A new translation of Hegel's Science of Logic is an event worth celebrating. Since any translation is an interpretation, it is always useful to have a variety of readings to provide a ‘stereoscopic vision’ of what the original text involves. So George di Giovanni's accomplishment can be added to those of Arnold Miller from 1969 and Johnston and Struthers from 1929 to deepen our understanding of Hegel's central text. For no two languages are identical in vocabulary or syntactical conventions. Some terms will be unique to one; and the associations of ordinary language can be diverse from culture to culture. In addition an inflected language, like German, has ways of avoiding ambiguity not available to the more atomistic English. As a result, different translators notice and emphasize different features present in the original text.
An example of the value of such a stereoscopic reading can be found in a sentence early in the Logic,Footnote 1 where Hegel is contrasting pure being (Sein) with the next category. The German reads: Aber das Dasein ist ein bestimmtes Sein, ein konkretes. Dasein poses problems for the translator. As Suchting notes: ‘Nontechnically it means as a noun, “existence” (with a certain bias to what is living) and, as a verb, “to be there” (as its etymology indicates), “to be present”, “attend”, “exist”’ (Hegel Reference Hegel1991: p. xxxvi, see also the discussion of Geraets and Harris at pp. xx–xxi). But Hegel has, much later, a discussion of Existenz. So the two previous translations chose to use ‘determinate being’ for this term.Footnote 2 The problem in this particular sentence is that, to stress the contrast with pure being's indeterminacy, Hegel's words are ‘But Dasein is a determinate being, a concrete.’ Johnston and Struthers solve the problem with ‘But Determinate Being is, as such, concrete’ (Hegel Reference Hegel1929: 1, 123). Miller is even more abrupt: ‘Determinate being, however, is concrete’ (Hegel Reference Hegel1969: 110). Both blur the contrast between determinate and indeterminate that Hegel is stressing. Di Giovanni solves the problem by deciding to adopt the non-technical sense of the German word, and use ‘existence’ for Dasein and ‘concrete existence’ for Existenz. But he does not escape difficulties; for our sentence now becomes: ‘But existence is determinate being, something concrete’ (84). The reader who takes di Giovanni's note seriously might think that the later category is being subtly introduced at this point in the discussion.
This example, however, does reveal the strengths of di Giovanni's translation. He struggles to remain close to the German text and capture its idiomatic sense, while respecting Hegel's technical usage. Where there are difficulties in meshing vocabularies, he has a useful discussion in the introduction, and adds footnotes at relevant places in the text. Unlike his predecessors, he consistently retains the indications of stress in the original. (In Gothic type, German spaces out the letters of a word to underline its importance, whereas Roman typography uses italics.) He correlates the pages to the critical edition of Hegel's works (Hegel Reference Hegel1968– ), and adapts its footnotes to indicate the sources Hegel is using. He is aware of the differences between the first and the second edition of the first book, on Being. And his extensive knowledge of the philosophical literature between Kant and Hegel enables him to catch echoes of the debates of the time.
A discussion of a longer passage, with the relevant translations, can provide a more adequate comparison of di Giovanni's technique with that of his predecessors. This comes from the introduction to volume 2, book 3, on The Concept (Hegel Reference Hegel1968– : 12, 15–16):
Im Begriffe [1] hat sich daher das Reich der Freiheit eröffnet. Er ist das freie, weil die an und für sich seiende [2] Identität, welche die Notwendigkeit der Substanz ausmacht, zugleich als aufgehobenen [3] oder als Gesetztsein ist, und dies Gesetztsein, als sich auf sich selbst beziehend [4], eben jene Identität ist. Die Dunkelheit der im Kausalverhältnisse [4] stehenden Substanzen füreinander ist verschwunden, denn die Ursprünglichkeit [5] ihres Selbstbestehens ist in Gesetztsein übergegangen und dadurch zur sich selbst durchsichtigen Klarheit geworden; die ursprüngliche Sache [7] ist dies, indem sie nur [8] die Ursache ihrer selbst ist, und dies ist die zum Begriffe befreite [9] Substanz.
The three translations:
In the concept [1], therefore, the kingdom of freedom is disclosed. The concept is free because the identity that exists in and for itself [2] and constitutes the necessity of substance exists at the same time as sublated [3] or as positedness, and this positedness, as self-referring [4], is that very identity. Vanished is the obscurity which the causally related [4] substances have for each other, for the originariness [5] of their self-subsistence that makes them causes [6] has passed over into positedness and has thereby become self-transparently clear; the ‘originary fact’ [7] [fn. die ursprüngliche Sache; Cf. Ursache ‘cause’] is ‘originary’ because it is [8] a ‘self-causing fact,’ [fn. Ursache ihrer selbst] and this is the substance that has been let go freely [9] into the concept. (Di Giovanni, 513)
With the Notion [1], therefore, we have entered the realm of freedom. Freedom belongs to the Notion because that identity which, as absolutely determined [2], constitutes the necessity of substance, is now also sublated [3] or is a positedness, and this positedness as self-related [4] is simply that identity. The mutual opacity of the substances standing in the causal relationship [4] has vanished and become a self-transparent clarity, for the originality [5] of their self-subsistence has passed into a positedness; the original substance [7] is original in that it is only [8] the cause of itself, and this is substance raised to [9] the freedom of the Notion. (Miller, in Hegel Reference Hegel1969: 582)
In the Notion [1], accordingly, the realm of Freedom has opened. The Notion is the free because it is the identity which is in and for itself [2] and which constitutes the necessity of Substance; simultaneously it exists as transcended [3] or as positedness, and this positedness. as self-relating [4], is precisely that identity. The darkness in which each of the substances which are in the Relation [4] of Causality stands to the other, has vanished, for the originality [5] of their individual persistence has passed over into positedness, and has thereby become self-transparent clarity. The original fact [7] is this in being only [8] its own cause, and this is Substance which, having achieved Freedom [9], has become Notion. (Johnston and Struthers, in Hegel Reference Hegel1929: 2, 216)
[1] Di Giovanni links this discussion back to the English Kantian tradition by adopting the more precise ‘concept’ for Begriff rather than the vaguer ‘notion’ of the earlier translators. Since the next sentence begins with a masculine pronoun, it can only refer to Begriff. All translators thus repeat the noun to avoid ambiguity.
[2] Miller ignores completely the technical significance of an und für sich and provides a paraphrase that is quite misleading. Di Giovanni and Johnston and Struthers adopt the literal ‘in and for itself’.
[3] Johnston and Struthers use ‘transcend’ for aufheben, a notoriously difficult term. While uncomfortable with the artificial use of ‘sublate’, which was coined from the Latin by J. Hutchinson Stirling (Stirling Reference Stirling1865),Footnote 3 di Giovanni recognizes that it has now developed enough currency in the language as a specifically Hegelian term that it has entered into most dictionaries.
[4] To maintain a sharp distinction between Verhältnis and Beziehung, both of which mean ‘relation’, di Giovanni has reserved ‘relation’ for the former, and ‘connection’, ‘reference’ and ‘connecting reference’ for the latter (Miller: ‘relationship’ and ‘relating’; Johnston and Struthers: ‘Relation’ and ‘relating’). He notes that this convention was initially adopted by the group that translated Hegel's early manuscript on logic and metaphysics (Hegel Reference Hegel1986). (Note that all three versions translate as ‘cause’ two different words used by Hegel: Kausalität and Ursache.)
[5] Ursprünglich means ‘original’ in the sense of ‘existing from the first, primitive, innate, initial, earliest’. But the English term also means ‘first hand, not imitative’ and that is now the dominant sense of the noun ‘originality’. Because of this ambiguity, di Giovanni is uncomfortable with the use of the noun by the earlier translators; so he has coined from an archaic adjective ‘originary’ the noun ‘originariness’ both of which are awkward, (rather like Geraets and Harris's ‘there-being’ for Dasein).
[6] To bring out the relation between Ursprünglich and Ursache, di Giovanni adds a gloss -- ‘that makes them causes’ -- to ‘originariness’, while acknowledging what he has done in a footnote. He makes the link explicit again in the later footnotes.
[7] Sache is another translator's nightmare because it can be translated in a number of ways. Di Giovanni, like Johnston and Struthers, has opted for ‘fact’ (which he italicizes, even though the original is not stressed). Miller misleads by using ‘substance’ both for Sache here and Substanz in the next sentence. All three use ‘fact’ at the end of the discussion of Ground at Hegel Reference Hegel1968– : 11, 319.
[8] Uncharacteristically, di Giovanni omits nur (‘only’) here.
[9] The participle befreite becomes the verbal phrase ‘let go freely’ in di Giovanni, ‘raised to the freedom of’ in Miller, and ‘having achieved Freedom’ in Johnston and Struthers. Quite different glosses on the original, which defies literal translation.
I did find one rather significant mistranslation. In his discussion of Opposition (Hegel Reference Hegel1968– : 11, 272–5) Hegel moves from the contrasts of Identity and Difference, and of likeness and unlikeness (Diversity), to that of positive and negative. Each of these latter opposites contains an explicit reference to the other. ‘Each therefore is, only to the extent that its non-being is, and indeed in an identical [my stress] connection (Beziehung).’ At this point Hegel starts shifting between the expression ‘the positive and negative’ which governs a singular verb (usually ‘is’) and ‘the positive and the negative’ which governs a plural verb (‘are’). The language becomes complicated because he at times refers to what happens to each of the two component terms within the unified term, so that both expressions happen in a single sentence: ‘The determinations which constitute the positive and negative consist, therefore, in that the positive and the negative are, first, absolute moments of opposition…’Footnote 4 Nonetheless a rather significant account detailing the role of this new unified term on the way to contradiction can be developed (see Burbidge Reference Burbidge1981: 77–80 and fn. 5, 250–1). While di Giovanni does have ‘the concept of the positive and negative as it occurs [sic] in arithmetic’ at the beginning of the Remark on p. 371, in the main body of Hegel's argument he, following his predecessors, assumes that Hegel is being careless, and not only consistently translates the singular verb as a plural, but also inserts a second article into ‘the positive and negative’ to make it correspond to the alternative expression. But if, as it seems to me, Hegel is making a significant contrast between a single integrated concept, ‘positive-and-negative’ (introduced by the ‘identical connection’), and two distinct concepts, ‘the positive’ and ‘the negative’, then we lose the point of his discussion in all translations. One would prefer an English version that remains closer to the text, and allows the reader to take note of what Hegel wrote and decide how to interpret it. Here one misses di Giovanni's usual scrupulous care.
Enough of the translation. For di Giovanni has also provided a detailed and useful introduction which deserves comment. This is made up of a number of units. After giving details of the original publication of the larger Logic, he provides a superb review of the development of Hegel's logic during his years in Jena. I cannot think of a better discussion of this period; for it gives a perspective on the overall pattern, while respecting the differences in detail, and explaining why changes were introduced.
He then turns to the background in Kant and Fichte, an area that di Giovanni knows well, and within which he can discern many rich strands. For Hegel's Logic has its roots in Kant's deduction of the categories, where he distinguishes concepts from the syntheses of imagination. Whereas Kant simply relies on the fact that the tradition had twelve forms of judgement, and sets them forth as a given, Fichte and Hegel see the need to show the reasons for each category. Fichte adopts a version of the transcendental unity of apperception that is linked with the rationality of willed initiatives. Hegel, in contrast, develops ‘a discourse about discourse – the only discourse which, because of its subject matter, can attain perfect completion, and which, therefore, defines the norm of intelligibility against which all other types of discourse, all of them more or less open-ended in their own spheres, are to be measured’. This discourse moves from abstract to concrete, from immediacy to mediation, and ‘from the least one can say about an object in general while still making sense’ to ‘sets of predicates, namely the categories, each of which defines the limits of a type of discourse suited to a certain subject matter’ (xxxv).
Di Giovanni then traces the development of the Logic in five stages: ‘quality’; ‘quantity’ and ‘measure’; a detour through two additions to the second edition of book 1; ‘essence’; and ‘the concept’. He concludes by discussing McTaggart's metaphysical reading of the Logic, and what he calls the modern ‘hermeneutical’ reading, selecting two alternatives from the many that are now current in the literature.
Di Giovanni has chosen the phrase ‘discourse about discourse’ to describe the task of the Logic, in part because of its associations with ‘dialectic’, but also to avoid Hegel's references to the logic as an analysis of pure thought: ‘[Pure science] contains thought in so far as this thought is equally the fact as it is in itself; or the fact in itself in so far as this is equally pure thought’ (29).Footnote 5 Using this language, he fears, would lead him into the fallacy of psychologism, originally defined by Frege. But if representations or ideas (the translation used for Frege's Vorstellung) are prey to subjective relativism and arbitrary contingencies, the same can be said about human discourse. For all that ‘the forms of thought are first set out and stored in human language’ (12), they are not simply adopted wholesale by the reflective thinker. For, ‘it is the privilege of philosophy to choose such expressions from the language of ordinary life, which is made for the world of imaginary representations (Vorstellungen),Footnote 6 as seem to approximate the determination of the concept’ (628). In other words, it is neither thought as such, nor discourse as such, that explains why the logic advances from category to category. Rather, the definition of each concept reveals implications that lead to a reworking of that original meaning. It is this content – ‘the fact (Sache) as it is in itself’ – inherent in the concepts themselves that provides sufficient reasons for the logical development, and thus, as in Kant's argument in the Second Analogy, establishes its objectivity. Unfortunately, however, we become aware of these implications only when thought finds that it has to move from the original concept to something else and then enshrines such transitions in public discourse.Footnote 7 It requires both reflection and a disciplined understanding of conceptual terms to distinguish these disciplined mental operations from the more casual associations of representations and ideas.
Appealing to thought or to discourse as such, therefore, leaves the dynamic of logical reasoning opaque and obscure. Both thought and discourse, however, can reflect on their own procedures and, by recognizing where they are subjective and partial, achieve some measure of objectivity. Adopting this procedure, the Science of Logic is able to reveal the structure of pure thought, and ‘defin[e] the norms of intelligibility’. It is di Giovanni's achievement that he has made this work available, even more effectively than in the past, to the English-speaking world.
