David Hume argued that what we perceive as continuity in the world is actually an assembly of “interrupted perceptions” that bear no necessary internal relation to one another. Davide Panagia asks what it would mean to “engage Hume’s writings from a Humean perspective that begins with registering discontinuous impressions, rather than reading his works so as to explain the continuity of his analytic propositions” (p. 4). The result is Impressions of Hume. (It is worth noting that this is not the first book with that title; see Marina Frasca-Spada and P. J. E. Kail, eds., 2005.) Panagia’s book challenges readers to consider Hume as a cinematic thinker, immersed in a world of moving images, whose radical empiricism presses us to consider the political implications of our realization that, like movies composed of still frames on a film strip, our knowledge of the world and our personal identities are composed of discontinuous impressions that can be edited, arranged, and rearranged in innumerable ways. Panagia urges cultural and political theorists to consider the contributions that Hume’s “politics of discontinuity” (p. 131) could make to contemporary debates concerning identity and difference. He leaves fuller elaboration of those contributions for future projects. In this work, his aim is to impress upon his readers the radical nature of Hume’s cinematic thinking.
In the first chapter, Panagia argues that film offers novel ways of thinking about politics. He emphasizes the ways in which perceived continuities in the political world are, actually, series of impressions, bearing no necessary internal relation to one another. It is our minds that produce an illusion or artifice of continuity. Particularly noteworthy, he writes, are the ways in which cinematic thinking makes vivid experiences of discontinuity. He marks Hume’s account concerning how individuals formulate a nonverifiable view of the world from “broken appearances” (T 1.4.2.36) as his discovery of cinematic thinking.
In Chapter 2, Panagia addresses the apparent anachronism of labeling Hume a cinematic thinker. Hume’s empirical understanding of human existence is cinematographic, in that it is “committed to the impression of moving images” (p. 48). But cinematic thinking need not be confined to the technology of film. In Hume’s time, the technology that emerged as dominant was the printing press, which, Panagia argues, reinforced an ontology of discontinuity: Just as no text is ever complete (given the possibility of future revisions), so too identities and judgments involve permanent processes of revision.
Chapter 3 focuses on what Panagia calls Hume’s iconomy. By that he means Hume’s account of the mind as a “space of image production and circulation” (p. 84). He presents Hume as immersed in a culture profoundly absorbed with the production and circulation of images. In the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, he argues, Hume employs a mode of enquiry requiring “a play of contours, a framing and reframing of edges” (p. 94). Hume repeatedly draws on examples that involve movement from one place to another and, thereby, calls attention to passages and doorways as frames in a discontinuous world.
In Chapter 4, Panagia clearly articulates some of the political implications of his reading of Hume. Against prevailing accounts of Humean sympathy and impartiality, he argues that, for Hume, impartiality is not a viewpoint or a perspective but, rather, a practice of “dispossessive resistance” (p. 117). As collections of disconnected impressions, we have a natural tendency to compose ourselves as defined identities by mentally “assembling the multiplicities of immediate impulses that affect us” (p. 119). Impartiality is the process through which we screen ourselves from our proximate interests and resist our imagination’s natural tendencies to produce artifices of coherence. Upon this screen, Panagia writes, we project our reputation and enter into sympathy with the projected reputations of others. This provocative account of impartiality, as a “practice of interruption” (p. 119), offers a powerful rejoinder to standard interpretations of Hume that privilege the notion of an impartial perspective and contemporary attempts at rejecting neo-Kantian accounts of democratic deliberation by appealing to Hume’s accounts of sympathy and the general point of view as avenues for establishing authoritative norms without strict requirements of rationalism.
Panagia does not always give sufficient weight to Hume’s own choice of words. He argues that Hume should not be read as defending a single impartial point of view because “there is nothing in Hume’s thought that begins with the kind of stasis” that such an account presumes (p. 114). While Panagia’s account of impartiality as process might be compelling, this particular argument is at odds with his aspectual method, which is supposed to privilege “registering discontinuous impressions” over analytic coherence (p. 4). It also seems to eschew a fully satisfactory account of Hume’s choice of words in his argument that an individual must “depart from his private and particular situation, and must choose a point of view, common to him with others” (Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, SBN272).
Hume’s words generally make quite forceful impressions, which accounts for his reputation as a clear writer. By contrast, Panagia’s book gives the impression that there is a deep incongruity between the clarity of Hume’s prose and the seemingly unnecessary opacity of the language being deployed to discuss it. To offer but one example, Panagia’s definition of an aspect as “a durational impression that advances contours of proximity, which potentiate processes of intonation between advening appearances” (p. 12) seems poorly suited to engage any readers except those already fully conversant in this jargon.
Impressions of Hume argues that there is a “radical shift in ontology from substance to process” in Hume (p. 3). Panagia leaves aside Hume’s political essays and his History of England (despite claiming on p. 56 that Hume’s ontology has profound implications for the way we should read those volumes). As a result, one sometimes gets the sense that he is overplaying his hand or, at minimum, moving too seamlessly from Humean ontology to Humean politics. For example, he cites Treatise 1.3.3.3 to claim that “the emergence of an occurrence … need not be dependent on an underlying cause for its production” (p. 60), without addressing why or how this passage might be in tension with Hume’s claim in “That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science” that “effects will always correspond to causes.” An engagement with Hume’s History and his other political writings might have contributed a great deal toward illuminating the political implications of his ontological commitment to discontinuity.
Panagia’s presentation of Hume’s ideas is warm and thoughtful. His use of film imagery even renders vivid certain aspects of “Hume’s politics of discontinuity” (p. 131). Some of the cultural and political theorists who are Panagia’s primary audience will undoubtedly find themselves challenged by this book to grapple with the consequences of recognizing our “capacities for beholding [as] curatorial practices of resistance to our inclinations to possess” (p. 131). The book’s opaque prose and a lack of attention to many of Hume’s most important political texts may well limit the impact of Impressions of Hume on Hume scholarship more generally. At the same time, Panagia’s account of Hume is novel and provocative.
