In 1743, the parlement in Metz authorised a translation of the Hoshen Mishpat (essentially the laws of torts, finance and legal procedure) of the Shulchan Aruk (the sixteenth-century code of Jewish law compiled by Joseph Karo, which remains normative to this day) and had copies placed in French courts to aid in the adjudication of cases involving Jewish claimants. While this move clearly indicates that, despite strong exhortations by Jewish leaders against making use of non-Jewish courts to settle claims among the Jewish populace, Jews certainly did make use of such Gentile courts, it also points to a recognition of the unique structures, conceits, presuppositions and definitions – indeed the whole universe of meanings – of the Jews as somewhat different from their Gentile neighbours, and the need to bring these into account when adjudicating a civil dispute. After reading Didi Herman's An Unfortunate Coincidence: Jews, Jewishness and English Law, one realises this was no small matter.
Didi Herman's excellent book is not about the eighteenth century or France. It is about the understanding of Jews and Jewishness in English law in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The book is concerned with a certain ‘structure of feeling’ (to quote Raymond Williams, from his The Long Revolution (Reference Williams1961)) and with uncovering the attitudes of judges and the courts to Jews, and what this shows about their own notions of Englishness, of membership in the nation and the boundaries of the English collectivity. It is a brief but powerful book, telling us much, not only about English legal attitudes towards Jews, but towards minorities in general. Its relevance goes well beyond the relatively circumscribed field of those interested in English Jews and their place in society. In fact, the real import of this book is in the whole field of multicultural jurisprudence and legal attitudes towards cultural diversity. Even beyond this, it raises huge questions about our very use of categories and the cultural baggage, including the very particularistic cultural baggage, that clings to all categories, even those claiming universal, objective and neutral status.
Herman's choice of cases on which to base her argument is faultless. She does not take cases where the ‘Jewishness’ of the litigants was the main reason for their being in court, and there are few where a charge of antisemitism forms the basis of the proceedings. Indeed, as she points out, the only case based on the 1976 Race Relations Act that Jews won was brought against the Jewish Free School (JFS) in 2008. Many will recall this case, where the English court ruled against the school in its bid to reject a student (during a year when admissions were oversubscribed) due to the non-Orthodox conversion of the mother to Judaism. The court ruled this to be a case of racial discrimination, despite the fact that from the perspective of Jewish law and the school, race had nothing to do with the matter at hand. For the Jewish Free School, the case turned rather on the nature of the religious conversion of the mother and the refusal of Orthodox Jewish authorities to recognise non-Orthodox conversions.
Striking throughout the whole story told by Herman is the inability, or more likely unwillingness, of English legal decision-makers to countenance categories and ways of being in the world that are not their own. In their mind, Judaism consistently reduces to race, to something ‘in the blood’ which cannot be assimilated to Englishness and which is approached with a cultural obtuseness bordering on parody (if the results weren't often so tragic). Lady Hale's contention (in the JFS case) that the student was rejected ‘because of his mother's ethnic origins which were Italian and Roman Catholic’ (p. 161) betrays a cultural blindness to what being Jewish is for Jews that is truly hard to believe. Herman, I hasten to add, does not really believe it. She claims not ignorance or cultural blinders – but again and again invokes the categories of ‘racialism’ or ‘racialization’ and ‘orientalism’ as defining terms of the English legal discourse. Though most probably correct, this is not an explanation but a definition and does little to further our understanding of the ‘ambivalence’, the ‘unease and confusion’ (p. 25) that Herman finds at the core of English legal attitudes towards Jews and Jewishness.
Some of the most telling examples that Herman brings to make her point are in the field of trust law. To different extents, and at different lengths, Herman reviews more than half a dozen cases from the early 1900s through to the 1970s of disputed wills which had a clear clause stipulating that if a child (or sometimes a grandchild) married a non-Jew he or she would forfeit any interest or share in the will. Again and again the cases were ‘voided for uncertainty’. That is to say, the courts ruled that it was impossible to know what the intent of the testator was in terms of the definition of a non-Jewish spouse. In some cases the courts defined Jewish in racial terms, and then queried (rhetorically, ironically, in good conscience, in ignorance – this is the big question) what percentage of Jewish lineage the spouse would have to have in order to qualify as Jewish and so meet the demands of the testator. In other cases, the courts played with alternative definitions of Jewishness as racial or religious and again posed hypotheticals as to which were in the testator's mind. What is fascinating – if unexplained – is the increasing confusion, as the century wore on, as to how to understand Jewishness. Most revealing is Herman's comparison of the Jewish cases with Christian cases where, for example, membership in the Church of England was deemed necessary for progeny to inherit. In these and similar cases the court had no difficulty in deciding what constituted membership in the Church of England, simply making use of common sense and the reasoning of ‘an ordinary man using ordinary language’ (p. 63).
The question I was left with, on reading through these and other cases, was the reason or perhaps intent of the court's continual obtuseness. How does one interpret a court's description of a woman as someone ‘who failed to emerge from the ghetto in Krakau’ (p. 107), or of ‘little Polish Jews’ (p. 36), or indeed its refusal to recognise in any way the particular historical circumstances (say in the Europe of the 1930s and 1940s) of Jewish existence, or the Jewish people's understanding of who and what they are (a blankness that the courts have also betrayed − according to the examples that Herman has brought − when dealing with Sikh and Muslim litigants as well)? Is this simply racism or antisemitism? Or is it a hermeneutic problem of the inability to think outside of our own received categories, of having to be always already an insider in order to understand the emic categories of another culture and people? Or is it an even deeper problem – the problem of categories and notation tout court, that is, the ultimately impossible task of legally defining and notating the inevitably labile and fungible messiness of life as lived? I don't know the answer to these questions. I suspect that in some cases Didi Herman would say we are facing clearly antisemitic (what she terms racialist and orientalist) prejudices. In some cases, I am sure she would be correct. I am not certain, however, that this is true for all cases. Nor am I certain that the problem of prejudice and even antisemitism is not, sometimes, also an epistemological problem and not just a moral problem.
I would hope that much more comparative work can be done along the lines that Didi Herman has broached in this important work. I would look forward to further work of hers, in the hope that it would engage with some of these issues.
