Corruption and Illegality in Asian Investment Arbitration makes a timely and significant contribution to the expanding literature on corruption in investor–State dispute settlement (ISDS) by shifting the focus from the predominantly Western perspective to Asian legal and institutional experiences. Edited by Nobumichi Teramura, Luke Nottage, and Bruno Jetin, the volume draws on expertise in international investment law, comparative corruption law, and political economy to offer an interdisciplinary examination of a subject that has received limited scholarly attention. It will be of particular interest to academics, practitioners, policymakers, and students engaged with investment arbitration and anti-corruption governance in Asia.

The volume addresses a notable gap in existing literature. While leading publications and institutional reports have established the framework governing corruption in ISDS, they have devoted little attention to Asian jurisdictions. Against the backdrop of Asia’s growing prominence as a destination for foreign investment, the prevalence of corruption across many Asian jurisdictions, and the emergence of mega-regional agreements such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership or the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, the editors argue that Asian states should aspire to become “rule makers” rather than merely “rule takers” in the evolution of international investment law and anti-corruption governance.

The book is organized into three parts. Part I examines the broader relationship between corruption, foreign direct investment, and economic development in Asia. Part II explores the principal legal issues arising from corruption in ISDS, including anti-corruption regulation, arbitral approaches to corruption allegations, standards of proof, evidentiary challenges, attribution of responsibility, and the consequences of investor misconduct for jurisdiction, liability, and damages. Particularly valuable is the discussion of the competing arbitral approaches—the “zero-tolerance”, “closer look”, and “it depends” models. Rather than endorsing automatic dismissal of all claims, the contributors advocate a more nuanced approach that requires tribunals to assess the nature, gravity, and legal consequences of misconducts. The “it depends” approach permits tribunals to consider factors such as whether corrupt officials remain in office, whether bribery reflected entrenched commercial practice, and the extent to which the misconduct affected the investment. Part III presents detailed jurisdiction-specific studies spanning East, Southeast, and South Asia before drawing together the comparative findings to identify emerging regional trends and evaluate how Asian experiences may inform future treaty drafting and ISDS reform.

One of the volume’s principal strengths lies in its interdisciplinary and comparative methodology, particularly through combining legal analysis with economic perspectives and detailed country studies. The book also moves beyond the conventional treatment of corruption as merely a jurisdictional bar by examining the potential abuse of corruption allegations as a litigation strategy and analyzing how corruption may affect not only jurisdiction but also the merits of claims, liability, and the assessment of damages.

With its nuanced rejection of one-size-fits-all solutions and an emphasis on contextual, evidence-based adjudication, this book fills an important gap in the scholarship by providing the first comprehensive examination of Asian approaches to corruption in ISDS.