Introduction
Karachi, the capital of Pakistan’s Sindh province, has a population that largely does not speak Sindhi, the dominant regional language. Before the 1947 arrival of muhajirs (Partition migrants from India), Sindhis (both Hindu and Muslim) made up most of the city’s population.Footnote 1 Following Partition, the influx of muhajirs coincided with the departure of many Hindu Sindhis, leaving a Sindhi-speaking minority in Karachi. This contrasts with Lahore, Punjab, where approximately 90 percent of the population speaks Punjabi; Peshawar, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, where about 90 percent of the population speaks Pashto; and Multan, Punjab, where 64 percent of the population speaks Seraiki. In 1981, the Sindhi population, by mother tongue, accounted for 6.29 percent of Karachi’s total population; by 2017, this figure rose slightly to 10.67 percent. In contrast, the city’s Pashtun population increased from 8.71 percent in 1981 to 15.01 percent in 2017, while the Seraiki-speaking population rose from 0.35 percent to 4.98 percent during the same period. Population data (Table 1) indicates that Karachi’s Sindhi population has not increased significantly in recent decades.
Population by mother tongue, in percentage, for Karachi in 1981, 2017, and 2023Footnote 2
Table 1. Long description
A table comparing the population by mother tongue in Karachi for the years 1981, 2017, and 2023. The table has 3 rows and 8 columns. Column headers are: Years, Total Population, Urdu, Punjabi, Sindhi, Pashto, Balochi, Seraiki, Others. Row 1: 1981, 5.2 million, 54.34, 13.64, 6.29, 8.71, 4.39, 0.35, 12.28. Row 2: 2017, 16.02 million, 42.30, 10.73, 10.67, 15.01, 4.05, 4.98, 12.26. Row 3: 2023, 20.03 million, 50.6, 8.08, 11.12, 13.52, 3.97, 3.7, 9.01.
Of Pakistan’s four provinces, Sindh is the second-most populous, with thirty districts. In 2023, Sindh’s population stood at 55,696,147. Karachi, which has seven districts (Central, East, South, West, Kemari, Korangi, and Malir), serves as Pakistan’s economic hub and Sindh’s provincial capital. In 2023, Karachi’s population was approximately 20,382,881, making it the world’s seventh-most populous city. As Karachi grows, it attracts migrants from within Pakistan and abroad, leading to overurbanization and resource imbalances. An estimated 45,000 migrant workers arrive in Karachi each day. Some stay for an extended period, often a decade or more. Over the years, the city has seen migration from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and other regions of Pakistan.Footnote 3
Scholarly research indicates that, globally and in peaceful times, people migrate to address “human insecurity,” such as poverty, exploitation, and a lack of services (e.g., healthcare and education).Footnote 4 Historically, rural-to-urban migration has been driven by people seeking to address human security deficiencies in rural areas. Urban destinations are perceived as places that enhance human security outcomes by providing access to healthcare and education, thereby supporting migrants’ overall wellbeing.Footnote 5 Research also identifies human insecurity, defined as a condition in which individuals are, or feel, unprotected from harm, threats, and dangers, in both manifest and latent forms, as a primary reason for rural-to-urban migration. In the context of Pakistan and Sindh, this condition raises several questions, including: why has Karachi failed to attract Sindhis despite being more developed than Sindh’s rural areas? Answers to this question involve identifying the human insecurity factors in Karachi and Sindh that have discouraged rural migration, particularly when compared with non-Sindhi groups in Pakistan. This article draws on Vietti and Scribner’s International Migration Model of Human Security to examine Sindhi migration (or the lack thereof) to Karachi.Footnote 6 According to this model, human security and insecurity play a significant role in encouraging or deterring migration.Footnote 7
Internal migration from rural to urban areas, in both Karachi and Pakistan’s other major cities, has been examined only marginally from a human security and insecurity perspective. This issue requires more a comprehensive assessment, which this article aims to do. Vietti and Scribner’s human security framework posits that internal migration must be understood through both economic and multidimensional security factors, including economic, political, community, development, and health-related factors. This article uses a qualitative narrative approach, engaging professionals across Sindh to better understand the contexts that inform the low level of Sindhi migration to Karachi.
Context, framework, and method
Scholarly literature often highlights the potential of rural development to ease urban pressure by curbing migration, noting that many Asian governments have recognized rural industrialization as a strategy to absorb surplus labor and, thereby, reduce rural-to-urban migration.Footnote 8 Building on this, Katherine Gough and Jonathan Rigg, in Rural-Urban Dynamics, note that some governments encourage handicraft industries and the relocation of manufacturing to rural areas to create employment and reduce urban influx.Footnote 9 In “HABITAT III-Toward a New Urban Agenda,” Brian Evans, Pietro Elisei, Orna Rosenfeld, Gulnara Roll, Amie Figueiredo, and Marco Keiner further build on Gough and Rigg, noting that migration contributes to diversity and innovation, as well as challenges social cohesion. Evans et al. stress that strengthening rural communities helps reduce urban strain, enables better migration planning, and urges the development of inclusive public policies. In “Migratory and Refugee Movements in and from the Horn of Africa,” Günter Schröder similarly recommends that governments invest in economic development in underdeveloped regions to reduce migration pressures, noting that it could take over a decade for areas to develop sufficiently to deter outmigration, particularly in politically unstable settings.Footnote 10 Debates over whether to invest in people or places reflect differing strategies for addressing regional inequality and the causes of migration.Footnote 11 A key insight is that employment-intensive rural investments can drive inclusive growth. This requires improvements to services, infrastructure, and working conditions, along with decentralized planning, to enhance local wellbeing and resilience. Migration drivers vary significantly, and involve both voluntary (e.g., job opportunities) and involuntary (e.g., conflict) factors.Footnote 12
In existing scholarly literature, Pakistan presents a unique case. Despite rural Sindh remaining underdeveloped, significant migration to Karachi is not occurring at the expected levels, and research on both this issue and internal migration in Pakistan generally remains scarce. Arif Hasan, in “Migration, Small Towns and Social Transformations in Pakistan,” and Asma Semi Malik, in “Rural-Urban Migration: Socio-Cultural Changes in Pakistan-Preventive Measures Taken by Government and Civil Society to Control It,” discuss the impacts of migration, but do not explore its root causes or human security dimensions.Footnote 13 In “Elderly Parents and International Migration of Sons,” Asia Ashfaq, Saif Ur Rehman Abbasi, Rabia Ali, and Ume Habiba address internal migration but overlook human security.Footnote 14 In “Migration, Urbanization and Security: Challenges of Governance and Development in Balochistan,” S. Shafqat and S. Shahid examine internal migration only through a national security lens.Footnote 15 In “Causes of Rural-Urban Migration and Its Effect on Quality of Life,” Riffat Rehman, Muqaddas Mazhar, Sadia Khan, and Humaira Waseem cite the quality of education, employment, and family conflict as central reasons for migration.Footnote 16 Adding to this knowledge gap is the fact that Pakistan lacks a national or provincial migration policy. As a result, in Sindh, unmanaged migration strains urban resources for both residents and migrants and is under-documented.Footnote 17 Only two policies, the National Climate Change Policy and its framework, address rural-to-urban migration, yet they ignore human security concerns.Footnote 18 These policies are also not adopted at the provincial level, so policy discussions often exclude the ways in which insecurity and security in rural origins and urban destinations shape migration decisions. To address a general lack of knowledge, this article examines why migration from rural Sindh to Karachi has not been on a larger scale and which human security and insecurity factors have driven or deterred such movement.Footnote 19
Theoretically, this article draws on Vietti and Scribner’s International Migration Model of Human Security to examine internal migration patterns from rural Sindh to Karachi. They define human security through two paradigms: freedom from fear (war, violence, and oppression) and freedom from want (poverty, disease, and economic hardship).Footnote 20 Vietti and Scribner also argue that the absence of both can lead to involuntary migration and outline seven interrelated threats to human security: economic, political, environmental, food, health, community, and personal. A failure to meet basic needs, such as food, water, healthcare, and income, can compel individuals to leave rural areas. Vietti and Scribner emphasize that these forms of insecurity are deeply interconnected and that institutions, both local and national, can act as duty bearers to address these conditions. Decentralization is also essential to ensure that security and development reach the rural level. Together, these points reinforce the idea that the goal of development is to create an environment in which individuals can live healthy, long, and creative lives. Migration, therefore, is not only a response to explicit threats such as war or persecution, but also occurs in response to chronic insecurity, poverty, marginalization, and lack of opportunities.Footnote 21 This article explores migration as both a movement and a response to human insecurity. Through the lens of human security and insecurity, this article raises a critical question: why is the migration of Sindhis from rural areas to Karachi so little? In other words, this article asks which positive human security factors have encouraged Sindhis to remain in rural areas and which negative human insecurity factors in Karachi have deterred mass migration from rural areas.
The article draws on data from individuals, largely collected through WhatsApp interviews with thirteen respondents from various professions in Sindh, who verbally consented to the publication of their names. The respondents were recruited through referral and snowball sampling. Initially, the researcher contacted Akram Khaskheli, 39, President of the Hari Welfare Association (an organization in Sindh that works for the rights of peasants and rural workers). With his assistance, the researcher identified and contacted other professionals, including: Sajad Ghalo, 45, Director of Training and Assessment at the Sindh Education Foundation; Ali Rind, 58, Chief Editor of Affair Magazine; Amanullah Bughio, 55, a senior advocate at the Sindh High Court; Yaseen Morejo, 37, a lecturer at Shaheed Benazir Bhutto University; Javed Ahmed, 37, a lecturer at the Federal Urdu Science College in Karachi; Paril Mari, 56, an advocate at the Sindh High Court; Ali Raza Khushk, 47, Assistant Professor at the University of Sindh, Jamshoro; Ishaq Soomro, a social activist from Karachi; Bheljee Mal from Tharparkar; Ahmed Hussain Buriro from Larkana; Nazeer Khoso, a peasant; and Shabeer Khoso, also a peasant. Except for Bheljee and Ahmed, all were interviewed via WhatsApp. Javed, Ali, Ishaq, and Sajjad moved to Karachi around twenty years ago with their families. They shared their motivations for relocating to the city and described conditions in both rural and urban areas.
All respondents were asked about the factors that “push” Sindhis in rural areas to migrate to Karachi and those that discourage this migration, the government’s development initiatives in rural areas aimed at curbing migration to Karachi, whether Sindhis’ migration to Karachi is increasing the city’s human security risk, and whether Sindhis living in rural areas are experiencing indicators of human insecurity. During interviews, the researcher took brief notes of the responses and later recorded them in a notebook in more detail. All interviews were thoroughly reviewed, and key codes and themes identified. Given the nature of the questions, the data fell into two broad themes: 1) human security and insecurity factors in Karachi, and 2) human security and insecurity in rural areas.
Human security and insecurity factors in Karachi
Political insecurity was a recurring theme in interviews, discussed in the context of ethnic tensions that immediately followed Partition in 1947. Such tensions led Sindhis into ethnopolitical conflict with muhajirs, Pashtuns, Afghan refugees, Punjabis, and Saraiki speakers, making Sindhis cautious about living in Karachi. This dynamic of political insecurity (especially regarding muhajirs) has contributed significantly to limiting the migration of Sindhis from rural areas to Karachi.Footnote 22 However, according to all respondents, this factor has become less relevant over the last ten years, as muhajirs now exercise less control over the city.
Ali and other respondents also stated that rural-urban migration is a “natural” phenomenon and not a recent occurrence. In Sindh, however, this process was impeded by the muhajirs and law-and-order issues in Karachi. Ali noted that after 1947, non-Sindhi bureaucrats were often unwelcoming toward Sindhis in Karachi, and that both preceding and during the Zia-ul-Haq regime (1977–88), most officers were non-Sindhis, despite Karachi being the capital of Sindh (and, until 1960, the capital of the country). As Ali stated: “In this province, Sindhis are the majority. Still, in Karachi, non-Sindhi officers generally maintained a mocking, negative attitude towards Sindhis, leading to discomfort among Sindhis and deterring migration to or prolonged residence in Karachi.”Footnote 23 Sajad noted that only during Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s era in the 1970s was there a brief respite, due to the appointment of Sindhi officials in Karachi. However, throughout Zia’s rule, Sindhis faced significant challenges, and many were compelled to sell their businesses and homes and leave Karachi. Sajad grieved: “Even after the return of democratic governments in the 1990s and beyond, the natural process of migration has not been reinstated, especially for Sindhis, as other ethnic groups, including refugees, are free to migrate to Karachi. They are welcomed, while Sindhis are not received in their capital.”Footnote 24
Most respondents believed the Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) was a major factor slowing Sindhi migration during the 1980s, 1990s, and 2010s. However, Ishaq Soomro offered a different perspective: “[Now] most of the police stations in Karachi are headed by Sindhi-speaking people (station house officers). Why should there be security threats to Sindhis coming to Karachi?”Footnote 25 Although there were unwelcoming behaviors toward Sindhis, Ali noted that the Sindhi nationalist Jaye Sindh Qaumi Mahaz and MQM formed an alliance in 1998. During this period, some Sindhis relocated to Karachi’s “suburbs” and other newly developed areas of the city, where muhajirs had relatively little influence.
Alongside political insecurity stemming from ethnic tensions, most respondents also highlighted the role of ethnic parties and the media in fueling insecurity. Sajad stated that Sindh’s nationalist political parties are concerned with their minority status in urban areas. Consequently, they mobilize Sindhis in rural areas, albeit with limited success due to a lack of organized, collaborative efforts. He added that most Sindhis are attached to the land and often wish to remain within their comfort zones to sustain their livelihoods and economic stability. When these zones are threatened, they may consider relocating; otherwise, they remain reluctant to move to urban areas. As Sajad stated: “[Sindhi] print, electronic, and social media have had a limited impact on changing rural Sindhis’ mindset about leaving their comfort zones.”Footnote 26 Sajad also noted that the Sindhi media (more than ten newspapers and at least seven TV channels) have been promoting narratives about ghairat (honor) by using the killings of Sindhis in urban areas as a pretext to mobilize to defend and protect Sindhi rights. He added: “I agree with this [media] narrative because Sindhis are continuously persecuted … also by other ethnic groups under the nose of state agencies. Therefore, they should take over Karachi and move there.”Footnote 27 Sajad further argued that Urdu-speaking political groups within the Pakistan Peoples Party Parliamentarians (PPPP) and MQM were unwelcoming to Sindhis in the city, adding that prominent politicians—such as Nabil Gabol and Saeed Ghani—are members of the PPPP and that Mustafa Kamal of MQM-Pakistan released videos on social media claiming that, due to floods in rural areas, Sindhis, including criminals, were migrating to Karachi.Footnote 28 Sajad added that such political rhetoric has reaffirmed anti-Sindhi attitudes among other ethnic groups, especially muhajirs. Sajad stated that the PPPP and MQM leaders’ media narratives are responsible for the murder of Sindhi youths in Karachi, whom muhajirs see as criminals. This also reflects a lack of political will to facilitate and welcome Sindhis to Karachi, driven by various political factors, but also, importantly, by power and resources.
Echoing Sajad, Javed stated that stereotypes portraying Sindhis as dacoits and illiterate persist, and that many television dramas have and continue to air these stereotypes: “In urban areas, Sindhis were being told [presented in the media] that they are saeen [a term to describe Sindhis as useless]. They only fit into rural areas, especially since their role was at shrines, and they had nothing to do in urban areas.”Footnote 29 Ali, however, countered that political rhetoric in the media has never fully succeeded, but that the terms “Sindh” and “Karachi” deeply affect Sindhis, as they believe Karachi is part of Sindh and its capital. So why do other ethnic groups present Karachi as separate from Sindh? These ongoing media discourses, especially those by leaders of various ethnic groups, irritate Sindhis, as Ali explained: “These narratives also compel Sindhis to move to cities and protect other Sindhis from the occupation of other ethnic groups, or at least to stay together to protect others. Yet they have failed because Sindhis are a minority in the city and lack political and administrative support.”Footnote 30
Respondents also noted that, after initially welcoming people of various ethnicities, Sindhi nationalists adopted the narrative of reclaiming ownership of the province’s major cities, especially Karachi, which had nearly “slipped from their grip” because of the large presence of other groups and the perception that Sindhis were persecuted. In this regard, Ali recounted an incident in July 2022 when a Sindhi boy was killed by Afghan refugees in Hyderabad, prompting community members to demand the repatriation of Afghan refugees and the removal of dharyas (aliens) from “their” cities. In response to protests across the province, Afghan refugees, together with Pashtuns of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, demonstrated against, attacked, and harassed Sindhis entering Karachi at Sohrab Goth in the city’s Malir district.Footnote 31 Ali further shared that in October 2022, two Sindhi men were murdered merely for being Sindhis, and, according to Ali, the assailants were non-Sindhi refugees from another country (i.e., Afghanistan). He argued that these events reinforced the political narrative surrounding urban ownership. Javed, on the other hand, noted that if Sindhis migrate to Karachi, the majority do so primarily for economic security and personal interests, not to endorse the political narrative of city ownership. Javed remarked that Sindhis are abojh (the laziest) people, who seldom arrive intending to seize control of the city. For him, Sindhis lack the agency to own Karachi.
In addition to political narratives, respondents cited Sindhis’ discouraging treatment in Karachi, which deters them from relocating to urban areas. As Javed, who has lived in Karachi for twenty years and has consistently urged his village friends and high school classmates to join him there for job opportunities, said: “My village fellows and other Sindhis have started moving to cities, but the number is so small, and they are not treated well in the job market, which discourages many in their hometowns.”Footnote 32 Parial also noted that Sindhis’ limited migration to urban areas, especially Karachi, is due to a lack of government facilitation and the absence of relatives and friends to support them in their initial housing and job searches. According to Sajad: “In Karachi, most Sindhis are discouraged from the formal industrial sector, which other ethnic groups control. In the past, they relied on government jobs. But they have changed their practice.”Footnote 33 Yaseen and Khaskheli also agreed that Sindhi migration to Karachi was minimal because the government failed to provide support, even as the city’s construction sector and small enterprises grew rapidly and demand for daily-wage construction workers increased.Footnote 34 Before relocating, Sindhis need information and motivation to make the most of opportunities in the city. They learn about these opportunities through their limited urban networks of friends and relatives, as well as through social media. Sajad noted:
As part of the political party, I regularly visited villages and towns in rural Sindh to mobilize youth on Sindh’s rights. I have not seen any young Sindhi person [he referred to educated adults] without a mobile. Every young person connects with 100 others on social media, where many Sindhi groups share information about work opportunities in Karachi.Footnote 35
For Sindhis living in Karachi, traveling to rural areas or their native towns is most common during holidays. Mobile phones have strengthened their social networks and connectivity. They remain connected with relatives and friends in the city and in their native towns. However, despite efforts to reach Karachi, some respondents reported receiving no assistance or support, which discouraged both them and others in their hometowns.
Human security and insecurity in rural areas
Human security and insecurity in rural areas were also major themes among respondents, who highlighted factors that deterred or encouraged Sindhi migration to Karachi and other cities. These factors include: poverty, unemployment, and wages; low levels of industrialization and infrastructure development; and lack of irrigation water, debt bondage, feuds, and the “feudal system.”
Most respondents stated that poverty was a factor in migration to urban areas, especially Karachi, linked to a lack of employment opportunities in rural areas, which created insecure conditions for most rural residents. In 2010, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) reported that Sindh’s overall poverty rate was 37 percent in 2005, with 20 percent of urban residents and 53 percent of rural residents living in poverty.Footnote 36 By 2018–2019, poverty stood at 24 percent, with rural areas much higher than urban areas.Footnote 37 According to Sindh’s 2025 Multi-Dimensional Poverty Index, around 70 percent of the rural population in ten districts were living below the poverty line.Footnote 38 Regarding the cause of rural poverty, Raza stated: “I believe that it [poverty] is primarily due to a lack of employment opportunities.”Footnote 39
In “An Analysis of Poverty Situation of Landless Peasants: Evidence from Sindh, Pakistan,” Qurat Ul Ain Memon, Shoaib Ahmed Wagan, Dong Chunyu, Xiao Shuangxi, and Luan Jingdong found that landless peasants working as sharecroppers for landlords in a rural district of Qambar Shahdadkot, Sindh, faced high poverty rates.Footnote 40 Most peasants had both farm and non-farm income, and some derived income from livestock rearing, all of which were insufficient to support livelihoods. The average household farm income was approximately PKR 10,000 (about USD 65 in 2019), while the average household off-farm income was around PKR 5,000 and livestock income averaged PKR 3,000.
Alongside landless peasants, rural workers received significantly lower wages than those in Karachi, thereby intensifying human insecurity. The labor force survey shows that the average yearly wage in agriculture, fishing, hunting, and forestry was PKR 246914 across Pakistan in 2020–2021.Footnote 41 In May 2020, an NGO, the Hari Welfare Association, which advocates for peasant rights in Sindh, reported that “underemployed” youth in rural areas were forced to work fourteen to sixteen hours in restaurants, shops, and workshops for only PKR 5,000 per month, while the minimum wage in Sindh was PKR 17,500.Footnote 42 This clearly depicts the exploitation of workers, which could be a sufficient enough reason for migration to cities, mainly Karachi. Javed reported that a lack of resources, opportunities, and adequate wages in rural areas is the primary motivation for those intending to migrate. Khaskheli, a peasant rights activist, similarly noted that wages in rural areas were minimal: “In rural Sindh, workers are being paid only 5,000 to 6,000 rupees per month for twelve hours of work a day, whereas the official minimum wage in Sindh [in 2023] is rupees 32,000.”Footnote 43 Khaskheli highlighted a significant gap between the officially declared minimum wage and the wages actually paid. In October 2023, in Karachi, the reported minimum wage for unskilled workers ranged from PKR 15,000–25,000, while in rural Sindh it ranged from PKR 5,000–6,000.Footnote 44 This disparity in income levels exacerbates economic insecurity, leaving workers unable to meet basic needs and threatening socioeconomic survival. Demands by worker-leaders for wages exceeding PKR 50,000 per month for unskilled workers also suggest that the lack of enforcement of the minimum wage law has reduced employment opportunities in rural areas and further increased poverty.Footnote 45
To address poverty, the governments of Pakistan and Sindh have implemented measures such as the Benazir Income Support Program (BISP) and short-term land reforms. These measures aimed to reduce poverty but not curb rural-to-urban migration, even though poverty is a push factor.Footnote 46 Critics also argue that, since 2020, the Sindh government has spent over PKR 20 billion to address poverty, yet poverty has persisted.Footnote 47
To combat poverty, the government of Sindh, with an ADB loan, launched a project in 2006 to increase the incomes of 22,000 peasant households in four districts by 21–29 percent by June 2009. However, the project failed to achieve its objective as a result of, according to the ADB, the complex social, cultural, legal, and political environment rooted in feudal relations among landowners, tenants, and landless laborers. Additionally, the BISP and the Landless Hari Project were both initiated in 2008 to address poverty, with a particular focus on women’s empowerment. The BISP has provided relief to some recipient households, reducing the burden of food and medical care costs, suggesting that human insecurity arising from a lack of these resources was partially addressed. Most respondents indicated that the BISP was merely a means of supporting voters of the ruling political party (i.e., the PPPP). As Khaskheli noted:
It [the BISP] has created dependency and beggary among people. It has discouraged self-sufficiency and skill development.… This money is distributed among voters through waderas [heads of villages, groups, or clans]. Bait-ul-Maal funds are also distributed through them … this money is used to empower waderas, who serve the interests of feudal political parties and groups.Footnote 48
In rural regions, access to land, the primary means of production, is key to addressing poverty. Most rural households do not own arable land. In Pakistan, no government has prioritized land reforms on its agenda, especially in Sindh. As a result, arable land is unevenly distributed across the country. Only 12 percent of the total cultivated area comprises farms that are approximately 47 percent smaller than two hectares. Sindh exhibits a highly unequal distribution of land ownership, with feudal elites dominating rural society and controlling most arable land, including state land.Footnote 49 Consequently, the ADB identified feudalism as a primary cause of poverty and concluded that without addressing this system, poverty would not be eliminated.Footnote 50
The Landless Harees Project was a pivotal initiative to address poverty. However, it has posed challenges for landless peasant women and men. Many peasants are still struggling to gain possession of the land that was under the control of local elites. In 2008 and 2009, the government of Sindh leased 41,520 acres of land to 2,883 women (70.6 percent) and 1,220 men (29.4 percent), providing training and agricultural inputs. These lands were allocated in the districts of Badin, Dadu, Umerkot, Thatta, Jamshoro, Sanghar, Larkana, Ghotki, Jacobabad, Kashmore, Khairpur, Matiari, Mirpurkhas, Qambar Shahdadkot, Benazirabad, Shikarpur, and Sukkur.Footnote 51 However, due to lack irrigation water, lack of access to credit facilities, and land under the control of feudal elites, the fate of these beneficiaries remains uncertain. According to Javed: “In these kinds of projects, mostly selected landlords benefit or their relatives and friends. Thus, real landless peasants [or sharecroppers] barely [benefit].”Footnote 52 Added to this, Khaskheli noted: “Some women were provided with barren land they could not cultivate, and many were not given possession of it, posing serious challenges.”Footnote 53 Nonetheless, while Khaskheli was unable to assess whether this initiative affected migration from rural to urban areas, he highlighted that it had helped many families address economic challenges, and that families with land had been able to send their children to urban centers for education. In Khaskheli’s view, the initiative may not have affected migration and empowered peasant men and women, but it did improve the economic stability of rural families, enabling them to invest in their children’s education. By addressing economic issues, especially through land ownership, he saw the initiative as reducing the need to migrate in search of better opportunities, thereby promoting long-term settlement in rural areas.
In addition to poverty and lack of land reforms, many respondents noted that the absence of small-scale industry in rural Sindh is contributing to problems in rural areas, including human insecurity, which in turn contributes to poverty.Footnote 54 Most small- and large-scale industrial units are located between Hyderabad (Sindh’s second-most-populated city) and Karachi, with a small number in other districts.Footnote 55 In 2013, a total of 6,893 industrial units (including manufacturing units) were reported in Sindh; of these, 5,630 (82 percent) were in Karachi and 1,263 were in the rest of the province.Footnote 56 In 2000–2001, there were 1,768 manufacturing units in Sindh, of which 1,218 (69 percent) were in Karachi.Footnote 57 In 2005–2006, there were 1,825 manufacturing units in Sindh, 66 percent of which were in Karachi.Footnote 58 Recent district-wise data on manufacturing units is unavailable, but older data indicates a wide disparity between rural and urban areas. As Raza contended: “There is some growth in small-scale industries in rural Sindh, but they do not offer enough opportunities to accommodate most youth. Thus, a large number of youths remain unemployed and often consider moving to cities.”Footnote 59 According to the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, 54 percent of people aged ten and older were employed in rural Sindh (mainly in agriculture) in 2020–2021, and 46 percent in urban areas. In 2012–2013, 58 percent were employed in rural areas and 42 percent in urban areas.Footnote 60 This indicates that employment opportunities have declined in rural areas relative to urban areas. Only 31 percent of the population (around 14 million people) live in Karachi, and the remaining 69 percent live in other districts.Footnote 61 In rural Sindh, low industrialization is also considered a factor in creating insecure conditions, a push factor for migration.Footnote 62
In addition to low industrialization, some respondents identified physical infrastructure as a concern, believing its absence plays a role in human insecurity.Footnote 63 The Public Health Engineering and Rural Development Department is mandated to build Sindh’s physical infrastructure network. However, this infrastructure is not connected to curbing migration from rural to urban areas. Generally, infrastructure projects focus on water and sanitation, road construction, and solar installations, but even these projects face severe limitations.Footnote 64 In 2018, the chief minister of Sindh reported that the province had 5,091 water supply and drainage schemes. However, reports suggest that 2,400 of these water filtration plants (47 percent) were dysfunctional.Footnote 65 This indicates that such physical infrastructure has not been effective in addressing people’s human insecurity in rural areas (and across Sindh).
Amanullah, a lawyer based in Hyderabad, noted that many families from Sindh’s Tharparkar region had been migrating to urban areas, including Karachi, because of a lack of safe drinking water, even though the government claimed it had installed about 750 water filtration plants in the region. According to Amanullah, “The Thari people were disappointed with this initiative. As a result, many migrated to urban areas, including Karachi.”Footnote 66 Khaskheli, who has worked with rural workers and peasants in Sindh for the past fifteen years, said that he has never seen any projects or programs discouraging rural people from migrating to urban areas: “The government has neither encouraged nor discouraged migration to Karachi. It did not provide facilities for people to migrate to cities.”Footnote 67 Ishaq contends that road infrastructure in Sindh has significantly improved over the past twenty years, including the construction of several bridges across the Indus River linking rural districts: “The Larkana–Khairpur bridge is an example.” It has halved the distance between the two district centers. Previously, the journey from Larkana to Khairpur was over 115 kilometers; it is now about 55 kilometers.Footnote 68 He added that roads and bridges have enabled people to access services in local towns and helped rural residents connect with big cities, including Karachi. Hence, such tangible progress in rural areas can further facilitate people’s emotional and traditional ties to their rural settings and help them decide to remain in villages.
Despite counterexamples, rural development in Sindh exhibits a lack of infrastructure across agriculture, roads, and industry. Moreover, much of the rural infrastructure and agricultural economy were devastated by the 2010, 2011, and 2022 floods, creating human insecurity and pushing people to migrate to cities such as Karachi.Footnote 69 As Sajad described: “During and after the floods and rains [in 2010 and 2022], those people migrated who were rural workers and landless peasants [i.e., sharecroppers]. Also, those who did not have assets or whose assets and properties were destroyed by the floods and rains.”Footnote 70 During the 2022 floods, Sindhis migrated from rural areas to Karachi, but not permanently. They returned to their homes when the water receded. This return migration could be attributed to displaced people’s emotional, traditional, and ethnic ties, which compelled them to return to their rural settlements, or insecurity factors in temporary settlements.
Lack of irrigation water and debt bondage are also reported as critical factors driving human insecurity and prompting Sindhi migration. All respondents reported that, due to a lack of irrigation water, especially at the tail end of waterlines, people in rural areas were losing the ability to find agricultural employment. The lack of irrigation water also affects related sectors, such as livestock and fisheries. Khaskheli described the situation: “The prime cause of poverty and the lack of employment opportunities is a shortage of irrigation water resulting from the unending construction of dams and canals on the Indus River in other provinces.”Footnote 71 Khaskheli further added that, in rural Sindh, only the affluent have access to water. Peasants with a few acres of land are frequently denied irrigation water and sharecropping peasants who work for landlords remain underprivileged. The government supports wealthy landlords by installing solar panels and providing tractors, subsidies, and other services, but poor, landless peasants cannot secure any government favors. Even after the heavy rains and floods in 2010 and 2022, subsidies, funds, and loans were only provided to big landlords, while sharecropping peasants did not benefit.
Parial Mari similarly stated that the agricultural sector in Sindh has been severely affected by a lack of irrigation water and expensive agri-inputs. He added that, as a result, people are disappointed and abandoning agriculture: “Some families are sending one or two members to cities, while others are migrating as a whole family.”Footnote 72 Mari also noted that, in the agricultural sector, families are often trapped in debt bondage to landlords. According to the Hari Welfare Association’s report, hundreds of peasants are released from debt bondage each year. Between 2013–2021, 10,190 bonded laborers, including 3,444 women and 3,529 children, were released from the captivity of feudal lords.Footnote 73 In 2015, the Sindh Bonded Labor System Abolition Act was introduced; however, because feudal lords control both the land and the region’s administrative and political structures, the act was never implemented.
Another important factor is the extent to which kinship-based tribal conflicts are linked to the feudal system and rural-to-urban migration. Most respondents reported that tribal feuds contribute to rural-to-urban migration. Over the past three decades, Sindh’s rural areas have experienced tribal conflicts and urban migration. However, it remains unclear how many people migrated from their villages to Karachi or other major cities, such as Hyderabad and Sukkur, due to tribal feuds and the feudal system. In twenty-two of Sindh’s twenty-nine districts, 1,566 tribal clashes were reported between 2010–2014. In these conflicts, 2,301 people were killed, including 160 women and 45 children.Footnote 74 After 2014, hundreds of clashes among groups were reported, primarily in the Dadu, Sukkur, Shikarpur, Khairpur, Larkana, Jacobabad, Qambar-Shahdadkot, and Ghotki districts, but cumulative data is unavailable.
In 2020, police reported that over 100 people had been killed in tribal feuds in rural Sindh. In May 2021, nine people were killed in a feud between the kinship-based Sabzoi and Chacharr tribes in Kashmore district. A livestock theft triggered the feud. In the 1980s, a feud broke out between the Maher and Jatoi tribes in Shikarpur district over a piece of land. The feud continued for twenty years, caused hundreds of deaths on both sides, and deprived children of education and peace.Footnote 75 These conflicts have also led to migration to Karachi, where most people felt safe to live without fear of being killed.Footnote 76
Disputes can arise over minor issues, such as cattle theft, disputed boundaries, or changes to watercourses. Even when a wild animal wanders onto a farm and is killed, it can spark a fight. Persistent elements include feudal lords (who seek to maintain their authority), a lack of state-enforced laws, police protection for the powerful, illiteracy, unemployment, and honor killings.Footnote 77 Tribal leaders often seek help from dacoits to carry out attacks and assassinations to settle disputes. Stronger tribal heads also often perform well during elections, as they frequently have affiliations with political figures and parties. Tribal leaders and high-ranking police officials can have financial arrangements with criminal gangs in their jurisdiction, receiving payoffs in exchange for protection and patronage.Footnote 78 These conflicts and conflicts of interest negatively impact the local economy, children’s education, and teachers’ duties, yet they have not been adequately evaluated.Footnote 79 Mari described the situation: “These tribes and clans are non-political, which has led to hatred, aggression, and enmity towards other groups and tribes. This has pushed many Sindhis to migrate to urban areas, especially Karachi.”Footnote 80 Ali also endorsed the idea that people are forced to migrate due to a breakdown of law and order, tribal conflicts, kidnappings, and robberies. However, migration intensity is extremely low because of unpredictable safety risks in urban areas, especially Karachi.Footnote 81 Most interview respondents shared that poor law and order has led to little or no investment in Sindh’s rural industrial base. Low levels of migration can again be attributed to the traditional linkages between rural dwellers and rural politics. Lack of exposure to modern systems of popular sovereignty and capitalism keeps rural Sindhis stuck in a feudal system. Since people are often unaware of modern systems and rely on tribal lords for personal and professional matters, this dependence hinders understanding of the norms and values of cities like Karachi.
Regarding dependency on waderas, who head villages, groups, or clans in rural Sindh, Yaseen noted: “People in rural areas were more dependent on waderas, landlords, and feudal lords … families who sent their children to cities for education did not want to be dependent on them.”Footnote 82 Amanullah reported that, in rural areas, dependency has also increased due to a lack of opportunities. Furthermore, people in rural settings have been dependent on the feudal system for basic socioeconomic issues related to land, shares, and conflicts. In matters related to the police and district administration, villagers have largely relied on waderas or landlords. This dependency, often spanning decades, creates “traps” that can take generations to recognize and escape. As Amanullah reported: “A peasant or worker must do extra work for the landlord. If he does not, he is an outcast and punished in many other ways. Thus, a worker or peasant must depend on financial markets controlled by landlords and rich people.”Footnote 83 Raza, who comes from an extremely poor district in Sindh, where physical insecurity has increased, shared that people fear waderas but depend on them for almost everything. However, youth have gradually begun moving to big cities in search of an independent life. Other respondents shared that people in rural areas also fear that once they leave their rural settlement, local feudal lords might not allow them to return. This fear leads some Sindhis to avoid leaving their goth or village. Bheljee categorically stated: “They do not want to leave their families, especially their wives.”Footnote 84
Ishaq observed that only a small number of the Sindhis he knows have migrated to Karachi and other cities in Sindh, including Sukkur, Hyderabad, and Benazirabad. This small number is due to the fact that Sindhis are reluctant to leave their agricultural way of life (their comfort zone) and fear that migration could jeopardize their perceived security. Thus, migration is not on a large scale, despite the presence of multiple push or insecurity factors in rural areas.
Discussion and conclusion
Because multiple factors drive or constrain rural-to-urban migration, identifying causal links in respondents’ narratives is challenging. Linking rural development schemes and initiatives aimed at reducing rural-to-urban migration is also difficult unless there are internal migration policies focused on preventing it, which there are not. Most development schemes are intended to serve rural dwellers, not stop migration, and this article does not claim otherwise. However, within the context of human security (or insecurity) and migration (or lack thereof), this article presents a narrative centered on Sindh and Sindhis, highlighting sociocultural, economic, and other factors and ties that are crucial to the migratory process. Using Vietti and Scribner’s human security framework, this article argues that internal migration must be understood through both economic and multidimensional security factors, including economic, political, community, development, infrastructure, and health-related factors. Although this framework emphasizes macro-level factors, this research shows that personal and cultural insecurities at the local or micro level contribute to rural-to-urban migration decisions, even within the single province of Sindh.
Karachi has expanded rapidly over the past decades and is a major destination for migrants from across Pakistan and beyond. Census data from the 1980s to 2023 shows only a slight increase in the number of Sindhi speakers in Karachi compared with the rapid growth of Pashtun and Saraiki speakers. This lopsided growth reaffirms the importance of this article’s central question: why have Sindhis migrated to Karachi less than other groups, despite their proximity to the city and its economic opportunities? Respondents’ narratives reveal that, while the Sindhi population has grown somewhat in Karachi, their proportional share remains smaller than that of the Urdu-, Punjabi-, and Pashto-speaking communities. As noted above, human security and insecurity in both rural and urban areas have affected Sindhi migration intentions, processes, and patterns.Footnote 85 In urban Karachi, a mix of encouraging and discouraging factors is evident, as are the social and cultural security conditions in rural Sindh that compel people to stay. Respondents’ narratives also indicate that Sindhi migration to Karachi is a complex matter, entangled in a web of security and insecurity in both the urban and rural contexts. In rural contexts, push factors in Sindhi migration to Karachi include the ruin of the agricultural base by both the lack of irrigation water and the rains/floods of 2010, 2011, and 2022.Footnote 86 Other factors include poverty and Sindh’s unjust land ownership system, in which most peasants are landless and work as sharecroppers without any formal agreement with landlords, who can evict them at any time.Footnote 87
There are also limited “pulling” interventions in rural areas that aim to strengthen the agricultural base, support small-scale landowners, and promote the redistribution of state lands to landless peasants through land reform programs.Footnote 88 Additionally, the industrial base is not expanding, despite a significant increase in the rural population; if this base were to expand, it could motivate Sindhis to stay in rural Sindh with improved livelihoods and lifestyle options. Beyond agriculture and industrial development, improving law and order in rural Sindh and providing adequate health and education opportunities could mitigate the “risks” of migrating to Karachi. In addition to social and economic contexts, this article also identifies political factors, including the feudal system and social and political dependence on waderas, that exacerbate insecurity.
The data also shows that Sindhi migration is induced by floods, which is a “push” factor in rural-to-urban migration.Footnote 89 However, no research indicates that people who escaped the 2010, 2011, and 2022 floods in rural areas and sheltered in Karachi have permanently settled there. The media suggests that most have returned, and those who have not are facing difficult circumstances, creating insecurity for other city dwellers with limited human security resources to meet their needs. Encouraging human security factors in Karachi related to rural-to-urban migration include economic pursuits, educational aspirations, and a yearning for city life, which are acknowledged as significant pull factors.
However, external human security factors also deter rural Sindhis from moving to Karachi, including historical political unrest and long-standing ethnic hostility between Sindhis and muhajirs, which have left painful memories for both groups and contribute to sluggish migration to Karachi. Respondents’ narratives also revealed that many people face job market discrimination and limited support systems, discouraging others from moving to Karachi. Although social media has improved information sharing and strengthened rural-urban networks, structural barriers such as ethnic bias, inadequate government facilitation, and the absence of reliable relatives in the city still limit Sindhi relocation to Karachi.
Factors that hinder Sindhi movement to Karachi are not solely external; rather, this article has found that Sindhis migrate to Karachi at low rates due to internal factors, including attachment to their comfort zones, which encompass traditional agricultural livelihoods, village life, community networks, and familiar surroundings. For Sindhis, leaving these areas creates insecurity and poses a challenge to their social stability. As such, many prefer to endure underdevelopment and poverty rather than jeopardize their way of life by moving to Karachi. Even during the floods in 2010 and 2022, which displaced many and devastated socioeconomic lives, individuals did not feel compelled to migrate permanently to Karachi.
Among internal human insecurity factors, “honor” is paramount. Sindhis have a strong connection to their women, and leaving them behind creates a profound sense of insecurity. This understanding of leaving their women behind insecure them and contribute to honor-related violence, as rural areas of Sindh often experience a higher rate of honor killings than other regions of Pakistan. Thus, migration decisions can be influenced more by personal security and cultural preservation than by economic necessity. In this context, the findings of this research contradict the view that abject poverty leads to conflict and violence, forcing people to compete for resources in other areas.Footnote 90 In Sindh, tribal conflicts are not the result of abject poverty, they are the outcome of feudal control over the sociopolitical machinery, including the bureaucracy, which perpetuates conflict and continues to rob the poor. Factors such as poverty, low wages, minimal industrialization, and a shortage of employment opportunities in rural Sindh also create pressure to migrate. Overall, a combination of internal and external human security and insecurity factors affect migration. These factors and pressures coexist with powerful emotional and cultural forces that anchor individuals to their villages. This article asserts that these factors do not cumulatively lead to Sindhi migration to Karachi, indicating that powerful internal emotional and cultural forces play a significant role.
In conclusion, this article offers qualitative analysis of internal and external factors shaping human security and insecurity in the context of rural-to-urban migration, with a particular focus on Karachi, Sindh. The article underscores the central paradox of Karachi, despite being the capital of Sindh and the country’s largest economic center, historically attracting limited migration from rural Sindh. The article also demonstrates that rural Sindh is severely underdeveloped and blighted by chronic water scarcity, especially in Tharparkar, where many reverse osmosis plants remain dysfunctional. Recurring floods have disrupted rural Sindh’s ecosystems and destroyed agriculture, and debt bondage and unequal land distribution further exacerbate rural insecurity. Alongside these “internal” rural issues, the article highlights political stereotypes, ethnic tensions, and cultural insecurities that have constrained Sindhi mobility. Karachi’s persistent reputation as a city dominated by non-Sindhis reinforces feelings of exclusion and fear, discouraging many Sindhis from relocating even when economic opportunities in Karachi are appealing. Additionally, strong tribal ties, fears of displacement, and dependence on landlords continue to pull many back to rural Sindh.
Overall, the article offers a new perspective on rural-to-urban migration in Sindh, highlighting the importance of “comfort zones” built on social cohesion, extended family ties, cultural norms, and the perceived protection and honor associated with women and traditional village (goth) values. Sindhis often view these sociocultural factors in human security as outweighing the incentives of higher wages or better employment prospects in Karachi. The article suggests that migration intentions, decisions, and processes are driven not only by economic needs, but also by deeper concerns about sociocultural identity, gendered honor, emotional attachment, and the vulnerabilities associated with unfamiliar urban environments. The article concludes that both security and insecurity factors play a crucial role in Sindhi migration to Karachi, but that personal security, centered on personal comfort zones, is also significant in reducing Sindhi migration to the city.
Declaration: use of artificial intelligence (AI) tools
The content, arguments, and analysis presented in this article were conceived, organized, and written entirely by the author without the use of any AI tools for content development. However, for language improvement, the author used the unpaid versions of Copilot and ChatGPT only for minor editing and sentence structuring. From March 2026, the author has also used the paid version of Grammarly to improve style, spelling, and grammar. These AI tools were used only for language improvement and have not contributed to the paper’s analytical substance. The author acknowledges that plagiarism detection software sometimes classifies Grammarly-assisted edits as AI usage. However, the author confirms that no AI tool was used to produce the original ideas or arguments in this article. The author is completely responsible for the content.
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