There was a time when economists held the idea of discretionary monetary policy in disfavor. The desirability of monetary discretion is, today, often taken for granted, and many people find puzzling the views of the economists from the past. The search for the explanation of this puzzle is the motivation of Arnon’s discussion of British monetary policies and corresponding theoretical contributions of the period between the mid-1700s and late 1800s.
Covering topics mostly chronologically, Arnon starts with Hume (ch. 1) and Smith (ch. 3), portraying them as advocates of laissez-faire in money and banking. He then covers the two rounds of the Bullion Debate (chs. 6–8), where the main protagonists argued over the inconvertibility of the Bank of England notes during the Restriction Period of 1797 to 1821. The Bullion Debate ended with resumption of convertibility of the pound, and thereby constrained discretionary powers of the Bank of England. The continuing recurrence of economic crises after the resumption, however, sparked new debates over the monetary institutions of the time (chs. 10–13). These—now famous—debates between the representatives of the Currency School, Banking School, and Free Banking School did not consider monetary discretion as a serious option. The Currency School of Loyd, Torrens, and Norman, whose vision eventually materialized through the 1844 Bank Act, argued for a strict policy rule on note issuing. The pre-1844 Banking School of Tooke, Fullarton, and Wilson dismissed the possibility of monetary discretion. The Free Banking School desired to constrain discretion in monetary policies through opening of the note-issuing business to competition. Arnon points towards Henry Thornton (chs. 7 and 18) as the single important person who argued against the mainstream of the time. Thornton’s 1802 defense of monetary discretion was, in this sense, “ahead of his time.” Arnon argues that Thornton’s ideas on monetary policy were forgotten and that it was only Wicksell who properly returned monetary discretion back to economics (ch. 17).
At the end of the book (ch. 18), Arnon ties together the different threads of the discussion in order to explain the dislike of discretionary monetary policies by economists in the past. He finds two complementary explanations of the puzzle. In the first explanation, Arnon stresses the prevailing free-market ideology of economists who lived between the mid-1700s and late 1800s. He argues that the laissez-faire ideology hindered them from advocating monetary discretion.
The second explanation focuses on the failure of Thornton’s 1802 defense of monetary discretion in generating a broader follow-up in the economics profession of the time. Arnon argues that Thornton’s model of the financial system, particularly his understanding of the importance of debits and credits in economic transactions, was too remote from the models used by Thornton’s contemporaries. Such a wedge in theorizing between Thornton and the profession might have led to the lack of interest in Thornton’s work on monetary policy.
In addition to the main theme discussed above, the book raises a number of other noteworthy points. One can learn about the structure and performance of the English financial system of the time (especially chs. 2, 5, 10), monetary economics of Marx (ch. 15), and the oral monetary tradition of Marshall (ch. 16).
Arnon certainly makes a valuable contribution by shedding light on the history of attitudes that the economics profession held towards monetary discretion. His explanations of the attitudes, however, leave room for further discussion. Arnon chooses the present-day favorable attitude towards monetary discretion as the criterion of the analysis. It is from this present-day perspective that economists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were deceived by their ideological and theoretical priors, and thereby failed to appreciate discretionary monetary policies. While such broad behavioral failures are thinkable, I want to point out that there is at least one alternative explanation of the puzzling attitude of economists towards monetary discretion. This alternative explanation depends on change in incentives that economists faced over time rather than on changes in their ideological biases and their constrained abilities to theorize.
It is well known that discretionary monetary policy gives monetary authorities the capacity to redistribute resources. Such capacity also gives monetary authorities an incentive to demand higher discretionary powers. To succeed in their demands, monetary authorities have an incentive to motivate others to publicly defend monetary discretion. Motivating economists to do so became easier over the past hundred years as the economics profession became much more intertwined with monetary authorities. Ceteris paribus, the proportion of economists who have been advocating monetary discretion should have, therefore, increased, precisely in line with the pattern observed by Arnon.
Whether monetary authorities have, over time, successfully motivated economists to defend monetary discretion is a quantitative question that is yet to be answered. Such an answer might, however, put Arnon’s puzzle in a different light when compared to his own explanations. Had the persuasion by monetary authorities played a role in increasing the desire for monetary discretion among economists, the ideological and theoretical biases of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century economists may have been overemphasized in Arnon’s analysis. The interplay between economic discipline and the wider social-political context would then suggest that we should pay attention not only to the biased economists of the past, but also to the biases of economists today. Responding to the incentives provided by monetary authorities, economists of today would be biased to favor monetary discretion.
In addition to the possible overemphasizing of the biases of the past, Arnon might have also misinterpreted David Hume and Henry Parnell. In chapter 18, Arnon relates Hume’s name with advocates of laissez-faire in money and banking. This association might be, however, misleading because it is well known that Hume was critical towards the institution of paper money, and his position on the issue of laissez-faire in money and banking was, thereby, ambiguous.
Arnon’s revisionist treatment of Parnell (pp. 265–270), who was a member of the Free Banking School, is unconvincing. Arnon argues that in his 1832 pamphlet, Parnell retracted from his previous free-banking position. In Arnon’s view, in the pamphlet, Parnell advocated transformation of the banking system into a cartel that would entertain monetary discretion. Parnell was, however, far from doing so. The parts of the 1832 pamphlet that Arnon quotes are taken from the passages where Parnell argues for desirability of having the system of free banking in England. While Parnell points out that banks would act “in a federative capacity” against overissuing banks in order to keep the amount of notes in the country at a proper level, such action is not meant as an action of a cartel. It is a mere description of the fact that all prudent banks have, in the system of free-banking, a common incentive: to bring the banknotes of the overissuing banks to their issuers and to demand the specie.
Overall, Arnon provides an impressive account of the history of monetary theory and policy that leaves us with an important message. He makes it clear that economists have changed their views about the desirability of monetary discretion over time, and that we need to understand why it happened. Such understanding is not only important as an exercise in the history of economic thought; it is also crucial for sober evaluation of policy proposals that economists make today.
