For those who hold dear, however naively, the idea that the proper application of constitutional law itself can create justice, Khiara Bridges's The Poverty of Privacy Rights is a devastating read. Traversing a wide swath of legal doctrine, political theory, and lived reality, Bridges presents and proves three interlocking theses. First, in the areas of family, informational, and reproductive privacy, she proves that, while privacy rights exist for those with economic privilege, poor mothers simply do not hold these rights. For poor women, “state intervention, coercion, and regulation” are the norm (205). Second, she proves that this lack of rights arises not from some failure of legal argument or jurisprudential misunderstanding but from society's moral judgment that poor women are not worthy of privacy rights. Judges and legislators, like society as a whole, do not view poor women as worthy of privacy, and the law follows those judgments. Finally and inexorably, Bridges proves that, as a result, it is not clever legal argumentation but instead only a profound cultural shift that will lead to poor women being viewed with dignity and therefore entitled to privacy. These arguments are elegantly presented, thoroughly documented, and persuasive, and there is no doubt that any future work in this area will have to begin by citing this book.

That Bridges's book breaks new ground is indisputable. This brief review, however, will focus on Bridges's decision to present her claim that poor women have no privacy rights in two forms, what she terms the moderate and the strong claim. While this decision is initially somewhat puzzling, it plays out brilliantly, as a kind of dialectic, which is likely to convince those initially drawn to her more moderate claim that, in the final analysis, the strong, and much more radical, claim offers the only coherent explanation of what she describes.

Bridges makes clear from the very beginning that she is presenting her central claim as to the lack of privacy rights in two forms. The moderate claim is, according to Bridges, rhetorical. According to that claim, “these mothers do in fact have rights; however, for all practical purposes, they lack them” (11). The strong claim, which Bridges describes as analytical, is different. It argues that “poor mothers actually do not possess privacy rights” (11). Bridges returns, again and again, to these two claims and posits that her readers can read her analysis of family, informational, and reproductive privacy in either way. At first one gets the impression that Bridges chooses to present two versions of her claim to widen her audience and create a broader consensus. It is as if she is saying, regardless of how you view the facts I present, you have to agree that poor mothers have no privacy. But as one reads on, it appears that Bridges has in fact set up a dialectic between the claims. This dialectic seems designed to persuade those inclined to subscribe to the moderate claim that in fact the strong claim, and its implications concerning both the pervasive, structural nature of the deprivation of poor women's rights and the need for a radical shift in culture, are the only ones supported by the facts. As she states, while “there is something pacifying about the moderate claim … the strong claim … might demand rebellion” (29).

Bridges's discussion of the insufficiency of what is known as the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is just one among many where this dialectic, with its insistence on exposing rights deprivations as deeply embedded in intersecting legal systems and in the structurally situated condition of poor mothers, is clear. The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions asserts that the government cannot impose a condition on the exercise of a constitutionally protected right that has the effect of depriving the individual of that right. In essence, the government cannot do indirectly what the Constitution forbids it from doing directly (68–69). That is true, unless of course the government has a very good reason to do so. In the area of public-benefits law, this doctrine seems ideal for combating eligibility rules that interfere with ostensible constitutional rights. So, for example, constitutional doctrine is clear that there are certain spaces, both physical and conceptual, into which the government may not intrude without an extraordinary justification. Under this doctrine, both the home and the decisions of parents about how to raise their children have long been viewed as nearly sacrosanct. Nevertheless, these rights, like all rights, can be overridden if the state has a compelling reason, which in these cases is often posited to be the interests of the children in the home. Despite this doctrine, poor women lose these cases almost without fail and without proof that they are more likely to be bad parents. The unconstitutional conditions doctrine might protect some rights holders, but it does not protect poor mothers. Through a detailed analysis of cases, Bridges proves that these losses can be traced to the deep assumption that poor women, unlike their nonpoor counterparts, are morally suspect as parents. The Court, like society, views these poor mothers as bad parents not deserving of privacy. Another logical explanation of the losses in these cases (and one perhaps consistent with the moderate claim) might be that these poor women simply waive their privacy rights in exchange for the benefit. A more vigorous application of unconstitutional-conditions reasoning might suggest that this is an unconstitutional bargain, but the law allows us to waive all kinds of rights. To take a familiar example, we all have rights to forbid the police from entering our homes absent a warrant or an emergency, but nothing stops us from allowing them in. Similarly a poor mother might be able, consistent with traditional constitutional law, to waive her right to privacy in exchange for the benefits. All this might support what Bridges labels the moderate claim—if only the legal reasoning were better, the women's privacy rights might be protected.

But the moderate claim falters as Bridges continues onto the more structural and contextual parts of her analysis. She demonstrates, for example, that if a poor mother refuses subsistence-level benefits, she will inevitably be subject to even more serious intrusions in the form of child-welfare investigation with its ever-present threat of child removal. So refusing the benefits does not protect her privacy. Instead it invites further incursions. Beyond this particular double bind, poor mothers, unlike their nonpoor counterparts, live in communities where state intrusion is the norm. Rates of child-welfare investigation and removal are far higher in those communities, and women, just like men, are subject to overpolicing. Bridges insists that one cannot separate the application of constitutional doctrine (which might be remedied through better legal reasoning) from the lived structural reality of poor women's lives. The moderate claim simply won't do. By the time a reader finishes the chapter on unconstitutional conditions it is clear, as it is in every subsequent chapter covering other doctrines, that the moderate claim, and constitutional law itself, is entirely insufficient. The privacy deprivation is so deeply embedded in the systems in which poor mothers live that far more radical cultural change is in order.

Ultimately, Bridges's compelling proof of the strong claim “offers a challenge. It challenges us to think about why we have been seduced by a narrative of equal rights when everyday lived reality suggests that nothing could be further from the truth.” It also “changes the political project. It incites us to analogize poor mothers to other historically disenfranchised groups. It inspires us to recall the techniques that those groups used to win the rights that they claimed the Constitution promised them. And it reminds us that these groups did not acquire the rights they desired by construing the Constitution in clever ways and encouraging the Court to do the same. Instead these groups were bestowed with rights because they agitated for social, cultural and political change” (29). As Bridges's dialectic ultimately proves, nothing less will do to address the profound injustices at the heart of this book.