From Barbarians to Imperial Subjects to Younger Brother Minzu

Yunnan did not become an administrative part of China until the Mongols’ 1253 campaign. Moreover, the Yunnan branch secretariat (Yunnan Xingzhongshusheng) was only established in 1276. Since then, Yunnan has been a primary provincial unit of imperial and modern China. Frontier Yunnan, in Chinese historical writings, was attractive but dangerous and awaited the Chinese civilizing project. Indigenous people in Yunnan were seen as barbarian, savage, uncivilized, rude, bellicose, dangerous and exotic, and were described as female, childish, and ancient, but educatable.Footnote ² During the Yuan-Ming-Qing period, with the arrival of several million Han Chinese, and the imposition of Chinese administrative, economic and educational infrastructure, a new society eventually emerged, which resulted in the indigenous peoples becoming truly a ‘minority’. By the time, imperial governments started to see ethnic peoples as imperial subjects. ‘Baixing’ (A Hundred Surnames), ‘Chizi’ (Innocent Sons) and ‘Lixian’ (common people/subjects [euphemistic]) that were previously reserved for Han subjects began to be used to refer to non-Han ethnic peoples by imperial rulers. Furthermore, in many cases, imperial states and rulers realized the necessity of protecting non-Han ethnic people from abusive Hanjian (literally treacherous Han people).Footnote ³ This trend and heritage was developed in the twentieth century by Chinese states that classified ethnic minorities as younger brother minzu within the large Chinese family in which Han Chinese have dominated.

To be a single minzu holds great importance. P. R. China claims to be a unitary multi-national state (tongyi de duominzu guojia). Since the 1950s, 55 minority minzus (Chinese nationality) have been assigned. The invention and introduction of minzu has been one of the key changes in late twentieth China, as minzu not only serves as a key feature to identify individual ChineseFootnote ⁴ but also has shaped contemporary Chinese society tremendously. When an ethnic group is officially assigned with the title ‘minzu’, it automatically becomes an official member of the large Chinese nationality family. Since Han Chinese is the majority, the other 55 minzus are considered minority minzus (shaoshuminzu). Minority minzus have been endowed with special, sometimes favourable treatments and policies, while vested with assumedly ‘equal’ political, economic and cultural rights, for example, as representatives in Chinese governments of all levels. Where certain minority minzus constitute the majority in a certain area, minority autonomous governments (province, city, county or xiang/rural town) are allowed to be established. Therefore, minzu is a unique and fundamental social construction created in China. In fact, minzu has been ‘institutionalized’ as the basic unit of socio-political system.Footnote ⁵

The word ‘minzu’ is a modern invention in China, as it did not appear until the late nineteenth century. Chinese treatments of minzu are quite complex. In a broad sense, it means the whole Chinese nation, i.e. Zhonghuaminzu. Officially, it includes all people who live within China's territory, which have been constituted as 56 officially recognized minzus. In a narrow sense, minzu refers to a subgroup of the Chinese nation, for example, Han, Mongols (Mengguzu), Tibetans (Zangzu), Muslims (Huizu) and so on.

Nonetheless, it would result in a lot of confusion if we regard minzu, nationality, or ethnicity as identical. Steven Harrell has classified ‘three languages’ used to define minzu by the three actors: the discussed ethnic group, neighbouring ethnic groups and the state. Among these three kinds of interactive languages, Harrell has found that the state language has the final word.Footnote ⁶ Consequently, only those ethnic groups acknowledged by the state would be given membership privileges in the Chinese nationality family. Here arises the critical difference between minzu and ethnicity: the former is a state invention and construction whereas the latter is usually defined as a group with an ethnic identity. Therefore, while ethnicity is shifting and flexible, minzu is fixed and exclusive.Footnote ⁷

Here I turn to introduce the minzu identification because it is within this project that 55 minority minzus have been designated, that the word minzu has been defined as distinctive from both Western ethnicity and Soviet nationality and that ethnic stratification was re-organized and regulated.Footnote ⁸ My discussion is mainly limited to Yunnan because Southwest China was one of the two foci (the other was Central China) due to its ethnic complexity and also because the most unsolved and debated problems of ethnic identity revolve around Southwest China.

Ethnic Classification in Yunnan

As soon as The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took over power in 1949, it began to establish its own political agenda. ‘Common Program’, the 1949 provisional constitution, stipulated the equality of minzus. In its party constitution, the CCP claimed that it was the loyal representative of all Chinese minzus, in addition to being the vanguard of the proletariat. Under such an ideology, the CCP assumed the power and obligation to liberate and distribute equal rights among minority minzus which were previously exploited. To put this ideology and policy into effect, first and foremost, it was necessary to articulate the number of minzus living in China,Footnote ⁹ otherwise the equality principle could not be executed. In a word, the crucial issue challenging the CCP's equality declaration was to classify component minzus of the large Chinese nationality family. However, what kind of ethnic group qualified to be minzu that was supposed to be an official participant in local and national political, economic and cultural arenas?

There were already some self-evident minzu candidates, for example, Han, Mongols (Mengguzu), Muslim (Huizu), Manchus (Manzu) and Tibetans (Zangzu), because of their relative dominance and historical significance. However, other minorities needed to be investigated. From 1953 onwards, a large movement was launched to decide what kind of ethnic groups should be officially labelled as minzu, that is, ethnic classification.

No sooner had the CCP succeeded in consolidating its power and in recovering China's economy than ethnic classifications began in 1953. In fact, minzu works (minzu gongzuo) started as soon as the CCP took over Southwest China in late 1949 and early 1950 because the control of those frontier areas required the cooperation of the ethnic groups. As a result, a national administrative hierarchy of minzu affairs (minzu shiwu) had already been established by 1953. Many minzu colleges and cadre schools were set up while many ethnic policies and rules were raised, passed and put into effect.

To reduce and eliminate the suspicions and resistance of ethnic peoples, the CCP dispatched several visiting delegations (fangwentuan) between 1950 and 1952 to ethnic areas, explaining the CCP's minzu policy. While comforting local minorities, especially local elites, with a lot of gifts and warm words, these groups collected local social information such as categories and names of ethnic groups, populations, languages, histories, economy and trade, education and hygiene and cultural characteristics.Footnote ¹⁰ Following the central pattern, some provinces even sent their own delegations to local ethnic areas.

The southwest delegation, the first central delegation, set out in June 1950. It included more than 120 members from over 20 ministries and the like. Later, they were also joined by local cadres and scholars. Liu Geping, a senior revolutionary became the head, with Xia Kangnong and Fei Xiaotong as deputies. They each led one branch: Liu went to Xikang province, Fei to Guizhou and Xia to Yunnan.Footnote ¹¹ The members consisted of two groups: one being scholars, the other being revolutionary cadres who were going to take charge of local ethnic affairs. For example, Wang Lianfang served as the vice chair of the Yunnan sub-branch delegation and he spent his life on Yunnan's ethnic works.Footnote ¹² During the visits, local governments not only provided staffs but also materials such as gifts for the ethnic people. Salt, for example, was obtained from Yunnan province, as it was very much desired by ethnic peoples.Footnote ¹³ In addition, the medical team, arts performance team and film team were equipped for delegations.Footnote ¹⁴

Simultaneously, the CCP invited and organized local elites into visiting groups (canguantuan) or representative groups (daibiaotuan) that paid visits to Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and other cities, expectedly impressed by the development and progress of New China.Footnote ¹⁵ The Yunnan visiting group included over 30 members. They went to Beijing, attended the ceremony of the first anniversary of P. R. China, and interviewed leaders such as Zhu De, Father of Red Army, and left for other large cities.Footnote ¹⁶ Between 1950 and 1954, 45 ethnic groups compromising a total of 4,170 people were organized, most of them being ethnic elites.Footnote ¹⁷

When Fei and his team arrived in Guizhou, over 30 ethnic units voluntarily asked to be recognized as minzu, partially due to the goodwill shown by the CCP.Footnote ¹⁸ Members of the visiting group in Guizhou would not have complained about the confusion had they known the ethnic complexity in Yunnan. When the Yunnan branch arrived in Kunming in June 1950, it was joined by more than 30 local cadres and scholars, including a vice president of Yunnan provincial government. While taking the opportunity to interview the ethnic people, they launched case surveys at the same time. As soon as they arrived, they started interviewing minority peasants who were attending the first provincial peasant conference. Consequently, they were divided into several working teams, each assigned to local investigations. From August 1950 to May 1951, these teams went to Yiliang, Lijiang, Baoshan, Dali, Chuxiong, Wuding, Mengzi, Puer and Wenshan, visiting over 230,000 ethnic people. In addition, they helped local governments hold four minority representative meetings and two workshops for ethnic cadres.Footnote ¹⁹ As a result, 20 village surveys and over 10 studies were completed. These data, plus other local sources collected, were compiled into Draft of Collected Minzu Information in Yunnan in July 1951.Footnote ²⁰ Although the main goal of the central visiting delegations was to explain minzu policies of the new regime, their investigations more or less touched minzu issues and sometimes minzu identity. This approach and research style (case studies) later characterized the ethnic classification project. Hence, it is fair to conclude that the central visiting delegations were a rehearsal for minzu identification.

Local government in Yunnan had its own role in minority affairs. Yunnan was not only a minority province but also a frontier province where numerous ethnic groups lived within and across boundaries. Besides bandits, remnants of the Guomingdang army were active in Burmese tropical forests, which made minzu work in Yunnan even more sensitive. With a heavy presence of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) forces in southern Yunnan, the CCP understood the complexity in this ethnic province. Correspondingly, the CCP's initial steps were highly cautious. In general, the CCP emphasized the necessity and importance of investigation and study of local situations before making any decision regarding ethnicities. In Yunnan, this idea was regarded as a strict guideline. In February 1950, the Yunnan party branch passed its working principle, emphasizing slow movement, advocating unity, and opposing anxiety, struggle and radicalism.Footnote ²¹ In short, in the beginning, the CCP tried to control and stabilize the locality rather than transform it.

At the end of 1950, a conference on minzu works was held in Yunnan. Based on preliminary investigations, the party branch divided the whole province into two zones: the first one was the inland areas where ethnic peoples lived in compact groups; the second was the frontier areas (bianyanqu) where the native chieftain system still existed. Different policies were implemented in these two zones. In the first one, the CCP immediately launched land reforms and other movements as had been done in inland China. By 1952, land reforms there had already been completed.

The frontier zone had a rather different experience. It included Lijiang, Dehong, Xishuangbanna, Diqing, Linchang, Simao and Honghe, altogether 16 counties which were mostly located along boundaries. Tai, Hani, Zang (Tibetans), Yi, Bai, Jingpo, Lisu, Va, Bulang and Han people, which totalled a population of 2 million (nearly one-eighth of Yunnan population), were under the rule of local chieftains.Footnote ²² While land reform was postponed in the frontier zone, investigations were carried out. The main goal from 1950 to 1952 was the so-called sorting-out of minzu relationships (shutong minzu guanxi). Basically, the party branch sent working teams to negotiate with the upper classes of ethnic groups to ally with them and to reach the masses through them. In a word, putting aside the ideology of class struggle, the CCP attempted to win the cooperation and support of ethnic elites. Ma Yao's experience in Dehong illustrated the necessity of this policy.

In summer 1952, Mao Yao, deputy secretary of minzu affairs in charge of minzu investigation and studies in Yunnan, led a working team of more than 200 members to Dehong. In many villages, they found men running away, women hiding, children crying, chickens flying and dogs barking. Ma and his team were forced to make announcements that the native chieftain system would not be changed and no reforms would be launched unless approved by the local ethnic leaders. Gradually, the enmity diminished and through the upper classes, Ma began to reach the commoners. Indeed, Ma Yao's experience was universal in ethnic areas. Ma's case explained why the systematic minzu investigation, namely, the minzu classification project, did not begin until 1954.Footnote ²³

Only through a series of steps was the timing for minzu classification considered ripe in 1954. First, the CCP managed to consolidate its regime; second, bureaucratic hierarchies were created from top to bottom; finally, the CCP had gained some experience, information and personnel through early exercises. That is why the years 1950–1953 (the year 1953 saw the first national census) are commonly recognized as the first stage of minzu identification. At this stage, from among more than 400 minzu candidates, 38 minzus were already identified.Footnote ²⁴

The period from 1954 to 1963 (the year 1963 saw the second national census) marked the second stage when large-scale investigations and identifications were launched. The Central Minzu Affairs Commission (Zhongyang Minzugongzuo Weiyuanhui, henceforth CMAC) was in charge of this huge ethnological project, in which local ethnic groups were invited to apply for the status of minzu. Over 1,700 scholars and students of ethnology, history and linguistic were mobilized and dispatched to local areas in order to provide ‘scientific’ reports for the central state to make final decisions.

Southwest China and Central China were the two foci, while small teams, when necessary, were dispatched to Northeast, Northwest, and East China. In Southwest China Yunnan won major attention, thanks to its complexity. The year 1954 witnessed over 400 ethnic groups applying for recognition as minzu, among which more than 260 were from Yunnan. From May to October 1954, the Yunnan investigation team of minzu identification sent by the CMAC launched a large-scale project of survey and research. Team members included Lin Yaohua, Shen Jiaju, Liu Yaohan, Wang Wenqing, Shi Lianzhu, Wang Xiaoyi and so on. Many were already famous scholars. For example, Lin Yaohua was a Harvard Ph.D. They visited various areas including Wenshan, Mengzi, Yuxi, Lijiang, Dali and Puer, studying Yi, Zhuang, Dai and Hani ethnic groups. Their research cooperated with the United Front Department of Yunnan Party Branch, Minzu Affairs Council, Institute of Language (Chinese Academy of Science), Yunnan University, Yunnan Minzu College and Kunhua Hospital. As a result, 68 ethnic units were identified.Footnote ²⁵

Thirty years later, Lin Yaohua recalled that they first approved 13 units as minzu and then 68 units were classified. The 13 minzus were Yi, Bai, Dai, Miao, Hui, Va, Hani, Lisu, Lagu, Naxi, Jingpo, Zang and Yao.Footnote ²⁶ Other units belonged to the following two categories. The first category was determined to be branches of existing minzus. Lin Yaohua listed ‘Tujia’ and ‘Menghua’ as examples. With a small population (Tujia: 170,000; Menghua: 40,000), they are scattered over a dozen counties. Lin found that their languages were very similar and their customs, rituals and economy were the same as the Yi Minzu. As a result, the two were classified into the Yi.Footnote ²⁷ Some other ethnic groups were also classified as Yi branches, mainly on the basis of similar languages and customs. In total, 43 units were classified into 20 branches of the Yi.Footnote ²⁸ The second category was recognized as Han Chinese. Lin listed the Zheyuan people (sugarcane farm) in Funing County. The Zheyuan had a population of around 1,000 and was so named because they made living by planting sugarcane. Lin's research found that they were descendents of Han migrants, speaking Cantonese.Footnote ²⁹ Shi Lianzhu, Lin's colleague in this project, has detailed the classification of applicants into several major minzus, for example, Zhuang, Yi, Hani, Minjia (Bai) and Va.Footnote ³⁰ As a result, 22 minzus in Yunnan were identified.Footnote ³¹

The identification in Yunnan could not have been done without the support and assistance of the local governments. By early 1951, minzu affairs offices had been established, both in the provincial government and in the party branch of Yunnan.Footnote ³² Before the arrival of the central team, many local teams had already been dispatched for case surveys. These teams were shocked to find that there were several hundred ethnic names in Yunnan. Some were what they called themselves; some were what they were called; some were named after their professions; some were named after their hometowns and some were named after their sub-branch of ethnicity.Footnote ³³ The first task of the Provincial Minzu Affairs Commission was to find out the composition of ethnic minorities.Footnote ³⁴ Ma Yao's office examined these names and straightened out more than a dozen of ethnic groups with large populations, which, as he stated, was based on their own wills.Footnote ³⁵ On another occasion, he said that the above several hundred names were further classified into 132 categories.Footnote ³⁶

Linguists contributed a lot to the identification.Footnote ³⁷ As early as 1952, Fu Maoyong led his linguistic team to Yunnan for ethnic language survey and reform. The team studied languages of Dai, Hani, Va, Lagu, Jingpo, Achang, Lisu and Nu Minzu. They also helped to create 14 scripts for ethnic groups,Footnote ³⁸ similar to what some missionaries had done in Guizhou and Yunnan. In 1955, when a nationwide survey of ethnic languages was launched, another working team with more than 100 members arrived in Yunnan. They were joined by over 200 local people, and together, they investigated over a dozen ethnic groups. These linguistic studies shaped the classification of ethnic applicants to a large degree. Both Lin Yaohua and Shi Lianzhu list language as a vital criterion of classification,Footnote ³⁹ which confirms Norma Diamond's conclusion that language was taken as a ‘key feature’ in the identification.Footnote ⁴⁰ It has been criticized that emphasis on language sometimes went too far.Footnote ⁴¹

By 1956, when land reforms had been completed in most areas in Yunnan, China launched the so-called ‘Socialist Reforms’, which were aimed at transforming China into a socialist country. Leaders of the CCP recognized that these reforms in ethnic areas would cause the disappearance of pre-capitalist societies, in which ethnic groups were living. So they decided to launch another survey—one of ethnic societies and history that were regarded as backward, as ‘vivid fossils of social history’. So the slogan of this survey was ‘To Save the Backward (qiangjiu luohou)’.Footnote ⁴²

The investigation team of minority society and history in Yunnan was led by Fei Xiaotong. They arrived in Kunming in August 1956 and local scholars such as Fang Guoyu, Hou Fangyu, Yang Kun and Jiang Yingliang worked with them. Under the guideline of Marxism, this survey made a comprehensive investigation of the ethnic groups. The data produced focused on productivity, relations of production, class structure, religions and customs.Footnote ⁴³ However, this survey was disrupted by the 1957 ‘Anti-Rightist Movement’ when Fei Xiaotong was called back to Beijing and criticized. The radical ideology that prevailed in the following years greatly reduced the reliability of sources and researches of the time.

By the second national census in 1963, ethnic minorities had been classified into 53 minzus. The Keba in 1965 and the Jinuo in 1979 were respectively recognized. After the Jinuo, no more new minzu have been designated. Twenty-five minzus are officially identified in Yunnan: Yi, Bai, Hani, Zhuang, Dai (Tai), Miao (Hmong), Jingpo, Lisu, Hui (Muslim), Lagu, Va (Wa), Naxi, Yao, Zang (Tibetan), Bulang (Blang), Primi (Pumi), Nu, Achang, Deang, Jino (Jinuo), Shui, Man (Manchus), Menggu (Mongolian), Buyi and Dulong. There are some peoples who are still unidentified, for example, the Kemu people and Kucong people.Footnote ⁴⁴

Since the case of Jinuo, the identification project has been frozen. In 1987, the state announced that the project was basically completed.Footnote ⁴⁵ By the word ‘completed’, it implied that no new minzu would be recognized in the futureFootnote ⁴⁶; by the word ‘basically’ it meant that there were still some so-called remnant issues (yiliu wenti). These issues were of two types: one was to identify those unidentifiedFootnote ⁴⁷; the other was to re-identify unsatisfied ethnic units. Since the recognition of the Jinuo, the number belonging to the large Chinese nationality family has been fixed and remained, although research and remnant work continue.

During Deng Xiaoping's era, the 56 minzus have been written into textbooks and repeated in all kinds of media as 56 flowers of the Chinese nation. For example, in the annual C(entral) C(hina) TV's annual spring festival show, the most popular television show in China, one theme that continues to reign is the unity of the 56 minzus. People dressed in exotic clothes performed special dances and songs that were supposed to represent their own unique culture and tradition, symbolizing the happy life of minorities within Chinese nationality family under the leadership of the CCP. Through the daily media, propaganda and education, the idea of 56 as the one in which Han Chinese play the role of an elder brother has been successfully instilled in the common people.

The identification project has left both positive and negative legacies. It especially yielded positive influence for some small and disadvantaged ethnic or sub-ethnic groups. Theoretically, all minzu members of the Chinese nationality family are legally equal, of which many minorities take advantage to pursue their interests, although they have essentially been restructured into a new hierarchy. The advocacy of equality has been welcomed and has attracted them to accept state decisions, because they have more or less been provided with an opportunity and potential space and resources on a national stage, an offer never made before. This partially accounted for the reason for over 200 ethnic/pro-ethnic groups in Yunnan to apply to be minzu in 1953. Moreover, it was through this process that many ethnic minorities created or strengthened their ethnic consciousness.

The Daur people in Northeast China served as such case. Before 1949, the Daur people made a living by hunting and gathering and were often abused and exploited by the Mongols. They never shared a common ethnic awareness. However, the investigation team reconstructed their history in light of Marxist ideology and decided that the Daur was qualified to be a minzu. It was during this identification process that a common identity was formed among the Daur people. The Daur welcomed the decision and thought highly of the CCP because they had never been treated in this way.

The She people in Zhejiang province and Fujian province is another such a case. They live in mountainous areas, as fertile lands were occupied by Han people. However, their classification as a single minzu has brought them many advantages, which gradually helped these people to get rid of their reluctance of and accept the category of She.

The Daur and the She were certainly not the only ones. It is hard to estimate exactly how many ethnic units have accepted the state classification but it seems that in general they were satisfied. For example, two of the three ethnic units classified into the Yi minzu that Stevan Harrell has examined have accepted the result.Footnote ⁴⁸ Furthermore, there were only several cases of ethnic units who appealed for identification or re-identification. In some circumstances, units in question were mis-classified, but the irony of this is that a common awareness has been formed during the five-decade period. For example, the Yi, Yao and Miao (Hmong) include many ethnic units who live far away, yet sometimes their languages are not intelligible, so they could have been labelled as several different minzus. However, the classification into one minzu has helped to create a common consciousness among these scattered units.

In short, state policies encouraged ethnic awareness when granting them with rights and interests. It is widely noticed that before 1949, Chinese ethnic minorities tended to hide their identity and claimed that they were descendents of Han migrants. For example, many minorities in Yunnan insisted that their ancestors were military colonists who moved from Nanjing, the capital of Ming dynasty. Hence, it is a remarkable contrast that over 400 units applied to be minzu in the early 1950s. Although their consciousness was repressed in the Cultural Revolution, ethnic minorities are now proud of their non-Han identity.Footnote ⁴⁹ Since the 1980s, a nationwide ethnic nationalism has emerged, which Gladney concludes, is sometimes an unexpected challenge to the state authority.Footnote ⁵⁰ For example, the Deng people who were put into the Tibetan minzu have asked for a re-identification, threatening its recession from P. R. China should they not be officially recognized as a single minzu.Footnote ⁵¹ The case of the Deng people is an unexpected result of the state policy. Whether the CCP likes or not, it represents a universal trend showing how ethnic units can make use of this system to struggle for their own interests and how they negotiate with the state.

While the majority accepted their categories, the classification proved to be problematic, in terms of both its process and result. While the 56 minzus have been constructed among over four 400 applicants, many other ethnic or sub-ethnic groups have been forgotten, especially those in remote jungles, let alone those which were mis-classified. The Limi people in Yunnan have shown some concern over this. First, they were ignored and then in the 1980s they were put into the Yi minzu from which they think they are different.Footnote ⁵² Today, hundreds of thousands of people are still waiting for identification. In fact, some of them even think they are so culturally different and distinctive that it is impossible for them to be recognized as a new minzu. Instead, they have been or would be classified into the existing minzu categories.

Henry G. Schwarz is partially correct that minzu lacks a clear definition, and that the minzu identification lacks a clear standard. Scholars applied different criteria to different groups. After reviewing the application of Stalin's four-common, Hsieh Jiann concluded that ‘the approach towards ethnic identification in practice is more dependent on traditional uncritical enumeration rather than on the academic analysis of the ethnic construction’, as there is little evidence to show that the four-common has been applied.Footnote ⁵³

Hsieh's proposition may go too far, but his suggestion that historical ethnic patterns have influenced the identification is correct. Scholars of China also criticize the identification for overstressing historical origins while ignoring historical transitions, as well as other problems, for example, overemphasis on language, influence of Marxist dogma, rigid application of the four-common and insufficient respect for the wills of units in question.Footnote ⁵⁴ Their list may not be comprehensive; nonetheless, these are the major problems that have concerned western scholars, especially the lack of respect for the wills of discussed units.Footnote ⁵⁵ To a large degree, all the above problems result from the nature of this project: it was a state move.

Local Governments, Ethnic Units, Ethnic Elites and Contingency

As a state project, the central state certainly played a key role, in terms of the initiatives, the mobilization, the procedure, the process and the final decisions. Stevan Harrell, when examining the classification, has realized the role of the state and pointed out that the state had the final word in classifying ethnic applicants.Footnote ⁵⁶ His insight is shared with many scholars.

It is true that the Chinese state played a key role in the process of ethnic classification and negotiations, however, many other factors too played important, even crucial roles, in ethnic issues. David Wu concluded that ‘these newly created fifty-six ethnic categories are therefore the results of national politics, official-scholars’ research and interpretation, and minority groups’ self-awareness and contesting of ethnic identity’.Footnote ⁵⁷ Wu's list can be expanded and the relationships and interactions among these factors need to be elaborated. Besides the central state, scholars who conducted investigations and provided proposals, ethnic groups and local governments played significant roles in the process. There arise many questions regarding the project, for example: Did the neighbouring ethnic groups affect the discussed unit? What was the role of ethnic elites or masses who provided scholars with information and expressed their wills? Hence, while it is generally true that the state held the final word, results of this project were products of a series of contingent elements, since the identification was an interaction and negotiation among ethnic units, scholars, local governments and central state.

The respect of ethnic wills was an interesting issue in the classification, especially since a few people have ever discussed how the principle was put into effect before. Fei Xiaotong vaguely states that the final decisions were approved by ethnic representatives and the masses (minzu daibiao ji qunzhong) of discussed units.Footnote ⁵⁸ Here, I identify ethnic representatives with ethnic elites. Nonetheless, we still do not know the exact details regarding this issue. Shi Lianzhu mentions that the classification asked for opinions from the masses of ethnic units concerned, ‘especially intellectuals, cadres, and patriots of the upper class’.Footnote ⁵⁹ Her address seems to imply that ethnic elites had more important roles to play than the masses. The postulation can be supported by the case of Pingwu Zangren.

Pingwu Zangren (‘Tibetans’ in Pingwu County), or Baima Zangren (White Horse Tibetans), lives in Sichuan (Pingwu County and Nanping County) and Gansu (Wen County). They were classified as Tibetans because their Tibetan chief reported in 1951 that his group was Tibetan. However, the masses later asked for re-consideration. Moreover, scholars discovered that their customs and religions were different from the Tibetans. The case of the Qiang people in Heishui County in Sichuan is similar. They were identified as Tibetans because of its Tibetan chief while the Qiang in other places were classified as Qiang Minzu. These cases support the argument that the apparent will of the masses was to a great extent also that of the elites.

The role of local governments is another intriguing issue. Local governments were very important as they functioned as the bridge between ethnic units and the central state. From top down, central state had to rely on local governments to carry out its policies and initiatives; from bottom up, ethnic groups had to approach local governments before they reached the central state. Local governments, when dealing with both of them, had their own concerns and interests. Frequently their decisions and moves were based on these interpretations and interests. In terms of classification, ethnic applicants initially had to deal with local governments. They had to present applications to local governments and had to gain their approval for further procedures. Local governments also organized their own investigations or sometimes joined or cooperated with central teams. Ma Yao, an important leader of minzu affairs in Yunnan, categorized the ethnic units before the central team arrived. From 1951 to 1953, several hundred names of minorities were reported to the Provincial Minzu Affairs Commission. Ma and his colleagues classified them into 132 groups, which provided a basis for further work by the central team.Footnote ⁶⁰ Early surveys and studies by various local governments certainly influenced the places or ethnic groups the investigation teams were dispatched to. Today, many provinces (for example, Yunnan, and Guizhou) and sub-provincial governments make efforts to propagandize their ethnic resources, mainly for economic interests. Melissa Brown notices that in Hubei, local governments’ and officials’ ‘deliberate manipulation of population statistics, creative interpretation of state criteria, differentiation of Han and non-Han families and individuals where none had previously existed, and implementation of measures designed to forestall for local protest over this new differentiation’, in order to create Enshi Tujia-Miao Autonomous Prefecture.Footnote ⁶¹ In a word, local governments of all levels have played and will play an active role in ethnic affairs.

Tension between ethnic boundaries and administrative boundaries has been largely ignored in the classification. Many ethnic units lived across administrative boundaries and the national investigation was conducted on the basis of administrative units, therefore, the lack of cooperation among local governments (mainly provinces) contributed to some mis-classification.Footnote ⁶² The Xifan (West Barbarians) is such an example. The Xifan lived both in Sichuan and Yunnan. In Yunnan, it was labelled as the Pumi Minzu, in Sichuan as the Zang Minzu (Tibetans). The Zhuang people (Tai) are another example. In Guangxi, it is called the Zhuang Minzu; in Yunnan the Buyi Minzu. The Nasuo people in Sichuan are regarded as the Menggu Minzu (Mongolians), in Yunnan as the Naxi Minzu. Such problems resulted from the fact that the classification was done primarily by provincial governments.

Tension among various ethnic units served as another subconscious element. Large and powerful ethnic groups, such as the Han, Tibetans, Mongols, Zhuang, certainly enjoyed some advantages. Firstly, while other units needed to be identified, these groups were assumed as minzu without any prior investigation or research. They were automatically seen as minzus, which attests to Hsieh's argument of historical enumeration. In Yunnan, 13 ethnic units were regarded as minzu with little research, because they had been publicly acknowledged for a long time (lilai gongren).Footnote ⁶³ Their self-evident candidacy was closely associated with their relative dominance. The 13 minzus in Yunnan included those powerful and influential groups, such as the Yi, Bai, Naxi, Dai, Tibetan, Mongols and Manchus.

The relative domination and power of large ethnic groups not only affected their own classification but also the neighbouring ethnic peoples. Here the Deng people in Zayu (Tibet) are clearly illustrative of this fact. When the Deng threatened its recession from China should their appeal be denied, the Tibetans resorted to the same strategy were the Deng approved as a different minzu, with the reasoning that the Deng would split the Tibetan Minzu. Considering the special significance of Tibet, the Deng people have no chance of winning their appeal.

A minzu's relationship with the CCP may be another factor affecting the identification. For example, Wulanfu, a Mongolian and a senior party member, facilitated the strong voice of the Mongols in the state. The Zhuang Minzu may be another such a case. Katherine Kaup points out that the Zhuang is a creation in P. R. China, because the people had no prior ethnic awareness.Footnote ⁶⁴ But why did the CCP create the Zhuang Minzu? She cautiously suggests that the CCP might have taken this risk in order to convince other minorities to accept its policy by using the Zhuang as a model example.Footnote ⁶⁵ However, why did the CCP choose the Zhuang instead of other minorities, such as the Yi, Miao or Yao? One possible explanation is the Zhuang's participation in the Chinese Revolution. Local people (labelled as the Zhuang in 1958) actively took part in the 1929 Bose Uprising in Guangxi (Deng Xiaoping was a leader in this series of uprisings and the creation of local red army).

In some cases, decisions were made purely by chance. The Jinuo people in Jinghong County (Yunnan) were one such case. Du Yuting, the scholar who first investigated the Jinuo people in southern Yunnan in 1958 and took charge of the final proposal that was approved by the state in 1979, concluded that, ‘the Identification of Jinuo as minzu results from an element that cannot be ignored, that is, opportunity or contingency’,Footnote ⁶⁶ because his visit in 1958 was dispatched by chance. The Jinuo people, the last minzu assigned, were just lucky, whereas many other small ones, such as the Limi people in Yunnan, were not.

The Dulong Minzu in northwest Yunnan is a similar case. It was so named because its cadre met Primer Zhou Enlai in 1952, and later this ethnic group was classified as an independent minzu. Had some other small ethnic group been singled out by Zhou Enlai, it is highly possibly that they would have been made minzu, and the Dulong would instead suffer the fate of the Limi and be classified into the Nu Minzu. Hence, opportunity of this kind seems so crucial for these small ethnic groups. In fact, the Jinuo and the Dulong were not the only lucky ones and similar cases were also found in Guangxi.Footnote ⁶⁷

The above discussions illustrate the complexity of the identification. Though its results were solely approved by the state, many unexpected elements sometimes played decisive roles in determining the outcome. As a consequence, it is very hard to find the criteria of classification, since they varied case by case.

The Application of Soviet Model: Rigid or Flexible?

Since the very beginning, scholars have been curious about the criteria of minzu, or what constitutes a minzu. They logically turned to examine Stalin's theory of nationality, since it was regarded as a guideline for the project. It is hard to determine Stalin's influence on the Chinese Revolution and ‘Socialist Building’, yet, it is worth noting how Chinese Marxists have interpreted and re-interpreted Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism and how they have in turn transformed and implanted those theories and ideas into China's soil. For instance, Stalin's theory of nationality highlights both the influence of Stalinism and China's pragmatic and flexible application.

The most frequently quoted definition of minzu (nationality) by Chinese Marxists is the four-common by Stalin. In ‘Marxism and National Question’, Stalin concluded that ‘A nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of common language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture’.Footnote ⁶⁸ In the same article, Stalin stated that none of the four-common taken separately was sufficient enough to define a nation and that if one of the four disappeared, the nation would cease to exist.Footnote ⁶⁹ Furthermore, he claimed that nation was a historical phenomenon that was formed only in the rising period of capitalism.Footnote ⁷⁰ Based on this statement, the nation did not exist until the arrival of capitalism. However, capitalism did not take roots in China. Does it mean there was no nation (minzu) in China before 1949 when the Communists took power or before 1956 when socialist China was claimed? A heated discussion over this issue took place in the mid-1950s.

In 1954, Fan Wenlan, an influential historian stated that Han nationality (Hanminzu) was formed when the Qin united China in 221 BCE. He argued that Qin's policies of standardizing roads, written language and measures agreed with the four-common.Footnote ⁷¹ Some scholars, however, citing Stalin's claim that minzu was a product of capitalism, accused Fan of violating this claim and concluded that Han minzu could only be formed after the Opium War, namely, when capitalism began to spread in China. They believed that all the ethnic units in China including Han were not minzu but buzu (Narodnost in Russian), a stage between tribe (buluo) and nation (minzu) in the Marxist linear social trajectory, since China before 1949 was labelled as ‘semi-feudal and semi-colonial’, a pre-capitalist society. Unexpectedly, ethnic peoples felt insulted with such a proposition, which forced those scholars to reconsider their stance.Footnote ⁷²

To bridge the gap between Marxist theories and Chinese reality, the CCP felt it necessary to strengthen its research on minzu and religion, especially on how Marxist classics expounded these issues. In 1958, the Institute of Minzu Studies (Minzu Yanjiusuo) devoted to translating and studying Marxist classics on nationality was established. Minzu studies operated under the premise and assumption that theories on nationality raised and elucidated by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin were an integrated whole. If there were some differences or contradictions among scholars it was because of their different interpretations and translations of the tests, since Marx and Engels wrote in German while Lenin and Stalin in Russian. As a result, any theoretical tension was simplified into a technical issue, an inaccuracy of interpretation and translation.

Ya Hanzhang, a Marxist expert on minzu and religion, was a strong supporter of the above opinion. He and a few other scholars found that Engels had already presented the answer for the origination and formation of minzu. In his article ‘The Role of Labor’, Engels concluded that nation came into being a long time before the emergence of capitalism. However, this questions Stalin's conclusion that minzu was a product of capitalism. Was Stalin's claim then in disagreement with that of Engels?

Ya certainly did not think so. After reviewing Stalin's other articles, Ya, as well as his colleagues, pointed out that when Stalin said nation was formed in the time of rising capitalism, he referred to modern nation (xiandai minzu), and that what Engels discussed was ancient nation (gudai minzu) and a universal law of nationality (minzu de yiban guilü). Hence, Ya argued that had previous translations treated buzu as ancient minzu, there would have been no contradictions.Footnote ⁷³ In a word, this theoretical issue was nothing but a technical one.

This conclusion was presented by the Institute of Minzu Studies and relevant translations thereafter were standardized.Footnote ⁷⁴ To Ya and his school, there were many minzus in China which were all ancient, and only after the establishment of People's China did these minzus become modern (socialist). Although Ya strictly adheres to Stalinism, his school is not influential in practice.Footnote ⁷⁵ In fact, many other scholars do not agree with Ya. For instance, Liu E points out that the word buzu in Chinese is different from what Stalin intended, and that the mere translation of Stalin's buzu into minzu is sometimes not appropriate.Footnote ⁷⁶

Since there is a unified and consistent theory on minzu from Marx and Engels, via Lenin, to Stalin, the preceding issue is not the main difficulty. Instead, the main problem resided in the application of the theory to China, especially Stalin's four-common, which scholars of China have found the most difficult and which scholars of the West have heavily criticized. While the identification resulted in a kind of neo-tradition in China and has been regarded as ‘scientifically’ sound, the criteria for determining minzu nevertheless remain unclear. Early western scholars were baffled by the inconsistency in the criteria of identification. In 1971, Henry Schwarz complained: ‘In the issuing of laws, regulations, policy statements, and work reports, they have never publicized their definition of a minority’.Footnote ⁷⁷ Recent western studies have expressed discomfort with Stalin's four-common as it ignores self-consciousness and have often criticized the rigid Chinese application.Footnote ⁷⁸ Thomas Heberer finds the application ‘absurd’, because he feels that China's cases lack common language, common territory, common economic life and a common culture.Footnote ⁷⁹ Scholars in China, however, have been generally proud of their application of Marxist theory in Chinese practice, although they too have noticed and acknowledged its shortcomings and problems.

My view differs from scholars both of the West and of China. I differ from western scholars because I argue that the application of Stalinism was rather pragmatic and flexible. I differ from Chinese Marxist scholars because I do not agree that the classification was as scientific as they claim. In fact, I do not think that the classification was solely guided by Marxist ideology. Rather, it should be considered along with its historical context and thus be regarded as a continuity and development of imperial heritage. Imperial traditions and legacy were easily ignored. In essence, the CCP has continued with the imperial project of central penetration into ethnic frontiers.

During the classification, scholars of China, partially due to the brainwashing, claimed that the Marxist theory on nationalities was the guideline and that Stalin's four-common were the criteria.Footnote ⁸⁰ However, as soon as scholars launched numerous investigations and case research, they immediately found the unbridgeable gap between theory and reality. Some scholars questioned,

In fact, what they could do was to ‘continuously define, redefine, interpret, reinterpret, confirm, and reconfirm’ the four-common, especially the last one—psychological make-up—manifested in a common culture.Footnote ⁸² Debates regarding this issue took place in the 1950s, 1960s, 1980s and 1990s. Different views of the four-common have resulted not only from the degree of Marxism scholars accepted but also from which case they studied.

Scholars felt that Stalin's definition of the psychological make-up was the most difficult to grasp. Colin Mackerras has classified Chinese responses into two kinds: the first is to ignore or downplay Stalin's claim that none of the four-common could be omitted from any identification; the other is a partial challenge to the four-common.Footnote ⁸³ Indeed both responses attempt to re-interpret Stalinism, to fix it onto China. For example, some scholars argued that psychological make-up was identical to ethnic features (minzu tezheng), ethnic consciousness (minzu yishi) and ethnic sentiment (minzu ganqing); some argued that it was more than the above three; others insisted that the above equalization made no sense.Footnote ⁸⁴ The efforts to fit ethnic consciousness into Stalin's definition were best revealed in Fei Xiaotong's address in 1978.Footnote ⁸⁵ Fei, trained in London, was the first one to realize the ignorance of ethnic consciousness in Stalin's definition.

In the beginning Fei, like other scholars, accepted the four-common. But gradually he noticed its limitations. That is why Fei concluded in 1978 that the application of Marxist theories was the key to the success of identification.Footnote ⁸⁶ Though in this address Fei still lauded Stalin's definition as a ‘scientific generalization (kexue zongjie)’ of Western nationalities formed in the capitalist period, which should be taken as ‘the guiding thought (zhidao sixiang)’, he indeed emphasized the limitations of Stalin's theory and the particularity of the Chinese case. Here, even though Fei referred to the four-common as ‘the guiding thought’, in the tone of the official language, I feel it was not his true evaluation, considering the temporal and spatial circumstances.Footnote ⁸⁷ Fei's later addresses reflect his attitude more accurately. For example, in his 1996 lecture in Japan, Fei no longer used ‘guideline’ or ‘guiding theory/thought’. He frankly stated: ‘the four features in our minzu identification can only be used as a reference (zhe sige tezheng zai women de minzhu shibie gongzuo zhong zhineng qi cankao de zuoyong)’.Footnote ⁸⁸ In addition to serving as a reference (cankao), Fei thought that the four-common's contribution was to inspire Chinese own thinking and helped to accomplish the characteristics of Chinese minzu (Zhongguo minzu de tese).Footnote ⁸⁹ It is in this way that Chinese minzu differs from both western ethnicity and the Soviet model. Indeed, as early as in his 1978 address, Fei emphasized the distinctive Chinese approach that might provoke western criticism and cautiously stated that his use of minzu was based on Chinese tradition,Footnote ⁹⁰ even though China never used the two characters ‘min’ and ‘zu’ together until the late nineteenth century.

In his 1996 speech, Fei Xiaotong further denied a common psychological make-up when he analyzed the four-common in the identification one by one. The point he highlighted was not what Stalin meant but how scholars of China fixed it onto Chinese cases. In terms of common language, many minority minzus do not have their own languages and some use other ethnicities’ languages. Hence Fei refines this feature by concluding that common language in China actually refers to minority minzus living in a compact area and speaking similar or intelligible languages, although languages of different branches within one minzu might not be intelligible. In terms of common territory, Fei emphasized the concept of compact areas (jujuqu). In terms of common economy, Fei frankly stated that it was not the case in China. Finally, in terms of common psychological make-up, Fei said that this feature was not tangible and that he did not understand it. In contrast, Fei's speech provided a great deal of space for ethnic consciousness as he discussed concepts such as in-group and we-group, arguing that the so-called common psychology was in fact ethnic consciousness.Footnote ⁹¹ Therefore, Fei revealed that none of the four-common actually had been rigidly applied.

Fei's implication is confirmed by the results of identification, as none of over 400 ethnic units possessed the four-common, neither did the 56 minzus.Footnote ⁹² Statistics by Chinese scholars have shown that only 21 of 55 minzus have their own written languages, and 53 have their own spoken languages.Footnote ⁹³ Only a few minzus have their own living territories, mostly mixed with others. For example, the Hui Minzu is spread from northwestern grasslands to southeastern coastal areas.Footnote ⁹⁴ And almost no minzu has its own economy due to long-term interactions with other peoples. Therefore, how could we blame the identification for being a ‘rigid application?’

In this manner, the concept of minzu is distinctive. It differs from Stalin's nationality because minzu includes all kinds of ethnic or pro-ethnic groups, no matter which stage of society they are in: ‘modern’ or ‘ancient’. It differs from western ethnicity because it is designated by the state. Indeed minzu could be a mix of several ethnic groups, one single ethnicity, a sub-ethnic unit or just a tribal community.

Imperial Legacies and Counterparts

Contrary to common perception, the Soviet influence on Chinese minzu was not intense, thought, in fact, many elements suggest that imperial ethnic legacy had an enormous impact on the minzu policy.

It is very interesting that Fei Xiaotong points out that his use of minzu is based on Chinese tradition, even when the term minzu did not appear until the late nineteenth century. Fei's statement indeed suggests a long-lasting influence of imperial heritage on the modern efforts of state-building. While the CCP claims that its ethnic policies are unique in the world and unprecedented in history, contemporary ethnic approaches, policies, measures and regulations, to a great degree, can be traced to imperial times.

The CCP regarded the minzu identification as an unprecedented undertaking (chuangju). Its reason was that for the first time, all minzus were treated equally in the Chinese nationality family and that minority minzus were made masters and decision-makers in their internal affairs. All these achievements were eventually attributed to Marxism, the ‘scientific truth’ for the exploited. It is dangerous to ignore Marxist influence on China, as much as it is to ignore the interpretation and re-interpretation of Marxism, namely, the process of Sinicization of Marxism (makesi zhuyi zhongguohua). On the other hand, it is dangerous to ignore the historical continuity—the imperial heritage—that shaped modern China's trajectory. Joseph W. Esherick in his ‘Ten Theses on the Chinese Revolution’ concluded that ‘1949 was a watershed, not an unbridgeable chasm’, since the large structures of China's state and society ‘imposed significant constraints on the agents of revolution and counterrevolution’.Footnote ⁹⁵ I want to push his statement a littler further: the imperial structures and traditions not only constrained the revolution but also greatly affected the aftermath, namely, modern state-building.

More than 30 years ago, William Skinner elaborated the rural marketing system that the CCP attempted to transform and failed to transcend. The collapse of the People's Commune was the convincing evidence for revealing the imperial constraints on China's modernization efforts.Footnote ⁹⁶ Vivienne Shue has discussed the negotiation and mediation between rural societies and the central state when the CCP tried to penetrate rural China.Footnote ⁹⁷ Huang Shu-min's The Spiral Road may be the very annotation for Shue's theoretical analysis, as he has discovered how traditional institutions survived in Socialist China.Footnote ⁹⁸

Similarly, the CCP's ‘unprecedented’ minzu polices cannot escape confrontation with the imperial legacy and historical patterns. Hsieh Jiann argues that the identification was ‘more dependent on traditional uncritical enumeration’,Footnote ⁹⁹ which is interesting and insightful, since he compares ethnic categories of socialist state with traditional empires. Contrary to common thinking, the gap between a modern nation-state and a traditional imperial state may perhaps not be as huge, especially if a long-term approach is deployed. Essentially, contemporary efforts and imperial projects share the same aim, namely, central control over frontier peoples.

First, contemporary ethnic projects are not, as the CCP claims, liberating. The Communist regime is not emancipation, but another form of domination.Footnote ¹⁰⁰ Ethnic classifications, political participations and special economic subsidies are not processes which increase rights for ethnic minorities, but what Michael Foucault calls a process of delimitation.Footnote ¹⁰¹ An imperial counterpart during the Qing period was Gaitu guiliu, or replacing native chieftains with central assigned officials. Emperor Yongzheng justified this radical project that was aimed at eliminating native ethnic power by accusing the brutality of native rule. Thus, this radical and brutal state project was legitimized by the good intention to ‘free’ imperial ethnic subjects from brutal chieftains. A similar claim was made by the CCP: its liberation of ethnic peoples from the old, dark, brutal rule of slavery as well as the feudal system on the frontiers. In both cases, the image of the CCP as saviour was created and used to justify their control.

Second, while 55 ethnic minzus have their own representation in all levels of governments, their presence has been a kind of political vase for the authoritarian hall. Although it is true that the number of ethnic cadres has corresponded to that of the ethnic population, which has been set up as an important principle by the CCP, the former's role in politics is not correspondingly powerful in the decision-making, either in local or in national arena. This is because Han cadres usually take the critical offices. A further comparison of native chieftains in the Ming-Qing period shows that the control of ethnic elites (chieftains or cadres) by central states (Ming or Qing, and P. R. C) was very much tighter. While the Ming and Qing empires made efforts to regulate and intervene in the native chieftain system, especially the issue of succession, they too had to acknowledge native institutions, practices, customs and ethnic laws. For example, the extent of their tolerance was shown in the way they allowed the existence of female chieftains. In contrast, ethnic cadres under the minzu institution are selected, trained and evaluated by the CCP. The question as to what extent these ethnic cadres represent their groups’ interests remains since the 1980s, even during the period of ethnic consciousness.

Furthermore, the minzu identification was naturally a well-motivated and organized and top-down state project. Essentially it was an indivisible part of state-building launched by the CCP in its attempts to create a better world. It is the central state that has successfully set up an arena for and imposed a designed order and system on its chosen ethnic minority players. It is the central state that decides who to play, how to play and what to play. In this sense, there are many similarities between the imperial exam system and the minzu system. While the former presented social elites—potential rebels—with access to power, it greatly contained their rebellious nature by incorporating them into the existing regime. In this manner, it enhanced the legitimacy and flexibility of the regime. That is why over 1,000 years ago, Tang Taizong exclaimed with great relief and happiness when he saw candidates entering the exam hall: ‘All the heroes under the Heaven are now within my hands (tianxia yingxiong jinru wo guzhong)’.Footnote ¹⁰² Just like the exam system, the minzu system while providing space for ethnic minorities to voice themselves, it illegitimizes other spaces and ways that minorities had previously enjoyed. Through this process and system, the state succeeded in establishing the game space and rules for ethnic peoples. As a result, many ethnic groups have been denied access to represent themselves, especially those small groups, such as the Limi people. Although the Limi people thought they were different from any other minzu, ironically, they were classified into the Yi Minzu, and an autonomous xiang (rural town) was established in March 1988.Footnote ¹⁰³

The case of the Limi people shows how they were mistreated in the official space and how little space the state left for these small and disadvantaged ethnic groups. But the Limi people are by no means the only one (remember that the Limi people say ‘we these small minzus’). Similar situations are bound to be experienced by many other small ethnic units in Yunnan.

In a word, the minzu system in People's China is the construction of new regulations for ethnic minorities. Though many remarkable transitions and developments have been achieved via contemporary practices, the disadvantages which the CCP and its scholars avoid mentioning, intentionally or not, can find their imperial counterparts.

First of all, the minzu identification is ethnic categorization. It is true that imperial China had never assigned titles such as minzu to all ethnic minorities, but official and honorific titles were given to chieftains, and similar projects were launched to classify ethnic peoples. The most eminent may be the compilation of Huang Qing Zhigongtu (Illustration of all Tributary Peoples in the Imperial Qing). To be sure, drawing tributary rituals was the responsibility of court artists and as a result, it had become a kind of tradition. Many drawings of tributary missions have been cautiously kept,Footnote ¹⁰⁴ among which Huang Qing Zhigongtu was the largest. The Qianlong Emperor in 1750 ordered local officials to draw photos of diverse ethnic peoples, which boasted the space and virtue of the Manchu rule. All drafts were sent to Beijing in 1757 and the project was completed in 1761 with nine chapters. The Yunnan chapter included 36 drawings. Each drawing includes one man and one woman (sometimes three people), with different clothes and customs representing their distinctive ethnic identity. It is hard to know the criteria by which these peoples were selected, but in this aspect, Huang Qing Zhigongtu is similar to the five series of minzu data produced in the minzu identification.Footnote ¹⁰⁵ These projects and collections embodied the process of categorization and systemization, which subjugated local knowledge. Moreover, these drawings were not any different from actors/actresses with assumed distinctive minzu clothes on the stage of CCTV's new year eve show, a central image, invention or creation imposed on ethnic minorities.

But the most amazing fact is the figure of 25 minority minzus in Yunnan. The figure 25, a result of ‘scientific’ researches, is in fact closely associated with the categories classified in the Ming-Qing imperial works or gazetteers, since they basically remain the same as what were categorized by the Ming and Qing states. Yang Shen mentioned that there were over 20 native ethnic peoples in mid-sixteenth century Yunnan. Dian Zhi by Liu Wenzheng of the early seventeenth century listed around 30 ethnic peoples in the category of zhongren (types of peoples), which was confirmed by the 30 categories in Fuheng's Huang Qing Zhigongtu of the 1770s. The figure of around 30 generally agrees with the ‘scientific’ identification by the CCP, which has classified 25 minzus in Yunnan. In this sense, Hsieh Jiann is correct to conclude that the identification was ‘more dependent on traditional uncritical enumeration’.Footnote ¹⁰⁶ Indeed, the problem essentially results from the concepts imposed on local peoples, such as ethnicity or minzu. Since the peoples are so mixed during long-term interactions, it becomes almost impossible for us to label them by a rigid ethnic standard.

Other practices also have their historical counterparts. For example, at the end of 1950, the party branch of Yunnan classified the province into two areas: one where land reforms were immediately launched, and the other where land reforms had to be postponed and where the CCP promised no change in the native system.Footnote ¹⁰⁷ Such a classification was indeed shaped by gaitu guiliu during the Qing. The first category used to be under the direct administration of the Qing local Yamen, while the other was under the rule of native chieftains.Footnote ¹⁰⁸

It is logical to compare the minzu autonomous region system with the native chieftain system. In the 1990s, the Chinese state and its scholars began to emphasize the historical and realistic elements of minzu autonomy to distinguish China from the Soviet Union.Footnote ¹⁰⁹ However, when discussing historical reasons, they never mention the native system. The underlying reason is that the native system, according to the official language, was backward: it protected backward modes of production and could potentially wreck China's unity. However, historically, the native chieftain system used to help the imperial state control and incorporate the frontiers and frontier peoples.

The guiding idea of minzu autonomy is to ‘let minority minzus administrate their own affairs’, a modern mediated version of ‘rule based on local customs’, while in the Tusi system, native chieftains ruled their ethnic groups or communities. To some extent, the two systems share the same premise: the acceptance of central surveillance and superiority. Therefore, both of them are forms of regulating ethnic peoples while respecting the local authorities. In the native chieftain system, native chieftains enjoyed much autonomy, since the central state rarely intervened in internal affairs. Moreover, the power and authority of some local chieftains in Yunnan had lasted at least until the early period of P. R. China. In the early 1950s, many native chieftains were incorporated into local Communist governments. Without the corporation of the local elites, the CCP would have faced much more trouble in frontier areas.Footnote ¹¹⁰ Even until the 1960s and 1970s, some native chieftains and their family members still held government positions. Furthermore, I believe that an examination would reveal that their descendants are still holding relatively dominant positions. In this sense, the native chieftain system had and still has its influence over minzu affairs.

The principle of equality is often cited: ‘historically and universally, no country has really treated its ethnic minorities as equally as People's China’. Such a statement seems to legitimize CCP's actions by erasing historical and cultural legacy. In general, the Chinese regarded others as uncivilized but this does not exclude occasional equal and peaceful coexistence. Tang Taizong named himself ‘Khan of the Heaven’ and prided his equal treatment of all peoples within the four seas. Once he stated: ‘The Yi and Di are also just human beings, and their natures are not different from those of the Chinese. A ruler's concern is that the beneficence of his virtue may not extend to them and he should not suspect them because of racial difference. If the beneficence of his virtue harmonizes them, then the four barbarians can be made into one family; if suspicions are many, even family members cannot avoid being enemies’.Footnote ¹¹¹ On another occasion, he proudly proclaimed: ‘Emperors from ancient times all appreciated the Chinese and depreciated the barbarians. Only I view them as equal. That is why they look upon me as their parent’.Footnote ¹¹²

From the Yuan period onwards, Chinese rulers gradually began to see ethnic peoples in Yunnan as their subjects who were no different from Han people. Their gentle attitude resulted partially from their moral beliefs and partially from the brutal local resistance. The Qianlong Emperor, after tasting the bitterness of the Jinchuan Wars (western Sichuan), issued a decree that all discriminative names of ethnic peoples in imperial documents and archives be deleted or changed,Footnote ¹¹³ a practice both the Guomingdang and the CCP followed.Footnote ¹¹⁴ All these similarities between P. R. China and imperial states resulted from the commonalities between Chinese Communist ideology and Confucianism that Harrell has compared.Footnote ¹¹⁵

In conclusion, the CCP's minzu policies are neither unprecedented nor a simple application of Marxism or Soviet model. Imperial heritage posited a remarkable stamp on contemporary China's strategy and management of ethnic minorities and frontier areas such as Yunnan. While ethnic problems more or less contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Empire, conventional wisdom of over 2,000 years to a large degree accounts for China's relative success, for example, in Yunnan.

Conclusion

The creation of minzu is a vital part of state-building in contemporary China, a transition from a ‘traditional empire’ to a ‘modern nation-state’.Footnote ¹¹⁶ During this transition, the imperial legacy to a large degree shaped contemporary policies, institutions and practices. Moreover, minzu policies in China are double-edged. On the one hand, at least on paper, all peoples are considered equal. Many ethnic minorities are able to voice themselves and have access to resources on the national stage where Han Chinese dominate. On the other hand, state penetration has reached ethnic minorities and areas to an unprecedented degree, which should again be accredited to the long-term management of imperial China, for example, in Yunnan. As a result, a new hierarchical system has been imposed on ethnic minorities and frontier areas, and which most of them have surprisingly accepted. In this manner, ethnic peoples in Yunnan have been transformed and incorporated from barbarians into members of the Chinese nationality family by imperial subjects, but at a hefty price.