Joshua Stacher's Watermelon Democracy tries to understand what happened between the revolutionary effervescence of 2011 and the authoritarian “recalibration” we see in Egypt today. More specifically, the book examines the “purveyors of counterrevolution” (17) and how they deployed “strategies, tactics, and tools” (15) to apprehend the revolutionary process and engage in a process of regime-making. A decade after the start of the Arab uprisings, this study makes the case for looking at outcomes beyond the narrow binary of either success or failure, a binary that has dominated discussions about the legacy of the Arab spring. To develop this intervention in political science studies of transition, the author chooses to focus on processes rather than outcomes and does so by closely studying four central areas: “opposition relations during revolutionary moments, elections, state violence, and political economy.” These areas structure the outline of the book, composing its four chapters.
Chapter 1 looks at the process of “incumbent ejection” that characterized the revolutionary sequence of 2011 and culminated in the retirement of President Hosni Mubarak. Stacher argues for careful study of the transition process that follows an incumbent ejection, as it “determines whether a democracy or an autocracy is constructed” (26). To make sense of these events, he focuses on the linkages and history of interactions between incumbents and the opposition. More importantly, he looks at the structure of relationships within the opposition field. The author then (re)tells the history of opposition politics in the 2000s, making the useful distinction between systemic and anti-systemic oppositions and how their various forms of engagement with the state contributed to the emergence of upheaval and as well structured its aftermath. Divisions between opposition movements allowed for the “state to limp forward” and structured the “transition in a way that favoured the new leader” (53). In Chapter 2, Stacher looks at some of the institutional tools that the new leaders of the Egyptian state—the military establishment—used to disempower the people and neutralize the revolutionary atmosphere of January 2011. This was largely achieved by “electionizing,” which led to breakdown of the ranks of revolutionary forces and allowed the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) to divide and rule, while at the same time demobilizing the population. Detailing the several electoral participations of Egyptians between 2011 and 2014, Stacher shows the pernicious role of elections in a time of transition and regime-making.
As SCAF laid the foundations of the regime-to-come using elections, it also engaged in extreme violence in the following months and years to affirm its grip on power and construct a new regime: this is the subject of Chapter 3. The author revisits the history of state violence under Mubarak and its role in the revolutionary sequence of 2011. He then makes the distinction between preservationist and constitutive state violence, pointing to a shift in the state's practices that took place around the 2013 coup. As the author states, “elites in the postcoup state use [sic] organized violence to help create a new regime while simultaneously transforming Egyptian political society” (109). The last chapter frames all of these processes in the context of neoliberal economic politics, from Mubarak to the present day. Synthesizing the works of several political economists, Stacher shows the role of the state's fiscal crisis and the incremental decline of the standard of living in the emergence of the Egyptian revolution. Beyond this well-documented history, the author focuses on the economic politics of the SCAF transition as well as the renewed role of the military in the political economy of Egypt.
Watermelon Democracy is an informative book about the transition that followed the Egyptian uprising, cleverly bringing together a variety of literatures and making critical contributions to political science studies of the Egyptian transition. One contribution is the case for looking at the processes of transitions and how certain “structural conditions and challenges,” either “inherited (economy, opposition relations) or manufactured (elections, state violence),” can have decisive effects on the transition's outcome (9).
Nevertheless, several limitations should be noted. First, it is unusual to find a scholarly book that does not contain a methods and data or sources section. Indeed, at no point is there a presentation of the data on which the book is based, nor of how it was collected. Since the reader is not given any tools to gauge the production of these sources, the mobilized evidence can feel tautological. For instance, the author argues that SCAF “worked overtime with parts of the state apparatus to undermine the process of having consequences that would limit its ability to act politically” (84), and ends by saying, “when the military leadership realized that there was no bringing a core of revolutionaries into the voting booth, they decided to take counterrevolution into the streets” (85). This paragraph does not contain a single footnote. We have to take the author's word for it.
The same paragraph illustrates another issue that runs through the book, sometimes in contradiction with the author's own stated view of transition processes, notably their messiness and uncertainty. Indeed, in this instance, as in most of the book, SCAF appears as an omniscient and anthropomorphized actor. Although the author cautions against the use of the term “regime” as it “gives away too much because there is no coherence and [al-Sisi and his apparatchiks] remain ad hoc in their strategies,” SCAF orchestrates coups, uses elections to redistribute power, and even feels things, among many other attributes. Moreover, contrary to citizens who made “mistakes and concessions” (162), security forces were “meticulous in their preparation of protests” (104). As a result, the book reads as an account of the highly organized and successful attempt of SCAF to sabotage a transition to democracy. With the occasional use of hindsight to establish this account, the narrative skips over the highly uncertain several months in which both incumbents and protesters interacted. This treatment occludes that, at certain points in this process, other outcomes would have been as likely. This is a point the author does make but never addresses in his analysis.
The attention to the meticulousness of incumbent strategizing and action is not devoid of interest in and of itself, as studies often focus on protesters and neglect the state. The problem is that the other party to the transition, the Egyptian people, are not given a similar attention. Although the author generously states that he has “tried to take Egyptians seriously” (xviii), they remain conspicuously absent, apart from scattered citations. Their voices are for the most part erased in the analysis and only reappear in the conclusion to illustrate the book's broader results. One illustrative example of this is the opening anecdote, which gives the book its title (and cover artwork), Watermelon Democracy. I must admit that when I saw the book's title, I was confused. I am Egyptian; I lived through and took part in the revolution, yet I did not understand the reference. In the preface, the author writes that a teenager told him that “we live in a watermelon democracy.” The author then presents an exegesis of the joke, explaining its social and cultural foundations. Although there is no shortage of vegetable and fruit-based (even watermelon-based) idioms in Egypt, this feels far-fetched. That one of the rare instances of the people's voices in this book is to relay this anecdote also is problematic. It corners popular voices in an expression of ironic idiomatic lay analysis, giving their political intervention a strong culturalist tone. As Egyptians would say, this metaphor is ay batīkh (baloney)!
