Richard Sylla (“Financial Systems and Economic Modernization,” this Journal 62, no. 2 (2002): 277–92) argued that countries become economic leaders only after they have had a financial revolution, and that Hamilton ushered in the U.S. financial revolution during his tenure as Treasury Secretary. Chatterjee’s book asks what generally are the sufficient conditions under which a country’s politicians will facilitate such a revolution. The emphasis of this book is on the model. Chatterjee uses history to illustrate the model’s predictive power. The relevant events were the creation of a modern financial system in the immediate post-colonial United States—a topic well studied by Sylla among others, and the failure to create such a system in India once it came under the control of the East India Company following the Battle of Plassey in 1757—a topic on which there is almost no economic analysis. The two periods were roughly contemporary, and the cultures of the political elites were similar. Thus, a comparative analysis has the potential to yield insights into the formation of financial institutions.
Chatterjee follows multiple scholars in ascribing the key to a modern financial system to institutions such that the owners of financial capital trust the state to both honor its own debts, and to act as an impartial “arbiter and contract enforcer” in the private debt market. The state creates these institutions, which limit its actions, only if it faces pressing financial needs. The novel part of Chatterjee’s analysis is to add to the model the recognition that when a state has alternative sources of financing its debt, it need not make any accommodation to local owners of capital. Chatterjee argues that after the War of Independence, the U.S. government was cut off from English financing, and Hamilton created the institutions of modern finance to assure the merchants of the young country that loans to the new government would be repaid. Not only did the nation have the benefit of these institutions, the merchants through their connection with the finance of the nation formed stronger political connections, fostering political as well as economic development. The Indian government, in contrast, had other financing options: a well-functioning land tax and access to English capital markets. Thus, the financial system of India remained undeveloped, and the native merchants remained separated from the state.
The bulk of this slim book is focused on developing the model and discussing U.S. events. But as readers of this journal are probably familiar with the creation of the U.S. financial system, I will focus my comments on the Indian story.
After the death of the Mogul emperor Aurangzeb in 1707, India’s systems of governance began to disintegrate as multiple players vied for control, including the East India Company (EIC). Borrowing was crucial to funding the many battles of the period. This funding was provided locally, but not by floating public debts. India did not have formal banks, but it had numerous very wealthy private bankers. These bankers remained an important source of funding for the EIC even after the Battle of Plessey. Just as one example, Manohardas Dwarkadas loaned more money to EIC in a single year, 1781, than Thomas Jefferson borrowed to make the Louisiana Purchase (Tripathi, Dwijendra. The Oxford History of Indian Business. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 39.) Abruptly after 1800, as the British in India became more organized, bankers ceased to play this role. Private bankers remained supremely important in Indian finance right up to independence. But they no longer were a part of government finance.
Chatterjee makes much of the fact that in 1772, Sir James Steuart, an advisor to the EIC, proposed the creation of a bank using language not dissimilar to the language with which Hamilton would propose creating the Bank of the United States in 1790. Steuart envisioned the bank being subscribed and operated by native Indian bankers. According to Chatterjee, if the EIC had taken Steuart’s advice, India would have been on a path to financial modernization similar to the one the United States followed. Chatterjee believed the Englishmen operating the EIC would not have wanted native merchants influencing monetary affairs. As they had the option of funding through the land revenue and borrowing on the English capital markets, they did not have to. And that is why native owners of financial capital were excluded from government operations.
I am not as sure. Chatterjee includes several quotes from Steuart. Consider two. “[The bankers] will be employed in a trade something like what they now carry on; but it will be so fenced in proper regulations, that it will have every advantage and none of the inconveniencies of the present practice.” And in a later quote, “Besides, the very notion of standing upon a solid and independent footing, will be extremely flattering to many of the natives.” Neither of these points seems likely to have appealed to native bankers. Much later, in 1931, an extensive study of financial conditions in British India concluded that though it would be advantageous to tie native private bankers into the formal, regulated banking sector, the bankers themselves were unwilling as they did not want to have to submit to regulations. And would businessmen with the acumen and resources of Indian private bankers be flattered simply to be part of a business enterprise because it was conducted with British “appropriateness?”
Chatterjee’s more general point, however, is valid. The early strong ties between the EIC and native merchants quickly dissipated. The English political elite seemed to operate in a different space than the still very wealthy natives. If the English in India had relied on income collected from powerful merchants rather than from a powerless ryot, would that have led to a different polity? Chatterjee’s book does not definitively show that it would, but at least he raised the question and framed it in a precise manner.
