Although long neglected by philosophers, at least as an explicit theme, the phenomenon of bullshit has been made the object of fruitful scrutiny by Harry Frankfurt, who notes in justification for this project that bullshit has become disturbingly ubiquitous in our society. In fact, Frankfurt’s essay dates back to the late 1980s; however, its recent republication in the form of a small book gained Frankfurt considerable fame: to wit, such unusual distinctions among professional philosophers as a space on The New York Times best-seller list and an interview on 60 Minutes. Frankfurt’s analysis, however, seems to me wanting in several respects.
Accordingly, what I propose to do here is first to explore how Habermas’s theory of communicative action can help clarify what is really going on with and in bullshit, then second, and more importantly, to discuss why Habermas and Habermasians ought to be deeply troubled by this phenomenon. It isn’t just that the prevalence of bullshit is normatively criticizable from the point of view of the theory of communicative action. This is indeed true, as I hope to show. But the deeper worry concerns the consequences for Habermas’s position of the change in attitudes toward communication which the prevalence of bullshit threatens. These consequences are twofold. First, the prevalence of bullshit threatens to undermine the capacity of apparently competent speakers to make distinctions regarding the nature of language use which are integral to Habermas’s account of a communicatively integrated society: in particular, it troubles the distinction between strategic and communicative uses of language on which the promise of discourse relies, and it presents at least the possibility of a separation between linguistic comprehension and the process of reason-giving. Second, through this, it challenges the status of Habermas’s theory as an immanent critique of society—a “critical theory of society,” in the sense of the Frankfurt School—which status relies on its claim to be a reconstruction of the intuitive knowledge of competent speakers.
I propose to organize my comments on bullshit as follows: (i) to briefly rehearse Frankfurt’s original analysis, with an eye toward observing some unresolved difficulties with his approach; (ii) to summarize the basic outlines of Habermas’s idea of the validity basis of speech, with an eye toward developing a more adequate formulation of the nature of bullshit as a violation of the validity claim of sincerity; (iii) to consider whether and to what extent bullshit may be helpfully analyzed as a form of the “strategic use of language”; (iv) to consider whether and to what extent bullshit qualifies as an example of what Habermas has termed “systematically distorted communication”; and, finally, (v) to defend my hypothesis regarding the potential consequences of the prevalence of bullshit for Habermas’s critical project and for his position on the nature of social integration and political legitimation in contemporary society.
1. Frankfurt on Bullshit
The key to the “essence” of bullshit, on Frankfurt’s view, is its specific difference from lying: when we lie, we must regard ourselves as having knowledge of the truth which we use as a negative point of reference in constructing our lie, which is intended to conceal the truth. Bullshit, by contrast, is identified by Frankfurt as being “unconnected to a concern with the truth”; a bullshit-claim “is grounded neither in a belief that it is true nor, as a lie must be, in a belief that it is not true. It is just this lack of connection to a concern with truth—this indifference to how things really are—that I regard as the essence of bullshit” (1998, 124-5). It is not necessary, then, that bullshit actually be false; a fortiori, it is also not necessary for the bullshitter to deceive us, neither with respect to the facts reported nor with respect to his beliefs. But, according to Frankfurt,
[w]hat he does necessarily attempt to deceive us about is his enterprise. … This is the crux of the distinction between him and the liar. Both he and the liar represent themselves falsely as endeavouring to communicate the truth. The success of each depends upon deceiving us about that. But the fact about himself that the liar hides is that he is attempting to lead us away from a correct apprehension of reality; we are not to know that he wants us to believe something he supposes to be false. The fact about himself that the bullshitter hides, on the other hand, is that the truth-value of his statements are of no central interest to him. (130)
In Frankfurt’s estimation, this makes the bullshitter “the greater enemy” of truth, since the liar continues to operate within a game defined by a concern for truth, even if he does so only negatively (132). Interestingly, however, he also notes that, as a society, we tend to the inverse judgment: we regard bullshit more tolerantly than lies, “perhaps because we are less inclined to take the former as a personal affront” (129). Despite offering this hypothesis, in his essay “On Bullshit,” Frankfurt claims to leave the issue of the justification for our relative judgments of the liar and the bullshitter as an open and interesting question. However, in his subsequent response to criticisms of his account made by G. A. Cohen, Frankfurt makes clear—for reasons we will see below—that he sees this popular toleration of bullshit as wrongheaded: thus, in his view, bullshit is not merely “the greater enemy” of truth in a descriptive, epistemic sense; he also regards it as more “dangerous” in specifically moral or political terms (2002, 343).
But, in any case, it is necessary to exercise some caution in interpreting the carelessness or indifference of the bullshitter: as is clear in the examples of advertising, public relations, and politics—arenas which, according to Frankfurt, are “replete with instances of bullshit so unmitigated that they can serve among the most indisputable and classic paradigms of the concept” (1998, 122)—bullshit, despite its disregard for truth, can be very meticulously crafted. Frank Luntz provides a good example: his work as a “communications specialist” spans all three arenas mentioned by Frankfurt above, and his clients include not just large corporations but also an array of Republican politicians including Rudy Guliani and Newt Gingrich. Luntz employs sophisticated market research and focus-grouping techniques in the creation of vocabularies intended to successfully merchandize issues, platforms, and policies. Among Luntz’s successful campaigns are included Gingrich’s “contract with America” and the successful re-branding of the “estate tax” as a “death tax,” in order to generate political support for its abolition.Footnote 1 Despite insisting that his aim is “clarification, not obfuscation,” Luntz nevertheless concedes that this success is predicated on the production of an emotional effect: “I am much more interested in how you feel than how you think,” Luntz explains. “How you think is on the outside; how you feel is on the inside.”Footnote 2
The example of Luntz’s “vocabularies,” though perhaps less standardly a case of bullshit than some others (more on that below), nevertheless helps to focus attention on something which remains rather mysterious in Frankfurt’s treatment: in discussing the expression “hot air” as a putative synonym for bullshit, Frankfurt notes,
[w]hen we characterize talk as hot air, we mean that what comes out of the speaker’s mouth is only that. It is mere vapour. His speech is empty, without substance or content. His use of language, accordingly, does not contribute to the purpose it purports to serve. No more information is communicated than if the speaker had merely exhaled. … [Thus, bullshit is] speech that has been emptied of all informative content. (1998, 127)
What, then, is the purpose of bullshit, in Frankfurt’s view? G. A. Cohen similarly objects that, while distinguishing the bullshitter from the liar at least partially with reference to intent, Frankfurt nevertheless fails to provide any account of the ultimate point of bullshitting. And, in Cohen’s view, even the above distinction is overstated since, he argues, advertisers often do intend to get us to accept claims which they know to be false. In any case, they do seek to induce certain thought-processes in their target audiences (see Cohen, 327,331).Footnote 3 It seems to me, however, that these claims ought to be kept distinct. With respect to the first, Frankfurt is correct in insisting in his reply to Cohen that, while it is perhaps “a reasonable assumption” that the persons responsible for marketing Marlboro cigarettes know that smoking them will not actually have the effect of producing rugged masculinity in the smoker, it wouldn’t much matter to them if it did (Frankfurt Reference Frankfurt, Buss and Overton2002, 341ff). On the other hand, it is too hasty to conclude as Frankfurt does from the factual diversity of the aims of the bullshitter that nothing of philosophical interest can be said regarding the teleology of bullshit. To the contrary, the salient point is noted by Frankfurt himself: it is characteristic of bullshit that the aim of the speaker lies outside the propositional content of the speech in such a way as to render the latter “empty” or “hot air.” In short, then, at least in some significant class of cases, the aim of bullshit can be described as the attempt to induce beliefs, thought-processes, or at least some kind of state or effect in others, through a use of language which is basically instrumental. This is also why Luntz’s expertise is both helpful as an example and rightly regarded as bullshit: while it is no doubt true that one could simply frame the issue of the estate tax rhetorically as a “death tax” and then go on to raise genuine truth claims regarding the wisdom of abolishing it, the aim of Luntz’s clients is to do away with the need for this subsequent process of reason-giving. Of course, the desired effect on the hearer can be propositionally articulated from the outside as the induction of the belief that “the estate tax is bad”; but it is misleading to construe the sought-after emotional reaction in these terms. What Luntz discovered, and considered to be the mark of a successful vocabulary, was that so long as you introduced the estate tax as a “death tax” in the first place, it didn’t matter if you went on to point out that it would apply only to the super-rich, while costing the government enormous amounts of revenue, etc.; no subsequent information meaningfully altered the emotionally-guided level of support.Footnote 4 The purpose of the speech is indifferent toward the question of truth, falsity, reason-giving, etc., and its success is, as in this case, measured by the imperviousness of the consequent affective state to correction on grounds of truth, falsity, or reason-giving.
This is the first unanswered question with which Frankfurt’s account confronts us: how to conceptualize the instrumentalizing of language which is reflected in the peculiar “emptiness” of bullshit. To this, I would add: Is it plausible to define bullshit solely with reference to its relationship to the game of truth-telling? Are there not forms of bullshit typical of non-constative uses of speech? More importantly for my ultimate aim here: Why, after all, is bullshit worse than lying? And, finally, is it really the case, as Frankfurt has argued, that the bullshitter like the liar must deceive us about their indifference to the truth? I would like to expand briefly on this last point before going on to consider how Habermas can be of some help in answering these questions.
In a review of Frankfurt’s republished essay, Jonathan Lear suggests that Frankfurt has failed to grasp the depth of the true bullshit artist, and so too one of the key elements of the specific nature of bullshit. Bill Clinton’s art of public apology serves as his model:
We do a disservice to his mastery if we think this is just a phony attempt to appear sincere. That would be ordinary bullshit. What takes Clinton to another level, I think, is that he expects us to recognize his gesture as bullshit and he expects to get away with it precisely because we do. His openness about his own bullshit is meant to be endearing. This is a level of bullshit that Frankfurt’s analysis cannot account for. Indeed, it runs counter to Frankfurt’s thesis that the bullshitter must hide his indifference.(24)
In fact, Lear thinks this can be read back into ordinary bullshit as well; that is, he denies generally that the bullshitter must hide. It is precisely because of this, in Lear’s view, that the phenomenon is so troubling: because it demands and is made possible by our complicity as hearers. “It is, in its own way, a demonstration of power. The bullshit artist in effect says, ‘This is bullshit, but you will accept it anyway’” (25). I will return to the relevance of power below. On the question of openness, the case of the public apology is indeed illustrative. I don’t mean by this the official apologies of politicians in their roles as representatives of government: such apologies derive their force or efficaciousness from an institutional context and have implications for civil suits, for instance, totally apart from the sincerity of the speaker. I am thinking instead of the public pressure brought to bear on the disgraced politician or public figure—congressman, celebrity, etc.—to apologize for inappropriate conduct, such as infidelity. “Complicity” is perhaps an understatement in such cases: what is so perplexing is the apparent combination of a genuinely felt demand for an apology on the part of the public with the open recognition that the apology once given is bullshit, spin, damage control. A speech act which is not regarded as really communicative nevertheless receives some sort of “uptake” (i.e., is taken at least partially seriously as a communicative act); produces some real illocutionary effect vis-a-vis the public image of the person concerned. How are we to understand such a case? I would now like to turn to Habermas in attempting an answer.
2. Communicative Action and BullshitFootnote 5
Let’s begin with the general question the theory of communicative action is intended to explain. Although it has as one of its aims expanding the account of the rationality of speech to include not only constative but also normative and expressive uses of language, it is ultimately an account of social integration or the coordination of action:
The question in social theory of what makes social order possible has a counterpart in action theory: How can (at least two) participants in interaction coordinate their plans in such a way that alter is in a position to link his actions to ego’s without a conflict arising, or at least without the risk that the interaction will be broken off? If the actors are interested solely in the success, i.e., the consequences or outcomes of their actions, they will try to reach their objectives by influencing their opponent’s definition of the situation, and thus his decision or motives, through external means by using weapons or goods, threats or enticements. Such actors treat each other strategically. In such cases, coordination of the subjects’ action depends upon the extent to which their egocentric utility calculations mesh. The degree of cooperation and stability is determined by the interest positions of the participants. By contrast, I speak of communicative action when actors are prepared to harmonize their plans of action through internal means, committing themselves to pursuing their goals only on the condition of an agreement—one that already exists or one to be negotiated—about definitions of the situation and prospective outcomes.
(Habermas Reference Habermas and Weber Nicholsen1990, 133-4)It isn’t that individuals pursuing communicative action don’t continue to be motivated by their ends; the difference is that, unlike strategic action, we cannot describe communicative action purely teleologically but must also include a description of the conditions for reaching understanding. Understanding, in Habermas’s “emphatic” usage, means not only comprehending the utterances of our interlocutors, but also coming to a rationally motivated agreement regarding the content of those utterances.Footnote 6 That is, the smallest unit of communicative action includes a claim raised by one participant in interaction and a “yes” of acceptance or a “no” of refusal by at least one other participant. The “yes” must be rational, which is to say, for Habermas, that it cannot be the result of manipulation or external force; it must instead represent the acceptance of an implicit validity claim which is “in principle criticizeable” (1990, 134). To say that the validity claim is “in principle critizeable” means that, if necessary, ego could give reasons why alter should accept it. The nature of these reasons will depend on the kind of claim made, and it is the typology that Habermas develops in elucidating this that counts as a broadening of the idea of rationality. In his mature work, Habermas claims that there are three mutually irreducible kinds of validity claims which are implicitly raised by every utterance: claims to truth (that something is the case); claims to rightness (that something ought to be the case or is legitimate); claims to sincerity (that what I say is said in earnest).Footnote 7 So if I, the author, say to you, the reader, “Habermas’s theory of communicative action, though difficult, is worth learning about,” then along with the propositional content of that statement there are three other things I have additionally claimed: (a) that it is true that the theory is worth learning about; (b) that as the author of a work in which I attempt to explain this theory, it is appropriate (morally acceptable, in keeping with social roles, etc.) for me to make such a claim to you, the reader; and (c) that I really do believe that the theory is worth learning about and, in so saying, I am not, for instance, engaging in an elaborate practical joke at your expense.
For the first two types of validity claims, it is understood that I could offer reasons should you raise doubts about them, whereas sincerity, on the other hand, is usually demonstrated convincingly only through consistent future action and not through repeated protestations (I demonstrate my sincerity, I hope, by the seriousness of my discussion).Footnote 8 If you accept my claim that the theory of communicative action is worth learning about, you have implicitly accepted as well both my sincerity and the nature of the interpersonal relation that I seek to establish between you and me, as author and reader. The process of giving justifying reasons for validity claims is what Habermas refers to as their “discursive redemption”; that is, they are redeemed from the doubt into which they were cast by engaging in discourse or argumentation. In ordinary communicative action, however, it is not the process of discourse, which is relatively rare and costly in terms of time and energy, that secures the coordination of action; rather, it is the implicit promise of discourse which is contained in the structure of communicative action—in the presupposition that the speech acts of one’s interlocutor are based on what they regard as rational convictions—that provides the bonding force of social integration.
Although every utterance simultaneously raises all three validity claims, in any given utterance one validity dimension is proposed as thematic: for instance, in constative uses of language, the utterance is focused on the question of truth. But because acceptance of the claim entails acceptance of both the legitimacy of the utterance in its context and the sincerity of the speaker, an interlocutor can at any time shift the focus to another validity dimension (Habermas Reference Habermas and McCarthy1984, 308). This is important with respect to the analysis of bullshit, for a couple of reasons. It is clearly the validity claim of sincerity that is being violated where bullshit is produced; that is, the “indifference” toward the truth by which Frankfurt identifies the bullshitter represents a lack of sincerity, or of sincere supporting conviction, for the truth of his or her claim. But it is also clear that one can bullshit not merely through an indifference to truth. When the disgraced politician apologizes, we suspect that he is bullshitting precisely about his being sincere. Frankfurt is correct in tying this to the idea of indifference, since it isn’t a question of whether the politician really “has” the feelings he professes; when we say that he is bullshitting, we identify his attempt to manifest sincerity as phony (whether it is sincere regret, sincere embarrassment, etc.). Similarly, when the politician extols military service as a civic duty, we may well believe that he is bullshitting with respect to normative commitments; but, again, it is the sincerity of his professed feeling of the bindingness of the norm of military service on democratic citizenry of which we are sceptical. Whether the norm itself is actually a legitimate one is not at issue.Footnote 9
One of the reasons for insisting upon these distinctions is that, as Habermas argues, we cannot accurately represent norms or desires and feelings along the lines of “states of affairs.” The validity of a norm is not a fact about a specific social world: “It is commanded that q” does not mean the same thing as “It is the case that q is commanded” (1984, 88). To say that a norm is valid means that it deserves to be recognized by those affected, whereas the descriptive proposition states only that a norm enjoys currency or social force and leaves aside entirely any claim about its legitimacy. Similarly, according to Habermas, “[a] subject capable of expression does not ‘have’ or ‘possess’ desires and feelings in the same sense as an observable object has extension, weight, colour, and similar properties” (91).Footnote 10 But the more important and practical point in observing these divergences from the case of truth and assertoric speech is that the acceptance of expressive and regulative speech acts has different consequences: acceptance of a truth claim has no special obligations attached to it, although it does serve to bring about agreement among interlocutors regarding their shared world; but acceptance of a normatively-regulated speech act brings about a certain type of relationship between the speaker and hearer, or between the hearer and the norm proposed; the acceptance of an expressive act grounds not only the public attribution of certain characteristics to the speaker, but certain expectations regarding their future conduct. This has considerable significance for the effects of bullshit on the question of social integration, which Frankfurt’s limitation of the phenomenon to the language game of truth fails to illuminate.
3. Bullshit as Strategic Action
As the quote with which I began the previous section indicates, communicative action is not the only option available to social actors. We can also opt to act strategically, which is defined by Habermas as instrumental action “where there can enter into the agent’s calculation of success the anticipation of decisions on the part of at least one additional goal-directed actor” (1984, 85). The distinction between communicative and strategic actions is not merely an analytical or heuristic device: it corresponds, according to Habermas, to an intuitively made distinction on the part of competent speakers, and it plays a constitutive role in the possibility of a genuinely communicative form of interaction. That is, the practice of communicative discourse or argumentation is made possible by the more or less counterfactual presupposition on the part of participants that strategic action is excluded—in other words, that all actors are oriented toward reaching understanding, that all force but that of the better argument is excluded, etc. (286-7). Moreover, not only is the distinction constitutive for the possibility of engaging in argumentation; it is also the axis of Habermas’s account of critique. This is true in two ways: first, because it makes argumentation possible, which is the privileged arena for social critique in which participants adopt a hypothetical attitude toward validity claims which enjoy de facto recognition; second, because Habermas argues that, despite what is arguably their empirical prevalence, strategic uses of language are parasitic upon communicative uses, such that the latter has justified priority in the construction of a social theory (pace theorists like Foucault or Lyotard, who propose to base social theory on the idea of games or strategies of power). This second point has critical significance because the dependence of strategic uses of language entails that they can be critically “unmasked” from the perspective of a social theory rooted in communication action.
Habermas employs Austin’s speech act theory in his defence of this “parasitism thesis.”Footnote 11 In The Theory of Communicative Action, he distinguishes, first, between the locution (the propositional content of an assertion), the illocution (what is done through the speech act itself, e.g., a promise is made), and the perlocution (an effect produced by the speaker upon the hearer, e.g., inducing fear) (1984, 288-9). The meaning of an illocution follows directly from the locution or propositional content of the speech act: for instance, the illocutionary meaning of the claim “I promise to meet you at four in the afternoon” is that I undertake a promise or obligation to meet you. The success or failure of such an illocutionary speech act is therefore also judged on the same grounds: do you accept my promise and undertake to meet me? It is otherwise with a perlocution, according to Habermas, the meaning of which can be specified only by appeal to the intentions of the speaker: if I have promised to meet you at four only in order to stand you up and embarrass you, this cannot be derived from the content of my speech. Moreover, the success of such a perlocution cannot be determined simply by whether it succeeds in receiving uptake; that is, by whether or not you agree to meet me: you might agree to meet and yet, despite my failure to show, have a pleasant time by yourself and not be embarrassed at all. His point here is that, while illocutions may well have incidental perlocutionary effects—my promise may make you happy, but it needn’t do so in order to be successful as a promise—perlocutions are dependent for their success on illocutions: while I may ultimately fail to embarrass you, I cannot succeed in doing so if you don’t accept my promise as a genuine one in the first place. This, in turn, requires that my perlocutionary aim remain hidden behind the illocution.
This is the parasitism thesis, as Habermas originally defended it: that perlocutions are parasitic upon illocutionary speech acts. And, since Habermas regarded perlocutions as reflecting the absorption of illocutions into strategic action contexts, he concluded that strategic uses of language in general are, in fact, derivative, parasitic upon communicative action orientations (1984, 293). Finally, because competent language users themselves distinguish between strategic and communicative action, they are in principle capable of unmasking this latent or concealed strategic action and rejecting it. Now, a number of commentators on Habermas are quite willing to accept the parasitism thesis as it applies to latently strategic action; however, it has been observed by Karl Otto Apel, Maeve Cooke, and others, that Habermas’s argument does not fare nearly so well when it comes to openly strategic uses of language. Such uses range from direct imperatives, as in “Hands up, or I’ll shoot!”, to open bargaining between parties and individuals with competing interests (Apel; Cooke 23ff). Moreover, Habermas’s original usage of Austin’s terminology has been criticized as being not merely idiosyncratic but unduly restrictive, particularly with respect to the category of “perlocutions.” Habermas has modified his terminology in response to these objections on more than one occasion, most recently broadening his account of the perlocutionary effects of speech to include three types or kinds of effect and distinguishing these perlocutionary effects of successful illocutionary acts from perlocutions per se, where the latter now refer to openly strategic speech acts such as “Hand up, or I’ll shoot!”.Footnote 12 The perlocutionary effects of an utterance include: (a) those which follow from the meaning of the illocutionary act, such as the action-effects which result when a promise is successfully made (e.g., that you arrive at the appointed time to meet me); (b) those which are only contingently related to the content of what is said (as in the case where my promise happens to make you happy); and (c) those which follow only insofar as the intent to produce them remains latent from the perspective of the hearer (that I succeed in embarrassing you when I stand you up at our promised meeting) (Habermas Reference Habermas and Cooke1998, 330). Only category (c) is defined to correspond to what Habermas had earlier designated as “perlocutions,” simpliciter; what remains true is that the conditions for the success of such a perlocutionary effect cannot be determined except through reference to an intent which is not manifest in the meaning of what it said.
The upshot of these modifications, so far as my purposes here are concerned, is that the parasitism thesis, which Habermas does not relinquish, comes to describe the relationship between manifest illocutionary success and the specific type of strategically motivated perlocutionary effect which requires latency (c), and no longer the relationship between illocutionary success and perlocutions as a whole. This reformulation does entail that perlocutions as Habermas now understands them—such as threats—cannot be shown to be directly parasitic upon illocutionary success, at least not in the strong sense of consensus or agreement. But I am less interested in the question of such openly strategic action, in any case, and for a couple of reasons. First, I quite agree that open threats of violence or coercion cannot be shown to be dependent upon communicative action orientations in specific instances though, like Habermas, I do not consider the option for open declarations of violence plausible in any but a rather limited set of cases (Habermas Reference Habermas and Weber Nicholsen1990, 100).Footnote 13 Second, Apel agrees that bargaining is nevertheless, at a meta-level, dependent upon a recognition of the justification for or appropriateness of this pattern of interaction (1999, 288);Footnote 14 if a refusal to engage in argumentation oriented toward consensus is unilaterally pushed through in favour of strategic bargaining despite the fact that at least one participant considers such a move to be unjustified, then we are back with a situation of mere power. The question I am interested in instead is this: Is bullshit a perlocutionary use of language? That is, is bullshit a strategic use of language in which a necessarily latent perlocutionary effect is sought through an apparently illocutionary act? In some cases, clearly the answer is “yes.” This is true of a great deal of both advertising and political speech, which are unconcerned with rightness, truth, and sincerity, and which intend to produce predetermined effects on their hearers. But, as Lear observed earlier—and in contrast to Habermas’s claim regarding the need for strategically motivated perlocutionary effects to be concealed within illocutions—this sort of bullshit need not hide itself. One only need think of the number of advertisements today which are openly ironic, self-mocking, etc., to be quite sure of this. This also explains the “emptiness” of bullshit remarked upon by Frankfurt: because the emotional effect which is the aim of the speech is produced through a set of associations understood behaviouristically, “understanding” is not a precondition for its success. As I argued earlier with reference to the work of Frank Luntz, although we can externally reconstruct the successfully induced emotional association between “death tax” and “bad” as though it were an intentional state, the imperviousness of the state to correction strongly suggests that it is not in fact an affirmation, even implicitly, of a proposed validity claim.
I would like to just mention here some related evidence, which concerns the effects of bullshit on “complicit” hearers. The evidence comes from recent studies of belief correction with respect to political misinformation. The experimental cases have included such recent candidates for public bullshit as the claim that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (clearly, this is a case of an intentional state): though it is perhaps arguable that U.S. officials actually knew this was false (and so lied), it seems at least equally plausible to suggest that, inasmuch as their aim was to generate support for a predetermined course of action, it mattered no more to them whether the claim was true than it does to Marlboro executives whether smoking cigarettes produces rugged masculinity. The disturbing finding is not simply that subjects who accepted the claim did not process contradictory information when presented with it; but rather that, especially among those most partisan in their outlooks, fact correction frequently “backfired,” increasing or reinforcing misperceptions. As the authors of the study in question concluded, the explanation for this odd but familiar phenomenon seems to relate to the attitude the subjects adopted toward public truth-claims; specifically, that rather than simply receiving a truth-claim directly, the subjects pit it against a constructed partisan opponent (Nyhan and Reifler, forthcoming). This isn’t a question of understanding and evaluating the claim by constructing a debate, a contest between competing justifications; rather, it neutralizes the question of justification by turning the claim into an opportunity for affective, in this case partisan, identification.Footnote 15
Of course, on some minimal level, the subjects in both of the above cases must comprehend the utterances in question: Luntz’s techniques could not succeed on a subject who did not speak the same language, for instance. Yet such cases raise troubling questions for Habermas, who has argued for the inseparability of understanding in the sense of comprehension, and understanding in the sense of agreement: that is, following (and expanding upon) the work of Michael Dummett and Donald Davidson, Habermas has argued that we cannot understand a claim except insofar as we are able at least to anticipate the sorts of reasons which could be given in support of it (1984, 276ff).Footnote 16 The imperviousness to correction of the beliefs and states in question seems to speak to the possibility for some kind of separation between the two components of Habermas’s emphatic sense of understanding, or else we will have to say that the subjects do not understand at all. More to my ultimate point here, however: as with the theory of communicative action as a whole, which claims to be a reconstruction of the intuitive knowledge of existing competent speakers (this historical index is part of what puts the “quasi-” in his “quasi-transcendental”), alterations in fundamental attitudes toward communication have the potential to undermine the basic distinctions on which Habermas’s theory relies.
I will return to this line of argument in my conclusion. But first, I would like to address one other class or type of bullshit which is not so obviously instrumental, or at least not along these behaviouristic lines. The apology of the disgraced politician, for instance, surely is not an attempt to “make” citizens vote for him in a way directly parallel to the manipulative uses of language reflected in the “communicative expertise” of a Frank Luntz. Moreover, there seems to be some deeper sense in which the speech in question here receives some kind of “uptake,” and so really does succeed on a genuinely illocutionary (and not merely perlocutionary) level. It is this fact which principally speaks against considering bullshit to be, despite its openness, an instance of a perlocution in Habermas’s revised sense of manifestly strategic speech acts (to be categorized alongside such examples as “Hands up, or I’ll shoot!”). Does this illocutionary success conceal a perlocutionary aim which could only be clarified via the intentions of the speaker? What sort of aim would this be? And what about other cases still, like the vacuous “double-speak” of bureaucrats and administrators, or the histrionics and bullshit outrage which proliferates on twenty-four-hour news stations, especially those which are most openly partisan and which are responsible for a good deal of the misinformation mentioned above? I want to suggest one final Habermasian strategy for approaching bullshit, with these less obviously manipulative examples in mind.
4. Bullshit as Systematically Distorted Communication
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Habermas began to articulate a theory of distorted communication which spoke to those cases in which his confidence in the ability of competent language users to distinguish between communicative and strategic uses of language appears unfounded. His hypothesis is that distortions of communication occur when the “external organization of speech”—its social context—is “overburdened,” and this burden is “shifted onto the internal organization of speech”—its validity basis, as discussed above (2001, 147). Put plainly, the idea is that communication becomes distorted where there is some problem or conflict in the social norms or interactions in which participants are caught up and which cannot be directly discussed or worked through. Accordingly, the issue is systematically avoided or covered over, while this apparent transition to a strategic mode of action is itself denied and the appearance of communicative action maintained. We are thus faced with systematically distorted communication where
the validity basis of linguistic communication is curtailed surreptitiously; that is, without leading to a break in communication or to the transition to openly declared and permissible strategic action. … The confounding [or paradoxical] thing about ‘systematic distortion’ is that the same validity claims that are being violated (and violation of which has pathological effects) at the same time serve to keep up the appearance of consensual action (emphasis Habermas’s). (154-5)
Habermas offers as an example a woman who “keeps up the appearance of reciprocating the affection of her husband whom she has long detested” (152), presumably out of a felt need to maintain the relationship, to protect children, etc. Perhaps she is aware of violating the claim to sincerity raised in her speech; perhaps she deceives even herself about this. In either case, Habermas claims the sequence of communication is systematically distorted and, most importantly, according to his analysis, this signifies that it is in fact “latently strategic.” Habermas focuses on the paradoxical nature of this strategy: the social context of the family includes its privileged role in the maintenance and formation of identities dependent upon the recognition and love of others, as well as its function of meeting the basic needs of all members; but the attempt to shield from threats one’s identity or opportunities for needs satisfaction necessarily involves a strategic, defensive posture, which cuts one off from the possibility of attaining recognition that is available only in a communicative attitude (155). It is Habermas’s position that systematic distortions are typically the product of asymmetrical relations of power. Thus, in the case above, this would apparently suggest something like the following interpretation: Because of the imbalance of power between husband and wife (let’s say, rooted in earning potential), the woman in question cannot confidently assert her need (to break off a relationship which is no longer emotionally fulfilling) because of the threat this poses to the stability of her identity (let’s say, tied to the family as primary care giver) and/or to her ability to have her needs met (including basic questions of economic security).Footnote 17
While not disputing the basic outline as presented above, nor the idea that the validity claim of sincerity is being violated in distorted communication, James Bohman—who has expanded upon the idea of distorted communication in much more detail than has Habermas himself—nevertheless rejects Habermas’s reductive designation of the phenomena as “latently strategic action.” Such a characterization suggests that the action is not really communicative after all, whereas Bohman attempts to explicate how it is possible for communication itself (rather than the strategy concealed within it) to be genuinely paradoxical in the sense of violating its own conditions for communicative success. And, indeed, if we recall the analysis of perlocutions (or, in Habermas’s revised account, the specific relevant class of perlocutionary effects, category (c), above) as latently strategic uses of language, it seems clear that distorted communication presents a different sort of figure: first of all, it may not be possible to clarify the aim of the speech with reference to the intentions of the speaker, particularly insofar as self-deception is involved; but more importantly, while not entirely wide of the mark, it seems rather Procrustean to insist that the woman in the example above is best described as trying to bring about some kind of effect upon her husband. It isn’t necessary for me to go into the details of Bohman’s alternative analysis; what I would like to recover from it is simply his observations regarding the consequences of distortion.
Bohman lists as examples of distorted communication: “double bind,” in which the issuing of paradoxical commands frustrates uptake, and “disqualification,” in which one “says something without really saying it” (for instance, implied threats, interruptions indicating a dismissal of the other’s view). In these cases, the effect at least partially is to obscure the meaning of what is said and so too the form of validity claimed for it (is it a proposed norm, or a threat?). As a result, the communicative act “does not have all the consequences and obligations for speakers and hearers that such communication ought to have” (8). The significance of this will depend, in turn, on the form of language use in question: in cases of constative speech, it entails at least that rational testing and argumentation is forestalled; in cases of normatively oriented speech, such as promising, distortions inhibit “the formation of common obligations” which uptake would normally create; and in the case of expressive speech, distortions break the bond between the content expressed and the obligations of the speaker with respect to conduct. Bowman concludes:
In each case of distortions, asymmetries of power make it such that the normative obligations of communicative success are not self-binding upon some of the participants in communication: they can ignore their obligation to provide justifications to other interlocutors when challenged, to bind themselves with others, and to commit themselves to particular sorts of actions without injuring their chances of success. (10)
It is precisely in order to capture this important insight regarding the consequences of speech—an insight which slips through Frankfurt’s conceptual net, because of his limitation of bullshit to the problem of indifference to truth—that the idea of systematically distorted communication recommends itself for the analysis of at least one dimension of bullshit, namely, with respect to those cases which seem less obviously manipulative or instrumental.Footnote 18 Note the role of power in distorted communication, first, and recall Lear’s claim that bullshit is a gesture of power. Frankfurt, too, says something similar, albeit in different words, when he remarks that bullshitting is in some ways akin to bluffing (1998, 128). Distorted communication is a kind of partially open wager that one’s bluff will not be called; it is, at least in those socially and politically noteworthy cases which I’ve focused on here, the prerogative of power to bullshit and to assume that one’s audience will play along. From the example of Frank Luntz, to politicians and public figures of various sorts, to television networks with disposition over the means of public communication—and we can add others, such as bureaucratic actors speaking to subordinates or to the public, and experts made to speak on topics outside their expertise (see Frankfurt Reference Frankfurt1998, 132)—we are faced with cases of an asymmetrical relationship between speaker and hearer. Bohman and Habermas agree on this point: these violations of the rational infrastructure of language are possible because of the external fact of power. This surely is part of the paradox of uptake in which, for instance, the public really does continue to demand certain kinds of decency on the part of public figures, demands that they apologize when caught running afoul of those expectations, and then recognizes that the offered apology is bullshit. What this ultimately means is not just that we don’t think them sincere in their presentations of sincerity; it is also, and because of this, that on some level we recognize that the apology does not really bind its speaker. And yet, paradoxically, we are not able fully to withdraw from the relationship either, for reasons which will differ according to the relationship in question.Footnote 19
In this broadened context, we can repose the last of our unanswered questions: Frankfurt had declared bullshit to be the “greater enemy” of truth than are lies, since lies at least operate within the parameters of the game of truth. We can now reframe this to say that bullshit is a greater threat to the rationality of language than are lies – which, beginning at least with Aquinas have been criticized as frustrating the purpose of language. The reason for this is now clear as well: a lie can be critically challenged and the liar pressed for reasons; but bullshit systematically frustrates the transition to discourse, and so its deflection away from the game of argumentation in which truth could be pursued is far more fundamental. Moreover, bullshit with respect to norms and sincere self-presentation systematically interrupts the binding force of the obligations and expectations, rooted in the illocutionary force of speech, and so threatens the communicative integration of society. It is crucial to recall, with respect to all three forms of language use, Habermas’ claim that it is the promise of discourse contained in ordinary speech which is responsible for its integrating force; it is this promise which bullshit dissolves, both in the particular case and in its broader effects on our attitudes toward truth and rightness claims as severed from – and so as impervious to correction by – the process of reason-giving. Frankfurt himself seems to struggle to articulate this insight within the context of his approach, and it is in his attempt to do so that it becomes clear that his identification of bullshit as the “greater enemy” is not merely an epistemic description:
[I]ndifference to the truth is extremely dangerous. The conduct of a civilized life, and the vitality of the institutions that are indispensible to it, depend very fundamentally on respect for the distinction between the true and the false. Insofar as the authority of this distinction is undermined by the prevalence of bullshit and by the mindlessly frivolous attitude that accepts the proliferation of bullshit as innocuous, an indispensible human treasure is squandered (2002, 343).
Lies, which in fact rely on the distinction between the true and false, do not pose this far-reaching moral or political danger. At the same time, there is surely something more specific at stake here than the “indispensible treasure” of “civilized life.” I would like to conclude, accordingly, with some more pointed observations on the significance of bullshit for Habermas’ critical project and for his communicative account of social integration.
5. Why Bullshit is Habermas’s Worst Nightmare
In his well-known essay from 1946, “Politics and the English Language,” George Orwell warned of the connection between the debasing and hollowing out of meaning, the prevalence of systematic obscurity in public speech, and patterns of unthinking political conformism (1950, 87). A few years later, he would more famously still dramatize these dangers in the novel, 1984. The book contains not a few memorable examples of bullshit, for instance, the collection of state propaganda and interrogation functions under the rubric, “the Ministry of Truth”; yet Orwell’s focus is on the organized attempt to shape and limit thought in a perlocutionary manner through the internal constraints of “newspeak.” Habermas’ most potent worries about the “brave new world” look somewhat different: in Legitimation Crisis, Habermas had outlined the dystopian possibility of “the end of the individual,” the product of a new kind of “socialization without norms” (1975, 117ff but especially 124-30). This scenario corresponds to a total transformation of society from the pattern of social integration and political legitimation in accordance of normative justifications, to a purely systemic integration, in which political decisions could be made without any need to provide reasons precisely because citizens were no longer socialized to demand them. Several critics objected at the time that, since Habermas’ account of systemic integration is based on the idea of strategically-motivating, welfare state buy-offs, reasons, after all, were still in force.Footnote 20 This misses Habermas’ point: he regards the validity claim tied to questions of legitimacy as that of “rightness.” But the promise of some sort of individually-distributed reward – for instance, financial or security incentives – in exchange for whatever occupational or citizenship performances are functionally required for the reproduction of society, does not intend to offer any kind of justification regarding the “rightness” of the current organization of society or its institutions: it asks client-citizens to put that question aside in favour of a different kind of non-normative consideration.
The dominance of bullshit presents the prospect of something like this brave new world, in which individuals are socialized without the sense that the society in which they live makes normative demands upon them; it threatens the possibility of a society in which social integration, at least as Habermas understands it, has become impossible, because its basis in the coordinating and integrating function of language oriented to reaching understanding has been swallowed up by language as spectacle, as strategy, as bullshit. As a hollowing out of the rationality or validity basis of speech, especially in its most open variants including both the perlocutionary and systematically distorted forms, bullshit not only appears to explode the distinction between communicative and strategic action; it also dissolves the promise of discourse and the formation of obligations for future action which are implicit in ordinary speech and are responsible for its integrating force. Moreover, among individuals socialized in contexts in which such bullshit abounds, who acquire their linguistic competence therein, the difference between rationally-motivated conviction and simply “getting someone to agree with you,” threatens to dissolve into the kind of cynicism toward reason-giving and political speech which is already so familiar to us today. Just how much bullshit is required to produce such a fundamental change in communicative attitudes would appear to be answerable only in light of its effects, which is as much as to say, in retrospect. But the fact that this sort of cynicism toward political and public speech is already, as I’ve said, so familiar, should give us little enough cause for optimism on this score.
At the level of theoretical analysis, the distinction between justification and persuasion may yet hold, and so it would certainly be possible simply to condemn the cynical and complicit recipients of public bullshit as lacking in communicative competence (in particular, in discourse-competence). But the critical theory of society has, since Marx and the first generation of the Frankfurt School, defined itself in opposition to such simple normativity by its insistence upon rooting the development of theory in the hopes and potentials for resistance in the present. In Habermas’ non-historicist version, it is precisely the theory of communicative action, understood as a reconstruction of the intuitive knowledge of competent language users, which provides this immanent foothold (and no longer a privileged set of social actors, like the proletariat). Bullshit is thus Habermas’ worst nightmare, because in a society in which bullshit became sufficiently dominant, such a critical theory would have become impossible, a mere castle in the air, ungrounded in the expectations and self-understanding of social actors.Footnote 21, Footnote 22
