This book, written in English, is a collection of T.'s essays, previously published in Italian, that have been extensively revised and, in some cases, expanded. This approach means that there is not a single argument developed over the course of the book. Instead, readers will find related but discrete chapters as essays on some of the key philosophical issues and most challenging passages in Plato's Phaedo.
Although it does not defend a single thesis, the book presents a single coherent perspective on the Phaedo, and T. is explicit about his methods and interpretative principles in approaching the dialogue. In this way, it is closer to a monograph than a typical edited collection. One interpretative principle, which T. sets out in the introduction, is that there is ‘an underlying coherence’ to Plato's dialogues (p. 5). Indeed, later in the book, T. rejects a developmentalist reading of the dialogues, calling it ‘the last and weakest’ interpretative hypothesis (p. 51). This commitment to coherence means that, while the bulk of the discussion concerns passages from Phaedo, T. draws from other dialogues across Plato's career in support of his readings. A second principle, which T. states outright in Chapter 7 but that is operative throughout, is that the book is purely interpretative; he is only trying to determine ‘what Plato sought to express’ in his writing (p. 125, italics original). That is, he rejects approaching Platonic texts as a starting point for exploring philosophical issues of interest to thinkers today, writing that, if this were the goal, we should not ‘waste our time with archaic and faulty arguments’ but instead focus on the issues themselves (p. 126). I presume that there is some hyperbole here, because especially in the discussions of virtue and eudaimonism (esp. Chapters 2 and 3) it seems to me that T. reads Plato as offering insights into the human condition that are not limited to his own time. In any event, even if T. is in earnest and even if one disagrees with this principle of reading Plato, it is undeniable that the book offers many careful discussions of important passages. So, whether one is working through the passages in order to sort out what Plato is saying for its own sake or whether one thinks that Plato is a good starting point for an inquiry into the issues, this book is beneficial.
Given the nature of the volume, a summary of the chapters is required in order to appreciate its scope. Because the book is full of provocative claims persuasively supported, there is much to engage with, but I will limit myself to a few critical comments along the way. The book begins with an introduction wherein T. advocates the ‘Progressivist’ approach to ancient scholarship, meaning that one should only pursue publication if one has something new to say about the texts. Novelty requires a grasp of the relevant literature, but certain voices and languages are sometimes ignored. This is the central motivation for this collection: to make accessible his interpretations to a wider audience.
Chapter 1, ‘Death’, concerns Socrates’ hopeful attitude towards death in the dialogue. T. situates his analysis and the Phaedo more generally in a longstanding interpretative debate as to whether Platonic philosophy is dogmatic or sceptical. T. argues for a ‘third way’ (p. 17), according to which humans can have limited but necessarily incomplete knowledge of universals while alive. In this way, the Phaedo encapsulates the fundamental challenges and responses of Plato's philosophy. As for how this manifests in the dialogue, Socrates defends his attitude towards death by claiming that only there, if anywhere, can he achieve the knowledge that as a philosopher he has long desired. But this threatens to undermine the practice of philosophy, as it seems to indicate that knowledge is not possible while embodied, rendering philosophy futile. T. argues that appreciating the significance of Plato's choice of ktaomai (‘to possess’) helps us to see his ‘third way’ forward; philosophers can have ‘partial and provisional’ (p. 27) knowledge of Forms while embodied, but only fully possess it when disembodied. This strategy is promising, but elaboration would have been welcome. For example, T. never explains what it means to possess knowledge in the relevant sense. ‘To possess’ (ktaomai) occurs prominently in the analysis of desire in Symposium (200cd); so bringing this passage into the conversation may have helped. Within Phaedo a relevant passage occurs at 79d, which T. does not discuss, where Socrates characterises the experience of what they have been calling ‘wisdom’ (phronesis) as staying with and communing with Forms. This unmediated experience (pathema) does not easily translate to T.'s possessive knowledge, for knowledge is here something that is experienced. Moreover, the initial problem of the Phaedo and the Platonic philosopher reemerges because this kind of communion with Forms can occur before death.
Whereas Chapter 1 deals with big picture issues in Platonic philosophy, Chapter 2, ‘Suicide’, casts its initial attention more narrowly, focusing on a single vexed passage concerning the prohibition against suicide. This is one of several places in the book that dwell on short passages of text. In this case, T. leverages the analysis of the passage into a discussion of eudaimonism, arguing that what many commentators misunderstand is that for Plato ‘no obligation is of any value if it goes against the happiness of the person subject to it’ (p. 46). Chapter 3, ‘Virtue’, continues these ethical discussions, arguing that Plato brings up virtue after Socrates’ second defence in order to highlight that the ascetic nature of the philosopher is exactly what suits, rather than disqualifies, him for politics.
Chapter 4, ‘The (True) Philosopher’, is the longest in the book, asking what Plato has in mind in the numerous instances where he employs various iterations of the phrase ‘true philosopher’. This is a wonderful and important question. T. cautiously suggests that Plato contrasts his own philosophy, which he conceives of as the proper working out of ideas implicit in Socrates’, with Antisthenes’, a false inheritor of Socraticism. In T.'s view, Antisthenes’ bogus philosophy lacked the epistemic and metaphysical resources to go beyond the body.
Chapters 5–9 turn to some of the more epistemic and metaphysical issues in the dialogue, which T. thinks characterise Plato's philosophy in contrast to Antisthenes’. In order, these chapters concern recollection, Simmias’ soul-as-harmony view, causes, Socrates’ so-called ‘second sailing’ in his search for explanations, and the final argument of the Phaedo.
Considerable space would be needed to do justice to the scholarship in any one of these chapters. Here, I will say a bit about Chapter 5 because it connects to some earlier points. T. denies that recollection is a method of inquiry, arguing that it is a theory, known only to philosophers, that explains human learning. Hence, the ‘third way’ of understanding Platonic philosophy. It is disappointing that T. does not engage with the passage at 76bc, as this presents an apparent problem for his otherwise appealing interpretation. Here it is implied that Socrates has an account, and so knows at least some of the Forms that have been under discussion. But T. argues that no human being ‘is in possession’ of knowledge of the Forms (p. 96); otherwise the motivation for the theory of recollection is undermined. T. cleverly invokes his earlier technical notion of ‘possessing’ knowledge, but questions remain about this from Chapter 1. Moreover, the tension with which the book, and likewise the Phaedo, begins returns: how to reconcile Socrates’ attitude towards death and the belief in the value of embodied philosophy? Although the answer may still seem elusive, in considering this and many other questions about the Phaedo, scholars will be grateful for T.'s collection.
