Introduction
As Japan's immediate neighbor, South Korea faces an irresistible challenge to engage in extensive research on Japanese politics and diplomacy. However, Japan's perception as being geographically close but emotionally remote has twisted the progress of Japanese political studies in South Korea for a few decades. South Korean intellectuals had long shied away from objectively analyzing what is going on in Japan. This does not mean that the South Korean academia has not turned their attentive eyes to Japan. With the rise of Japan as a virtual security ally to South Korea (Cha, Reference Cha1997) as well as the number two economy in the world, South Korea's newly emerging generations have begun studying Japan more vigorously than the previous generations. From the mid 1980s onwards, the number of Japan analysts has expanded rapidly.
This article aims at historically and analytically reviewing the status of Japanese political studies in South Korea throughout the postwar period, though it will highlight major works in the 2000s. Starting with analyzing why Japanese political studies made a delayed start in South Korea, this article will illustrate the shifting generations of Japanese political studies in South Korea. In particular, the academic works by third generation scholars, who compose a majority of Japanese political studies in South Korea now, will be critically and comprehensively analyzed. A final part of this paper will deal with the future potential as well as challenges for the upcoming generation of Japanese political studies in South Korea.
Delayed start of Japanese political studies in South Korea
Since the late 1980s, a number of status reviews of Japanese studies in South Korea have been conducted. More often than not, the Japan Foundation funded those survey projects. In 1988, Jung Suk Youn initiated the first academic attempt to look into the status of Japanese studies in South Korea (Jung Suk Youn, Reference Youn1988). This study is not necessarily confined to the review of Japanese political studies, but a comprehensive survey of Japanese studies in South Korea. Soong Hoom Kil at Seoul National University reviewed the nature of Japanese political studies in South Korea in 1990 with the financial support from the Area Studies Center at Seoul National University (Soong Hoom Kil, Reference Kil1990). In 1999, Young Jak Kim conducted the most thorough and comprehensive analysis of the status of Japanese political studies in South Korea (Young Jak Kim, Reference Kim1999). This study is composed of a statistical compilation of the articles, journals, and books published in South Korea as well as a mathematical counting of intellectuals involved in Japanese political studies. He also categorized different generations of Japanese political studies in South Korea. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the Japan research center at Seoul National University began accumulating the data on the status of Japanese studies in South Korea.Footnote 1 This marks a beginning of an annual reporting by the South Korean institution regarding the status of Japanese studies in various fields, not simply Japanese political studies.Footnote 2 In 2005, Chang Soo Jin at the Sejong Institute, with the support of the Japan Foundation, illustrated the location of institutions offering Japanese studies as well as the specific composition of students of Japanese studies in South Korea (Chang Soo Jin, Reference Jin2007).
All these surveys on the status of Japanese political studies in South Korea contain a couple of weaknesses.
First of all, most of these studies concentrate on statistically compiling the number of intellectuals and the research undertaken with a view to grasping the overall outlook for Japanese studies in South Korea. This bias toward statistical analysis is closely intertwined with the institutional incentive of the funding organization, the Japan Foundation, because counting the numbers can easily justify the flow of money to the target countries and target institutions.Footnote 3
This is certainly a good start when figuring out the overall status of Japanese political studies. However, it does not necessarily clarify who are doing what. In other words, without doing qualitative content analysis of Japanese political studies in South Korea, people from outside end up with counting the numbers of intellectuals without any knowledge of the nature of the research being undertaken by South Korean intellectuals. Young Jak Kim's review article is clearly an exception in that he pinpointed changing research focuses across generations.
Second, the criteria of dividing the generations of Japanese political studies in South Korea remain ambiguous or arbitrary. In dividing the generations of Japanese political studies, scholars tend to adopt a different dividing line, depending on authors. Soong Hoom Kil divides the generations into two: fledgling period, 1965–77, and blooming period, 1978–90 (Kil, Reference Kil1990). Sang Il Han divides them into three: empty period, 1945–65; infant period, 1966–79; and childhood period, 1980–90 (Sang Il Han, Reference Han1990). On the other hand, though he accepts basically the division by Sang Il Han, Young Jak Kim divides them into four stages: anti-conception period, 1945–65; cradle period, 1966–80; childhood period, 1981–90; and youth period, 1991–99 (Young Jak Kim, Reference Kim1999).
For most of them, a politically symbolic year in South Korea-Japan relations has been highlighted as the primary criteria for dividing generations of scholars. However, that demarcation does not necessarily reflect changing milieu in the South Korean academia. Most of all, there is a mismatch between a politically symbolic year and the growth of Japan-related intellectuals. For example, though diplomatic normalization was achieved in 1965, it is only around the mid 1970s, almost a decade later, that Japan specialists began to publish major articles on contemporary Japan in the academic community. Accordingly, this article will focus on the actual flow and growth of human resources in Japanese political studies within the academia instead of marking a politically symbolic year as a criterion for dividing generations of scholars. In other words, this article focuses on the supply side of academia rather than the political demand side of the story.Footnote 4
Despite the caveats placed on previous studies, the authors mentioned above identify a few similar trends in Japanese political studies in South Korea.
All the reviewers suggest that anti-Japanese feeling, submerged in the mindset of ordinary South Koreans, led to the delayed start of Japanese studies in South Korea. In particular, the Sung-man Rhee regime utilized ‘anti-Japanism’, together with anti-communism, as one of the two major political justifications for the regime. A psychological barrier among the populace, most likely even among the academia, kept South Korean intellectuals from engaging in extensive research on Japan in the 1950s and most of the 1960s. It is only after the US-trained intellectuals were brought back as new blood in the mid to late 1970s that South Korean academia began analyzing Japan from a relatively objective standpoint. Because of the lingering prejudices left in South Korean society, topics of Japanese political research before the mid 1970s were limited to a few typical categories, such as the study of modern imperial Japan, Japanese aggression to South Korea, and its colonial oppression.Footnote 5 It is not surprising that most of these works assumed anti-Japanese positions.
Another common point raised by the reviewers is that humanities, particularly Japanese language and literature, dominated Japanese studies in South Korea. Even now the majority of college level departments teaching Japan studies are mostly departments of Japanese language and literature. They teach Japanese language, history, literature, and philosophy without fully exposing students to any social scientific analysis of Japan. The need for trained students with high level Japanese proficiency sustained the legacy of humanity-centered Japan studies in South Korea.Footnote 6 This institutionally rooted legacy is not likely to change easily. It is only since the 1990s that South Korean universities have begun incorporating area-studies extensively, as is shown by the trend that universities began establishing departments of Japanese area studies instead of the department of Japanese language and literature.Footnote 7 For example, the Graduate School of International Studies at Seoul National University established Japanese area studies as one of its majors.Footnote 8
The other point commonly raised by all the reviewers is that Japanese political studies have been initiated and led by foreign-trained South Korean scholars. During the time when first generation intellectuals were active, there had been too many Japanese speaking people in South Korea. Though they were not professionally trained as students, most of them pretended they knew some aspects of Japan.Footnote 9 This unusual social environment, which is very dissimilar from other countries, delayed the emergence of professional academics. Starting from late 1960s and 1970s, many South Korean scholars went abroad to study for higher degrees, mostly to major universities in the United States. Exempt from the social pressures and prejudices of South Korea, many of them were able to undertake their research on Japan from an objective angle. After returning to South Korea, these US-trained scholars became leading Japan specialists undertaking various research projects on contemporary Japan and trained the next generation scholars. Affected by these second generation scholars, many of their students went abroad to study Japan either in the United States or in Japan.Footnote 10 Thanks to the increasing availability of funding sources in Japan in the 1980s, a number of students headed for Japan for their graduate studies.
To sum up, social, institutional, and human infrastructures related to Japanese political studies in South Korea have experienced substantial changes over time. Anti-Japanese feeling has been gradually attenuated. Also, narrow focus on linguistic and humanistic understanding of Japanese society has extended to comprehensive social scientific understanding of it. In addition, as educational backgrounds of intellectuals pluralize, multi-cultural understanding of Japanese society substituted for the simple importation of the US perspectives.
Composition of the third generation: comparison with the previous generations
Around the mid to late 1970s, Japanese political studies in South Korea experienced a major turning point. It was in 1973 that the Center for Asian Studies at Korea University opened a Japan center.Footnote 11 Around 1977–1979 many US-trained Japan specialists began returning to South Korea, which marked the first massive inflow of intellectuals undertaking Japanese studies. A majority of them obtained their Ph.D.s in the United States.Footnote 12 Young Jak Kim and Sang Yong Choi are exceptions in that they received their Ph.D.s in Japan.Footnote 13 It was in 1978 that the Korean Association of Contemporary Japanese Studies was first formed. They cultivated a team spirit and clearly shared a strong identity, belonging to the same generation of scholars of Japanese studies. Reflecting this trend, this article categorizes the second generation of Japanese political studies in South Korea as those intellectuals who returned to South Korea in the mid to late 1970s and began publishing research results mostly from late 1970s to the early 1990s.
The second massive inflow of Japan specialists took place from the mid 1990s. Chang Soo Jin, Hwang Soo Chun, Won Deog Lee, Kee Seok Kim, and Yol Sohn returned to South Korea in the mid 1990s as fresh Ph.D.s. A number of intellectuals who received their Ph.D.s either in the United States or in Japan around this time continue to join this group. They also shared a clear generational identity among themselves.Footnote 14 The third generation scholars can be identified as those who produced their research results most actively from the mid 1990s to the mid 2000s.
The third generation Japan specialists have a few distinctive features in common.
The third generation scholars began seriously studying Japan from the mid 1980s to the early 1990s. This is the period when Japan drew most attention from graduate students because the Japanese economy was booming. Even after the bubble economy began to collapse, still the status of Japan as an economic giant was not challenged. Hence, third generation scholars acquired ambivalent feelings toward Japan. On the one hand, they unconsciously inherited the anti-Japanese feeling of South Korean society. But, at the same time, as they began studying Japan when the Japanese economy was at its peak, Japan was thought of as a model.Footnote 15 Accordingly, being anti-Japan was not a proper guiding light for them. Grasping a realistic view of Japanese politics and economy was their primary research interests.
The third generation scholars are composed of almost equal numbers of US-trained and Japan-trained Ph.D.s, unlike previous generations. The first generation scholars are mostly endogenous, trained or self-trained in South Korea, while most of the second generation scholars received their Ph.D. degrees in the United States with little field research experience in Japan. In contrast, most of the third generation scholars, even when they were trained in the United States or in South Korea, went over to Japan for field research (Yoo Hyang Kim, Reference Kim2000). This is distinctively different from the second generation, part of whom could not speak Japanese fluently. For the third generation scholars, Japanese language proficiency constituted an integral part of their competencies.
Another characteristic of the third generation is that most of them are now in their mid 40s to early 50s. One unusual phenomenon in Japanese political studies in South Korea is that those who attended college in the 1970s compose a relative minority.Footnote 16 Most of the third generation scholars attended college in the early 1980s when the student struggle for democracy was intense. South Korea's democratic transition helped them to acquire elevated confidence about their own political and economic system, which enabled them to analyze Japan with lesser prejudice and biases.
When the third generation returned to South Korea between the mid 1990s and early 2000s, the academic environment surrounding them was substantially different from the past. From the mid 1990s, the South Korean government began giving subsidies to the area studies program for the purpose of promoting internationalization of South Korean society. Nine graduate schools of international studies have been established for the purpose of promoting sekyehwa, or internationalization.Footnote 17 Also a number of academic institutions regarded Japan studies as a core part of the program.Footnote 18 In addition, South Korean academia put increasing emphasis on publishing articles in the peer review journals. Without having published quality articles in the review journals, one could hardly get a job at a competitive academic institution.Footnote 19 As a result, a number of research papers have been published in academic journals from the late 1990s and throughout the 2000s. It is not surprising at all that Japanese political studies flourished from the late 1990s, when the third generation began actively publishing their articles.
As the number of Japan specialists expands, their speciality areas become diverse and pluralized. In terms of a time framework, the first generation concentrated more on prewar Japan, mostly the nineteenth century Japan, or the imperial rule of Japan. For them, Japan was regarded as a target of explicit or implicit criticism. When they studied South Korea-Japan relations, the negative aspects of them were highlighted.
On the other hand, second generation scholars developed three research fronts to tackle.Footnote 20 The first front was the study of Japan from a historical perspective or from the prism of Korean nationalism, partly inheriting the tradition of the previous generation.Footnote 21 When they focused on South Korea-Japan relations, they paid attention to the impact of the Japanese system change on the bilateral relations. Another research front of the second generation was analyzing Japan from a modernization perspective.Footnote 22 How to understand the actual operation of Japan as the first modernized country in Asia turned out to be a puzzle, and was the first meaningful step toward understanding Japan from a politically neutral standpoint. The third front of the second generation has been the study of Japanese foreign and security policy. Like South Korea, Japan remained an ally to the United States under the Cold War structure. Thus, Japanese foreign policy behavior drew much attention from South Korean intellectuals.Footnote 23 The elevated international status of Japan after economic growth also spurred the study of Japanese foreign policy from a South Korean angle.
With the third generation, their research focus did not remain only in the conventional framework. Not only did they study recent Japanese history, South Korea-Japan relations, and the Japanese external relationship, they also began tackling many key issue areas such as Japanese party politics and political process, Japanese civil society, Japanese political economy, public administration and policy processes, local politics, individual policy areas, etc. The time gap between South Korean and Japanese intellectuals in terms of picking up subjects for their research topics was drastically narrowed. Research subjects that South Korean and Japanese scholars addressed became almost identical. As a result, potentials for collaborative research increased, making it a reality, not just a dream or hope.Footnote 24
Research fields of the third generation: who are doing what?
There are several ways of evaluating research topics in Japanese political studies in South Korea. Surveying Ph.D. dissertations and MA thesis is one of them. Another is collecting the list of books published by South Korean authors in and out of the country. A third way is to look at the articles appearing in the peer review journals. Out of those methods, this article takes the third approach. Since the late 1990s, most academic institutions have awarded higher credits to the articles published in the peer review journals. It goes without saying that other research outcomes also counted, but highest credits have been awarded to those articles appearing in the major journals. That is why this article focuses on reviewing articles that appeared in the major political science journals.
However, this review of the articles is still limited in two senses. First, for the purpose of reading the time trends, this article is confined to three major journals in the political science field – The Korean Political Science Review (Hankook Jongchi Hakhwoibo), The Korean Journal of International Relations (Kukje Jongchi Nonchong), and The Korean Journal of Japanese Studies (Ilbon Yonku Nonchong) – that contain high-quality articles related to Japan. This does not mean that other political science journals are not important. Journals such as The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Korean and World Affairs, National Strategy and others also contain articles about Japan. However, the three journals mentioned above have long been regarded as the top three journals in the field of Japanese political studies in South Korea (Young Jak Kim, Reference Kim1999).Footnote 25 Second, this article aims to review articles that appeared mostly in the 2000s when the third generation scholars began publishing actively. The Korean Journal of Japanese Studies began regular publication in 1999, though the first volume was published in 1978. Before then, Japan-related political scientists, if they obtained Ph.D.s, sent their articles to the two other journals. That is why this article reviews a few articles that appeared in two other journals before the 2000s.Footnote 26 Considering those two caveats, this is not the full-fledged and comprehensive review of all the works published by the third generation scholars in the field of Japanese political studies. Rather it is a partial systematic attempt to overview the issue areas and topics of Japanese political studies in South Korea.
The articles written by the contemporary authors in Japanese political studies in South Korea can be broadly classified into four categories: (1) widening the research horizon; (2) inheriting the tradition; (3) synchronizing research agendas; and (4) searching for a new research area.
Widening the horizon
There exist a few scholars between the second and the third generation, who can potentially be identified as the third generation but actually occupy a distinct position. They are those scholars who attended colleges in the 1970s and returned to South Korea in the late 1980s or in the early 1990s.Footnote 27 They contributed to the development of Japanese political studies in South Korea by widening the scope of research.
Jang Kwon Kim, Tsukuba Ph.D., wrote a dissertation on local political autonomy in Japan, where he took a pioneering look at the central-local linkages (Jang Kwon Kim, Reference Kim1992). Extending his logic, he also developed his own view about the Japanese civil society. Kim argues that community in the Japanese society, part of which is civil society, is captured either by the state or by the market, which led to the absence of self-identity and autonomy (Jang Kwon Kim, Reference Kim1999).
Jae Ho Yeom, Stanford Ph.D., turned his eyes to civil society and the governance structure in South Korea and Japan. He should be recognized as a pioneer in initiating international collaborative study in comparing South Korean and Japanese politics. Together with Yutaka Tsujinaka, Yeom conducted a survey about the composition of civic organizations in South Korea and Japan, from which they argued that South Korea has more advocacy groups while Japan has more interest groups (Tsujinaka, et al., Reference Tsujinaka, Chung and Jae1998).
Eun Bong Choi, Ph.D. at Ohio State University, keeps her eyes on the education policy issue in the context of changing Japanese civil society. One of her articles is about the controversy between South Korea and Japan regarding history textbooks. She discusses the rise of right-wing forces who are trying to compose new history textbooks in Japan. What she explored is the perplexed definition of the Japanese identity (Eun Bong Choi, Reference Choi2001).
Inheriting the tradition
Quite a few third generation scholars inherited the traditional research topics that the previous generations explored.
Scrutinizing modern Japan
Young June Park, who originally studied the modern Japanese Navy buildup after the Meiji restoration, continues to delve into the study of modern Japan. In an attempt to understand the shifting national strategies of Japan in modern times, Park studied political thoughts of Tanzan Ishibashi in prewar times. He identified Ishibashi as an advocate of a small Japan idea, contrasting him with the expansionists of the times (Young June Park, Reference Park2005). Park finds the potential of Kantian democratic peace in Ishibashi's thought.
How to judge the Japanese colonial rule is one of the most controversial topics in South Korea. Dong Myung Kim addresses this question, studying the case of introducing modern voting rights to colonized Korea (Dong Myung Kim, Reference Kim2002). Imperial Japan justified the introduction of local participation as a case for modernizing Japan. However, Kim claims that it resulted from a bargaining between the Japanese rulers, who wanted to repress Korean resistance, and minority Koreans, who accepted the Japanese imperial rule.
South Korea-Japan relations
The South Korea-Japan relationship may be an ongoing research topic for South Korean intellectuals studying Japan. Two approaches have been adopted to develop the theme: the historical approach and theoretical analysis.
Won Deog Lee looks at voluminous historical records of the bilateral negotiations between South Korea and Japan toward normalization to reveal the truth about how the two countries negotiated over sensitive issues related to the past (Won Deog Lee, Reference Lee2000). As an extension of his research agenda, the Institute of Japanese Studies at Kookmin University, where Lee is currently a director, is extensively involved in researching the declassified documents and material about the normalization treaty between South Korea and Japan in 1965.Footnote 28 Reviewing the status of South Korea-Japan relations in the 1990s, Won Deog Lee traces shifting structural context from which three contending issues emerged: historical controversy, Japan's conservative shift, and Japan–North Korea relations. He cautiously points out that conflict and confrontation would be escalated despite the need to upgrade cooperative ties (Won Deog Lee, Reference Lee2001). Kee Seok Kim also suggests that the structural context defining South Korea-Japan relations has been changed. He argues that changes in international relations in East Asia encouraged the gradual shift in the level of the ties from trilateral alliance among the US, Japan, and South Korea to a multilateral complex power game including Japan, China, and the US (Kee Seok Kim, Reference Kim2008).
Sang Young Rhyu and Seung Joo Lee highlight the changes in economic transaction to figure out shifting South Korea-Japan relations. According to them, a flying geese model accounts for South Korea-Japan economic cooperation during the Cold War period. But, after the South Korean economic crisis in 1997, they claim, the flying geese model is no longer an effective framework to account for the bilateral ties between South Korea and Japan. In the steel sector, learning shifted to innovation while horizontal division of labor emerged in the IT industry (Sang Young Rhyu and Seung Joo Lee, Reference Lee2003). Sang Young Rhyu also analyzes the Japan–North Korean economic relations. His argument is that, unlike the conventional view that Japan can be a savior of North Korea, economic interfaces between Japan and North Korea have disappeared or been lost. Instead of Japan, China emerged as a major trading partner to North Korea (Sang Young Rhyu, Reference Rhyu2004). Ki Woong Yang claims that economic context does not always negatively affect the bilateral ties between South Korea and Japan. He relied on a concrete case study, that of negotiating the new fisheries agreement between South Korea and Japan in 1998, which ended up with a successful conclusion because of external pressure from the Asian economic crisis, issue linkage with other comprehensive cooperative programs, and the deadline set by the Presidential visit to Japan (Ki Woong Yang, Reference Yang2005).
If scratching at the empirical realities of the bilateral ties from a historical standpoint composes one approach to the study of South Korea-Japan relations, analyzing the ties between the two countries from a theoretical angle constitutes another. Victor Cha pioneered in featuring South Korea-Japan relations in the light of alliance politics. Using entrapment–abandonment fear among allies, Cha found deepening alignment despite antagonism when the US shows a sign of gradual finality (Cha, Reference Cha1997). Seung Ji U makes rebuttals against Victor Cha's model and suggests that Cha's theory does not fit neatly with empirical realities. He argued that coalition–engagement dynamics account for the changing ties much better (U, Reference Seung Ji2003). Instead of looking at the role of the US, Sun Won Park, by empirically investigating the critical period of 1979–1980, focuses on the independent role of Japan in a providing cooperative stance (Sun Won Park, Reference Park2002). Park asserts that when Japan detects the ineffectiveness in the US's South Korea policy, especially because the US is entangled with the international crisis in other regions, Japan tries to exert autonomous influence on South Korea by providing security cooperation.
Tae Ryong Yoon develops a net threat theory to explain South Korea-Japan relations (Yoon, Reference Yoon2006). According to him, when the net threat from the third party increases, South Korea and Japan have more potential to cooperate. In this dynamic, the US is an important but not a crucial determinant of the relationship. Cheol Hee Park critically reviews all these works and suggests an alternative framework that he calls the convergence-escalation model (Park, Reference Park2008). Park argues that South Korea-Japan relations are favorable when the threat perceptions from the third party are converging and historical controversy is subsiding. On the other hand, bilateral ties turn bitter when the two countries develop diverging threat perceptions from the third party and they engage in the domestic escalation of historical controversy.
Japanese foreign and security policy
The question of a US-reliant, minimalist, low-expenditure defense policy has long been a puzzle for the student of Japan's security policy. Instead of explaining a minimalist security policy with institutional or cultural logic, Tae Hyo Kim interprets it as the realistic and strategic adaptation to the changing external security environment of the times (Tae Hyo Kim, Reference Kim1997). Though he does not fully appreciate the domestic political context in Japan, Tae Hyo Kim contributed to analyzing Japanese security policy from an angle that Japan devises its policies in a rational way.Footnote 29 In an adventure to investigate an adaptive transformation of the US–Japan alliance, Change Hee Nam addresses the role of US forces in Japan after the end of the Cold War. Nam points out that the US forces in Japan play four main functions: responding to the regional contingencies, maintaining intra-regional balance of power, securing Japan, and reducing temptation for Japan's self-reliant military buildup (Nam, Reference Nam1996). He goes on to study the US forces stationed in Okinawa. After a screening of the base relocation issue in Okinawa, he takes a view that the strategic role of Okinawa has not been altered at all, because the base relocation issue started with the limited purpose of dealing with anti-American sentiments among the Okinawa residents (Chang Hee Nam and Jong Sung Lee, Reference Nam and Lee2004).
Together with the maintenance of the US forces in Japan, how to support them was a major concern for both countries. Woon Do Choi closely followed the case of Japan's defense burden sharing. Against the claim that Japan's free ride is the result of the lack of political leadership or immense pressure from interest groups, Choi argues that defense burden sharing resulted from the two level games in which policymakers in the US and Japan were immersed (Woon Do Choi, Reference Choi1999). He suggests that in the 1970s Japan's relative free ride is a result of domestic political controversy within Japan rather than absence of the US request. In the 1980s, he argues, Japan's domestic situation enabled the discussion about defense burden sharing in the context of increasing US pressure. In the 1990s, Japan's active burden sharing is the reflection of domestic conflicts within the US combined with weakened negotiating power.
If the US–Japan alliance constitutes a conservative pillar of Japanese external policy, Japanese pacifism may have been a progressive agenda. Japanese pacifism is the area where the Japanese and South Korean perspectives diverge. As for the nature of Japanese pacifism, Joon Sub Kim challenges the pacifist idea that is codified in the Japanese peace constitution (Joon Sub Kim, Reference Kim2000). According to him, Japan's one country pacifism is founded on absolute pacifism, driven by the victimized spirit, while it is also intertwined with pragmatic pacifism, which utilizes constitution as a logical defense for alleviating Japanese burdens in changing situations. Kim claims that since the end of the Cold War, two different kinds of pacifism are emerging in Japan: assertive pacifism, which emphasizes military contribution, and internationally collaborative pacifism, which focuses on civilian contribution. Sang Bong Lee further pursues this theme and finds vulnerability in Japanese pacifism resulting from the dual identity of being an aggressor as well as the victimized (Sang Bong Lee, Reference Lee2003).
Cheol Hee Park traces the complex twist in the development of Japanese security posture. He argues that Japanese security policy has been shifted from exclusive defense to active defense (Cheol Hee Park, Reference Park2004b). According to Park, in the political context of weakening progressive forces, Japan has shifted its security policy toward actively responding to threats while expanding the geographical perimeter of action allowed to the self defense forces. Accordingly, Japanese pacifism should be realistically reassessed. Woon Do Choi sends a comforting signal by claiming that, despite the Japanese defense policy shift to the active defense principle, trust in the US control over Japan assuages concerns about Japan's overexpansion of military activities (Woon Do Choi, Reference Choi2005). He asserts that, though the military role of Japan may be expanded under the US–Japan alliance framework, it also signifies the further integration of Japan into the American military strategy, which is not deplorable at all.
Synchronizing research agendas
Japanese political economy
Reflecting the intellectual mood in the late 1980s and early 1990s, many third generation scholars joined the fad in studying Japanese political economy.
The role of the state in the market has been a longstanding topic for political economists. Against a view that bureaucrats dominate in the Japanese market, Chang Soo Jin develops a view that the Ministry of Finance's fiscal balance policy combined with the industrial rationalization policy driven by the Ministry of International Trade and Industries (MITI) contributed to the smooth operation of the market mechanism in Japan (Chang Soo Jin, Reference Jin1996).
The relationship between bureaucrats and politicians occupy another area of theoretical attention. Kee Seok Kim, introducing a rational choice institutionalism perspective, argues that introducing the consumption tax in the 1980s was possible because of the LDP rank and files’ consent to the reform bills (Kee Seok Kim, Reference Kim1998). Later, Kee Seok Kim applied the principal-agent model to the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats, focusing on the level of delegation (Kee Seok Kim, Reference Kim2001a).Footnote 30 However, he does not think that a rational choice model is universally applicable to any system. In interpreting the overall nature of economic reform in Japan, Kee Seok Kim asserts that Japanese financial system reform shows the amalgamation of a market-oriented system and a traditional Japanese-style system (Kee Seok Kim, Reference Kim2005b). Following the tradition of the rational choice model, Kee Seok Kim also finds the importance of political incentives in reforming the Ministry of Finance. With the background of economic slowdown and public opinion critical of the ministry, party political leaders put the ministerial reform in the general context of political reform, which led to a partial success (Kee Seok Kim, Reference Kim2001b). The unorganized public is often an neglected part of the story when it comes to analysis of the political economy. Se Keol Kim addresses this issue with a case study of tax reform in the 1980s. He asserts that, despite the claim that the LDP is a catch-all party, the interests of the salaried people have always been underrepresented (Se Keol Kim, Reference Kim1997).
Whether the Japanese state is reactive or not has been another topic of controversy. Against the view that Japanese foreign economic policy is reactive, Hong Young Park, who concentrated on studying Japan's Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) policy (Hong Young Park, Reference Park2000), argues that Japanese economic diplomacy has been autonomous and strategic (Hong Young Park, Reference Park2002). Unlike the indication that Japanese diplomacy lacked political orientation and strategic mindsets, Park argues that Japan utilized reparation to Vietnam as a means of boosting up a favorable perception of Japan as well as a means to strengthen Japanese economic revitalization. Park categorizes three different phases of Japanese ODA strategy (Hong Young Park, Reference Park2003). The first period, 1945–1976, is a period of high economic growth strategy. The second period, 1976–1989, is a phase of international cooperation and contribution. And the third period, after 1989, is a phase of assertive international political economic strategy. Kee Seok Kim also finds the element of strategic extension in Japanese finance. Kim compares internationalization of the yen in the 1980s and that in the 1990s (Kee Seok Kim, Reference Kim2000). He suggests that the internationalization of the yen in the 1980s took the shape of deregulating the Japanese financial and foreign exchange market. In contrast, he finds, the internationalization of the yen in the 1990s was an assertive foreign economic strategy, which aimed at circulating yen more broadly in the international society.
As the Japanese economy experiences recession, negative aspects of the Japanese political economy have also been analyzed. Sang Joon Kim associates financial liberalization with the corporate governance structure (Sang Joon Kim, Reference Kim2003). According to him, in the 1970s, Japanese corporate governance was controlled by the credit providers, but, in the 1980s, control by the credit providers weakened, while speculative investments increased as the result of financial liberalization. Seong Bin Pak links the amakudari practice with the convoy fleet system in Japanese finance (Seong Bin Pak, Reference Pak2004). What he finds is that about 70% of Japanese banks provide amakudari to the finance authority. Local banks provide more jobs than urban banks. Also he finds that amakudari practice peaked in the 1980s. Seong Bin Pak goes on to argue that, though the convoy fleet system has been disentangled, new financial systems emerging after the reform would take the shape of the refreshed Japan-born system because of path dependence (Seong Bin Pak, Reference Pak2005).
Elections, party politics and diet affairs
Elections and party politics are central to Japanese domestic political studies. In this issue area as well, South Korean scholars tried to narrow the gap between South Korea and Japan in addressing questions and making arguments.
In line with his advisor in Japan, Sadafumi Kawato, Se Hun Ha produced a few original works on the Diet deliberation. In 1999, Ha produced a research outcome that the deliberative functions of the Japanese Diet were weakening around 1955 (Ha, Reference Ha1999). He finds the reasons for this to be the overwhelming status of the budget committee over other committees as well as the introduction of a prior screening system by the ruling LDP. In another article, Ha also traces the historical development of the Japanese Diet system. He suggests that the Japanese Diet adopted a combination of the British and American system without considering their institutional affinity (Ha, Reference Ha2001). According to him, the British style parliamentary system combined with the American style standing committee system produced institutional dissonance, which later forced the committee system reform after the end of the American occupation. Ha extends his study to the Diet reform in the 1990s (Se Hun Ha, Reference Ha2008). Due to the reform measures introduced to the Diet, such as tighter surveillance over the public administration, active Diet deliberation, the role of Diet is getting more important than before.
The end of the 1955 system and subsequent political change is definitely an area that needs elaborate analysis. Hyun Chool Lee looks at the shifting pattern of voting behaviors. Lee points out that, instead of ideological cleavages that divided the public under the 1955 system, a new cleavage based on the urban–rural cleavage is emerging since the end of the 1955 system (Hyun Chool Lee, Reference Lee2002). Soon Mee Kwon highlights the role of the labor front in Japanese politics (Kwon, Reference Kwon2004). She argues that a party system with labor under the 1955 system shifted to a party system without labor after the introduction of the new electoral system in Japan. However, she asserts that the advent of a party system without labor resulted from a policy failure of the progressive parties as well as the lack of organizational capability rather than from an institutional imperative to walk away from the labor front.Footnote 31
Ki Wan Lee focuses on the platform shift of the former opposition parties. Regarding the Japan Socialist Party, Ki Wan Lee associates the sudden platform shift led by Murayama with the intra-party division as well as the party's overall decline (Ki Wan Lee, Reference Lee2003). Ki Wan Lee also finds realism in the Komeito's action to get in the coalition government. Unlike the criticism by the media, he claims that Komeito's position shift is rooted in the rational choice for political survival based on middle of the road reformism (Ki Wan Lee, Reference Lee2006).
How the LDP dominance varied over time is a long-lasting topic in party political studies. Cheol Hee Park argues that the 1990s, which the Japanese calls a lost decade, should be grasped as a period of major regime transformation (Cheol Hee Park, Reference Park2004a). During the decade, the LDP tried varying survival strategies, but Park claims that, because of contradictions and vulnerabilities of those strategies, the LDP can only maintain a precarious, rather than stable, dominance. Park also analyzes that what has been fundamentally transformed since the end of the 1955 system is the opposition camp. Focusing on the rise of the Democratic Party of Japan, Park asserts that, in the process of absorbing scattered opposition political parties as well as accepting new blood, the DPJ is shifting to be a viable alternative to the LDP by carefully managing intra-party affairs (Cheol Hee Park, Reference Park2006).
Seon Gyu Go explores a new territory in the Japanese election (Seon Gyu Go, Reference Go2003). He looks at online cyber campaign activities, which is a little studied area even in Japan. He finds that the cyber campaign emerged as a new style activity from the year 2000. The trend he finds is that online activities like homepages are actively under use among the major political parties rather than small parties.
Public administration and policy process
In South Korean academia, specialists in public administration and political scientists have different domains for professional careers. However, a few South Korean political scientists address the question of public-sector reform in Japan.
Jin Won Lee evaluates Hashimoto's administrative reform as a new initiative to establish political leadership as against bureaucratic dominance (Jin Won Lee, Reference Lee2002). Sang Hoon Lee, after studying the reshuffling of central government ministries under Hashimoto, concluded that this drastic reform was possible because the symbiosis between the LDP and bureaucrats broke down after the LDP once experienced loss of power in 1993 (Sang Hoon Lee, Reference Lee2002). Lee also thinks Koizumi's reform was possible because his reform led to a high popular endorsement rate, the biggest faction in the LDP has been weakened, and he succeeded in demolishing the decision-making style led by zoku giin (Sang Hoon Lee, Reference Lee2006).
Mi Ae Jung traces the changes in Japanese social welfare policy in the 1990s (Mi Ae Jung, Reference Jung2005). Jung asserts that Japanese social welfare policy shifted from the household-oriented one to the individual-oriented one. Also she finds that the reconciliation model is replacing the male breadwinner model because of the effects of a low birth rate and an aging society.
Civil society
The nature of Japanese civil society is not firmly articulated in South Korea. Mi Ae Jung claims that Japanese civil society is a government-driven one where insufficient volunteerism is found (Mi Ae Jung, Reference Jung2002). According to her, Japanese civil society was strategically boosted by the Japanese government from the 1980s for the purpose of utilizing private-sector energy in the process of pushing forward public-sector reform.Footnote 32 Unlike this pessimistic view, Jeong Sook Chung finds a vibrant Japanese civil society from a feminist angle (Jeong Sook Chung, Reference Chung2003). According to Chung, as of 2002, Japan had 620,000 civil organizations where 1.7 million people work. In particular, Chung points out that the females who have the luxury of time have been active in civil society.
Searching for a new research area
South Korean intellectuals pioneered in cultivating the research topics that have not been actively addressed by Japanese and foreign scholars for a long time. Because of the geographic location of South Korea, South Korean scholars developed almost an instinctive desire to look at Japan in the East Asian context. Two areas have duly emerged as new horizons of research: locating Japan in the East Asian context and comparing South Korea and Japan.
Japan and East Asia
Japan's East Asia policy is an area in which South Korean intellectuals show a keen interest. Chang Soo Jin scrutinizes changes in Japan's East Asia policy and points out that Japan's Asia policy before the Asian economic crisis in 1997 was characterized by comprehensive Asia policy, including cooperation with the United States (Chang Soo Jin, Reference Jin2008). However, Jin asserts that, after 1997, Japan's East Asia policy has shifted to promoting cooperation among intra-regional collaboration in East Asia. Won Deog Lee identifies three distinctive features in Japan's East Asia policy (Won Deog Lee, Reference Lee2005). First, Japan defines the geographical boundary as broad as possible rather than confining the region to Northeast Asia. Second, Japan tries to balance the US–Japan alliance with its Asian initiative. Third, in an attempt to check the increasing influence of China in Southeast Asia, the sense of competing with China lies behind the East Asia policy. Seong Bin Pak also finds a similar trend in Japan's regional strategy. He argues a basic unit that Japan has in mind in terms of East Asian regional cooperation is ASEAN+6 (Seong Bin Pak, Reference Pak2007). He suggests that Japan's regional strategy is shaped by three critical factors: sympathy for the US position, check against China, and domestic political concerns. In Japan's East Asia policy after the end of the Cold War, Ju Myung Song finds the dynamic alternation between Asianism and what he calls security nationalism (Ju Myung Song, Reference Song2001).
Ho Sup Kim has concentrated on Japanese diplomacy toward East Asia. He contends that Japanese access to East Asia becomes more active as China emerges as a major competitor in the region (Ho Sup Kim, Reference Kim2006). The idea of an East Asian community is an outgrowth of that challenge. He goes on to argue that, without incorporating South Korea and China in the scheme, Japanese initiative for the East Asian community cannot bear fruit. Ho Sup Kim also develops his idea about how Japan deals with China. He critically reviews the termination of Japan's ODA to China and concludes that Japanese perception toward China has undergone fundamental transformation (Ho Sup Kim, Reference Kim2008). Ki Sup Son carefully analyzes Japan–China relations. He posits that the 1972 system continued to expand and grow in the 1980s, but began shifting in the post-Cold War context (Ki Sup Son, Reference Son2004). Looking at the case of Japan's ODA to China, Son identifies the nature of Japanese ODA as being a politicized initiative primarily coordinated by the Prime Minister's Office because major decisions on the initiation, continuation, and termination of the ODA to China have been made by the political leaders (Ki Sup Son, Reference Son2005).
Regarding the Japanese FTA policy toward Asia, Ho Sup Kim suggests that domestic politics matter more (Ho Sup Kim, Reference Kim2004). Though the diplomatic authority in Japan is actively pushing forward the idea of concluding the FTA with many countries, Kim implies, resistance by noncompetitive sectors blocks the move toward a successful conclusion of the FTA, including the South Korea-Japan FTA negotiation. Chang Gun Park extends the logic to the East Asian region in general. He asserts that Japanese FTA strategy in East Asia should be understood as an intra-regional trade strategy (Chang Gun Park, Reference Park2007). He names the strategy as multi-complex regionalism, the target of which is to take the initiative in designing regional cooperation.
Comparing Japan and South Korea
There is an increasing consciousness among the South Korean as well as Japanese academia that South Korea and Japan are comparable in a parallel way.Footnote 33 Several attempts have been initiated to tackle the adventure of comparing the two nations.
Suhng Bin Lim compares South Korean and Japanese initiatives for promoting local autonomy in the 1990s. He points out that Japan obtained a positive outcome in enacting relevant laws and abolishing delegation of authority, while South Korea did not carry out fundamental reform measures. In the process, he finds the importance of local policy networks, where a variety of private intellectuals participate (Suhng Bin Lim, Reference Lim2005).
Young Joo Kwon and Yutaka Onishi compare administrative reforms in South Korea and Japan. They find that administrative organs in South Korea reshuffled drastically especially in the earlier years of every new administration. In contrast, Japan show only a piecemeal engineering. They locate an initial answer in the different regime type, South Korean presidential system and Japanese parliamentary system. However, they identified a deeper reason in the location of authority to dictate personnel administration as well as the right to nominate electoral candidates (Young Joo Kwon and Yutaka Onishi, Reference Kwon and Onishi1999).
Yong Bok Kim compares economic reform after the Asian economic crisis. He argues that the general direction of South Korea's economic reform converges with the neoliberal economy, while that of Japan attempts to maintain a distinct Japanese-style economy while partially coping with the Anglo-Saxon style economy (Yong Bok Kim, Reference Kim1999).
Rhee Beom Lee puts leadership style of Koizumi and Moo Hyun Roh in the context of rising populism (Rhee Beom Lee, Reference Lee2006). In that both political leaders took a negative stance toward the vested interests codified in the existing institutions, two leaders share a similarity. However, Lee claims that Roh put more emphasis on the generational cleavage, while Koizumi locates the question with voters’ dissatisfaction toward the ruling LDP.
Future challenges of Japanese political studies in South Korea
Newly upcoming generation
Even though fresh Ph.D.s have not published many articles and books yet, there are a number of the next generation scholars of Japanese political studies. New generation scholars are equipped with a few distinctive features that are different from the third generation.
First of all, a major proportion of the next generation scholars have received their higher education in Japan.Footnote 34 Most of them are trained in Japan as the recipients of the Monbusho Scholarship. Unprecedented is not simply the overwhelming number of Japan-trained scholars, but many of these new generation scholars have been hired at the Japanese academic institutions after they obtained Ph.D.s. Examples are plenty: Dong Kook Kang at Nagoya University; Kyung Il Ra and Kyung Mook Kim at Chukyo University; Kyung Joo Kim at Dokai University; Dae Song Hyun at the University of Tokyo; Suk Hyun Kim at Tohoku University, and others. It is reported that, irrespective of their specialty areas, about 120 South Korean intellectuals are hired at the academic institutions in Japan.Footnote 35 Political scientists who are hired at the Japanese universities are still minority, but this is clearly a new trend that is differentiated from the previous generations.Footnote 36
Secondly, the upcoming generation tends to put Japan in a wider regional and global context than the previous generations. Instead of concentrating on Japanese affairs itself, new generation scholars are inclined to link Japan with the regional and global affairs. For example, Yang Hyeon Jo (Reference Jo2006) wrote a dissertation on Asian regionalism and American diplomacy. He argues that Asian countries tried to collectively deal with intra-regional common challenges by initiating the establishment of inter-governmental institutions.Footnote 37 Hee Sik Choi, who studied at the Keio University, also endeavors to locate South Korea-Japan relations in the context of Asia-Pacific regional cooperation.Footnote 38 According to him, South Korea and Japan had dissimilar regional approaches in the 1960s. But, in the 1990s, South Korea and Japan shared a regional partnership. Suk Hyun Kim, who obtained Ph.D. at the University of Tokyo, also investigated the implications of a Sino-South Korean relationship in the East Asian regional context (Suk Hyun Kim, Reference Kim2010).
A third distinctive feature of the upcoming generation may be that they are trained in an inter-disciplinary setting before advancing to the Ph.D. level study. Many of this generation became interested in Japan from exposures to Japanese popular culture such as manga, comic books, Japanese dramas or songs. They received inter-disciplinary training in the course of pursuing degrees. As area studies programs became available to them at several universities, they did not dare to switch their majors from humanities and social sciences to the area studies programs and other graduate programs before entering into the Ph.D. program at higher academic institutions. From that experience, they try to look at the Japanese political issue from a wider angle.
Challenges for the future
Even though Japanese political studies in South Korea have grown up both in terms of quality and quantity, further endeavors should be devoted to improve it to a globally competitive academic adventure.
First of all, a number of articles have been written on the basis of field research and first-hand information about Japanese politics and diplomacy. In this regard, academic achievements by South Korean scholars do not lag behind. However, Japanese political studies in South Korea should make the utmost effort to embrace a more theoretical approach and critical perspective. Whether South Korean intellectuals in the field of Japanese studies can upgrade the theoretical underpinnings for the purpose of exposing them to the wider scholarly community in the world is a big challenge. In addition to the microscopic analysis of key cases, putting them in the framework of a bigger picture so as to understand Japanese society from a comparative and theoretical angle may be needed. This means that Japanese political studies in South Korea have to be more globalized in the future.
Another challenge may be the need to develop a uniquely South Korean perspective on Japanese politics and diplomacy. For the past few decades, Japanese studies in South Korea have made rapid development in catching up with Japanese studies in Japan and the United States mostly. In that sense, Japanese political studies in South Korea succeeded in synchronizing the research agendas and issues. Now it is time to develop a distinctive South Korean standpoint in understanding Japan. Like the Japanese studies in America which often reflect the strategic interests of the United States,Footnote 39 Japanese political studies in South Korea are urged to develop their own research agendas and fields of studies for further investigation. Such little studied issue areas as Japanese right-wing social movements, Japanese and East Asian regional integration, historical controversy, and national identity in East Asia are examples of candidates.
A third challenge may be developing a systematic collaborative study with the foreign scholarly community. A few South Korean scholars have already attempted to work with Japanese and other foreign scholars. Also government-sponsored joint research projects have been initiated for ten years where a number of political scientists from Japan and South Korea joined. However, it is time for South Korean scholars to independently find top-class scholars in their own research fields in order to collaboratively produce internationally competitive research outcomes. Developing new agendas and issues for further study may come out from this collaborative adventure of advancing Japanese political studies.
About the author
Cheol Hee Park is an associate professor at the Graduate school of International Studies (GSIS) at Seoul National University, South Korea, where he teaches Japanese politics, Korea-Japan relations, and international relations in East Asia. He got a Ph.D. at Columbia University. Before joining a faculty at Seoul National University, Dr. Park was an assistant professor at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Japan, and also served as an assistant professor at the Institute for Foreign Affairs and National Security under the Korean Foreign Ministry. He published many articles on East Asian politics and international relations in Korean, Japanese, and English at various journals, including Asian Survey, Japanese Journal of Political Studies, Asian Journal of Political Science, Asia-Pacific Review, International Political Science Review, Korean Political Science Review, Korean Journal of International Relations, and etc.
