Nicholas Bamforth and David A. J. Richards make a full frontal attack on the philosophical consistency, social relevance, and political desirability of new natural law as advanced by Germain Grisez, John Finnis, and Robert George. It is also a rallying cry: “Too many legal theorists” have taken the new natural lawyer's arguments at “face value,” and “ignore or gloss over evidence” that such arguments are religious in character. As such, it will be welcomed and dismissed by partisans in equal measure. But for those who aspire to objectivity, rationality, or simply enjoy robust analysis, this text presents challenging philosophical insights as well as informative commentary on the role of doctrinal religion in the construction of seemingly secular law.
Bamforth and Richards voice two central concerns. First, Finnis' work must be contextualized, particularly regarding its genealogical dependence on Grisez. This “strategy” pinpoints the internal inconsistencies, particularly in relation to a Thomistic framework, and the blurring of religious and secular arguments. The latter draws clear connections between the academic work of Finnis, Grisez etc. and their practical interventions in United States politics and in Catholic Church theo-political positioning.
The second concern establishes the interventions of new natural law in constitutional arguments on sexuality and gender as “morally unappealing” in a constitutional democracy. Summarizing normative arguments for same-sex partnerships, lesbian and gay sexuality, and against homophobia, Bamforth and Richards argue that the fundamentalism lurking within new natural law is inappropriate for a constitutional democracy and probably appealing only to those with “preexisting doctrinal commitments.”
While their considerations could end there, they continue in a more constructive mode. The penultimate chapter traces patriarchal religious beliefs historically and culturally to a tradition far removed from that concerned with individual liberty. The book closes with a reasoned reflection upon the role of Christian values in contemporary politics and draws a distinction between this “patriarchal notion of religion” and an alternative, “progressive,” view of Christianity which resonates more with the values of a constitutional democracy.
Undoubtedly, the book is meticulously argued, well-written, and thoroughly annotated, as one would expect from Cambridge and from academics of their caliber. It provides a detailed map of the philosophical, personal, and political affiliations between Grisez, Finnis, George and, most importantly, it closely traces their arguments to “illiberal prescriptions” concerning sexuality and gender. On the latter point, Bamforth and Richards argue that most other legal theorists assume Finnis, for example, believes law has a secular character and is “unconcerned” about its “dependence” on the religious doctrines underpinning the conservative Catholic Grisez. This is the gap in the philosophical investigation of new natural law that the text wishes to fill. As such, it redresses the scales tipped toward a sympathetic reading of Finnis and George, and challenges others to see such work as no more than a “reflection and defense” of the “authoritarian and patriarchal” Roman Catholic Church hierarchy.
This work joins a growing body of literature in the discipline attempting to “take the Christian Right seriously” as a political theory, a policy position, and as a political actor in a modern liberal democracy highly divided on “moral wedge” issues. It marks a maturing move away from off-handedly dismissing one's political and philosophical nemeses. One of the most interesting of these strategies, particularly within the United States context, is the careful delineation between varying Christian theologies, and the resulting varying impacts upon politics and policies. This is why the last two chapters are both informing — contextualizing historically — and politically interesting. That said, the most philosophically and theologically compelling sections of the text are those offering a detailed analysis of Finnis and Grisez, and concluding that they have an inconsistent and selective reading of St. Thomas that is deployed for a sectarian religious and political purpose.
The authors set out “to demonstrate the religious character and substantive undesirability of the new natural lawyer's arguments about sexuality and gender-related matters” (8) and that task is expertly achieved. As such, the book will serve advanced undergraduates, post-graduates and professional academics in disciplines of law, politics, religion, and philosophy. As an intervention into the occasionally hostile terrain of natural law discourse, it must be seen as a serious, compelling, and thought-provoking commentary on the religious and political motivations some academics pretend to deposit behind a veil of ignorance before entering the ivory tower. Some, of course, will dismiss it as yet another shot in the ongoing United States “cultural wars.” There are others, myself included, who will delight not only in the sound philosophical investigation, but in the added benefit this contribution brings to a discipline only just beginning to appreciate the nuances involved in researching sexuality and politics.
