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No Policy is an Island: Mitigating COVID-19 in View of Interaction Effects

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 July 2022

Jan-Philip Elm
Affiliation:
Institute of Law & Economics, University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany
Roee Sarel
Affiliation:
Institute of Law & Economics, University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany
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Abstract

Why are COVID-19 mitigation strategies successful in reducing infections in some cases but not in others? Existing studies of individual policies tend to neglect the many interaction effects that arise when multiple policies are enacted simultaneously. Particularly, if a socially undesirable behavior has a close (and equally problematic) substitute, then a prohibition of that behavior will simply cause people to switch to the substitute, resulting in no effect on infections. However, joint policies that prohibit both the targeted behavior and the substitute will create a positive interaction effect, which closes the loophole. Respectively, behaviors that are complements (rather than substitutes) can be discouraged by prohibiting one behavior because this discourages complementary behaviors as well.

We provide a new argument for why COVID-19 policies can fail and why the evaluation of such policies may be incorrect: policies are effective only when they reduce infections as a general equilibrium, accounting not only for the targeted behavior but also for interaction effects.

We illustrate our arguments by applying insights from traditional and behavioral law and economics to several examples. Thereby, we highlight regulators’ challenge when facing interaction effects and factors such as social norms and time preferences.

Information

Type
Articles
Copyright
© 2022 The Author(s)
Figure 0

Table 1.Illustration of a simple choice between two options

Figure 1

Table 2.Illustration of choice between three options

Figure 2

Table 3.Illustration of choice: complementary policies

Figure 3

Table 4.Illustration of complementarity effect

Figure 4

Table 5.Illustration of effects with costs vs. benefits

Figure 5

Table 6.Illustration of choices in light of strong family ties

Figure 6

Table 7.Illustration of Choices in Summer vs. Winter

Figure 7

Figure 1Illustration of Back-to-Back LockdownsNote: This figure presents an illustration of payoffs in the example of back-to-back lockdowns. Rectangles represent a decision and circles represent a random process. The choices to Visit (V) and No Visit (N) are marked below the lines. The probability (p or 1-p) are marked above the lines. The last nodes are the payoffs, which account for the benefits of visiting and the respective fines.