Immortalized by Hollywood movies, over eighty years of policy debate, and a surprisingly large number of garage bands, the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930 is more often than not thought of as an unsurpassed policy blunder enacted in a blind attempt to “just do something” in the wake of the Great Depression, subverted by craven private interests, and distinguished by dire unintended consequences. But as Douglas Irwin asks in this slim and snappy volume: “Where does the truth lie and what should we remember about it?” (p. 7).
Divided into four chapters, Irwin's work has boiled down the lessons of Smoot-Hawley along three dimensions: its context, its conception, and its consequences. As to its context, Irwin positions the Smoot-Hawley Tariff with respect to key historical features of the American commercial policy debate, in particular the deep-seated antagonism between free traders and protectionists. In one corner, he identifies pro-tariff interests which competed against the “highly diversified set of goods” imported into the United States and which were “generally very broad,” and in the other he identifies pro-trade interests which exported their products to the rest of the world and which were “relatively narrow” (p. 15). Add to this the long-standing practice of log-rolling and the natural outcome of the U.S. legislative process was likely to be highly protectionist in its orientation, a feature which was only enhanced by downturns in the business cycle.
As to its conception, Irwin highlights two elements of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff which set it off as somewhat of an outlier with respect to U.S. commercial policy history. First, he notes that generalized revisions of the tariff code generally proceeded at a pace of about one per decade and were generally subsequent to changes in political power between pro-protection Republicans and pro-trade Democrats. However, 1928, the year in which a tariff revision featured prominently as a campaign issue, had witnessed uninterrupted Republican control for a number of years. Second, he notes that 1928 was also a year in which the business cycle had not reached a downward inflection point, much less a trough. For Irwin, reconciling these facts with the historical record is a straightforward task: faced with the post-World War I woes of agriculture and its prominence in the U.S. economy, there was a perceived need to alleviate its plight and establish “equality for agriculture” (p. 18) with one of the few policy levers available, higher tariffs. That this was a relatively futile gesture, given the outward orientation of the sector, is a point that was not lost on observers both in the past and present.
As to its consequences, Irwin delineates between its effects on the domestic macroeconomy and on the international stage. On the domestic front, Irwin completely exonerates Smoot-Hawley in any role as a cause of the Great Depression. His case is so clearly laid out with respect to the timing of events and the inherent illogic of the arguments to the contrary that one hopes this will dispel this particularly misleading trope in future discussions on the topic. He additionally demonstrates that most of the heavy lifting with respect to the heightened protectionism of the United States in the early 1930s was done by declining output prices in combination with the use of specific tariffs and not necessarily the rise in tariff rates occasioned by Smoot-Hawley. On the international front, Irwin offers a slightly more nuanced view of Smoot-Hawley's reception than is generally put on offer. In particular, he argues that given the structure of U.S. trade, both with respect to its composition and its geographic orientation, Smoot-Hawley invariably had differential effects on and, thus, generated differential responses in the rest of the world. Some of these responses were unambiguously retaliatory in nature while some simply paid lip service to Smoot-Hawley. Consequently, the subsequent disintegration of world trade occasioned by protectionist policies cannot be fully laid at Smoot-Hawley's feet. Nonetheless, he argues that Smoot-Hawley most “certainly contributed to the climate in which such policies flourished” (p. 183).
Throughout, Irwin also offers up an account of Smoot-Hawley which, although not shocking to specialists, does run strongly counter to the views of the general public on the issue.
First is the fact that Smoot-Hawley was a comparatively long-lived affair. Discussed in 1928, initiated in 1929, and enacted in 1930, Smoot-Hawley was in no shape or form a direct policy response to the Great Depression. It was the particular confluence of party politics and global economic forces which called it forth. That vested industrial interests were not directly responsible for its inception does not, however, obviate the fact that the legislative process became captured by the same or that relatively inefficient small- and medium-scale manufacturers were Smoot-Hawley's chief beneficiaries. Second, given the relative inward orientation of the U.S. economy as a whole, Smoot-Hawley had vanishingly small effects on the domestic macroeconomy. Irwin runs through various scenarios and cannot pin more than a tiny fraction of the cumulative output decline from 1929 to 1933 on Smoot-Hawley. In effect, his assessment challenges two notions of varying controversy which free traders over the years have found particularly useful, namely that Smoot-Hawley was a disaster for the domestic economy and that, therefore, protectionism is never a viable option.
Finally, this is, by the standards of almost any other work on the history of commercial policy, a fun book. Irwin marshals up an admirable range of evidence, both qualitative and quantitative, which allows him to make his case and entertain his reader. Of course, it helps when you have the aid of statesmen deadpanning lines on the national policy relevance and urgency of “‘the inadequately protected American potato’” (p. 94). At the same time, this assessment is in no way meant to diminish the achievement of what Irwin has accomplished here: with very little doubt, this book is and will be, for some time to come, the definitive account of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff.
