The book is a work of synthesis, constructed largely from a wide variety of secondary sources, with little evidence of a familiarity with the primary works, with the notable exception of the chapter on Carl Schmitt. The assumption throughout is that we know more about a particular thought or action by pointing out that similar thoughts and actions happen elsewhere. It is a construction based on resemblances at the level of conclusions, without any serious attempt, and deliberately excludes any serious attempt, to explore the reasons for arriving at the conclusions, in order to avoid the “mere description of the unique case” (p. 10). It is interesting, for example, to know that Cicero did not justify war, especially on religious grounds, unlike ancient Hebrew thought and Zoroastrianism. Politics, and not war, was central in his idea of national identity. Why Cicero held these views is left unexplored, and unless you already know, it remains a mystery.

As the author presents it, he has constituted a tradition based upon coincidences, rather than substantive connections. The continuity of the tradition is not demonstrated, but assumed from the soundings taken in different historical periods, considerable distances apart in both space and time. The Middle Ages gets particularly cursory treatment on the eccentric and idiosyncratic grounds that it is an elusive period between the ancient and the contemporary worlds, stretching from the early Christians to Edmund Burke, as the first “modern” representative of the tradition. There is a great body of literature on what constitutes a tradition, and the criteria that have to be met before one can talk in terms of authors belonging to such traditions (see John Gunnell, Political Theory: Tradition and Interpretation, 1979; C. Condren, The Status and Appraisal of Classic Texts, 1985). For Harle, the existence of a tradition is unproblematic. A resemblance between the thought of one period and that of another, or the thought in one geographical location and that in another, is sufficient evidence of the “use” or “application” (p. 53) of the tradition, or of the influence of one set of ideas upon another. Is, for example, self-consciousness, or self-awareness, a criterion of belonging to a tradition? If so, authors have to be shown to be, at least in principle, conscious of their use of the vocabulary and concepts. Even in making such connections, to follow Ricoeur, are we doing no more than constructing a quasi-world of texts, distanced from their authors and the contexts in which they were produced? Indeed, Harle deliberately distances the ideas he reiterates by presenting them at a high level of generality, in order to highlight their similarities. Take just one example as illustrative of what is lost in dealing with generalities abstracted from their contexts. The author suggests that the rhetoric surrounding the conquest of the American Indians “reproduces the tradition” he is discussing (p. 72). What is important for Harle is the dehumanisation of the Indians, the representation of the Other as alien and inferior. What is of significance, however, is how a complete adjustment of the European cosmology had to be changed as a result of the discovery of the Americas, and how it generated modern theories of property, such as those of Grotius and Locke, which justified the appropriation of land in the Americas. First, the discovery of a fourth race of people was contrary to the teachings of the Bible, which taught that Africans, Asians, and Europeans were the descendants of the three sons of Noah. The question of whether the Indians were human was a real theological dilemma. Given that their lands were being conquered, to constitute a legitimate claim to appropriation, and to have that claim respected in international law, or the law of nation, the question of land ownership became paramount. On this question is was claimed that Indians were not human, or that they were children, heathen, or insane, all of which would disqualify them from land ownership. The Spanish theologian Vitoria denied all of these grounds for the appropriation of Indian land but allowed appropriation on the grounds of just war. Practically, this had the same effect as allowing appropriation on the other grounds. To prevent free passage through one's land was a violation of the law of nature and constituted an act of war, which allows combatants to seize lands. It is true, then, that the Indians as Other were constituted as the enemy, but we could hardly claim to have understood why without knowing that it was in order to justify the appropriation of their lands.

Harle's book is not without illuminating insights, and interesting pieces of information that give an indication of different ways of thinking from the West, such as that of Islam. At a time when Jihad has become so thoroughly part of the lingua franca of the age, it is important to be reminded that it does not simply mean holy war. The great Jihad in Islam represents the religious quest for righteousness and goodness in all aspects of life. The small Jihad is the duty to defend Islam with weapons and is related to the idea of just war. War between Islamic countries (harb) is regulated by strict ethical considerations, whereas between an Islamic state and a nonbeliever state (razzia) ethical rules are suspended and any methods for defeating the enemy are permissible.

As an interesting catalog of ideas on the ways in which evil is represented in a variety of cultures, as manifest in the enemy, or Other, the book serves a useful purpose and is a valuable resource. It is, however, methodologically and theoretically naïve.