The effect of the citizen initiative on public policy outcomes is an issue that is of considerable interest to political scientists. Some scholars have argued that the high cost of initiative campaigns renders the citizen initiative a tool that is primarily used by special interests and wealthy individuals to advance their own narrow policy objectives. These political scientists have provided journalistic accounts of the significant sums of money spent placing citizen initiatives on the ballot and running competitive campaigns (Broder Reference Broder2000). Indeed, empirical research finds that money plays a substantial role in the outcomes of initiative campaigns (Gerber Reference Gerber1999).
However, other political scientists maintain the initiative amplifies the voice of the general public and results in policy outcomes that are more consistent with public opinion. They argue that vote trading among legislators (Weingast and Marshall Reference Weingast and Marshall1988), the agenda control of legislative committees (Romer and Rosenthal Reference Romer and Rosenthal1978), and free rider problems involved with monitoring officeholders (Peltzman Reference Peltzman1984) can all result in policy outcomes that would fail to command majority support. Conversely, since an initiative needs to obtain support from a majority of voters in order to take effect, these scholars argue that successful initiatives result in policy outcomes that are more consistent with majority opinion.
A number of academic studies have used empirical data to examine the extent to which direct democracy affects public policy outcomes. There is considerable evidence that the initiative strengthens the linkage between citizen preferences and policy on polarizing social issues that are relatively easy for voters to understand. These include abortion (Bowler and Donovan Reference Bowler and Donovan2004), gay rights (Gerber and Hug Reference Gerber, Hug, Mendelsohn and Parkin2001), and the death penalty (Gerber Reference Gerber1999).
Conversely, there is less of a consensus about the effects of the initiative on state fiscal policy. Some studies have shown that the presence of the initiative process fails to result in more responsive policies on a range of fiscal policy issues (Lascher, Hagen, and Rochlin Reference Lascher, Hagen and Rochlin1996). However, a number of studies have shown that taxes and spending are lower in initiative states (Besley and Case Reference Besley and Case2003; Matsusaka Reference Matsusaka2004). John Matsusaka couples this analysis of fiscal outcomes with an analysis of survey data. He argues that, on balance, Americans would prefer marginally less taxes and fewer services and that the citizen initiative results in fiscal policy outcomes that more closely reflect these preferences (Reference Matsusaka2004).
However, based on Matsusaka's findings, it does not necessarily follow that the initiative is shifting fiscal policy in a direction consistent with public opinion. That is because Matsusaka does not detail which types of taxes are lower in initiative states. Hypothetically, if the presence of the initiative only reduced those taxes paid by the very wealthy, it would certainly not follow that the initiative was leading to policy outcomes favored by the general public. Instead, it would be reasonable to conclude that the initiative was giving high-income earners greater influence over fiscal policy.
As such, a more detailed analysis of state tax policy might lend additional insights to this debate about whether the initiative benefits wealthy interests or the general public. There are several reasons for this. First, surveys indicate that some taxes are consistently less popular than others. Second, people of different income groups possess differing preferences about both the overall size of government and the types of revenue instruments used to fund government. Finally, different types of taxes burden some groups more directly than others.
My analysis of both state tax policy and public opinion provide substantial evidence that the citizen initiative gives high-income earners and corporations more influence over state fiscal policy. The smaller size of government in initiative states is largely due to lower collections from both individual income taxes and corporate taxes. Interestingly, the results indicate that the initiative results in considerably larger reductions in top marginal income tax rates than bottom marginal income tax rates. This provides further evidence that the presence of the initiative benefits the wealthy.
Conversely, initiative and non-initiative states exhibited little difference in terms of either their sales tax rates or sales tax revenues. This is interesting because sales taxes are regressive. Additionally, surveys indicate that low-income earners are more likely than others to consider state sales taxes unfair. These results provide further evidence that the presence of the initiative results in fiscal policies that more closely reflect the preferences of the wealthy—and not those of low-income earners.
Now this research does not provide an explanation as to how high-income earners and businesses utilize the citizen initiative to advance their policy objectives. Since the initiative is rarely used to enact large tax cuts, it seems likely that the initiative is having an indirect effect. The threat of an initiative might render state legislators less likely to raise corporate taxes or top marginal income tax rates. Further analysis of the mechanism through which the citizen initiative affects state fiscal policy is a topic that will be explored in future research.
