Kosovo's declaration of independence from Serbia in February 2008 split the international community. As of this writing, approximately 40 statesFootnote 1 have recognized or intend to formally recognize Kosovo as an independent state—a tally codified on a website called kosovothanksyou.com. Serbia has consistently opposed Kosovo's formal separation from Serbia, and continues to enforce ties to Serbs living in Kosovo—approximately 7 percent of Kosovo's population.Footnote 2 Given the Serbian government's stance in opposition to Kosovo's independence, it was to be expected that states with close ties to Serbia, such as Russia, might withhold formal recognition of the entity. However, other states with their own potential separatist movements have also demonstrated reluctance regarding Kosovo's recognition. Countries such as Slovakia and Spain have cited Kosovo's independence as setting a dangerous precedent of redrawing borders in the international system, via unilateral decree.Footnote 3
This diverse range of opinions on the Kosovo issue poses an inconvenience to the United States and a number of EU countries that have been articulating plans for the region's independence. Long negotiations within the EU have failed to bring all member states to full agreement in support of independence. Moreover, the independence issue has faced an embarrassing division within the UN Security Council that makes Kosovo's recognition from that body unlikely for some time.
The unilateral nature of Kosovo's independence has included some rather stark rhetoric by its supporters, in an effort to obscure dissent on the matter. But this rhetoric also obscures some of the complexities of Kosovo's intended governance structure, needlessly ratcheting up the debate. U.S. President George Bush has stated categorically that Kosovo's “borders have been clearly defined.”Footnote 4 Certainly, Kosovo's borders can be clearly drawn on a map. However, in de facto terms, the governance structures outlined for Kosovo will be much more complex than the typical Weberian state model.
The ideal of a state as outlined by Max Weber is that of a sovereign administrative apparatus governing the use of force within a clearly defined territory. But the Ahtisaari plan on which Kosovo's governance is to be based establishes an asymmetric decentralization model, granting particular powers to Serb-majority municipalities to govern their own affairs.Footnote 5 Similar to governance structures in Belgium, Northern Ireland/UK, and Bosnia, it devolves substantial powers to substate units and even allows these units some powers of cross-border linkages with other states in the realm of specified issue-areas or functions.
The strong devolution and weak central authority in these functional governance models defies a traditional view of state control as structured hierarchically around a powerful center. Rather, Kosovo is an example of a growing number of states with complex governance structures to govern diverse ethnic or religious populations. First, in contrast to the hierarchical model, such states have a dispersed control structure, in which the central government is weak and substate units have substantial powers. Second, in contrast to a territorial premise for governance and control, they operate on the basis of a functional premise of control—meaning that substate units need not be territorial. As an example, Belgium's linguistic communities regulate educational affairs on a functional principle, meaning that both the Francophone and Flemish communities govern particular schools within the territory of Brussels. These communities may also sign treaties on educational policy with other states. Such an ability for substate units to conduct foreign policy without direction from the center is a serious departure from the typical model of a territorial state.
While these complex state structures hold promise for the governance of divided societies, they remain poorly understood in the everyday world of policy discourse. The rhetoric surrounding Kosovo's independence by all sides has tended to reflect a zero-sum understanding of the meaning of statehood—one that makes Albanians overly joyful and Serbs overly mournful in relation to the complex institutions that comprise Kosovo's governance structure. This article attempts to correct these misunderstandings. In the sections that follow, I first sketch the conditions in Kosovo that warrant a complex governing structure. I then consider the Weberian state model and the territorial and hierarchical solutions that it implies, noting why they are likely to be inadequate for this case. I then outline the conceptual bases for functional governance, which provides an alternative to the Weberian model in terms of both territory and hierarchy, and analyze the new Kosovo structures along these lines. Finally, I conclude with an overview of the advantages of creative designs for states that move beyond territory and hierarchy, to deal with complex demographic realities in regions such as the Balkans.
Background: Intractable Positions?
During most of the 1990s, Kosovo was a civil disobedience success story. After the removal of the province's autonomy by Slobodan Milošević in 1989, the majority Albanian population adopted a strategy of passive resistance to Belgrade, under the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova. The Albanians maintained a “shadow state” government that functioned at a number of levels, including the collection of taxes and the development of some infrastructure.Footnote 6 The stirrings of violence among Albanian extremists of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in 1998 were caused by the convergence of a number of events. These included the undeniable repression of the Milošević regime, the agitation of political rivals to Rugova, and a government collapse in Albania in 1996—which produced chaos on Kosovo's doorstep and facilitated access to armaments. With the growth of Albanian extremist activity, repression by Milošević increased, drawing the attention of the international community.Footnote 7
Following the NATO intervention in 1999, the United Nations held de facto control over Kosovo, granted by UN Security Council Resolution 1244. The Resolution denoted Kosovo as officially remaining under the control of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which prevented the province from officially conducting its own affairs or establishing its own defense structures. Kosovo thus remained a de jure part of Serbia, while Serbia held no de facto control in its Albanian-majority areas after the June 1999 settlement.Footnote 8 The real authority was instead the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). It not only provided security, but also proposed legislation for parliament, nullified parliamentary decisions on security issues (over Albanian protests) and regulated foreign visitors to Kosovo (over protests from Belgrade).Footnote 9
The international community's drive to resolve Kosovo's status accelerated in the fall of 2005. Although policy briefs soon after the 1999 intervention were open to a variety of possibilities for Kosovo, independence slowly came to dominate all other options—partly due to the vehemence of the international actors supporting this position.Footnote 10 Most of these policy discussions took the line that independence, by establishing clear “ownership” over Kosovo, would solve the complex problem of ethnic mixing by simply forcing Serbs to accept Albanian control of Kosovo's territory.Footnote 11 The Serb position was that Kosovo should be granted extensive autonomy within the boundaries of Serbia, but this proposal was generally unsuccessful in garnering Western support.
In Kosovo's first parliamentary elections in November 2001, the Serb coalition Povratak (Return) was able to mobilize enough of the vote to obtain 22 seats in the 120-member parliament, far above their guaranteed 10 seats—in spite of initial threats of a Serb boycott.Footnote 12 However, as Serbs began to perceive UN support for the Albanian position on independence, they slowly began to withdraw further from participation in political institutions. Less than one percent of eligible Serbs voted in the October 2004 parliamentary elections, a boycott endorsed by leaders in Belgrade.Footnote 13 A Serb boycott of the 2007 parliamentary elections had a similar effect, as only 3 percent of registered Serb voters went to the polls.Footnote 14 Serb representation after both elections thus became limited to their quota of 10 parliamentary seats. The remaining Serb representatives have occasionally withdrawn their participation as a form of boycott as well.
Following the February 2008 independence declaration, protests were held by Serbs in Kosovo and in Serbia. Serbia has vehemently declared that it will not recognize Kosovo as a state. Controversy has raged within Serbia regarding how to treat those states and international bodies recognizing Kosovo. A dispute within the Serbian state government regarding its stance toward the EU—given most EU countries' support of Kosovo's independence—caused the government to collapse a few weeks later, followed by May elections.Footnote 15
Kosovo's independence declaration is a claim for de jure control to be officially allocated to Kosovo, although the international community will retain a strong de facto governing role for the next several years. The independence plan outlines quite complex governance structures, a means to acknowledge that a simple Albanian domination of the Serbs in government would be problematic. In order to extend powers to the Serbs, the plan outlines a detailed proposal for decentralization, represented by Article 124 in the Constitution. It outlines enhanced governance powers that are allocated to local level municipalities, which also have the power to collect and allocate their own revenues. They also have the ability to engage in cross-border cooperation with Serbia and to form associations of municipalities.Footnote 16 As I outline below, these arrangements reflect a dispersed state control model that differs greatly from the Weberian ideal type of a territorial, hierarchical state.
Options for Divided Societies in the Weberian State Model
The current international system is founded on the norm of territorial states, an order that is preserved through the practice of mutual recognition.Footnote 17 Max Weber's influential writings on the state describe it as “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.”Footnote 18 These territorial lines may be granted to the state and recognized by the international community. But it is left to that state itself, as the sovereign, to assert its own de facto control within them, in the form of “physical force,” throughout that territory. According to these norms, the “state is considered the sole source of the ‘right’ to use violence” for the purpose of control. However, the complex realities of governing diverse populations can produce a divergence from this ideal type—and a wide gap between recognized state borders and actual control on the ground.Footnote 19
Given the predominance of the norm of territorial state control in international discourse and legal structures, actual deviations from this model tend to be treated by the international community as temporary and unstable arrangements. Appellations such as “failed states” or “state death” reflect this understanding. Moreover, international policy often approaches such places with a focus on the creation of institutions to reflect the ideal Weberian state model, or “state-building.”Footnote 20 One of the difficulties of applying this ideal is that the act of drawing and enforcing boundaries cannot erase the ethnic, linguistic, religious, and family networks that may cross recognized state boundaries. The Balkan region contains particularly strong examples of such networks, though they certainly appear elsewhere throughout the globe.Footnote 21 Under such circumstances, attempts to draw and enforce such boundaries require a steady commitment of resources to prop up the territorial state edifice.
Kosovo's independence declaration reflects some of these territorial border norms. Soon after the independence declaration, the international community immediately moved to fortify its new state borders—an act that Serbs responded to by vandalizing border posts.Footnote 22 After the declaration, Serbs in the North, in cooperation with Serbia, began strengthening local institutions in preparation for a potential partition of the Serbian-dominated North from the remainder of Kosovo.Footnote 23 Even with the establishment of border controls, these borders will remain inevitably porous, and surround diverse populations that are connected by networks. Such networks often pose control problems for a centralized and hierarchical government structure.Footnote 24
There is an inherent incongruence between these on-the-ground realities and the attempt to endorse an international system of idealized “nation-states.” A number of strategies have been attempted in the pursuit of increased state control. One historical solution to potential minority challenges to central authority has been the repression or removal of minority groups via ethnic cleansing or forced assimilation.Footnote 25 Normative shifts in the international system towards human and minority rights and towards democratization have problematized these approaches as policy options. More recently, scholars and policymakers are focusing on attempts to design state institutional structures in a way that can more successfully regulate potential group conflicts.Footnote 26 In the sections below, I first outline three categories of state structure options that remain founded on the Weberian ideals of territory and hierarchy in state control. I then discuss alternative options—founded on a non-territorial foundation and with dispersed control structures.
Independence and Partition as Conflict Resolution
Conflicts within a state can either be resolved by brute force and military victory or by negotiated settlement. Military victory may be more likely to produce a lasting end to conflict, but at a sizeable cost to life and human rights.Footnote 27 If a negotiated settlement is to be successful, each side must believe that the other is adhering to its terms and will not resume hostilities—what scholars refer to as a potential commitment problem.Footnote 28 Negotiated settlements thus often require third-party enforcement to provide enforcement, or credible commitments, that the other side will be unlikely to cheat on the agreement.Footnote 29 Moreover, negotiated settlements should also redefine conflicts in a way that convinces each side that it has a stake in a lasting peace.Footnote 30
Negotiated settlements may be difficult to implement and costly for third parties to maintain, as heavy troop presence may be required to prevent a recurrence of hostilities. Some theorists have argued that conflicts between identity groups are inevitable when individuals of different groups remain mixed, because the commitment problem implies that each side will have an incentive to attack the other—an ethnic security dilemma.Footnote 31 Following this logic, they propose that the only means to achieve a permanent end to hostilities is through partition and population transfer: partition or independence to draw a boundary, and population transfer to remove the element of mixing.Footnote 32 Population transfer tends to be unpopular among policymakers, given the obvious human rights abuses involved in such a policy. However, the logic of “divide and quit”Footnote 33 inherent in partition does imply that minorities left within a new state or province would continue to face a serious security dilemma—one potentially greater than before partition.Footnote 34 Indeed, such circumstances have often led to a military or militia removal of these minorities post-partition, as an effort by majorities to homogenize the newly-partitioned unit. The Serbs in Kosovo have repeatedly expressed fears of such potential homogenizing actions, and there has indeed been sporadic violence against them over the past several years.Footnote 35 Reflecting a Serb unwillingness to participate in the security apparatus of a new Kosovar state, soon after the independence declaration a number of Serb police officers in Kosovo refused to adhere to Kosovar Albanian commanders—but rather attempted to pledge loyalty to UN forces.Footnote 36
The recognition of Kosovo's independence currently applies a double standard regarding the partition issue. Kosovo has been effectively partitioned from Serbia, but Serb proposals for a territorial partition of Kosovo itself, namely to separate the Serb-majority north from Pristina, have been officially rejected by the same bodies, ironically on the grounds that it would negate multiethnicity and facilitate population transfer.Footnote 37 But independence is simply partition by another name—both partition and the creation of new states are based on a territorial principle of allocating control. Minority groups who find themselves within these new territories have understandable concerns about their status. Such problems are not unique to the Balkans, as a similar dynamic persists between religious communities in Iraq.Footnote 38 The act of drawing borders in partitions and independence declarations will inevitably make minorities worry about their status in a new entity. For this reason, territorial autonomy and decentralization, outlined below, tend to be viewed as more palatable options—as minorities remain within the protection of a larger state. However, these options are also based in Weberian state principles, and are thus limited as a means to alleviate minority concerns.
Territorial Autonomy, Federalism, and Decentralization
Socialism left a legacy of very centralized governments. For the past two decades, most Central and Eastern European states have embarked on decentralizing reforms—the territorial devolution of governmental powers from the central to a more local level. Devolution efforts are founded on the normative principle of subsidiarity: “the notion that responsibilities should be assigned to the lowest level government that can adequately perform them,” as noted by Ronald Watts.Footnote 39 Naturally, the act of choosing what unit this lowest level should be is often fraught with controversy. Contention over types of decentralization was indeed one of the primary initial causes of the initial unravelling of Yugoslavia in 1990 and 1991.Footnote 40 This devolution process continues, but is now being implemented at far more local levels.
While devolution is a broad term that implies the transfer of power, terms such as decentralization and federalism usually denote a symmetric dispersion of powers among units. The United States is an example of a symmetric allocation of powers among the 50 states of the union. Autonomy, on the other hand, consists of an asymmetric devolution of powers to a specific minority within a state.Footnote 41 It codifies the recognition that a particular minority group or historical territory might have unique governance concerns beyond those of other groups—as in the case of Native American reservations in the United States, Quebec in Canada, Catalonia in Spain, Crimea in Ukraine, or South Tyrol in Italy. Autonomous units tend to have powers beyond those of other units.Footnote 42 In addition, autonomous units may take territorial or non-territorial forms; territorial forms are addressed here, while non-territorial forms are addressed in the following sections on functional governance principles.Footnote 43
Autonomy may be assigned to a unit as part of a useful post-conflict strategy. In essence, it gives concessions to each side—it can satisfy a minority enclave's demand for a degree of self-government without conceding state sovereignty. Autonomous structures thus allow for the possibility that groups on different sides may both perceive governing institutions as advantageous; in academic terms, they are “multivocal,” allowing for different interpretations.Footnote 44 The ambiguity of autonomy is a source of its strength, as it allows each side to claim some victory in a battle for control over a specific territory. Up until the February independence declaration, Belgrade had been proposing autonomy for Kosovo, in a form that would have allowed significant governing authority to the Albanians within the territory of Kosovo, while at the same time keeping Serbia's state borders around Kosovo intact.Footnote 45 But many international policymakers viewed the proposal with suspicion, preferring instead a “clear” solution in Kosovo.
A disadvantage of territorial autonomy is that once territorial units are created, they can also provide a basis for secession from the state. The propensity of territorial autonomy to encourage secession has occupied the attention of several analysts in comparative politics and international relations.Footnote 46 Autonomous units established on a territorial principle tend to legitimize and institutionalize local control within particular borders, and thus can be perceived or used by local leaders as a stepping-stone to statehood. The alternative of functional autonomy, discussed further below, can mitigate these effects by only giving groups power over certain competencies or functions, rather than over a territory. In this way, it does not create “mini-states” potentially ready for secession.
The most commonly-used forms of devolution in the international system take territorial forms that are very much in line with the Weberian state model. In addition, these systems preserve hierarchical structures, provided that the central government retains powers to restrict or negate powers exercised at the substate unit level—also the case in most devolved systems.Footnote 47 These territorial models tend to reserve powers over foreign policy and security for the central government. But systems of functional competencies may allocate these powers to substate units (as in Belgium and Bosnia), moving away from the typical Weberian centralized hierarchy. Current plans for Kosovo's governance structures include a mixture of all of these elements, discussed in more detail towards the end of the article. One more territorial menu option first remains to be discussed: innovations in elections, representation, and the allocation of governing powers.
Elections, Representation, and Consociationalism
The above sections illustrate how, under the premise of territorial governance, minorities will tend to perceive that they are at a power disadvantage in relation to majorities.Footnote 48 Because democracy codifies the principle of majority rule, translating demographics into political power, its implementation can augment these minority fears. These effects are compounded where ethnic or religious groups are mobilized as ethnic or religious political parties, a strong feature of the Balkans.Footnote 49 The majoritarian electoral systems of the United States and Great Britain discourage the formation of small parties, such as ethnic parties. Majoritarian systems thus tend to hide ethnic or religious political divisions. In doing so they may prevent political fragmentation, but also fail to give voice to minorities in the political process.
Proportional representation (PR) electoral systems, used in both Kosovo and Serbia, grant minorities this voice—because in PR systems seats in parliament more closely reflect group proportions.Footnote 50 PR systems can also encourage ethnic parties. Serbia contains ethnic minority parties for Albanians (Preševo Valley), Muslims (Sandžak), Hungarians (Vojvodina), and Roma while Kosovo contains ethnic minority parties for Serbs and Roma. Quotas are also applied to guarantee representation and voice for minorities. Of the 120 seats in Kosovo's parliament, 10 are reserved for Serbs and 10 for other minorities. Given continued Serb boycotts of Kosovo's elections, their quota has served as a useful avenue for continued representation.
Minorities may view electoral representation as a small allowance, because even quotas in parliament cannot change the fact of minority status in the decision-making process. For this reason, consociational structures in many divided societies provide a more direct means to integrate minorities in policy discussions. In consociational structures, each group is given veto powers. In Belgium, Bosnia, and Northern Ireland, for example, decisions on important matters cannot be made by one group without the potential for veto by other groups.Footnote 51 Kosovo's new governing structure includes some consociational features, but they do not involve a strict minority veto—partly due to the demographic imbalance in favor of the Albanian majority. Rather, the decentralized structure provides the mechanism to alleviate minority concerns.
One disadvantage of consociationalism is that it includes groups in representation at the cost of government efficiency.Footnote 52 Groups often disagree, producing frequent stalemates. Belgium thus maintains a modified form of consociational government. In Belgium, decisions on particular functional matters are relegated to each group separately, in a process discussed below. This functional innovation provides a means out of obvious stalemates in advance—and in this way steps away from the territorial and hierarchical limitations of the Weberian state model.
An Alternative: Functional Rather Than Territorial Governance
A territorial principle for control assumes sovereignty on the basis of territory. A functional principle is instead concerned with control over particular issues. Rather than allocating sovereignty over a particular territory, functional governance specifies sovereignty over specified competencies: Sovereignty over what? Sovereignty to do what? Functional units of government that are designated these controls can coexist and cooperate with territorial units. The Belgian federation, for example, consists of three territorial and three non-territorial units. The non-territorial linguistic councils adjudicate matters of language, education, and health care, while the territorial regions adjudicate matters that are more closely linked to territory, such as environment and economy. In a system of “exclusive competencies,” policy decisions on language and education thus come under the jurisdiction of the three non-territorial linguistic communities. This innovation removes divisive issues from the realm of general state debate and adjudicates them separately—a means to avoid unnecessary conflicts between groups.Footnote 53
The central government in Belgium does maintain decision-making powers over budgetary allocations to these units, which can be and has been a source of a stalemate at the center. But because so many functions of the Belgian government are devolved to these substate units, a potential crisis is not perceived as such. In fact, during a long governmental stalemate in 2007 and early 2008, interviewees in Brussels quipped that the business of governance simply continued on without an effective center, due to the fact that devolution to the federation units is so strong.Footnote 54
How can it do this? As noted above, the Belgian government is consociational, such that each group may veto proposals by the other—a source of recent crises. Consociationalism requires that elites cooperate in order to create policy. However, Belgium's consociationalism is supplemented with the complex federal structure outlined above. In this structure, territorial and non-territorial units with specific functional competencies take specific policy matters outside of the realm of general debate. Belgium thus takes two steps away from consociationalism as it is usually applied. First, the division of competencies among the different units means that elite cooperation is not necessary for several decisions to be made. Second, the non-territorial units of the federation invoke aspects of collective rights for communities in governance, regardless of the actions of elites at the central level.Footnote 55 Some of these innovations appear in the new governmental structure for Kosovo.Footnote 56 After a sketch of the conceptual foundations of functional governance, I will outline the Kosovo structures in more detail.
Basics of Functional Control Structures
Territory may currently serve as the dominant principle of governance in an international system based on states, but it has not always held this role.Footnote 57 Various non-territorial and functional control structures conducted the tasks of governance long before states became dominant units in the international system.Footnote 58 In the Ottoman Empire, for example, non-territorial units called millets allowed Orthodox and Jewish groups to administer family law on the basis of their own religious traditions, rather than on the basis of Islamic law. Membership in millets was based on a personal rather than a territorial principle; thus individuals within the same millet might be dispersed throughout a territory.Footnote 59
Nor does territory hold exclusive reign in the contemporary era, as the modern international system includes highly visible exceptions to territorial governing rules. John Ruggie calls these non-territorial or functional control structures, such as the mutually recognized powers of embassies on foreign territory, a form of “neomedievalism” that counters the hegemony of territoriality in world affairs.Footnote 60 In addition, globalization processes are increasingly chipping away at the edifice of territorial governance, requiring new assumptions about the assessment of political control.Footnote 61 In addition, the establishment of shared competencies across the states of the European Union has produced a hybrid system of territorial and functional governance structures.Footnote 62 Another cross-border innovation is Northern Ireland. Although Northern Ireland is officially part of the United Kingdom, a North-South council with Ireland allows for strong direct consultation with this other state, and citizenship can be shared between the UK and Ireland.Footnote 63 The territorial model of the Weberian state is hardly appropriate here.
International relations scholarship has devoted some attention to functional governance structures, in order to better conceptualize these deviations from the system of territorial states—as in recent approaches to the study of empires. Although the study of empires and the study of states tend to be analyzed within the different fields of international relations and comparative politics, their governance structures are isomorphic, with similar forms regardless of the level of aggregation at which they are applied. Dynamics of imperial control and dynamics of domestic control can both be understood through an analysis of potentially similar control structures.Footnote 64
These control structures can be approached from sociological or neoliberal viewpoints. Viewed through a sociological lens, functional control is exerted through networks as ties and relationships form non-territorial conduits through which power may be exercised. Such networks as a basis for control have been examined across a variety of settings (from Renaissance Florence to old and new empires) as a strategy used by leaders to consolidate power over diverse populations.Footnote 65 Viewed through a neoliberal lens, which emphasizes individual choices in politics, functional control can take the form of contracting between self-interested parties.Footnote 66 In both versions of analysis, control structures have the capacity to exercise power independently of territorial sovereignty, and independently of territory.
Functional structures of control thus differ from the Weberian state model in terms of their non-territorial exercise of power. They also differ from the model in terms of its emphasis on centralized hierarchy, as the structure of control may be more dispersed throughout a network or set of contracts. As outlined by Alexander Cooley in his application of firm theory to power structures, power relations in a governance structure or relationship may take unitary (U) forms or multi-divisional (M) forms. While U forms are more hierarchical and centralized, in M forms the center is weaker and there is more autonomy allotted to the subunits—a dispersed control model.Footnote 67 The degree to which a governance structure reflects hierarchy versus dispersed controls varies according to the strength of the entities and the network's isomorphic pattern.Footnote 68
As one example of a hierarchical arrangement, Cooley examines Russia's contracts with Central Asian republics for purposes of resource extraction. Both parties may be willing participants in such transactions, even though their interactions often reflect a hierarchical structure of power.Footnote 69 Another fruitful area for the application of these dynamics lies in the study of imperial management. As outlined by Daniel Nexon and Thomas Wright, a hub-and-spoke network pattern with little connection between subunits is a more effective control structure than other forms for an empire, because it forces all communication through the center.Footnote 70 This hub-and-spoke pattern with little subunit communication denotes a hierarchical focus on the center that is not unlike that of the Weberian state. A strong empire may exercise less direct influence than does a central government in a Weberian hierarchical state, but the two structures reflect the same governance pattern. In contrast, a more dispersed control structure could allow for direct links between the units, or for direct links between the units and external actors. In these dispersed forms, controls are allocated to the subunits for potential interactions that do not involve the center. These deviations from the territorial and hierarchical aspects of Weberian state structures show promise for addressing governance problems in divided societies.
Non-Territorial Autonomy and Functional Governance
The primacy of territorial states over other types of recognized political organization inevitably produces conflicts between groups vying for the same territory. As noted by Gidon Gottlieb, the premise that each nation should have a state of its own is a good idea only in the abstract.Footnote 71 Given these problems, scholars of nationalism, ethnic conflict, and group accommodation have been engaged in the project of designing various institutional solutions for governing complex societies. First, if territory poses a source of dispute between groups, the nature of territory can be reframed.Footnote 72 Northern Ireland's flexible citizenship policy and North-South councils take precisely these steps. Second, if a state's governance hierarchy poses a source of dispute between groups, the state structure can be redesigned away from hierarchical structures. Belgium's non-territorial federal structure allows French and Flemish speakers to administer their own schools without fear of involvement by the other group in educational matters. The fact that educational matters lie under the jurisdiction of the non-territorial federal units, the linguistic communities, effectively takes them out of the realm of general debate. This is how the system of divided competencies can reduce ethnic tensions, by minimizing debates on issues that are most likely to cause controversy between groups. In this way, many potential disputes are simply redirected via institutional design before they can become truly divisive.Footnote 73
Normative theorists attempting to address these problems have noted that democratic decisions in particular issue-areas need not require territorial units.Footnote 74 This line of thought was initially put forth a century ago by Karl Renner and Otto Bauer, in their attempt to address dilemmas of minority governance brought about by the demise of the Austrian Empire. In their view, the non-territorial premises of the Ottoman millet system could be applied to address this matter directly.Footnote 75 While their instrumental works on this subject were not put in practice at the time, in the last few decades a literature has emerged on non-territorial autonomy as a means to address governance problems for minorities. Due to a diverse range of scholarship on this issue, these non-territorial structures are also referred to as “personal” or “cultural” autonomy, as well as national-cultural autonomy (NCA).
These examinations of functional governance have been pursued separately from the international relations work on functional governance, but the two literatures have much in common. In the development of the concept of non-territorial autonomy, non-territorial units hold jurisdiction over individuals according to a personal principle, and in relation to specific governance functions. Groups may thus administer themselves with regard to competencies that can be separated from territory.Footnote 76 Such functions generally include the cultural, linguistic, ethnic, or religious matters of a minority group. However, they might also include foreign policy, criminal justice, and economic policy. These foreign policy powers are evident in Belgium, where the linguistic subunits have the capacity to sign treaties with other states on matters relating to education. Consistent with the logics outlined in the international relations literature, non-territorial autonomy includes two important components: 1) decision-making bodies that are not territorial—such as councils elected according to linguistic affiliation, and 2) specific functional competencies that are assigned to those bodies. In specifying particular functions for particular councils, these structures reserve matters such as language and education for internal group debate, rather than allowing them to become a bone of contention between different groups.
Belgium is not the only example of this type of non-territorial governance. In Hungary, non-territorial councils for minority groups were established in 1993, primarily to administer matters of culture. Similar to the Belgian units, the Hungarian bodies consist of representatives chosen by their ethnic constituents in non-territorial elections.Footnote 77 The Russian Federation passed a law on National Cultural Autonomies in 1996, as a means to address the problem of recognized national minorities living outside of territorial republics assigned to their ethnic kin. These entities officially serve functions of linguistic, cultural, and religious administration.Footnote 78 In addition, courts to adjudicate matters using Shari'a law (usually with regard to family law) appear in a number of diverse states, including Nigeria, India, and Greece.Footnote 79
Closer to Kosovo, Serbia's 2002 Minorities Law included provisions for minority councils funded by the state budget and designed to protect language, education, media, and culture for minorities.Footnote 80 Such pro-minority structures, a vast deviation from past Serbian policies, are comparable to the non-territorial structures in Hungary, Russia and Belgium. Moreover, the Minorities Law provides for towns with high concentrations of a particular minority group to work together, allowing for a loose organization of Hungarian-strong or Albanian-strong towns and regions. The Hungarian minority in Serbia, which was particularly involved in designing this portion of the legislation, has already established some of these structures. The law was partially designed with Kosovo in mind. Indeed, as early as 2003, Serb communities in Kosovo began following this model in the form of a Union of Serb Municipalities, a loose organization headed by a president and executive board.Footnote 81
Kosovo's New Structures
Kosovo's current constitution emerged from the Ahtisaari plan from 2007,Footnote 82 and includes structures quite similar to those outlined above to address minority concerns—especially for the Serbs. Minorities in Kosovo are granted particular concessions in the areas of representation and decentralization, discussed here. The constitution, which took effect on June 15 2008, utilizes more vague wording to outline decentralization provisions than the previous constitutional draft and the Ahtisaari plan. However, their basic logic remains, with some of the differences between versions noted in the coming discussion.Footnote 83
With regard to representation, both the previous proposals and current constitution codify the 10-seat quota for Serbs in the Kosovar parliament (Article 64) that has been ongoing practice in recent years. Other minorities are also granted seats. In addition, there is a permanent Committee to represent the interests of minorities in parliament, particularly on issues of “vital interest” to those communities (Articles 78 and 81). Finally, at the municipal level, minorities are guaranteed a representative voice where they comprise over 10 percent (Article 62).Footnote 84 At first glance, these representation structures might appear somewhat consociational. However, the constitution does not give minorities a veto on decisions, thus stopping short of a consociational model.Footnote 85 Rather, the operative powers for minorities appear in the highly devolved state structure.
With regard to decentralization, the initial provisions for Kosovo's devolved structure were quite specific with regard to references to Serb interests. As stated explicitly in the Ahtisaari plan's executive summary (2007):
The Settlement provides a wide-ranging decentralization proposal, which is extensive in scope and intended to promote good governance, transparency and effectiveness in public service. The proposal focuses in particular on the specific needs and concerns of the Kosovo Serb community, which will have a high degree of control over its own affairs.Footnote 86
In the 2008 final constitution, the decentralization language is more vague, but is represented in the discussion of the “high degree of local self-governance” and “extended and delegated competencies” outlined for municipalities in Article 124.Footnote 87
The Ahtisaari plan of 2007 is more explicit in outlining specific competencies for municipalities in areas of higher education and health care, similar to the Belgian model. The 2007 plan also proposes extensive financial autonomy for municipalities in the form of block grants, including the “ability to accept transparent funding from Serbia for a broad range of municipal activities and purposes.” The final 2008 Constitution omits explicit references to Serbia, likely due to Albanian sensitivities, but retains these provisions in the form of municipal powers for “cross-border cooperation,” (Article 124) and in the rights of ethnic and national communities to establish and maintain their own schools (Article 59).Footnote 88
In addition, following a pattern established by the 2002 Serbian minorities law, Serb-majority municipalities are able to establish partnerships with other municipalities—most likely to be other Serb-majority entities (Article 124). Taken in conjunction with their powers of cross-border cooperation with other states, Serbian municipalities can thus establish a range of agreements and financial connections with other municipalities and Serbia, on particular maters of governance that remain of interest to the Serbian community.Footnote 89
These decentralization plans are particularly intriguing in relation to the demographic dispersion of the ethnic populations in Kosovo. While the plan officially avoids outlining territorial autonomy, a concentration of Serbian communities in the north, combined with the municipal structures, gives a wide degree of de facto territorial autonomy to this area. In the aftermath of independence, Serbia has been using this fact as the basis for an alternative plan for the potential territorial partition of Kosovo. However, Serbia's attempts at partition are problematized by the existence of several Serb municipalities outside of this region, to the east. The Ahtisaari plan outlined extensive autonomy to these Serb-majority municipalities as well, which are points dispersed throughout Albanian-majority areas. In addition, the divided city of Mitrovica, with a Serb majority in the North and an Albanian majority in the South, may be governed by two ethnic municipal entities.Footnote 90
At first glance, one might say that these municipal entities could be units with territorial autonomy. But this configuration is a combination of territorial and non-territorial controls. Serb-majority municipalities in the East can work closely with the Serb-majority area in the North, and both can form close links to Serbia. Moreover, the Ahtisaari plan for Kosovo explicitly outlined the potential for Serbian state institutions to contribute funding towards the governance of these Serb-majority areas in Kosovo, to supplement their own revenues, formally recognizing an ongoing practice. The linked network structure of Serb communities creates a de facto non-territorial network of governance over certain issue areas, particularly language, culture, education, and health care in cooperation with the Serbian state. While both the 2007 plan and the constitution officially omit the establishment of a meso-level Serb representative body, the system of links implies a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts—a network structure not unlike the medieval Hanseatic League with competencies over particular areas.Footnote 91 Even the police force, the representative of state control in the Weberian model, is to be quite decentralized in Kosovo.Footnote 92
Both groups are aware that this strong decentralization reduces the potential for territorial and hierarchical control in Kosovo, taking it several steps from the Weberian state model. Albanians, as the majority, would prefer a more hierarchical model, while the Serb minority prefers a more dispersed control model. Thus, the strong levels of decentralization for municipalities were opposed by the Albanian majority, which can explain the shift to vague language on these provisions between the initial plans and the final Constitution. But the Serbian community in Kosovo ueses these decentralized structures to their full potential, and will very likely continue to do so. The strong cross-border links that can be established between Serb-majority municipalities and Serbia, including the receipt of Serbian state funding for their activities, contravenes the norm of a territorial state with the ability to regulate its own affairs. The proposal appears to be at least as powerful as Northern Ireland's North-South councils in this respect. The dispersion of strong competencies to these municipalities also represents a quite dispersed control structure, rather than a hierarchical model for governance. In addition, the network links that municipalities can form with each other and with Serbia add an element of non-territorial autonomy to the structure, as a de facto governing network entity is created independent of territory to regulate matters of ethnic Serbian interest.
Kosovo is thus in essence pushing the boundary of what it means to be a state—unless one is willing to move away from the standard Weberian definition of states.Footnote 93 Indeed, it may be time to re-think this standard understanding of how states should be configured, as democratization throughout the globe fosters increased involvement of minority groups in politics—rather than simply their repression. Governance dilemmas are unfolding in a vast range of places, from Europe to Africa and the Middle East. As a result, more analysts are turning their attention to the need to think creatively about the design of institutions to manage them.Footnote 94
The Precedent Issue and Kosovo's Neighbors
What will happen next? Several state governments have expressed fears that Kosovo's independence will encourage other separatist movements throughout the globe—movements that may view it as establishing an international precedent for others to follow.Footnote 95 But proponents of Kosovo's independence argue that it is a unique case that will not set an example elsewhere.Footnote 96 How might we conceptualize potential ripple effects in the immediate region, and how might potential effects be contained?
The impact of Kosovo on separatist movements will likely depend on the ability for extremist wings of separatist groups to successfully employ it as evidence or support for their own claims. As outlined by Rogers Brubaker in his triadic nexus model, this potential is contingent on the set of interactive relationships between minorities, host states, and kin states—and the extremist and moderate elements within these entities.Footnote 97 Romania and Slovakia, for example, contain significant Hungarian minorities. In the few years before Kosovo's independence, articles in both the ethnic Hungarian and titular press in Romania and Slovakia invoked Kosovo as a potential model for ethnic Hungarian minorities. The minority Hungarian press has viewed Kosovo independence in quite positive terms, while the Romanian and Slovak press have opposed it.Footnote 98 It should thus come as no surprise that Hungary has recognized Kosovo, while Romania and Slovakia have been reluctant to do so.Footnote 99
The recognition issue also poses serious problems for states such as Bosnia and Macedonia, where different ethnic groups may espouse different views on whether to recognize Kosovo. This section outlines how Kosovo's independence might play out in light of the on-the-ground complexities of some of its neighbors. As much policy rhetoric on the Balkans appears to overlook some of the complexity of this region, the potential implications for these countries and regions merit some attention.
Bosnia
The 1995 Dayton agreement that ended the brutal civil war between groups established a state divided into two main parts: the Republika Srpska (RS), inhabited primarily by Serbs, and the Croat-Muslim Federation. As Montenegro held a successful referendum on independence from Serbia in May of 2006, Bosnian Serbs began to call for a similar independence referendum for the RS. In spite of an immediate EU rejection of the referendum request, these Serbian demands became louder as the push for Kosovo's independence accelerated. As of this writing, Serbs continue to threaten to declare independence for the Republika Srpska from Bosnia.Footnote 100
Macedonia
Until the Kosovo crisis in 1999, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) was an oft-cited example of ethnic coexistence. Albanian parties have been a rather constant presence in the country's coalition government since its first free elections in 1994. Macedonians, who are Slavs, constitute the majority of the population. Official census figures denote the Albanians at 23 percent, though Albanian leaders there have argued that they instead comprise close to 40 percent. Other population groups, including Turks, Serbs, and Roma, are estimated at roughly 10 percent.Footnote 101 In 1999, the ethnic balance was changed somewhat with the arrival of a vast number of Albanian refugees fleeing Milošević's military drive and ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.
But in 2001, violence erupted in Macedonia as well. Some violence between Albanians and Serbs within Serbia brought both extremists and refugees across the border into Macedonia. Initial gunfire on the Kosovo-Macedonian border grew into clashes between Albanian militants and Macedonian police, and arms were regularly transported from Kosovo into Macedonia.Footnote 102 As the conflict grew, civilians inevitably became caught in the fray. By June, more than 33,000 refugees had left Macedonia for Kosovo, reversing the path walked by Kosovar refugees in 1999.Footnote 103
Intervention from the international community quickly brought an end to the violence and produced the Ohrid agreement between groups. However, scars of fear and suspicion remain. Recent disruptions in the implementation of the Ohrid agreement demonstrate that in spite of Macedonia's successes, peaceful ethnic relations there could be easily disrupted. Strong Albanian networks in the region make it possible that Albanian extremists, emboldened by Kosovo's independence, could renew an attempt to annex towns in Macedonia to Kosovo, similar to efforts by some Albanian extremists in Serbia. Moreover, because Macedonia borders Kosovo to the south, it would be a likely destination for Serbian refugees from Kosovo if they might be forced to leave—further disrupting the country's ethnic balance. In addition, the issue of Macedonian recognition for Kosovo remains internally divisive, and could become a source of political contention between groups.Footnote 104
Vojvodina in Serbia
Vojvodina is located in the north of Serbia. Unlike the southern portion, it was part of Hungary before 1920. For decades, it has been Kosovo's sister province, as the two regions have historically held the same autonomous legal status within Serbia. Milošević revoked the autonomy of both provinces simultaneously in 1989, but Vojvodina's territorial autonomy was reinstated in 2002.Footnote 105 Although Vojvodina has fewer autonomous powers than it did before 1989, the 2002 Minorities Law provides for the establishment of non-territorial minority councils.Footnote 106 Many of the province's residents of a variety of ethnicities argue that any independence for Kosovo implies a parallel consideration of Vojvodina's potential independence. Pro-Vojvodina parties, the leaders of which are Serbs, are a strong political presence—and the province's own blue, yellow, and green flag is ubiquitous. Multiethnic support for Vojvodina's increased governing powers is based on the province's wealth in relation to the rest of Serbia, as well as its separate historical identity.Footnote 107
Vojvodina contains a population that is 17 percent Hungarian, along with a mixture of other groups. Ethnic Serbs constitute approximately 57 percent of the population.Footnote 108 In addition to the pro-Vojvodina parties, ethnic Hungarian and radical Serb parties are the most visible. Among the province's groups, the Hungarians have been the most active in establishing the non-territorial councils endorsed by the Minorities Law.Footnote 109 Increased autonomy for Vojvodina has not deterred the actions of local Serb extremists, who categorically oppose any further separation from Belgrade.
Unfortunately, Vojvodina is rarely mentioned in reports on Kosovo, and the legal relationship between the two is often dismissed without much consideration of events on the ground.Footnote 110 In fact, in July 1999, when U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen visited Hungary's Prime Minister Viktor Orbán to thank him for his assistance on Kosovo, he was surprised when Orbán proposed autonomy for Vojvodina as a proper thank you. Cohen described the Hungarian plan as the last thing he wished to discuss in the wake of the Kosovo conflict.Footnote 111 But the notion of even further governing powers for the province has not gone away,Footnote 112 and the pro-Vojvodina parties there remain vocal.
Serbia's Preševo Valley and the Sandžak
Large concentrations of Albanians live in Serbia's Preševo Valley, bordering Kosovo's east. A sizeable community of Slavic Muslims inhabits the nearby Sandžak region, which borders Kosovo's northwest.Footnote 113 These regions have not been immune to violence—events in Kosovo have had undeniable spillover effects in these areas of Serbia. In the most recent demonstration of how events in Kosovo and Serbia are entwined, mosques in several cities around Serbia were set on fire following some violence against Serbs in Kosovo in 2004.Footnote 114
These incidents were not the first time that events in Kosovo ignited tensions in Serbia. In February of 2001, clashes between Albanian militants and Serbian police took place in the Preševo Valley. After the Kosovo conflict in 1999, NATO had established a 5-kilometer buffer zone between Serbia and Kosovo. It was in this army-free buffer zone that Albanian militants, calling themselves the Liberation Army of Preševo, Medveđa, and Bujanovac, were able to gather their forces. These 500–800 militants modelled themselves on the KLA and were equipped with weapons from Kosovo. With a stated goal of attaching three Albanian-majority towns in Serbia to Kosovo, they attacked local Serb police and a bus convoy, as well as moderate Albanian politicians. By May of 2001, NATO began to allow Serb army units into the zone in an effort to rout the Albanian extremists—though many remain at large.Footnote 115 Kosovo's independence could breathe more life into this goal of annexing Albanian municipalities to Kosovo.Footnote 116 Moreover, both the Preševo Valley and the Sandžak border Kosovo. In the event of a potential departure of Serbs from Kosovo, these already tense areas could be among their primary destinations. An influx of individuals escaping violent conditions would be highly likely to disrupt regions that already feature a delicate balance between ethnicities—as shown by the 2001 Macedonia violence.
Overview
As these examples make clear, the territory of the Balkans is not composed of a set of atomized unit states firmly separated by clear lines on a map. Even without the formal cross-border institutional provisions inherent in the new Kosovo, the fates of the various regions within the Balkans are thickly intertwined with networks—ethnic, religious, trade (legal and illegal), and family networks. The presence of these networks might facilitate two mechanisms that could increase the likelihood of regional instability following Kosovo's independence: emulation and spillover effects. Such network dynamics are quite common across the borders of diverse states, and can work against the logics of state control—Kurds in Turkey and Iraq, borders of Palestine/Israel, and Tutsi in Rwanda and Burundi are just a few such examples. The Balkans display similar complexities. Rather than establishing forms of government that ignore these realities, it is important that institutions embrace them. The Ahtisaari model, used as a foundation for Kosovo's new government, is a good step in this direction. However, the international community actors in Kosovo must implement these provisions as they were intended, rather than falling back on the rhetoric of atomized and hierarchical state units.
Conclusion
This article has outlined a case for dispersed state control models as an alternative to the territorial and hierarchical principles of the Weberian state. Rather than allocating governance powers in terms of territory, these innovative structures are based on a functional principle, in which governance is allocated to various subunits by issue area or function. The examination here is informed by recent debates in international relations theory on contractual and imperial network models of control, as well as work on non-territorial autonomy in the fields of nationalism and ethnic conflict. Like Northern Ireland's North-South councils, Kosovo's new structures allow substate units to create formal links, including financial links, with Serbia. With this component, as well as its non-territorial structures, Kosovo moves away from the typical hierarchical premises of the Weberian state. Like Belgium's model of divided competencies for territorial and non-territorial units within the federation, the structures planned for Kosovo aim to remove some of the most controversial matters of governance from the realm of public contestation. In doing so, they reduce the potential for group conflict by moving away from a hierarchical state model to dispersed controls.
The dispersed state control model offers much promise in a world of diversely-populated states. Rather than forcing ethnic or religious minorities to conform to the will of the majority because they find themselves within a particular territory, dispersed state control models establish non-territorial institutions by which minorities might control specific functions of concern to them. The “deciders” of Kosovo's fate have done well to establish a dispersed state model for control within its new structure. It can only be hoped that the policy rhetoric of the international community will catch up to these realities. Complex societies require complex governance solutions.
