The present collection of papers brings together a broad range of interpretations and criticisms of the philosophy of Ernst Mach. The volume is intended not only to provide a resource to scholars interested in attaining an overview of the reception of one of the most influential and intriguing intellectual figures in the German-speaking world in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries but also as a pedagogical exercise for students. The editors spell out this latter aim in a short preface in which they sketch their conception of education, which crucially involves being able to take points of view that differ from one's own and to honestly engage with alternative ideas, trying to understand other thinkers’ aims and assumptions. They have chosen to place an emphasis on Mach's psychology in selecting papers for inclusion in this volume, since they regard his work in psychology as his greatest contribution. The first half of the book contains a biographical sketch, a preface, and three introductory essays (which make up Part A), all of which aim to contextualize Mach's philosophy in the history of philosophy, science, and the broader culture; the second half (Part B) contains excerpts of important writings about Mach, ranging from the late nineteenth century to the present day.
In the first introductory essay (“Prolegomena”), the editors aim to analyze and contextualize Mach's epistemology. They start out by distinguishing between direct and indirect epistemology, the former of which is typified by phenomenalism or positivism, the latter by realism. The distinction serves as a framework for the ensuing discussion, in which various other philosophers are situated with respect to Mach, and Mach's purportedly direct epistemology is elucidated and criticized. They aptly rehearse the arguments that science and philosophy can and do profitably seek to go beyond merely describing phenomena and indeed give explanations that appeal to a reality independent of perception. One crucial point that they neglect is that Mach employed the notions of description and explanation in a totally different way than they were used in the philosophy of science of the twentieth century.
One speculative historiographic point (25) they make in this connection is that nomological interpretations of causality—and also such noncausal accounts as that offered by Mach—may have been more plausible in the nineteenth century than they are now, when the potential for individuals to actively shape their lives was more restricted than it presently is. This is an interesting idea, which would be worth pursuing, and it demonstrates the fruitfulness of such interfaces between philosophers and historians of science.
Given the pragmatic and social character of Mach's program, it is entirely fitting that the editors consider the cultural values that science can either serve or benefit from. They ponder whether the increasing affluence that science facilitates may undermine the values that give rise to good science, such as discipline and devotion to one's society. These are interesting reflections, but the discussion would be stronger if the authors did not try to buttress it by appealing to their own idiosyncratic views, which they proclaim with such personal remarks as “The descent into expressionist and vulgar music, painting, sculpture, novels, poetry, television, computer, and internet bloggery is not reassuring. Good as democratic government generally is we have lost too many aristocratic virtues, including courage, endurance, honesty, and forgiveness” (14).
Some of the editors’ remarks about contemporary philosophy are also obviously imbalanced. They write, for example, that “most professional philosophers and physicists have been reluctant to follow his [Planck's] lead about strengthening causal explanation in science to make it more realistic” (30) and go on to complain strangely that “it is still unnecessarily difficult to find any philosopher in Central Europe who accepts that atoms are real in a strong, causal sense” (32). But this is just not an accurate reflection on the state of affairs in philosophy of science today. Realism in general has been a live option for decades, and realistic conceptions of causality not only have been popular but have played a prominent role in evolutionary epistemologies, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and elsewhere.
The second introductory essay is devoted to “Mach's epistemology.” The editors brush aside the controversy about whether Mach is best interpreted as a phenomenalist or a neutral monist by ascribing the latter position to “extreme supporters” (39). One point that the editors emphasize in this essay is that committing to a realistic—that is, correspondence—account of truth does not prevent one from also being a fallibilist, since the world's objectively being a certain way does not imply that there is a way of checking whether one's theory succeeds in capturing that objective state of affairs. On the basis of this distinction between the dichotomy “absolutism/relativism” on the one hand and the dichotomy “fallibilism/infallibilism” on the other, the editors point out that Mach was clearly a fallibilist but may not have been a relativist, as is often assumed. Their argument is that if descriptions are true insofar as they accurately report on sensations, there may be an objective fact of the matter that is contingent on the sensations and not on the outside world beyond the sensations. This interpretation can certainly be challenged by Mach's own writings as well as by the reception of his ideas up to Paul Feyerabend.
The third introductory essay (“Mach's Theory of Economy”) focuses on the conception of “economy of thought” in Mach's philosophy. The authors point out that Mach was not always clear about whether economy was meant to apply to the logical complexity of scientific theories or to the practical or psychological efficiency of particular descriptions. According to the authors, both types of economy are in themselves worthy goals but are not necessarily productive within scientific methodology. With respect to the logical simplicity of theories, they make the realist's point that the object of inquiry determines the appropriate degree of complexity: a theory should be as complex as the matter calls for. With respect to efficiency, they argue that progress in science is sometimes impossible without putting aside the value of economy and being willing to spend lots of time and resources inefficiently in order to find the best solution. They argue that Mach is more interested in the latter, psychological or practical, sort of economy and also that he in fact had two theories of economy in this latter sense: the one applying to scientific methodology and the other to the “use of science for particular human purposes” (81). Regarding this latter version of the principle of economy, the authors observe a certain tension between the causal efficacy of human action that such an apparatus for means-end reasoning includes, on the one hand, and the anticausal commitments of Mach's phenomenalism, on the other. Not surprisingly, they support the former and praise Mach for knowing when to put aside his phenomenalism.
On the whole, the editors have done a good job of contextualizing the contributed papers and of being transparent about their own views on Mach, but at some points they are not as clear as they could be about when they are expressing their own particular views and when they are reporting on the consensus of the scientific community. On a side note, the introductory essays would certainly have gained in clarity if they had been subjected to more rigorous scrutiny by a native speaker of English.
Part B of the book, the collected papers, presents a sensible selection of mostly excerpted passages addressing specific aspects of Mach's philosophy. The contributions in favor of Mach include excerpts from an obituary of Mach by the German mathematician Georg Helm, a report on Mach's influence in the United States by the historian Albert Moyer, a defense of relativism by the literary historian Christopher Herbert, and a neutral monist interpretation of Mach by the philosopher Erik Banks, as well as seminal statements by Einstein, Carnap, Philipp Frank, Arthur Fine, and Mach himself.
The contributions contra Mach include Husserl's dismissal of Mach's psychologism; various criticisms from Brentano, Einstein, Planck, and Popper; Lenin's famous attack on Mach; and a polemical assessment of Mach's career from the point of view of university politics by the philosopher-historian Wolfdietrich Schmied-Kowarzik. Additionally, the historian Michael Polanyi takes issue with Mach's interpretation of Newton, Frederick Copleston charges Mach with solipsism, Maurice Cornforth decries the Humean character of Mach's thought, Mario Bunge finds fault with Mach's understanding of various physical concepts, Lawrence Sklar and David Lindley criticize Mach's phenomenalism, and the eye researcher Steven Lehar makes a plea for indirect realism.
The collection may have benefited from one or two additional recent papers. It would have been reasonable, for example, to include a contribution addressing Mach's pedagogy, especially in view of the educational function that the book is intended to serve. Similarly, it may have been interesting to include a contribution dealing with the connection between Mach and evolutionary epistemology. On a purely organizational note, it is a bit awkward that the dates and sources of the contributions are tucked away in a sort of appendix rather than being cited at the beginning or end of the individual contributions. It is a pity that the publisher is a sort of private institution, which has the effect of strongly restricting the accessibility and market presence of this and other publications from the same press. In addition, the design and layout are obviously unprofessional.
Since the publication of his seminal book Ernst Mach: His Work, Life, and Influence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), John Blackmore has written and especially edited a lot on Mach (we count some six further books), although he has remained a fervent critic of Mach's “phenomenalism” and favors a naive realism. Despite this philosophical bias, this book is undoubtedly another useful collection of primary sources, even if it lacks a more sophisticated philosophical interpretation and historical contextualization taking into account recent research on Mach in contemporary philosophy of science.
