Jews have been divided over religion and politics for millennia, and the advent of Zionism only added to the ferment; however, this book postulates that during the decade 1967–1977 there was a widespread communal consensus in support of the State of Israel and its government's policies. Unquestioning support of Israel and an unwillingness to publicly criticize its government was the rule. During this “golden age,” the pro-Israel lobby, led by AIPAC, consolidated and the Jewish establishment asserted its role and leadership among American Jews and in national politics. Since then, fissures have opened up, and bitterness and name-calling have flourished, mainly due to growing opposition to the continuing occupation and sympathy for the Palestinian cause. The truth is more complicated than presented here. External forces were more consequential, and so the real story is less a domestic Jewish communal affair than the author would like to admit.
This fashionable thesis is short on historical facts as is Trouble in the Tribe. One lacuna is that Diasporism has always been strong in the United States, and the debate over whether Soviet Jewish emigrants in Vienna should be directed towards Israel or be free to choose their destination (using UIA–UJA funds) was present in the 1970s. Reform Judaism, with its universalistic and ethical roots, was always likely to be critical of Jewish nationalism, especially as it had its own grievances against the Jewish state. Hence, the question of “who is a Jew?” and recognition of non-Orthodox rabbis and converts in Israel was already divisive and controversial in the 1970s. What did unite the various Jewish groups—Zionists, human rights activists, all the synagogue movements, liberals, and Cold War warriors (except for the fast-disappearing Communists)—was the Soviet Jewry movement or rather an antipathy to the domestic and foreign policies of the USSR. And on this issue they had no domestic American enemies, but only allies, including Catholics, the labor movement, and Republicans. After 1989, bipartisanship eroded across the political spectrum, polarization grew, and this occurred among Jews, too.
The American Jewish establishment's political clout was undermined by Israeli governments (e.g., Rabin) asserting they did not require intermediaries in Washington or Congress—and so not by J Street. Benjamin Netanyahu went further in viewing evangelical Christians as more reliable, more powerful, and less demanding allies in Congress than American Jews.
Waxman suggests the occupation was and is the defining event dividing American Jews. Hence, the book is overly focused on the critics of Israel's settlement and security policies. His thesis relies on a binary between an unrepresentative elderly Jewish establishment subservient to Israeli governments and a growing liberal-left opposition of young activists. His evidence relies on rounding up and liberally quoting the usual suspects: columnists from the New York Times, the Forward, Haaretz, and J Street.
One serious critique is the amount of space and attention given to Judith Butler, Jewish Voice for Peace, and the Far Left. They can hardly be counted as members of “the tribe” except as it allows them to operate as Jewish human shields for public relations purposes against claims of antisemitism among their radical allies. Their Jewishness contributes to “koshering” the virulent anti-Zionist hate of what the French call Islamo-gauchisme. Including these “renegades” in the study might be considered legitimate if, for example, the following groups and people did not fail to appear in the book's pages or index: Golda Meir, Senator Joseph Lieberman, Elie Wiesel, Chabad, and Satmar—all better known to the Jewish public and more influential than Butler or Jewish Voice for Peace. Those overlooked by Waxman are by any standards worthier of inclusion in “the tribe,” however troubled it might be. They also deserve a place in any objective and comprehensive political or sociological analysis that seeks to understand the nuances of “the American Jewish conflict over Israel” (3).
The author is also ignorant of some important recent demographic trends in American Jewry that affect the balance of political forces. Among young Jews, such as the Millennials, Orthodox Jews are overrepresented, as are Russian Jews and Israelis. This suggests his Jewish generational divide between young leftists and older rightists is incorrect. Of course, there are plenty of young Jewish students at elite colleges who have adopted the ambivalent but largely unsympathetic position on Israel of Bernie Sanders (his emergence was too recent to appear), but many of these young people are the offspring of intermarriages and so have alternative ethnic loyalties that quite logically do not align with the commitments that are found among the Orthodox, Russians, and Israelis who have close family on the front line in Israel.
Unfortunately, Waxman does not admit that most young progressive critics of Israel are often ignorant of even recent Jewish history—aside from the Holocaust. They are unaware of the Soviet provenance of the term “Zionism is racism.” On the other hand, the Jewish establishment is probably more politically and historically aware of the provenance of terms and that the state-sponsored 1968 “anti-Zionst” campaign in Poland was a case of blatant antisemitism and that economic boycotts (e.g., the BDS movement) have long been part of the antisemites' toolbox.
Obviously this book is not aimed at an expert or informed audience but rather for introductory Middle East studies courses. Each chapter has clear goals, and each has a summary of conclusions. The arguments in the book itself tend to be repetitious and trite but not vitriolic. Hence it may not be damning enough of Zionism and Israel to be adopted on many campuses.
