyderabad, by forging a transnational imagination modelled on Shi‘i politics in Iran through which the local is sought to be reformed. While both Twelver reform initiatives use coaching centres as a path towards progress and modernity, Tanzeem avowedly seeks to alter and change local forms of Shi‘i practices in its acts of intervention towards what it sees as moral, political and material progress. It enacts a modernity in seeking to break away from traditional local forms of commemoration and models of patronage towards universalist conceptions that derives from transnational Shi‘i politics. WIN's modernity derives from the creation of a transnational market and literate public sphere for the circulation of Islamic discourse, while it also works in providing secular education that enables the community to partake and belong to this transnational public.
Tanzeem deploys modes of a liberal secular public sphere, including adopting popular formats, such as the ‘MTV video’, similar to WIN. However, unlike WIN in its attempt to belong to a secular liberal public, Tanzeem seeks to interrogate secular liberal assumptions. This is done by aiming to re-establish the relationship between Islam and politics, questioning what it sees as the historical effects of colonialism on Islamic tradition in terms of its limitation to the private sphere. It seeks to do this by imprinting discourses of the Iranian revolution and by offering what could be seen as a revivalist reading of Karbala that critiques traditional ritual practices by arguing for a universalist model premised on a revolutionary imagination. Much of this reformist imaginary, emphasized by the circulation of Islamic texts and films, is used to rethink the local context where Shi‘ism was once a dominant public and courtly culture with links to Iran.
This is probably one of the reasons that Tanzeem's reformist initiatives are highly contested by the local Shi‘i community. Every Muharram, the stall put up by the Tanzeem activists is repeatedly attacked by different groups - including not just the local Akhbari group but also the Usuli group - for its critique of local Shi‘i practices. In particular, the resistance to their initiative centres on their advocacy of Khamenei's controversial fatwa against self-flagellation using sharp instruments as a mode of commemorating Muharram. Met with active resistance, this only bolsters Tanzeem's belief that the path towards reform and the realisation of an authentic Shi‘i self will be resisted, given what the Tanzeem activists believe is a moral decadence that ails local society.
WIN's reformist efforts, on the other hand, including their print and electronic media programmes, are widely popular, within the context of a separation between religion and politics in which controversies are avoided and personal opinions undisclosed. During Muharram, for instance, all live commemorations telecast on its channel are publicly screened in Muslim neighbourhoods and slums in Bombay and collectively watched, allowing for a market-wide circulation that engenders different modes of commemoration and personal affiliations. Diverse reformist agendas therefore appear to be underlined by disparate circulatory routes that are re-emphasized by media trajectories, as can be seen in the case of both WIN and Tanzeem, pointing to the social and material base through which Islamic transnational networks are forged and moral universalism sought to be articulated. This signals a situated universalism, in which transcendental ethics like those embodied in notions of an Islamic modernism, is democratically disseminated through print and electronic media within the separate public spheres. Both conceptions of reform then are locally embedded and grounded in their respective material cultures that are constituted through community and technological trajectories, commonly seeking an ethical universalism as much as global transnational connections across places through Islam.
