Industrial and organizational (I-O) psychologists should be grateful to Prof. Mumby (Reference Mumby2019) for providing theoretical insights regarding our domain of concern not often encountered in our own literature. My reading of his focal article prompted three questions:
Before turning to these questions, I comment on the sections presenting a historical consideration of work.
The nature of work
The essay seems unclear regarding whether it refers to the (actual) nature of work: for example, “for most of recorded human history, work was an activity in which only slaves, serfs, cloistered monks, or prisoners engaged. It was … viewed largely as punishment or penance” (Mumby, Reference Mumby2019, p. 429), or whether it is referring to society’s conceptualization of the social significance and psychological meaning of work: for example, “How did we go from seeing work as a marginal, rather distasteful activity … to something intrinsic to our self-definition as fully rounded human beings?” (Mumby, Reference Mumby2019, p. 430).Footnote 1
The conflation ignores the realization that even slaves, serfs, monks, and prisoners may be positively engaged in at least some of their work activities (depending on their job assignment) and derive satisfaction therefrom—if not from their social status and circumstances. That is, we have long known that work activities and responsibilities can be intrinsically gratifying (Hackman & Oldham, Reference Hackman and Oldham1980; Herzberg, Reference Herzberg1966) and do not necessarily require an external “injunction to love the work we do” (Mumby, Reference Mumby2019, p. 440) or “a tyrannical manager telling us to work harder” (p. 440). The issue is how to create the conditions that foster such gratification.
The distinction is important because Mumby seems intent on sketching a historical-developmental picture of the changed character of work from (a) something onerous and devoid of any inherent motivational qualities or intrinsic rewards; to (b) something harnessed, in ever more sophisticated ways, to control the people who perform it; to (c) work as a life-fulfilling form of flourishing; and finally (in later pages) to (d) the nidus of organizational power struggles. Whether the developmental discourse is about the nature of work or about its meaning affects our view of what it is that has changed: Is it actual changes in job design or current fashion in social science theorizing?
The bill of particulars
Mumby (Reference Mumby2019) presents a disturbing set of charges against capitalism—especially in its contemporary form of neoliberalism—that is, “raw capitalism.” His set of charges is phrased in the language and theories of critical scholarship, Marxism/neo-Marxism, Foucault’s political philosophy, and post-Fordism. I comment very little about these substantive issues because I believe that the criticisms are largely accurate. Instead, I contextualize them and focus on their implications and the inferences that might then be drawn.
How much of this critique is new to I-O psychologists?
One might think that I-O psychologists are familiar with the onerous conditions described by Mumby (Reference Mumby2019). After all, we work in corporations and some of these same indictments have been raised within our own literature. On the other hand, the relative sparsity of societal-level normative critiques or denunciations of the corporate inequities in our scholarship is disappointing.
As early as Reference Roback1917, Roback admonished that applied psychologists could be social reformers as well as scientists. Similarly, in a plea for “industrial psychology as social science,” Kornhauser (Reference Kornhauser1947) asked, “Do we work on the problems of the private businessman [sic], or on the problems of society?” (p. 224). More than 50 years ago, Herzberg (Reference Herzberg1966) observed that business organizations have co-opted the values of the other institutions that serve Western societies. More recently, Danley (Reference Danley1994) pointed out that our study of business ethics ignores the fact that ethical judgments are shaped by broader issues of economics, social theory, law, and political philosophy. Almost 25 years ago Frederick (Reference Frederick1995) summarized a shocking bill of particulars against American corporate business, including a condemnation of the institution itself, undermining trade unions and virtually taking over some government agencies. Cartwright and Holmes (Reference Cartwright and Holmes2006) point out that organizations have expected more from their workforce and have provided little in return other than simply a job or employability. The result has been increased employee cynicism and mistrust. Bergman and Jean (Reference Bergman and Jean2016) document that I-O psychology has relatively neglected to study the world of lower level workers who are not managers, executives, professionals, or students. Finally
There has been no dearth of descriptive and analytic accounts by social scientists and business scholars reporting on the changed nature of jobs, organizations, terms of employment, careers and the “psychological contracts” between employees and employers…. The career changes are largely nonvolitional—imposed on many people involuntarily by organizational policy changes that may or may not be justifiable. (Lefkowitz, Reference Lefkowitz2017, p. 365)
Therefore, on one hand, the issues decried by Mumby have not gone completely unrecognized by some among us. On the other hand, the profession surely has not made them salient objects of criticism, major topics of professional focus, or expressed concern for the extent to which elements of the economic system have been corrupted and workers exploited.
What is the relevance of these matters for I-O psychology?
Several years ago, at a panel discussion concerning the values of I-O psychology, an extremely successful consultant asserted, “We have been so successful in the corporate world because business people know that we share their values.” He seemed pleased and proud of that; I was ambivalent. For almost 30 years I have contributed indirectly to the destruction of many trees in expressing my criticisms of the values of I-O psychology and their adverse effects (Lefkowitz, Reference Lefkowitz1990, Reference Lefkowitz2003, Reference Lefkowitz2005, Reference Lefkowitz2008, Reference Lefkowitz2009, Reference Lefkowitz2010, Reference Lefkowitz2011, Reference Lefkowitz2012b, Reference Lefkowitz2013a, Reference Lefkowitz2014, Reference Lefkowitz2016a, Reference Lefkowitz, McWha-Herman, Maynard and Berry2016b, Reference Lefkowitz2017).
Those criticisms include the charge that our obligation “to improve the condition of individuals, organizations and society” (APA, 2003, preamble, p. 3) has been supplanted by the dominant corporatist value system that distorts even our science. Despite our knowledge and expertise, we shy away from taking moral or normative positions regarding what work, organizations, and society ought to be like (because that would purportedly be “unscientific”). We take a narrow managerialist perspective on such troubling matters as employment at will, wrongful discharge, “alternative dispute resolution (ADR)” (coerced surrendering of one’s legal rights and submission to enforced arbitration), wage theft, union-busting, replacement of full-time employees who have benefits by “independent contractors,” unsafe working conditions, abusive supervision, pay inequity, and so on. We largely disavow any concern for the broad societal consequences of such corporate policies or the work we do for them.
From a motivational perspective, I-O psychology’s commitment to corporate objectives necessitates our remaining publicly oblivious to all the assaults on workers noted above. This may depend on maintaining a collective state of deliberate ignorance and system justification.Footnote 2 By such means we are able to eschew any moral responsibility for the situation, avoiding cognitive dissonance. Citing Abraham Maslow, Hertwig and Engel (Reference Hertwig and Engel2016) note that “often it is better not to know because if you did know, then you would have to act and stick your neck out” (p. 362).
But is I-O psychology really outside the moral community of society? Are systemic moral issues really beyond our concern? Are economic institutions under capitalism also outside the moral community? I suggest that the answer to all three is “no.” The basic moral justification of free-market capitalism is instrumental or utilitarian—that is, that the effective use of capital and labor generates the greatest net good for society (Ahlstrom, Reference Ahlstrom2010; Lefkowitz, Reference Lefkowitz, Carr, MacLachlan and Furnham2012a, Reference Lefkowitz, Olson-Buchanan, Koppes Bryan and Thompson2013b). Perhaps Werhane (Reference Werhane1999) was correct in concluding that “free-enterprise is the least worst economic system, given the alternatives” (p. 237). But would she still feel sanguine after observing 20 years of the neoliberal distortions described by Dennis Mumby?
I believe that I-O psychology and business enterprises are moral institutions—meaning that they benefit from being part of the moral community and should be held accountable for their moral failings. The former’s scientific study of the latter, and the latter’s neoliberal excesses do not preclude our adopting proactive normative values positions like the following, and I urge that we do so:
Along with improving the effective functioning of organizations, a fundamental objective of research and practice in industrial-organizational psychology should be to assure that organizations are safe, just, healthy, challenging and fulfilling places in which to work…. When it is anticipated that actions undertaken to improve organizational effectiveness will adversely impact the well-being of employees or other organizational stakeholders, the appropriate role of the I-O psychologist is to challenge the morality, wisdom and necessity of those actions and, if necessary, to attenuate their adverse consequences to the extent feasible. (Lefkowitz, Reference Lefkowitz2017, p. 392)
What does Mumby’s critique propose be done? (Absolutely nothing)
After reading the critique of neoliberal “raw capitalism,” I felt as if I had been successfully recruited by a social movement to challenge these flagrant evils. I was ready to enlist, but could find no recruiting office or even slogans to follow, so I was disappointed.
When one encounters systemic injustice, exploitation, evil, what are the possible reactions one might have? It seems to me there are five facets, combinations of which may comprise any complex reaction:
1. Do nothing. One can deny and/or rationalize the injustice—perhaps viewing it as an inevitable cost of the personal or societal benefits/goods provided by the system (cf. “deliberate ignorance” and “system justification”). This may be potentiated by a sense of powerlessness or fear due to one’s societal or organizational position.
2. Rail against it. Vent one’s moral outrage and frustration—internally or publicly.
3. Study it. One can adopt an objective scientific attitude to study the injustice while not considering any normative judgments about it.
4. Attack it. Try to ameliorate the injustice from the standpoint of an outside critic. For example, Nielsen (Reference Nielsen1989) describes a dozen strategies for individually “intervening against unethical organizational behavior” (p. 123).
5. Engage it. Try to ameliorate the injustice as a participant within the system. Nielsen (Reference Nielsen1989) advocates “leading an ethical change effort … through participation” (p. 126). However, a critical question (for I-O psychology) may be the extent to which one is changed by the system rather than vice versa.
If neoliberal (raw) capitalism is the injustice in question, how might one evaluate Mumby’s (Reference Mumby2019) expressed position on these facets? Certainly, the mere existence of the focal article earns a good (i.e., low) score on #1 (for not ignoring or denying the issues). It seems clear that high scores should be awarded for railing against (#2) and attempting to understand it (#3). My disappointment, noted above, stems from the absence of any suggestions as to what might be done to challenge and attenuate the injustices (virtually zero scores on #4 and #5).Footnote 3
In contrast, the field of I-O psychology does not have the luxury of inaction: as applied psychologists we do things—and that helps produce the conundrum referred to in the title. All psychologists are obliged to help improve the human condition (APA, 2003). I-O psychologists live up to that obligation (in part) by furthering the fortunes of business institutions that are responsible for providing a great deal of tangible and intangible societal goods. But that begs the question of the normative critique of I-O because those same institutions are complicit in the multitude of harms catalogued earlier.Footnote 4 It has long seemed clear that by and large we have not been living up to that societal/humanistic obligation—that our professional (scientist–practitioner) model reflects primarily corporatist values and should be supplanted by a scientist–practitioner–humanist model.
Conclusion: The conundrum of I-O psychology
In comparison with academic social science we do not just “study” organizations; we help them—which, based on business’s moral justification, is a positive. Yet, the moral price we pay for being useful and handsomely rewarded is our silence in the face of the indictments described and the co-optation of our humanist values. In other words, we help even those organizations who do not deserve it—or perhaps more accurately, we offer our unequivocal help to organizations even though they are almost all morally tainted to some degree. That is how we have adapted to functioning within the corporate version of the Jekyll and Hyde metaphor. How often have you heard an I-O psychologist assert that business organizations are sometimes (perhaps often) unhealthy, ego-dystonic places in which to work? If we (justifiably) take credit for our contributions to the societal goods attributed to those corporations, should we not also own up to some complicity in the harms they commit? In some instances, we are more actively culpable (regarding certain HR policies and decisions). More important, we should assume the role of actively challenging those decisions by engaging the system.
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Industrial and organizational (I-O) psychologists should be grateful to Prof. Mumby (Reference Mumby2019) for providing theoretical insights regarding our domain of concern not often encountered in our own literature. My reading of his focal article prompted three questions:
1. I wonder how much of this critique is new to I-O psychologists?
2. What is the relevance for I-O psychology?
3. What is the “therefore …”?, i.e., are there any “action items”?
Before turning to these questions, I comment on the sections presenting a historical consideration of work.
The nature of work
The essay seems unclear regarding whether it refers to the (actual) nature of work: for example, “for most of recorded human history, work was an activity in which only slaves, serfs, cloistered monks, or prisoners engaged. It was … viewed largely as punishment or penance” (Mumby, Reference Mumby2019, p. 429), or whether it is referring to society’s conceptualization of the social significance and psychological meaning of work: for example, “How did we go from seeing work as a marginal, rather distasteful activity … to something intrinsic to our self-definition as fully rounded human beings?” (Mumby, Reference Mumby2019, p. 430).Footnote 1
The conflation ignores the realization that even slaves, serfs, monks, and prisoners may be positively engaged in at least some of their work activities (depending on their job assignment) and derive satisfaction therefrom—if not from their social status and circumstances. That is, we have long known that work activities and responsibilities can be intrinsically gratifying (Hackman & Oldham, Reference Hackman and Oldham1980; Herzberg, Reference Herzberg1966) and do not necessarily require an external “injunction to love the work we do” (Mumby, Reference Mumby2019, p. 440) or “a tyrannical manager telling us to work harder” (p. 440). The issue is how to create the conditions that foster such gratification.
The distinction is important because Mumby seems intent on sketching a historical-developmental picture of the changed character of work from (a) something onerous and devoid of any inherent motivational qualities or intrinsic rewards; to (b) something harnessed, in ever more sophisticated ways, to control the people who perform it; to (c) work as a life-fulfilling form of flourishing; and finally (in later pages) to (d) the nidus of organizational power struggles. Whether the developmental discourse is about the nature of work or about its meaning affects our view of what it is that has changed: Is it actual changes in job design or current fashion in social science theorizing?
The bill of particulars
Mumby (Reference Mumby2019) presents a disturbing set of charges against capitalism—especially in its contemporary form of neoliberalism—that is, “raw capitalism.” His set of charges is phrased in the language and theories of critical scholarship, Marxism/neo-Marxism, Foucault’s political philosophy, and post-Fordism. I comment very little about these substantive issues because I believe that the criticisms are largely accurate. Instead, I contextualize them and focus on their implications and the inferences that might then be drawn.
How much of this critique is new to I-O psychologists?
One might think that I-O psychologists are familiar with the onerous conditions described by Mumby (Reference Mumby2019). After all, we work in corporations and some of these same indictments have been raised within our own literature. On the other hand, the relative sparsity of societal-level normative critiques or denunciations of the corporate inequities in our scholarship is disappointing.
As early as Reference Roback1917, Roback admonished that applied psychologists could be social reformers as well as scientists. Similarly, in a plea for “industrial psychology as social science,” Kornhauser (Reference Kornhauser1947) asked, “Do we work on the problems of the private businessman [sic], or on the problems of society?” (p. 224). More than 50 years ago, Herzberg (Reference Herzberg1966) observed that business organizations have co-opted the values of the other institutions that serve Western societies. More recently, Danley (Reference Danley1994) pointed out that our study of business ethics ignores the fact that ethical judgments are shaped by broader issues of economics, social theory, law, and political philosophy. Almost 25 years ago Frederick (Reference Frederick1995) summarized a shocking bill of particulars against American corporate business, including a condemnation of the institution itself, undermining trade unions and virtually taking over some government agencies. Cartwright and Holmes (Reference Cartwright and Holmes2006) point out that organizations have expected more from their workforce and have provided little in return other than simply a job or employability. The result has been increased employee cynicism and mistrust. Bergman and Jean (Reference Bergman and Jean2016) document that I-O psychology has relatively neglected to study the world of lower level workers who are not managers, executives, professionals, or students. Finally
There has been no dearth of descriptive and analytic accounts by social scientists and business scholars reporting on the changed nature of jobs, organizations, terms of employment, careers and the “psychological contracts” between employees and employers…. The career changes are largely nonvolitional—imposed on many people involuntarily by organizational policy changes that may or may not be justifiable. (Lefkowitz, Reference Lefkowitz2017, p. 365)
Therefore, on one hand, the issues decried by Mumby have not gone completely unrecognized by some among us. On the other hand, the profession surely has not made them salient objects of criticism, major topics of professional focus, or expressed concern for the extent to which elements of the economic system have been corrupted and workers exploited.
What is the relevance of these matters for I-O psychology?
Several years ago, at a panel discussion concerning the values of I-O psychology, an extremely successful consultant asserted, “We have been so successful in the corporate world because business people know that we share their values.” He seemed pleased and proud of that; I was ambivalent. For almost 30 years I have contributed indirectly to the destruction of many trees in expressing my criticisms of the values of I-O psychology and their adverse effects (Lefkowitz, Reference Lefkowitz1990, Reference Lefkowitz2003, Reference Lefkowitz2005, Reference Lefkowitz2008, Reference Lefkowitz2009, Reference Lefkowitz2010, Reference Lefkowitz2011, Reference Lefkowitz2012b, Reference Lefkowitz2013a, Reference Lefkowitz2014, Reference Lefkowitz2016a, Reference Lefkowitz, McWha-Herman, Maynard and Berry2016b, Reference Lefkowitz2017).
Those criticisms include the charge that our obligation “to improve the condition of individuals, organizations and society” (APA, 2003, preamble, p. 3) has been supplanted by the dominant corporatist value system that distorts even our science. Despite our knowledge and expertise, we shy away from taking moral or normative positions regarding what work, organizations, and society ought to be like (because that would purportedly be “unscientific”). We take a narrow managerialist perspective on such troubling matters as employment at will, wrongful discharge, “alternative dispute resolution (ADR)” (coerced surrendering of one’s legal rights and submission to enforced arbitration), wage theft, union-busting, replacement of full-time employees who have benefits by “independent contractors,” unsafe working conditions, abusive supervision, pay inequity, and so on. We largely disavow any concern for the broad societal consequences of such corporate policies or the work we do for them.
From a motivational perspective, I-O psychology’s commitment to corporate objectives necessitates our remaining publicly oblivious to all the assaults on workers noted above. This may depend on maintaining a collective state of deliberate ignorance and system justification.Footnote 2 By such means we are able to eschew any moral responsibility for the situation, avoiding cognitive dissonance. Citing Abraham Maslow, Hertwig and Engel (Reference Hertwig and Engel2016) note that “often it is better not to know because if you did know, then you would have to act and stick your neck out” (p. 362).
But is I-O psychology really outside the moral community of society? Are systemic moral issues really beyond our concern? Are economic institutions under capitalism also outside the moral community? I suggest that the answer to all three is “no.” The basic moral justification of free-market capitalism is instrumental or utilitarian—that is, that the effective use of capital and labor generates the greatest net good for society (Ahlstrom, Reference Ahlstrom2010; Lefkowitz, Reference Lefkowitz, Carr, MacLachlan and Furnham2012a, Reference Lefkowitz, Olson-Buchanan, Koppes Bryan and Thompson2013b). Perhaps Werhane (Reference Werhane1999) was correct in concluding that “free-enterprise is the least worst economic system, given the alternatives” (p. 237). But would she still feel sanguine after observing 20 years of the neoliberal distortions described by Dennis Mumby?
I believe that I-O psychology and business enterprises are moral institutions—meaning that they benefit from being part of the moral community and should be held accountable for their moral failings. The former’s scientific study of the latter, and the latter’s neoliberal excesses do not preclude our adopting proactive normative values positions like the following, and I urge that we do so:
Along with improving the effective functioning of organizations, a fundamental objective of research and practice in industrial-organizational psychology should be to assure that organizations are safe, just, healthy, challenging and fulfilling places in which to work…. When it is anticipated that actions undertaken to improve organizational effectiveness will adversely impact the well-being of employees or other organizational stakeholders, the appropriate role of the I-O psychologist is to challenge the morality, wisdom and necessity of those actions and, if necessary, to attenuate their adverse consequences to the extent feasible. (Lefkowitz, Reference Lefkowitz2017, p. 392)
What does Mumby’s critique propose be done? (Absolutely nothing)
After reading the critique of neoliberal “raw capitalism,” I felt as if I had been successfully recruited by a social movement to challenge these flagrant evils. I was ready to enlist, but could find no recruiting office or even slogans to follow, so I was disappointed.
When one encounters systemic injustice, exploitation, evil, what are the possible reactions one might have? It seems to me there are five facets, combinations of which may comprise any complex reaction:
1. Do nothing. One can deny and/or rationalize the injustice—perhaps viewing it as an inevitable cost of the personal or societal benefits/goods provided by the system (cf. “deliberate ignorance” and “system justification”). This may be potentiated by a sense of powerlessness or fear due to one’s societal or organizational position.
2. Rail against it. Vent one’s moral outrage and frustration—internally or publicly.
3. Study it. One can adopt an objective scientific attitude to study the injustice while not considering any normative judgments about it.
4. Attack it. Try to ameliorate the injustice from the standpoint of an outside critic. For example, Nielsen (Reference Nielsen1989) describes a dozen strategies for individually “intervening against unethical organizational behavior” (p. 123).
5. Engage it. Try to ameliorate the injustice as a participant within the system. Nielsen (Reference Nielsen1989) advocates “leading an ethical change effort … through participation” (p. 126). However, a critical question (for I-O psychology) may be the extent to which one is changed by the system rather than vice versa.
If neoliberal (raw) capitalism is the injustice in question, how might one evaluate Mumby’s (Reference Mumby2019) expressed position on these facets? Certainly, the mere existence of the focal article earns a good (i.e., low) score on #1 (for not ignoring or denying the issues). It seems clear that high scores should be awarded for railing against (#2) and attempting to understand it (#3). My disappointment, noted above, stems from the absence of any suggestions as to what might be done to challenge and attenuate the injustices (virtually zero scores on #4 and #5).Footnote 3
In contrast, the field of I-O psychology does not have the luxury of inaction: as applied psychologists we do things—and that helps produce the conundrum referred to in the title. All psychologists are obliged to help improve the human condition (APA, 2003). I-O psychologists live up to that obligation (in part) by furthering the fortunes of business institutions that are responsible for providing a great deal of tangible and intangible societal goods. But that begs the question of the normative critique of I-O because those same institutions are complicit in the multitude of harms catalogued earlier.Footnote 4 It has long seemed clear that by and large we have not been living up to that societal/humanistic obligation—that our professional (scientist–practitioner) model reflects primarily corporatist values and should be supplanted by a scientist–practitioner–humanist model.
Conclusion: The conundrum of I-O psychology
In comparison with academic social science we do not just “study” organizations; we help them—which, based on business’s moral justification, is a positive. Yet, the moral price we pay for being useful and handsomely rewarded is our silence in the face of the indictments described and the co-optation of our humanist values. In other words, we help even those organizations who do not deserve it—or perhaps more accurately, we offer our unequivocal help to organizations even though they are almost all morally tainted to some degree. That is how we have adapted to functioning within the corporate version of the Jekyll and Hyde metaphor. How often have you heard an I-O psychologist assert that business organizations are sometimes (perhaps often) unhealthy, ego-dystonic places in which to work? If we (justifiably) take credit for our contributions to the societal goods attributed to those corporations, should we not also own up to some complicity in the harms they commit? In some instances, we are more actively culpable (regarding certain HR policies and decisions). More important, we should assume the role of actively challenging those decisions by engaging the system.