Most studies about the military dictatorship that ruled Argentina between 1976 and 1983 focus on the long-term political and economic effects of the regime. In these analyses, the massive violations of human rights carried out by the military forces and the country's pronounced economic liberalisation are a turning point in Argentine history. Paula Canelo does not underestimate the significance of these changes, but what is truly revealing in her book, La política secreta de la última dictadura argentina, are the striking continuities between the political themes of the repressive regime and the concerns that preceded and succeeded it among the Argentine ruling class: how to return to a democracy in which the masses are controlled; how to produce, through sheer violence, a new political elite that can sit on top of republican and hierarchical institutions – above all, how to get rid of the demagoguery and populism embodied in the national, indomitable curse of Peronism.
Then, of course, there is the experience of state terrorism that sets the dictatorship apart and establishes a before and after in Argentine history: the brutal repression, the annihilation of the guerrilla movements and progressive sectors, the death squads and clandestine detention centres, the thousands of disappeared people. As the book shows, the Cold War provided the dictatorship with a jargon (and the corresponding resources) for a massacre that had less to do with the confrontation with the Soviet Union or even with the Left, and more with a mighty battle against the pernicious effects of mass politics. Communist or not, collective action had to be destroyed, root and branch. The author argues that the illegal repression immediately became the core of the dictatorship's raison d’être, and the only common denominator of the various forces that converged in power in 1976.
Canelo's fascinating book argues that the armed forces had a political plan of their own. The author's main goal is to challenge the ‘mainstream’ interpretations of the dictatorship that have developed since the 1980s. One of those explanations situates the armed forces as puppets of civilian conservative sectors. The other, prevalent during the past 15 years, explains the repression as a simple function of an economic goal: the dismantling of the Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI), the subsequent economic liberalisation of the country, and the regressive wealth redistribution that reversed the gains that workers and the middle class had obtained in the previous three decades. In those narratives, the military is an annex to other, more dominant forces: local economic elites, civilians, US foreign policy.
The book brings back to the centre the political plan(s) of the dictatorship and shows how members of the military conceived of themselves (and acted) as autonomous agents of change. The core of the book is the analysis of two set of documents: one is the planes políticos, secret documents that circulated within the highest echelons of the military junta and that have been already part of historical and political debates. The other is one of the most fascinating discoveries in recent Argentine history: the Actas secretas de la dictadura, a group of 280 documents with the minutes of all the meetings of the Junta Militar, the highest government body during the dictatorship, between 1976 and 1983. Along with the minutes is a multitude of annexes and secret reports that were either inputs to or by-products from those meetings, produced by specific areas of the military government focused on strategic planning and political analysis. The documents, which were discovered in 2013 during routine maintenance at the central air force building, provide a vivid picture of the political thinking behind state terrorism. Historians and political scientists working on state terrorism, military dictatorships and comparative analysis in Latin America will benefit from this insightful analysis of the Actas secretas.
Three broad sectors converged in the dictatorship: ‘hardliners’, ‘politicistas’ (members of the political wing) and ‘moderates’. Each group had their own personnel, think tanks and policymakers. Moderates kept the other two extremes from direct confrontation. The first president, Lieutenant-General Jorge Rafael Videla, and the infamous Minister of the Economy, José Alfredo Martínez de Hoz (a civilian from one of the most patrician families in the country), were moderates, a term that denotes a somewhat restrained vision of total, eternal military power, along with a forceful investment in State repression. They tied brutal illegal repression to a no less brutal economic reform aimed at liberating the economy from the constraints that Peronism had imposed during decades: state regulation, the power of organised labour, and trade protection from foreign competition. The success of the dictatorship in this realm was less impressive than in other countries, notably Chile under Pinochet.
Hardliners and politicistas deployed an internal (and at times public) opposition to these reforms. They argued in favour of strong government planning (they controlled the Secretariat of Planning), and advocated for a State that held a strong ‘regulatory role in the economy’ (p. 80). ‘The so-called “economic forces” are not a legitimate power’, they argued, but simple ‘lobby groups’ (p. 80). Civilians and military members of the politicistas, for example, explained that the ‘displacement of intellectual elites in favour of mass society is the accelerating factor in the decay of Republican life’ (p. 77). State terrorism was a stage in political reform and towards the creation of a citizenry inoculated against the vices of mass society. The dictatorship should produce, they said, ‘a group of leaders unequivocally identified with the inherited tradition and ready to resist to the end the Marxist-populist aggression’ (p. 69).
The plans for a radical revamping of Argentina were ambitious, yet the military's platform was flimsy. The visit of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in 1979, the economic crisis and the war over the Malvinas/Falkland islands in 1982 sealed an abrupt end for the dictatorship. But Canelo shows how, even in its chaotic retreat, the military government tried to methodically build a transition in a series of infinite contacts and meetings with political leaders throughout the country.
The book leaves some questions open for future debate. One of the most relevant is about the autonomy of politics. The author does an excellent job of studying the goals for social and political regeneration that moved different groups within the regime. The fact that many sectors inside the dictatorship complained in writing about the excessive power of Martínez de Hoz reveals the internal opposition to his policies, but it also confirms that they felt dominated by the economic team. And even though they conceived state terrorism as a necessary means for political regeneration, the annihilation of the opposition also facilitated the introduction of neoliberal ideas and policy, and the dismantling of the collective actions that could have resisted those reforms. Was the goal of the dictatorship the reconfiguration of the economy, or the creation of a new political order? The answer lies, I think, in the way in which dissimilar goals converged into a common Weltanschauung: one that perceived the disruptive arrival of Peronism, and of mass politics before it, as a disease that precluded economic elites from having a sustainable leading role in society, hampering progress for the nation. That economic modernisation, hierarchical traditions and political coercion are not only compatible but desperately need each other is, probably, one of the principles that the Argentine dictators shared with their Latin American counterparts.
