Malaria is responsible for one million deaths and 300 million acute illnesses per year worldwide. After the disillusionment following the failure of the WHO's Malaria Eradication Program (MEP, 1955–69), malaria more or less vanished from the political agenda until 1998, when the Roll Back Malaria (RBM) Partnership was announced. Since then, unprecedented financial and technical resources have been mobilized by organizations in the UN system and by numerous other private and public donors to fight the disease with a new sense of urgency.
Can the discipline of history hope to make a difference in such a situation? Two of the books under review clearly confirm that the lessons history teaches can – and should – matter in the fight against malaria. The timing is auspicious. In recent years, the history of public health has left its narrow niche. Mainstream history has become more receptive of the idea that diseases can affect the social and economic foundations of societies and of how disease incidence reflects a society's material conditions and social arrangements. At the same time, public health has become more open to history as source of evidence for policymaking. But the history used is often not based on up-to-date interpretation. One hopes that the insights of these books and other work in the same spirit will finally have some impact on the design and implementation of malaria control programmes.
One reason the MEP proved futile was the belief that it was possible to eradicate malaria everywhere using the same techniques. The books under review thus focus on case studies from specific national contexts to illustrate why such universalism is overconfident and unwarranted. How the ambitious MEP unfolded and ultimately failed in Mexico is the theme of Marcos Cueto's book. Cueto places his account in a political context that was dominated by the polarities of the Cold War. In the years between the world wars the Malaria Commission of the League of Nations carried out extensive inquiries in the principal centres of the disease. The resulting reports strongly called for general social and economic uplift and were critical of strategies that relied solely on control of the mosquito vectors. This stance was no longer acceptable after the Second World War, however. DDT promised efficient vector control, and social and economic reform as part of a public health programme was anathema to a United States caught in ideological struggle with the Soviet Union. Support of malaria eradication by technological means came to be seen as a way for the US ‘to win the hearts and minds’ of people in the developing world. Cueto adeptly describes the global and national political contexts and the local situation on the ground, where sprayers and volunteers often devoted themselves passionately to the eradication programme. He also recounts how anthropologists, local doctors and indigenous people early on spotted signs of trouble. The top-down approach ignored cultural and linguistic barriers, toxic effects of DDT became apparent, and insects began to show signs of resistance. As the enthusiasm for the MEP waned in the face of these problems, population control rose up the agenda. This promised to be a more efficient way to achieve poverty reduction.
Europe today is largely malaria-free and only imported cases occur. Malaria has become a paradigmatic ‘tropical disease’; and this leads one to forget how seriously many regions of Europe suffered under the disease well into the twentieth century. Italy holds a special place in the history of malaria. In this country the disease came together with poverty, economic backwardness and low productivity. This situation, however, also led to groundbreaking insights and efforts by scientists and public health officials. The zoologist Giovanni Grassi demonstrated in 1898 that anopheline mosquitoes transmitted the disease, and throughout the twentieth century Italy employed a host of different strategies of malaria control, from quinine prophylaxis to the early use of DDT. In his highly readable book, Frank Snowden paints a panoramic view of the impact of malaria in twentieth-century Italy and provides a significant addition to studies documenting the interplay between the epidemiology of the disease and social, economic and political change. He shows that the quinine campaign in the early twentieth century worked because a network of health stations was built up, because poor people could afford to buy the subsidized drug and because peasant schools educated the rural population about malaria. As large-scale changes such as mass emigration to the US made labour a scarce resource in the large farms, the latifundia of the malarious Italian south and workers could finally negotiate better working and living conditions. Successes such as these were repeatedly undermined, however, by wars that disrupted the social and ecological fabric of the country.
Sandra Sufian is less concerned with malaria as a public health challenge that interacts with and participates in shaping a cultural, social and economic context than with the way Zionist images of Palestine and its Jewish and Arab inhabitants impacted anti-malaria policies and their implementation during the Mandate period (1920–48). Her work is thus in the tradition of approaches examining the role that science and medicine play in colonial and settler societies. In her exceptionally well-documented study Sufian shows how the Zionist movement used malaria eradication efforts to build a national mythology of the Jewish homeland. The unforgiving hard work needed to turn the inhospitable swamps of Palestine into fertile land was seen by Zionists as one way to turn the immigrated Jews, supposedly weakened by centuries of exile, into a healthy and strong people. Sufian describes how the control efforts affected the Arab communities. She claims that the Arab population was seen by the Jewish settlers mostly as an obstacle to progress and had to suffer from the condescending attitudes of Jewish physicians and public health workers. Unlike Cueto and Snowden, Sufian also considers the ecological consequences of the malaria control efforts. Today only three per cent of Israel's original wetlands remain, and efforts are under way to reconstruct some of the original ecosystems. However, these efforts are again caught in the turmoil of the Israel–Palestinian conflict and struggles about land claims.
The challenge of malaria is now tackled on the highest political and academic levels. Yet there is room for a more integrative approach. Contemporary policy discourse – as represented, for example, by the Noble Prize-winning economist Paul Krugman – is still dominated by the idea that ‘malaria blocks development’. These case studies suggest that Krugman may be wrong and that it has often been the other way round: development, with its large-scale transformations of the environment and population movements, has enabled or facilitated the spread of the disease. Snowden's and Cueto's studies in particular should be compulsory reading for public health officials. These two books illustrate persuasively that technology as a public health ideology, as for example embodied in the MEP and more recently in the aims of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, is likely to be short-sighted. Cueto ends his account with recommendations to improve malaria control in developing countries. He calls for holistic, persistent and flexible approaches to develop a popular culture of malaria prevention and vector control. Malaria is a socially and economically sustained disease, and this cannot be ignored in the fight against this scourge.
